On the Design of Contingent Capital with a Market Trigger

Contingent capital (CC), which aims to internalize the costs of too‐big‐to‐fail in the capital structure of large banks, has been under intense debate by policy makers and academics. We show that CC with a market trigger, in which direct stakeholders are unable to choose optimal conversion policies, does not lead to a unique competitive equilibrium unless value transfer at conversion is not expected ex ante. The “no value transfer” restriction precludes penalizing bank managers for taking excessive risk. Multiplicity or absence of equilibrium introduces the potential for price uncertainty, market manipulation, inefficient capital allocation, and frequent conversion errors.     

Earnings Management through Transaction Structuring: Contingent Convertible Debt and Diluted Earnings per Share

In this article we examine whether firms structure their convertible bond transactions to manage diluted earnings per share (EPS). We find that the likelihood of firms issuing contingent convertible bonds (COCOs), which are often excluded from diluted EPS calculations under Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) 128, is significantly associated with the reduction that would occur in diluted EPS if the bonds were traditionally structured. We also document that firms' use of EPS‐based compensation contracts significantly affects the likelihood of COCO issuance and find weak evidence that reputation costs, measured using earnings restatement data, play a role in the structuring decision. These results are robust to controlling for alternative motivations for issuing COCOs, including tax and dilution arguments. In addition, an examination of announcement returns reveals that investors view the net benefits and costs of COCOs as offsetting one another. Our results contribute to the literature on earnings management, diluted EPS, financial reporting costs, and financial innovation.     

中国政府债务可持续性和债务风险动态评估研究

债务杠杆率和债务可持续性是评估债务风险的两个重要指标。我国目前面临高政府债务杠杆率、高赤字率及经济下行压力。本文通过对债务杠杆率计算方法的分解以及对债务可持续性的分析发现:提高政府部门的投资效率将是降低当前政府部门债务杠杆的一个有效手段;当前国际所通用的债务上限标准并不适用于我国。本文还通过构建SVAR模型,进一步对我国债务情况进行了实证分析,发现财政赤字率和经济增长率的变化在当期对债务杠杆率产生的影响较小,其影响主要发生在其后的两到三年。针对这一分析结果,本文提出了相应的政策建议。     

财政风险与国债结构管理--从国债再融资角度的分析

国债风险是财政风险中的核心内容，控制风险的思路不能囿于国债总量的控制，还要注重国债结构管理所能发挥的作用。本文从国再融资资风险的角度，分析了国债结构管理在防范财政风险中的作用，并对我国国债现状进行了实证分析。最后，笔者提出，为降低我国财政风险，目前应该增加长期债券比例，形成一个均衡的债务期限。     

Hidden Overhang of Domestic Debt and Its Role in the This-Time-Is-Different Syndrome: An Empirical Contingent Liabilities Model

The recent studies in public finance literature open an exciting research area on hidden overhang of domestic public debt and creative accounting. In this study, I identify hidden public debts in Turkey. I then develop a dynamical model that takes as given the stock of contingent liabilities generated by lending/borrowing relationships among public entities and looks for the debt (in)tolerance of government to liquidate it in finite periods. Last, I introduce a general empirical methodology to analyze the role of overborrowing in the this-time-is-different syndrome and test model outcome against data for hidden debts in Turkey's postliberalization period (1989-2010).     

Monitoring and Controlling Bank Risk: Does Risky Debt Help?

We examine whether mandating banks to issue subordinated debt would enhance market monitoring and control risk taking. To evaluate whether subordinated debt enhances risk monitoring, we extract the credit‐spread curve for each banking firm in our sample and examine whether changes in credit spreads reflect changes in bank risk variables, after controlling for changes in market and liquidity variables. We do not find strong and consistent evidence that they do. To evaluate whether subordinated debt controls risk taking, we examine whether the first issue of subordinated debt changes the risk‐taking behavior of a bank. We find that it does not.     

Bank Competition,Risk, and Subordinated Debt

This paper studies a dynamic model of banking in which banks compete for insured deposits, issue subordinated debt, and invest in either a prudent or a gambling asset. The model allows banks to choose their level of risk after the interest rate on subordinated debt is contracted. We show that requiring banks to issue a small amount of subordinated debt can reduce their gambling incentives. Moreover, when equity capital is more expensive than subordinated debt, adding a subordinated debt requirement to a policy regime that only uses equity capital requirements is Pareto improving.

Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information

We test the implications of Flannery's (1986) and Diamond's (1991) models concerning the effects of risk and asymmetric information in determining debt maturity, and we examine the overall importance of informational asymmetries in debt maturity choices. We employ data on over 6,000 commercial loans from 53 large U.S. banks. Our results for low‐risk firms are consistent with the predictions of both theoretical models, but our findings for high‐risk firms conflict with the predictions of Diamond's model and with much of the empirical literature. Our findings also suggest a strong quantitative role for asymmetric information in explaining debt maturity.     

Multiple Credit Ratings, Cost of Debt and Self-Selection

Abstract:  In a world where firms pay for credit ratings and (because of regulatory requirements) where some investors must pay attention to the ratings of some specified set of raters, it may well be in the interests of a firm to seek a third 'optional' rating, beyond the standard 'mandatory' two ratings from Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The firm may get a better rating from the third major rater Fitch, which could save substantially on future debt issuance costs. In this paper I specify and estimate a structural self-selection model of the demand for optional credit ratings derived from their expected reduction effect on borrowing cost compared with the optional ratings' cost. Attention is focused on specifying the role of expected cost of debt savings in the derived demand for optional ratings; these are found to be empirically important determinants of the decision to request Fitch ratings.     

