“一带一路”下的中巴货币合作

我国是巴基斯坦第一大贸易伙伴、第一大进口来源国、第一大外商直接投资来源国和第三大出口目的地,巴基斯坦则是中国在全球最重要的工程承包市场之一和南亚最大的投资目的地。中巴经济走廊是“一带一路”倡议中的重大和先行项目,亟须以“资金融通”助力打通其他“四通”。     

Promise-based management: the essence of execution

Critical initiatives stall for a variety of reasons--employee disengagement, a lack of coordination between functions, complex organizational structures that obscure accountability, and so on. To overcome such obstacles, managers must fundamentally rethink how work gets done. Most of the challenges stem from broken or poorly crafted commitments. That's because every company is, at its heart, a dynamic network of promises made between employees and colleagues, customers, outsourcing partners, or other stakeholders. Executives can overcome many problems in the short-term and foster productive, reliable workforces for the long-term by practicing what the authors call "promise-based management," which involves cultivating and coordinating commitments in a systematic way. Good promises share five qualities: They are public, active, voluntary, explicit, and mission based. To develop and execute an effective promise, the "provider" and the "customer" in the deal should go through three phases of conversation. The first, achieving a meeting of minds, entails exploring the fundamental questions of coordinated effort: What do you mean? Do you understand what I mean? What should I do? What will you do? Who else should we talk to? In the next phase, making it happen, the provider executes on the promise. In the final phase, closing the loop, the customer publicly declares that the provider has either delivered the goods or failed to do so. Leaders must weave and manage their webs of promises with great care-encouraging iterative conversation and making sure commitments are fulfilled reliably. If they do, they can enhance coordination and cooperation among colleagues, build the organizational agility required to seize new business opportunities, and tap employees' entrepreneurial energies.     

Strategic execution in the presence of an uninformed arbitrageur

We consider a trader who aims to liquidate a large position in the presence of an arbitrageur who hopes to profit from the trader's activity. The arbitrageur is uncertain about the trader's position and learns from observed price fluctuations. This is a dynamic game with asymmetric information. We present an algorithm for computing perfect Bayesian equilibrium behavior and conduct numerical experiments. Our results demonstrate that the trader's strategy differs significantly from one that would be optimal in the absence of the arbitrageur. In particular, the trader must balance the conflicting desires of minimizing price impact and minimizing information that is signaled through trading. Accounting for information signaling and the presence of strategic adversaries can greatly reduce execution costs.     

NYSE execution costs: A case study of a leading bank

Using trade data obtained from a major bank and a measure of indirect execution costs based on the stock price when orders are placed, we investigate indirect costs and their relation to brokerage commissions. For all trades the mean brokerage commission is 6.5 cents per share, and the mean indirect execution cost is about 3.6 cents per share, or 0.1084% of the transactions amount. Contrary to the prediction of the price pressure hypothesis, indirect execution costs are lower for larger size trades. Further, higher indirect execution costs are not associated with lower brokerage commission.