Do auditors constrain intertemporal income shifting in private companies?*

This study investigates the association between private company auditing and intertemporal income shifting. Using a large reduction in the Finnish corporate tax rate as a strong incentive for income shifting and financial statement data coupled with proprietary information from the tax authorities, we analyse accruals and cost stickiness of small private companies. Our results reveal significant differences in accrual income shifting between audited and unaudited companies, but only among companies that on average could anticipate the tax reduction the most. Further, we find auditors to restrict sticky selling, general, and administrative cost behaviour that we hypothesise is associated with illegal actions. Additional tests expose a nontrivial number of incorrectly unaudited companies which are the ones mostly associated with income shifting. Taken together, our study highlights the effects of audit exemption and the importance of enforcement while also suggesting that the audit process is value adding for the tax authorities.     

Research horizons for public and private not‐for‐profit sector reporting: moving the bar in the right direction

The examination of public and private not‐for‐profit sector financial reporting has been a topic of interest on a cyclical basis in Australia over the last 30 years. Traditional topics have included examinations of the intended and unintended consequences of specific standards, the accountability value of financial reports, transaction neutrality, compliance with the accounting standards, and more recently, the prospective implications of new, differently focused reporting standards considering such issues as income measurement and outcomes reporting. With increased recent attention from standard setters and regulators, and greater data availability, the opportunities for undertaking impactful research in these and related areas are increasing. In this paper, we focus on research that has examined the following questions: (i) Which private and public NFPOs lodge financial reports and what is reported; (ii) Who are the users and what are their information needs? (iii) Which private and public NFPs should lodge financial reports and what should be included in them; and (iv) How should the accounting frameworks for NFP sector reporting be set? For each of these issues, we identify the research gaps and opportunities for further research.     

The impact of voluntary audit and governance characteristics on accounting errors in private companies

This paper examines the extent to which the audit and corporate governance characteristics of UK private companies are associated with defective accounting information. Despite the economic importance of private firms, relatively little is known about their financial reporting and governance characteristics. Using a large sample of UK private companies, we examine the effects of voluntary audit, board gender balance and financial expertise on the likelihood of errors occurring in published annual accounts. Our results indicate that audited accounts are approximately half as likely as unaudited accounts to contain errors. In addition to contributing to recent academic research in this field, our findings are likely to be of interest to policy makers, who are considering exempting more firms from mandatory audit. We also find that gender diversity among board members is positively associated with the accuracy of accounting information, though our primary measure of directors’ financial expertise has no significant effect.     

Determinants of voluntary audit and voluntary full accounts in micro- and non-micro small companies in the UK

This study investigates the link between the auditing and filing choices made by a sample of 592 small private companies, which includes 419 micro-companies. It examines decisions made in connection with the 2006 accounts following UK's adoption of the maximum EU size thresholds in 2004, and the impact of the proposed Directive on the annual accounts of micro-companies. The research extends the model of cost, management and agency factors associated with voluntary audit, and develops a complementary model for voluntary full accounts. The results show the benefits of placing full audited accounts on public record that outweigh the costs for a significant proportion of companies. In non-micro small companies, voluntary audit is determined by cost and agency factors, whereas in micro-companies it is driven by cost, management and agency factors. In both groups, the predictors of voluntary full accounts include management and agency factors, and choosing voluntary audit is one of the key factors. The study provides models that can be tested in other jurisdictions to provide evidence of the needs of micro-companies, and the discussion of the methodological challenges for small company researchers in the UK makes further contribution to the literature.     

Auditing private companies: what do we know?

The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the literature on what we currently know about the costs and benefits of auditing private company accounts. Our main conclusions are the following. First, there is much heterogeneity in factors driving audit demand in private companies and the value derived from the audit. Second, research provides support for improved financial reporting quality due to, and real economic benefits from, private company audits. Third, the cost–benefit analysis for private company audits is firm-specific and mandating the audit does not seem to be cost-effective and thus economically optimal for all private companies. Alternative services may better meet the needs of especially smaller private companies. Furthermore, mandating the audit is not necessarily an optimal solution since private companies with low demand for a high-quality audit are able to find an auditor that meets their requirements even under a mandatory regime. Hence, having a mandatory audit in place is no guarantee for universally high-quality audits and this seems most salient for private companies where auditors may be more prone to independence issues. We conclude by providing a number of directions for future research.     

