The Incentive Effects of Inequality: An Experimental Investigation

The effect of inequality on economic growth and efficiency is often debated. Our study investigates a behavioral phenomenon through which inequality might have adverse effects on economic growth. In particular we investigate whether or not individuals exhibit a discouragement effect in the face of inequality that leads to lower work effort. If such an effect exists, it provides a mechanism for converting even idiosyncratic inequality into sustained inequality with adverse consequences for the individuals being affected by the inequality and the economy as a whole. We investigate this phenomenon using an economic experiment to allow us to cleanly vary the nature of inequality and to allow us to directly observe several characteristics of the workers. We find robust support for the existence of a discouragement effect lending credibility to the claims that such an effect would exist in external situations among workers confronted with disadvantageous inequality.     

Independence in Appearance and in Fact: An Experimental Investigation*

In this study, we use experimental markets to assess the effect of the Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) new independence rule on investors' perceptions of independence, investors' payoff distributions, and market prices. The new rule requires client firms to disclose in their annual proxy statements the amount of nonaudit fees paid to their auditors. The new disclosure is intended to inform investors of auditors' incentives to compromise their independence. Our experimental design is a 2 3 between‐subjects design, where we control the presence (unbiased reports) or absence of auditor independence in fact (biased reports). While independence in fact was not immediately observable to investors, we controlled for independence in appearance by varying the public disclosure of the extent of nonaudit services provided by the auditor to the client. In one market setting, investors were not given any information about whether the auditor provided such nonaudit services; in a second setting, investors were explicitly informed that the auditor did not provide any non‐audit services; and in a third setting, investors were told that the auditor provided nonaudit services that could be perceived to have an adverse effect on independence in fact. We found that disclosures of nonaudit services reduced the accuracy of investors' beliefs of auditors' independence in fact when independence in appearance was inconsistent with independence in fact. This then caused prices of assets to deviate more from their economic predictions (lower market efficiency) in the inconsistent settings relative to the no‐disclosure and consistent settings. Thus, disclosures of fees for nonaudit services could reduce the efficiency of capital markets if such disclosures result in investors forming inaccurate beliefs of auditor independence in fact ‐ that is, auditors appear independent but they are not independent in fact, or vice versa. The latter is the maintained position of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), which argued against the new rule. Further research is needed to assess the degree of correspondence between independence in fact and independence in appearance.     

教师在互动英语教学中的角色探析

教师在互动英语教学中应摆脱以往的束缚，与学生在课堂上互相配合，以达到提高学生英语能力的目的。在课堂上教师应该以规划者、指导者、总结者的身份出现，强调以学生为中心，教师采取一种合作、默契的态度。     

【学界视点】腐败何以持续：基于社会规范视角的实验研究

为什么在各种高强度、持续性惩罚之下,腐败现象依然存在？通过一个改进的贿赂博弈实验,文章将命令性规范与描述性规范引入到实验情境中,首次在实验室中系统考察了这两类社会规范对腐败行为的影响。实验结果显示,社会规范对腐败行为的影响表现为框架效应与从众效应两个方面：一方面,避免使用明确的“腐败”语言会消解框架效应抑制腐败的积极作用,显著增加腐败行为的发生率;另一方面,当腐败成为一种流行现象之后,消极的从众效应会进一步增强个体的腐败倾向,而若不腐败是当前的流行规范,积极的从众效应则会强化框架效应。来自第三方合宜性评价的结果表明,这两种效应的作用模式完全符合一般人的预期。我们认为,腐败行为的这种规范基础可能正是现实中不管反腐力度多大、腐败行为仍持续存在的重要原因之一。这意味着,反腐制度与政策的设计需要考虑腐败的社会性基础,在发挥社会规范积极作用的同时,减少其消极作用。     

Legal Penalties and Audit Quality: An Experimental Investigation*

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of legal penalties on audit quality under different legal regimes. We investigate whether audit quality is affected differentially due to the complexity inherent in legal regimes and the frequency of imposing legal penalties. Economic theory predicts that players adopt equilibrium strategies that reflect the expectation that a penalty will be incurred, but the actual occurrences of penalties, if consistent with this expectation, should not prompt an individual to modify his or her strategy. However, learning theory suggests that players' choices will be repeated in the future based on outcomes. We found that penalties triggered both increases and decreases in effort, and seemed to introduce a “shock” that increased the variability of effort. We also observed a “funnel” effect — that is. greater changes in effort closer to the imposition of penalties, and smaller changes as more periods go by without a penalty.     

