Liquidity Coinsurance and Bank Capital

Banks can deal with their liquidity risk by holding liquid assets (self‐insurance), by participating in interbank markets (coinsurance), or by using flexible financing instruments, such as bank capital (risk sharing). We use a simple model to show that undiversifiable liquidity risk, that is, the liquidity risk that banks are unable to coinsure on interbank markets, represents an important risk factor affecting their capital structures. Banks facing higher undiversifiable liquidity risk hold more capital. We posit that, empirically, banks that are more exposed to undiversifiable liquidity risk are less active on interbank markets. Therefore, we test for the existence of a negative relationship between bank capital and interbank market activity and find support in a large sample of U.S. commercial banks.     

Examining the Relationships between Capital,Risk and Efficiency in European Banking

This paper analyses the relationship between capital, risk and efficiency for a large sample of European banks between 1992 and 2000. In contrast to the established US evidence we do not find a positive relationship between inefficiency and bank risk‐taking. Inefficient European banks appear to hold more capital and take on less risk. Empirical evidence is found showing the positive relationship between risk on the level of capital (and liquidity), possibly indicating regulators' preference for capital as a mean of restricting risk‐taking activities. We also find evidence that the financial strength of the corporate sector has a positive influence in reducing bank risk‐taking and capital levels. There are no major differences in the relationships between capital, risk and efficiency for commercial and savings banks although there are for co‐operative banks. In the case of co‐operative banks we do find that capital levels are inversely related to risks and we find that inefficient banks hold lower levels of capital. Some of these relationships also vary depending on whether banks are among the most or least efficient operators.     

Commitment, banks and markets

We examine how banks and financial markets interact with one another to provide liquidity to investors. The critical assumption is that financial markets are characterized by limited enforcement of contracts, and in the event of default only a fraction of borrowers’ assets can be seized. Limited enforcement reduces the fraction of assets that can be used as collateral and thus individuals subject to liquidity shocks face borrowing constraints. We show how banks endogenously overcome these borrowing constraints by pooling resources across several depositors, and increase the liquidity provided by financial markets.     

THE EFFECTS OF BANK CONSOLIDATION ON RISK CAPITAL ALLOCATION AND MARKET LIQUIDITY

We investigate the effects of financial market consolidation on the allocation of risk capital in a financial institution and the implications for market liquidity in dealership markets. An increase in financial market consolidation can increase liquidity in foreign exchange and government securities markets. We assume that financial institutions use risk‐management tools in the allocation of risk capital and that capital is determined at the firm level and allocated among separate business lines or divisions. The ability of market makers to supply liquidity is influenced by their risk‐bearing capacity, which is directly related to the amount of risk capital allocated to this activity.     

Bond market development and bank stability: Evidence from emerging markets

We investigate how bond market development shapes banks’ risk taking in terms of portfolio structure, liquidity risk, and overall bank risk. Exploiting a bank-level database of 26 emerging markets, we find that larger bond markets are associated with stronger bank liquidity positions, lower portfolio risk of banks, and higher overall stability of banks. The effect of bond market development on bank risk taking remains robust across different levels of bank size and capital sufficiency. Overall, we find new evidence of a complementary relationship between bond market development and bank soundness.     

Bank credit default swaps and deposit insurance around the world

We investigate the impact of deposit insurance schemes on banks' credit risk – a predictor of failure and a key element in the current financial crisis. Unlike most studies, which use balance sheet measurements of risk, we adopt a forward-looking and market-based measure of bank credit risk: the credit default swap (CDS) spread. We find that banks in countries with explicit deposit insurance systems have higher CDS spreads, supporting the “moral hazard” view. The results suggest that deposit insurance design features that lessen the adverse impact are risk-adjusted premium, coinsurance systems, government-established systems, “risk-minimizing” systems, and systems with dual-funding sources. Full coverage appears to stabilize bank risk only during the financial crisis period. More stringent bank regulation, such as capital adequacy regulation and independent supervision, could reduce the undesirable impact of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance seems to help stabilize volatile markets, as evidenced during the financial crisis and in countries with greater market volatility. In addition, we find that the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank credit risk is more pronounced for banks with low asset quality and low liquidity.     