An Analysis of Submissions on Proposed Regulations for Audit and Assurance in New Zealand

After numerous collapses of finance companies in New Zealand, and widespread losses by investors, self‐regulation of the auditing profession was no longer considered adequate or acceptable internationally. The New Zealand Government sought to restore public perceptions of audit quality and investor confidence in the financial markets with proposals to change existing accounting standards and audit and assurance requirements. The proposals included a review engagement for some entities, and imposing the force of law on auditing standards. We analyse the public submissions on the auditing and assurance aspects of these proposals. Many respondents object to the proposal, requiring small public sector and not‐for‐profit entities to obtain review engagements, and to give auditing standards the force of law.     

Effect of outsourcing public sector audits on cost‐efficiency

This study compares the cost‐efficiency of ‘in‐house’ and outsourced to private sector audit supplier arrangements to deliver financial audits in the public sector by examining audit cost‐efficiency within the context of the public sector arrangement at one state in Australia (Western Australia). The results for 178 public agencies show that outsourced audits are, in general, more costly than in‐house audits, but this result is conditional on the type and size of public agency. Specifically, outsourced audits are more costly than in‐house audits for small statutory authority audits, whereas for specialist audits (i.e. hospitals) and large and complex statutory authority audits, the in‐house supply is equally efficient as the outsourced service.     

Note on Self‐Selection of Auditors in the Municipal Sector*

The objective of this article is to revisit the literature on Big‐N audit fee premiums in the municipal setting using a methodology that controls for self‐selection bias. Because auditor choices can be predicted based on certain client characteristics, using standard one‐stage ordinary least squares regressions to draw inferences about the presence or absence of such a premium in the extant public‐sector audit fee studies may not be appropriate. Results indicate that, after controlling for a self‐selection bias, Big‐6 (non‐Big‐6) municipal clients on average pay a fee premium, compared to the case if they were to retain a non‐Big‐6 (Big‐6) auditor. Results continue to hold when we conduct further analyses on a subset of municipalities with access to both Big‐6 and non‐Big‐6 auditors in a local market defined by a 60‐km radius, rather than over a province‐wide audit market. The existence of non‐Big‐6 audit fee premiums has not been documented previously in the private‐ or public‐sector audit fee literature. We surmise that it may be caused by the dominance (79.4 percent) of non‐Big‐6 auditors in the Ontario municipal market, compared to most private‐sector audit markets where their market share generally does not exceed 20 percent. The strong market position of non‐Big‐6 firms in turn may have allowed these auditors to command a fee premium for the subset of municipalities that self‐selects to be audited by them. An implication from our study is that Ontario municipalities often choose to be audited by more costly auditors, even though they could have paid lower audit fees by switching to an alternative auditor type. These results do not support those reported by Chaney et al. (2004) , who find that U.K. private firms are audited by the least costly auditor type. The conflicting findings may be attributable to the fact that the Ontario municipal audit market is subject to regulation by not just the audit profession but also the Ontario government and that, unlike business corporations, municipalities receive funding from provincial governments to fulfil much of their financial requirements. Thus, municipal clients may be relatively more willing to accept higher audit fees provided their chosen auditor (or auditor type) matches their needs.     

Economic Nationalism in Mergers and Acquisitions

This paper studies government reactions to large corporate merger attempts in the European Union during 1997 to 2006 using hand‐collected data. We document widespread economic nationalism in which the government prefers that target companies remain domestically owned rather than foreign‐owned. This preference is stronger in times and countries with strong far‐right parties and weak governments. Nationalist government reactions have both direct and indirect economic impacts on mergers. In particular, these reactions not only affect the outcome of the mergers that they target but also deter foreign companies from bidding for other companies in that country in the future.     

Demand for and Assessment of Audit Quality in Private Companies

Financial statement audits are mandated in most countries, thus making it difficult to distinguish between auditing driven by private incentives versus that driven by regulation. Who would ask for an audit, and how would its quality be assessed in the absence of regulation? Many private companies in Canada get their financial statements audited even though the law does not require it. In this field study, we conduct interviews to discover reasons for demanding an audit, and criteria used to assess their quality. Our study reveals that both internal stakeholders (management, boards, and employees) as well as external stakeholders (customers, banks, and private equity firms) request audits. Users evaluate audit quality based on a variety of criteria such as the auditor's accounting expertise, the absence of errors, the fees involved, risk assessments offered, allocation of effort, internal control, and general business advice. Implications for audit regulations are discussed.     