An Experimental Investigation of Asset Pricing in Segmented Markets

This article reports the results of experimental asset markets in which participants trade two assets with distinct dividend claims. Some traders are able to transact in the markets for both assets, whereas others can trade in only one market. When some are restricted from transacting in one market, the ineligible asset that cannot be traded by all commands a super risk premium. Without this premium, unrestricted investors would not hold all the available shares of the ineligible asset. In addition, we find that although unrestricted traders have the opportunity to remove all risk, few take advantage of this hedging opportunity.     

Certainty of Punishment versus Severity of Punishment: An Experimental Investigation

Compliance with laws and regulations depends on the expected penalty facing violators. The expected penalty depends on both the probability of punishment and the severity of the punishment if caught. A key question in the economics of crime literature is whether increasing the probability of punishment is a more effective deterrent than increasing the severity of punishment. This article uses laboratory experiments to investigate this issue and finds that increasing the severity of punishment is a more effective deterrent than an equivalent increase in the probability of punishment. This result contrasts with the findings of the empirical crime literature.     

An Experimental Investigation of Moral Hazard in Costly Investments

Frequently, parties make sequential decisions regarding investments for which the probability of success or failure is dependent on the amount of total investment. This paper reports a series of experiments involving a costly investment game that is derived from the catalytic finance model of Morris and Shin (Global games: Theory and applications. In Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society, edited by M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen, and S. Turnovsky. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, pp. 56-114). The sequential nature of investments is such that the second investment could function as a complement to the initial investment or simply serve as a substitute to it, thereby creating moral hazard. The features of this game are similar to those of the ultimatum game. However, there are several key differences between the games that may account for the high frequency of materially self-interested behavior that we observe, particularly among second movers.     

An Experimental Investigation of Trust and Sequential Trade

The trust game has been widely studied in the laboratory and is often presented as a model of exchange with incomplete contracting. The standard presentation of the game differs in three potentially important ways from the naturally occurring transactions it represents: buyer‐seller framing, payoff privacy, and price setting. Two sets of experiments look at the combined effect of these three features while varying the order of moves, an aspect of the problem that previous research has found significantly affects the likelihood of a successful trade. In both cases high levels of trust and low levels of trustworthiness are observed. Further experimental investigation suggests that the framing effect generates the increased trust but that payoff privacy reduces trustworthiness.     

Motivating Truthful Subordinate Reporting: An Experimental Investigation in a Two-Subordinate Context*

Abstract. This experimental study tests the predicted effects of three performance-contingent pay schemes on subordinate misrepresentations: profit sharing, a single-subordinate truth-inducing scheme, and the Groves scheme. A contribution not found in prior experimental research is the introduction of the distinction between direct and indirect misrepresentations. The results show that, as predicted, the three schemes have different abilities to deter the two types of misrepresentations. The fewest direct and indirect misrepresentations occur under the Groves scheme and the most under the linear profit-sharing scheme. There is no significant difference between the single-subordinate truth-inducing scheme and the Groves scheme in the incidence of direct misrepresentations, but indirect misrepresentations are significantly more frequent under the former. Résumé. La présente étude expérimentale vise à tester certaines hypothèses relatives aux résultats de l'application de trois structures salariales liées au rendement sur les déclarations trompeuses des subordonnés: la participation linéaire aux bénéfices, une structure salariale individuelle favorisant la franchise et la structure Groves. Cette étude se démarque des etudes expérimentales antérieures en ce qu'elle introduit une distinction entre l'information trompeuse directe et indirecte. Les résultats révèlent que, conformément aux hypothèses, les trois structures salariales présentent des capacités différentes de décourager les deux formes de déclarations trompeuses. La structure Groves est celle qui occasionne le plus petit nombre de déclarations trompeuses directes et indirectes, tandis que la participation linéaire aux bénéfices est celle qui en occasionne le plus. Il n'existe pas de différence significative entre la structure salariale individuelle favorisant la franchise et la structure Groves en ce qui a trait à l'occurrence des déclarations trompeuses directes, mais les déclarations trompeuses indirectes sont beaucoup plus fréquentes dans le cas de la structure salariale individuelle.     

The Gender Gap in Economics Degrees: An Investigation of the Role Model and Quantitative Requirements Hypotheses

Using a panel of 159 institutions over 10 years, we investigate the role model effect of women faculty and quantitative requirements on the female proportion of undergraduate economics majors. We find no evidence that female faculty attract female students. Calculus, however, does matter. A one semester calculus requirement is associated with more female majors at institutions offering business degrees and liberal arts colleges. A second semester calculus requirement deters women from majoring in economics at Ph.D.–granting universities, but is associated with more female majors at liberal arts colleges. Econometrics requirements are unrelated to the gender gap in economics majors.     