Market Structure, Capital Regulation and Bank Risk Taking

This paper discusses the effect of capital regulation on the risk taking behavior of commercial banks. We first theoretically show that capital regulation works differently in different market structures of banking sectors. In lowly concentrated markets, capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking behavior because banks’ franchise values are low and banks have incentives to pursue risky strategies in order to increase their franchise values. If franchise values are high, on the other hand, the effect of capital regulation on bank risk taking is ambiguous. We then test the model predictions on a cross-country sample including 421 commercial banks from 61 countries. We find that capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking only in markets with a low degree of concentration. The results remain robust after accounting for financial sector development, legal system efficiency, and for other country and bank-specific characteristics.     

Banking Globalization and Monetary Transmission

Globalization of banking raises questions about banks’ liquidity management, their response to liquidity shocks, and the potential for international shock propagation. We conjecture that global banks manage liquidity on a global scale, actively using cross‐border internal funding in response to local shocks. Having global operations insulates banks from changes in monetary policy, while banks without global operations are more affected by monetary policy than previously found. We provide direct evidence that internal capital markets are active in global banks and contribute to the international propagation of shocks. This feature was at play during the financial crisis of 2007–2009.     

Bank Ownership and Lending: Does Bank Ownership Matter?

Using the Central and Eastern European (CEE) bank-level data covering 2004–12, this article examines the differences in foreign-owned banks’ loan growth and its determinants in comparison with privately-owned domestic banks. The results indicate the greatest differences in the context of bank capital and liquidity. Bank capital remains an important loan growth determinant only for domestic private banks during the non-crisis periods and bank liquidity is of greater importance to domestic private banks during the crisis periods. This highlights local regulatory authorities’ limited ability to harness loan growth and excessive risk-taking during the non-crisis periods and points at the benefits of multinational banking groups’ internal capital markets during the crisis periods.     

CAPITAL ADEQUACY AND THE VALUATION OF LARGE COMMERCIAL BANKING ORGANIZATIONS

Bankers argue that regulatory agencies require excessive capital adequacy. As a consequence, banks cannot achieve optimal capital structure. This study investigates the capital adequacy issue for bank holding companies over the 1974—1983 period, one of the most turbulent periods in recent banking history. During this time, capital is never excessive from the stockholders' viewpoint, and financial markets, on average, perceive capital levels as inadequate. Assuming the public wants no lower capital levels than shareholders, recent regulatory action to require higher capital ratios is a Pareto superior decision.     

Loan Sales and Relationship Banking

Firms raise money from banks and the bond market. Banks sell loans in a secondary market to recycle their funds or to trade on private information. Liquidity in the loan market depends on the relative likelihood of each motive for trade and affects firms' optimal financial structure. The endogenous degree of liquidity is not always socially optimal: There is excessive trade in highly rated names, and insufficient liquidity in riskier bonds. We provide testable implications for prices and quantities in primary and secondary loan markets, and bond markets. Further, we posit that risk-based capital requirements may be socially desirable.     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

TARP announcement,bank health,and borrowers’ credit risk

Theory suggests that unhealthy banks exhibit more pronounced flight-to-quality behavior during financial crises and, hence, the infusion of capital through unhealthy banks is less effective in relieving the liquidity shocks of vulnerable borrowers. We test these predictions by investigating how the financial health of leading US banks influenced their borrowers’ credit risk surrounding the announcement of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Changes in borrower credit risk, measured by credit default swap (CDS) spreads, should reflect the expected relief from liquidity shocks and other benefits of rescuing banks, such as maintaining the existing lending relationships. Consistent with the theory, prior to the TARP capital infusions, unhealthy banks’ borrowers with high leverage experienced a greater increase in their credit risk relative to similar healthy banks’ borrowers. Following the event, the CDS market anticipated less liquidity relief to these vulnerable unhealthy banks’ borrowers, but more liquidity relief to the vulnerable healthy banks’ borrowers.     