An Assessment of the Impact of IFRS Adoption on Public Sector Audit Fees and Audit Effort – Some Evidence of the Transition Costs on Changes in Reporting Regimes

While many countries have adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for private sector enterprises, New Zealand (NZ), Australia and the United Kingdom adopted IFRS for all sectors, including the public sector. This approach is consistent with the concept of sector‐neutral accounting standards that gained wide acceptance in NZ and Australia in the early 1990s. Although a number of studies have assessed the impact of IFRS adoption in the private sector, and the public sector has provided some evidence as to the effects of IFRS adoption on financial statements, the costs of adopting IFRS have not been examined. One measure of cost is the change in audit fees in an IFRS reporting environment. The authors examine the impact of IFRS adoption in the NZ public sector on audit fees and audit effort. They obtained data regarding audit fees and audit effort in the NZ public sector and compared the pre‐adoption year with the first year of adoption for all segments. Their results indicate a substantial increase in audit fees and audit effort in the first year of IFRS adoption for all segments, with some variation across the segments. Two sectors, local authorities and energy companies, have had significant increases in audit fees and audit effort. These findings provide some empirical evidence regarding the cost of transition to IFRS and are of interest to researchers and regulators in countries that are currently considering transitioning to IFRS or IFRS‐based International Public Sector Accounting Standards standards in reporting for the public sector.     

The Impact of the FMA Guidelines on Non‐GAAP Earnings Disclosures

In 2012 the New Zealand Financial Markets Authority (FMA) introduced guidelines for the disclosure of non‐GAAP financial information. This study investigates the effect of those guidelines on New Zealand listed companies. The findings show that, despite not being mandatory, these guidelines are modifying corporate disclosure behaviour. Companies have improved the way in which they disclose non‐GAAP earnings information and there has been a reduction in the emphasis given to non‐GAAP earnings compared with the emphasis given to audited statutory profit. However, the study also highlights areas for improvement, including the depth of explanation of non‐GAAP earnings calculations and adjustments, and concern about multiple adjusted earnings figures to explain performance.     

Making company directors liable: a comparative analysis of wrongful trading in the United Kingdom and insolvent trading in Australia

The separate legal entity doctrine in corporate law means that directors are not generally liable for their company's liabilities. However, there have been actions taken by governments and courts to make directors liable in certain cases. This article examines and compares legislative provisions in the United Kingdom and Australia to make directors liable for the debts of their companies. These provisions, namely section 214 of the UK's Insolvency Act 1986 (wrongful trading) and section 588G of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (insolvent trading), had the same starting point, but now differ substantially, even though, arguably, they retain very similar objectives. The article investigates: the reasons for these differences; the criteria on which each of the provisions focus; and the ramifications for the different approaches. It also endeavours to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the respective approaches adopted in each country. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Financial reporting and information asymmetry: an empirical analysis of the SEC's information-supplying exemption for foreign companies

This paper examines empirically the effects of domicile and SEC registration and reporting requirements on information asymmetry. We compare the adverse-selection component of the relative bid–ask spread (our measure of information asymmetry) for three samples of Nasdaq NMS companies that trade in different home markets and are subject to different standards of disclosure: registered U.S. companies, registered non-Canadian foreign companies, and unregistered non-Canadian foreign companies covered by the information-supplying exemption of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. We find that the adverse-selection component is not significantly larger for the two foreign samples, and it is not reliably different for the registered and unregistered foreign samples. Therefore, we are unable to document that less stringent SEC registration and reporting requirements for foreign companies are associated with greater information asymmetry among investors for non-U.S. securities traded on Nasdaq.     

Compliance with pension‐related mandatory disclosures and debt financing

Using hand‐collected data on the level of pension‐related mandatory disclosures required by International Accounting Standard 19 Employee Benefits, we test whether compliance levels with these disclosures convey information that affects firms’ access to the public instead of the private debt market, as well as the cost of their new debt issues. We document a higher tendency to access the public debt market for firms with higher levels of pension‐related disclosure. Furthermore, we find that firms with higher levels of pension‐related disclosure enjoy a lower cost in terms of issuance of public debt, but not a lower cost for private debt issues. Thus, the benefits of disclosure in reducing information risk are only realisable when creditors rely heavily on financial statements in their decision making, due to the limited access to private information. Additional tests reveal that high compliance levels effectively mitigate the negative effect of pension deficits on the cost of public debt. These findings provide novel evidence in the extant literature on the role of mandatory (and, in particular, pension‐related) disclosures on firms’ debt financing. They also have important policy implications.     