An Experimental Investigation of Increased Professional Education Requirements*

Abstract. We experimentally investigate the effects of a mandatory increase in education on the market for professional labor services when several service qualities are assumed to exist. We show that when suppliers have insufficient incentives to offer high-quality services in a free market, an increase in mandatory education can improve the coordination of supplier decisions and increase efficiency. If suppliers voluntarily provide a sufficient quantity of high-quality services, an education constraint can have the opposite effect. In both instances, however, an increase in the mandatory level of education can be expected to reduce the price of high-quality services while increasing the price of lower service qualities. Résumé. Les auteurs ont procédé à une analyse expérimentale des conséquences qu'aurait une hausse imposée du niveau d'études sur le marché des services professionnels, si l'on suppose l'existence de plusieurs qualités de services. L'analyse démontre que lorsque les stimulants sont insuffisants pour inciter les fournisseurs à offrir des services professionnels de qualité supérieure dans un marché libre, une hausse imposée du niveau d'études peut améliorer la coordination des décisions des fournisseurs et augmenter l'efficience. Si toutefois les fournisseurs offrent de leur propre chef une quantité suffisante de services de qualité supérieure, le fait d'imposer un niveau d'études supérieur peut avoir l'effet contraire. Dans les deux cas, on peut s'attendre à ce qu'une hausse du niveau d'études obligatoire réduise le prix des services de qualité supérieure tout en augmentant le prix des services de qualité plus faible.     

Price and Volume Reactions to Public Information Releases: An Experimental Approach Incorporating Traders' Subjective Beliefs*

This paper examines how market prices, volume, and traders' dividend expectations respond to public information releases in laboratory markets for a long-lived financial asset. The objective is to study deviations from the symmetric information risk-neutral rational expectations (RE) benchmark, which predicts no trade in such settings. The results of a series of double-auction and call markets are reported in which traders manage a portfolio of cash and asset shares over 15 rounds of trading. A public signal regarding the value of the liquidating dividend is released every third round, and traders' subjective expectations of the liquidating dividend are elicited each round as cash-motivated forecasts. We find that, despite the public dividend signal, traders' dividend forecasts are heterogeneous. Forecasts and prices both underreact to the public signals, with prices under-reacting more than forecasts. In general, price changes are not closely associated with public signals, and there is greater excess price volatility in double auctions than in call markets. Forty-three percent of trades are inconsistent with the trader's forecasts, and inconsistent trades occur more frequently in the double-auction markets. On average, approximately 10 percent of the outstanding shares are traded in each round, and trading volume is increasing in the mean absolute forecast revision and decreasing in the contemporaneous dispersion in forecasts. These results suggest that differential processing of the public signal and/or speculative trading for short-term gain may help to explain why symmetric information RE predictions are often not supported in empirical and experimental settings. They also suggest that market reactions to public information releases may be influenced by market microstructure.     

APEC与WTO的互动性分析

以WTO取代GATT为标志,世界多边贸易体制得到空前的加强和完善,同时,以欧洲统一大市场为先导,以北美自由贸易区(NAFT)和亚太经合组织(APEC)为两翼,以加勒比联盟、南锥体共同市场、东盟自由贸易区、西非共同体等中小区域集团为后续,世界经济区域集团化也表现出了强劲的发展势头.     

An Experimental Investigation of Approaches to Audit Decision Making: An Evaluation Using Systems‐Mediated Mental Models*

The objective of this research is to articulate a decision‐making foundation for the systems audit approach. Under this audit approach, the auditor first gains an understanding of the auditee's economic environment, strategy, and business processes and then forms expectations about its performance and financial reporting. Proponents of this audit approach argue that decision making is enhanced because the knowledge of the system allows the auditor to focus on the most important risks. However, there has not been an explicit framework to explain how systems knowledge can enhance decision making. To provide such a framework, we combine mental model theory with general systems theory to produce a hypothesis we refer to as a systems‐mediated mental model hypothesis. We test this hypothesis using experimental economics methods. We find that (1) subjects make systematic errors under the setting without an organizing framework provided by the systems information, and (2) the presence of an organizing framework results in lower reporting errors. Importantly, the organizing framework significantly enhances decision making in the settings where the environment changed. Establishing a decision‐making foundation for systems audits can provide an important building block that, in part, can contribute to the development of a more effective and efficient audit technology ‐ an important objective now when audits are facing a credibility crisis.     