A Look Back at Merton Miller's “Financial Markets and Economic Growth”

The author begins by agreeing with Miller's characterization of the fragility of U.S. banks and of the shortcomings of the Asian model of bank finance‐driven growth. The article also expresses “emphatic agreement” with Miller's arguments that the protection of banks through deposit insurance, regulatory forbearance, and other forms of “bailout” have created costly moral‐hazard problems that encourage excessive risk‐taking. And the author endorses, at least in principle, Miller's main argument that the development of capital markets that do not require the direct involvement of banks should make economies if not less prone to financial crises, then at least more resilient in recovering from them. But having acknowledged the limitations of bank‐centered systems and the value of developing non‐bank alternatives for savers and corporate borrowers, the author goes on to point to the surprising durability of some banking systems outside the U.S.—notably Canada's, which has not experienced major problems since the 1830s. And even more important, the author views banks and capital markets not as “substitutes” for one another, but as mutually dependent “complements” whose interdependencies and interactions must be recognized by market participants and regulators alike.     

Funding liquidity and bank risk taking

This study examines the relationship between funding liquidity and bank risk taking. Using quarterly data for U.S. bank holding companies from 1986 to 2014, we find evidence that banks having lower funding liquidity risk as proxied by higher deposit ratios, take more risk. A reduction in banks’ funding liquidity risk increases bank risk as evidenced by higher risk-weighted assets, greater liquidity creation and lower Z-scores. However, our results show that bank size and capital buffers usually limit banks from taking more risk when they have lower funding liquidity risk. Moreover, during the Global Financial Crisis banks with lower funding liquidity risk took less risk. The findings of this study have implications for bank regulators advocating greater liquidity and capital requirements for banks under Basel III.     

宏观流动性过剩与商业银行流动性风险管理

流动性过剩是近年来全球宏观经济领域的一个显著特征。在此背景下,商业银行流动性管理遇到了新的挑战。商业银行资金来源更加依赖金融市场,市场上的任何风吹草动都会影响到商业银行的流动性,甚至出现从流动性过剩到流动性不足的突然转化。有效管理商业银行流动性需要各国中央银行、金融监管者以及商业银行经营者的共同努力。     

The International Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy Rates and QE: Credit Supply,Reach‐for‐Yield,and Real Effects

We identify the international credit channel by exploiting Mexican supervisory data sets and foreign monetary policy shocks in a country with a large presence of European and U.S. banks. A softening of foreign monetary policy expands credit supply of foreign banks (e.g., U.K. policy affects credit supply in Mexico via U.K. banks), inducing strong firm‐level real effects. Results support an international risk‐taking channel and spillovers of core countries’ monetary policies to emerging markets, both in the foreign monetary softening part (with higher credit and liquidity risk‐taking by foreign banks) and in the tightening part (with negative local firm‐level real effects).     

Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk‐Taking Channel: Evidence from the United States

We present evidence of a risk‐taking channel of monetary policy for the U.S. banking system. We use confidential data on banks’ internal ratings on loans to businesses over the period 1997 to 2011 from the Federal Reserve's Survey of Terms of Business Lending. We find that ex ante risk‐taking by banks (measured by the risk rating of new loans) is negatively associated with increases in short‐term interest rates. This relationship is more pronounced in regions that are less in sync with the nationwide business cycle, and less pronounced for banks with relatively low capital or during periods of financial distress.     

Liquidity creation and bank capital structure in China

This paper investigates the relationship between liquidity creation and bank capital structure in China. We test the so-called “financial fragility-crowding out” hypothesis and the “risk absorption” hypothesis on Chinese banks and find that bank capital is negatively related to liquidity creation, which supports the financial fragility-crowding out hypothesis. In contrast, we find that foreign banks in China have a weaker relationship between liquidity creation and bank capital, which is consistent with the risk absorption hypothesis and findings in prior studies.     

投资者理性预期、流动性约束与股价崩盘传染研究

“传染性”是股价崩盘三大基本特征之一,会加剧股价崩盘负面影响,甚至引发系统性金融风险,因此,本文重点关注股价崩盘传染机制研究。首先,本文基于两阶段理性预期均衡模型,提出股价崩盘传染两大假设,即投资者理性预期与流动性约束导致传染;其次,基于2000-2016年全球28个国家或地区资本市场数据,实证检验股价崩盘传染机制和传染渠道。研究显示:(1)投资者理性预期、流动性约束会导致股价崩盘发生传染;(2)股价崩盘事件会在资本市场关联国家或地区传染;(3)提高资本市场信息透明度、加强金融管制有助于降低受关联国家或地区股价崩盘传染。