What Happens During the Private Period?: Evidence from Public‐to‐Private Reverse LBOs

This study provides new evidence on the restructuring activities undertaken by public‐to‐private reverse leveraged buyouts (RLBOs) while owned by private equity firms. The authors' comprehensive sample of public‐to‐private LBOs that return to public ownership through IPOs enables them to observe changes in profitability, valuation, financial structure, operating structure, and cost structure from the time the firms go private through (and after) their emergence through (re‐) IPOs. With their exclusive focus on reverse LBOs involving public‐to‐private deals, the authors reach findings that contradict previous conclusions about RLBOs. At the time of the LBO, the target firms in reverse LBOs are more levered than their peers, pay higher dividends, and are more profitable than their peers. At the same time, however, they appear to have lower market valuations before the buyouts. During the private period, the target firms of reverse LBOs achieve significant increases in employee productivity, asset restructuring, and improved gross margins, while operating with substantially higher levels of debt financing, lower levels of cash and working capital, and greater concentration of equity ownership. After the companies return to public ownership through IPOs, such companies continue to operate with higher leverage and ownership concentration than their publicly traded peers while producing further increases in profitability, resulting in substantial increases in both enterprise and equity valuation. The authors' analysis also shows that higher debt levels from the buyout play an important role in increased enterprise values. The evidence suggests that possible undervaluation as well as expected efficiency gains from restructuring actions are the primary motives for such reverse LBOs.     

How Does Financial‐Reporting Regulation Affect Industry‐Wide Resource Allocation?

This paper examines the impact of mandatory reporting and auditing of firms’ financial statements on industry‐wide resource allocation. Using threshold‐induced variation in the share of mandated firms in a given industry, I document that reporting mandates facilitate ownership dispersion in capital markets and spur competition in product markets. I, however, do not find that reporting mandates unambiguously improve the efficiency of industry‐wide resource allocation. With respect to auditing mandates, I find only that they impose a fixed cost on firms, deterring smaller entrants.     

Private Interaction Between Firm Management and Sell‐Side Analysts

Although sell‐side analysts often privately interact with managers of publicly traded firms, the private nature of this contact has historically obscured direction examination. By examining a set of proprietary records compiled by a large‐cap NYSE‐traded firm, I offer insights into which analysts privately meet with management, when analysts privately interact with management, and why these interactions occur. I also compare private interaction to public interaction between analysts and managers on conference calls. The evidence suggests that private interaction with management is an important communication channel for analysts for reasons other than firm‐specific forecasting news.     

The effect of external audits of internal control over financial reporting on financial reporting for clients of Big 4, Second-tier,and small audit firms

The external audit of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) is a very expensive and contentious aspect of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). Larger public firms were first required to file a management report on and have an external audit of ICFR in 2004. Smaller public firms were first required to file a management report on ICFR in 2007 but are exempt from the audit requirement. Whereas most related prior research investigates the combined effect of management and auditor reports on financial reporting, this study examines the distinct effect of auditor reports on reporting quality. For companies audited by small auditors, we find evidence that financial reporting quality improves with an auditor report on ICFR. We find no evidence that auditor ICFR reports improve reporting quality for clients of Big 4 or Second-tier audit firms. Our study adds to the debate on the applicability of SOX Section 404 to smaller firms.     

Incentives for Non‐Disclosure by Corporate Groups

A regulatory approved deed of cross guarantee (the deed) was introduced into Australia in December 1991, relieving participating companies within a group from having to prepare, have audited, and file financial statements. We examine the characteristics of firms that obtain relief from filing (and therefore disclosing) separate financial statements of closed‐group companies by adopting the deed. This is the first attempt to analyse adoption using large‐scale archival data. The results support the survey evidence in Dean and Clarke (2005 ), thus providing triangulation on their work. In particular they support the view that the decision to adopt the deed is a function of strategic factors as well as accounting and auditing cost savings. Those strategic factors were not in focus when regulators first introduced a deed of indemnity in 1985, nor when the original indemnity was modified to become a deed of cross guarantee in 1991 or when it was further modified in 1998. Further, evidence is provided to test the conflicting ideas arising from the analytical literature and the mixed results in the empirical, voluntary disclosure literatures. That evidence suggests that non‐disclosure arises when firms are in a more competitive industry and, in particular, when there is ability to retain non‐disclosure at the consolidated level (i.e., where the number of segments is high). Other factors supporting non‐disclosure are leverage and the proportion of foreign operations (proxying for deed complexity). The proportion of outside directors (a proxy for legal liability) and the number of shares outstanding (a proxy for agency costs of equity) are not associated with the decision to adopt the deed.