在构建和谐社会中应进一步发挥社会团体的作用

党的十六届四中垒会提出“把构建和谐社会摆在重要位置”。如何更新管理理念、改革和创新社会管理体制和方法、进一步发挥社会团体在构建社会主义和谐社会中的重要作用，是一个值得政府和社会重视的问题。     

中国经济“宏微观悖论”解读

本文从GDP计算体系和经济增加值（EVA）分析方法着眼，对近年来中国经济增长与企业微观绩效之间的关系进行了理论和实证性的分析。研究结果表明，我国宏观和微观经济之间并不存在本质性的背离，所谓“悖论”之说缘于比照对象不当，但它同时也反映了我国增长方式的一些问题：我国经济在总规模快速扩张的同时，政府投资和企业投资的收益率水平都有不同程度的下降，反映了我国经济粗放式增长的典型特征。在微观层面上，虽然随着企业规模扩大的同时资产收益率都在下降，但这此圻企业的EVA回报率基本趋势明显地在向好的方向发展，经济长期增长的微观基础有所加强，尤其是上市公司显示了较为优良的价值创造能力，为我国国民经济高速增长作出了重要贡献。寻求可持续的经济增长模式和激励机制，是未来中国政府应该关注的重点。     

An Experimental Investigation of the Effect of Cost Information and Feedback on Product Cost Decisions*

Abstract. In this paper we report the results of an experiment designed to investigate the potential benefits of more accurate costing systems. Subjects in our experiment participated in one of four single-person decision making settings, which varied in terms of the accuracy of costing systems (less accurate versus more accurate cost reports) and in the complexity of the economic environment (less heterogeneous versus more heterogeneous products). The costing systems provided imperfect reports that subjects could use to select forecasts of future product costs. Forecast accuracy determined the resulting payoffs for subjects. In addition to having the cost reports when making forecasts, subjects also observed the association between forecasts and actual profits for previous periods and the rank ordering of the products' relative usage of resources at each of the production processes. The results from our experiment indicate that subjects did not select forecasts based only on reported costs. Rather they updated forecasts using profit feedback and the supplemental rank information about the products' relative usage of resources. We found that profits decreased as the complexity of economic environment increased but increased with the accuracy of cost reports. The profits associated with less accurate costing systems, however, were not as low as we would have predicted had the subjects used the cost reports as their forecasts. In fact, using profit feedback, subjects were able to converge toward optimal profits even with imperfect cost information.     

An Experimental Investigation of Explanations for Outcome Effects on Appraisals of Capital-Budgeting Decisions*

Abstract. Studies investigating effects of outcomes on judgments and decisions have been increasing within the business/accounting research literatures. No study, however, has addressed the presence or absence of such effects in terms of potential explanations and the conditions affecting their viability. Three such explanations are the foci of the present study: cognitive reconstruction, self-enhancing motive, and an escalation-of-commitment analogue. The viability of these explanations was investigated experimentally in an accounting context in which subjects evaluated a capital-budgeting committee's funding priority decisions with or without project outcome information (five-year operating results). Experimental results fully support the cognitive reconstruction explanation for outcome effects on decision appraisals but provide only limited support for the self-enhancing motive and escalation-of-commitment explanations. Results of additional experimentation are presented, further supporting logic inherent in the hypothesis derived from the cognitive reconstruction explanation. The relationship of the present study to prior research and implications for future research and practice are discussed. Résumé. Les études portant sur l'analyse de l'incidence de l'issue d'une situation sur les jugements posés et les décisions prises par la suite se sont multipliées dans la recherche en gestion et en comptabilité. Aucun chercheur ne s'est pourtant penché sur la présence ou l'absence d'une telle incidence en s'interrogeant sur son explication potentielle et sur les facteurs qui influent sur sa viabilité. La présente étude s'articule autour de trois de ces explications: la reconstruction cognitive, la promotion personnelle et un équivalent de l'escalade de l'engagement. La viabilité de ces explications a été soumise à une étude expérimentale dans un contexte comptable dans lequel les sujets évaluaient les décisions d'un comité chargé du choix des investissements dans le cadre de l'établissement des priorités en matière d'affectation des fonds, avec ou sans information sur l'issue des projets (résultats d'exploitation de cinq ans). Les résultats de l'expérience confirment sans équivoque l'explication de la reconstruction cognitive relativement à l'incidence de l'issue des projets sur les évaluations décisionnelles, mais ils n'appuient que de façon mitigée les explications de la promotion personnelle et de l'escalade des engagements. Les auteurs exposent les résultats d'autres expériences, qui viennent étayer la logique sous-jacente à l'hypothèse fondée sur l'explication de la reconstruction cognitive. Ils analysent enfin la relation entre la présente étude et les travaux de recherche antérieurs de même que ses conséquences éventuelles sur la recherche et la profession.