Mortgage Debt Overhang: Reduced Investment by Homeowners at Risk of Default

Homeowners at risk of default face a debt overhang that reduces their incentive to invest in their property: in expectation, some value created by investments in the property will go to the lender. This agency conflict affects housing investments. Homeowners at risk of default cut back substantially on home improvements and mortgage principal payments, even when they appear financially unconstrained. Meanwhile, they do not reduce spending on assets that they may retain in default, including home appliances, furniture, and vehicles. These findings highlight an important financial friction that has stifled housing investment since the Great Recession.     

政府负债风险控制：影响政府会计改革的重要因素

政府会计与政府负债风险控制有着密不可分的关系。政府负债风险控制目标实现的关键取决于政府会计所提供的政府负债信息的质量。本文从政府负债风险控制的角度,以政府会计提供政府负债风险控制所需信息为出发点,分析了政府负债风险控制对提供政府负债信息栽体的政府财务报告和决定政府负债信息质量的政府会计基础的影响。     

In-Substance Debt Defeasance,Risk and Cash Flow Matchings

This paper examines the application of US and Australian accounting standards to trust-based in-substance defeasance schemes. Existing accounting standards focus on bond maturity in order to reduce the risk of the trust not being able to meet its obligations at the due date. By contrast, this paper refers to recent developments in finance theory and argues that bond duration and convexity are the crucial factors. A worked example shows that the proposed method would substantially reduce the risk that the trust would not be able to meet its obligations, and could also assist auditors in judging whether a particular defeasance scheme complies with the relevant accounting standard. Transactions costs are incorporated into the analysis.     

Default Risk, Asset Pricing, and Debt Control

The pricing and control of firms’ debt has become a majorissue since Merton’s (1974) seminal article. Yet Mertonas well as other recent theories presume that the asset valueof the firm is independent of the debt of the firm. However,when using debt finance, firms may have to pay a premium foran idiosyncratic default risk and may face debt constraints.We demonstrate that firm-specific debt constraints and endogenousrisk premia, based on collateralized borrowing, affect the assetvalue of the firm and, in turn, the collateral value of thefirm. In order to explore the interdependence of debt financeand asset pricing of firms, we endogenize default premia andborrowing constraints in a production-based asset pricing model.In this context then the dynamic decision problem of maximizingthe present value of the firm faces an additional constraintgiving rise to the debt-dependent firm value. We solve for theasset value of the firm with debt finance by the use of numericaldynamic programming. This allows us to solve the debt controlproblem and to compute sustainable debt as well as the firm’sdebt value.     

On Equilibrium When Contingent Capital Has a Market Trigger: A Correction to Sundaresan and Wang Journal of Finance (2015)

This paper identifies an error in Sundaresan and Wang (2015, hereafter SW) that invalidates its Theorem 1. The paper develops a model of contingent capital (CC) with a stock price trigger that is consistent with SW's framework and yields closed‐form solutions for stock and CC prices. Yet, the model shows that unique stock price equilibria exist for a broader range of CC contractual terms than those required by SW. Specifically, when conversion terms benefit CC investors and penalize shareholders, a unique equilibrium can exist rather than the multiple equilibria stated in SW.     

化解我国地方政府债务风险的新思路

尽管我国法律法规对地方政府举债的限制比较严格,但地方政府规避法律规定举借债务的情况却非常普遍。近年来中央和各级地方政府不断采取措施,试图控制和缩减地方政府债务,但由于缺乏统一的债务管理机构和科学的管理办法,地方债务规模呈现出加速上升的趋势。因此,如何认识我国地方政府债务现状、成因,从而进一步加强地方政府债务管理是一个值得认真研究的重要课题。     

Capital Structure and Financial Risk: Evidence from Foreign Debt Use in East Asia

Using a data set of East Asian nonfinancial companies, we examine a firm's choice between local, foreign, and synthetic local currency (hedged foreign currency) debt. We find evidence of unique as well as common factors that determine each debt type's use, indicating the importance of examining debt at a disaggregated level. We exploit the Asian financial crisis as a natural experiment to investigate the role of debt type in firm performance. Surprisingly, we find that the use of synthetic local currency debt is associated with the biggest drop in market value, possibly due to currency derivative market illiquidity during the crisis.     

企业债务风险处置策略研究

本文总结近几年产能过剩行业企业债务风险的不同处置模式,分析了银行、政府、企业在企业债务风险爆发后的策略博弈行为,发现企业负债规模越大,负债结构越复杂,政府在企业重组(整)中应该发挥的主导作用就应该越强。管理者应该根据企业和市场状况及时选定合理的重组(整)模式,提高债务风险处置效率。     

高等院校债务风险管理研究

高校在依靠银行贷款缓解高校事业发展与资金短缺的矛盾、实现学校超常规发展的同时,面临着巨额本息支付的严峻债务风险,阻碍了高校可持续健康发展。文章通过对当前我国高等教育发展形势及高校面临的主要问题进行分析,提出了如何有效缓解高校还贷的巨大压力,保证高等教育健康、平稳、可持续发展的具体措施和办法。