Performance of Thinly Traded Assets: A Case in Real Estate

Thinly traded private assets do not fit into the traditional finance paradigm of a liquid and well‐functioning market where trading is continuous and instantaneous. Since private assets cannot be bought and sold easily, they bear liquidity risk. Classical finance theories cannot properly gauge the performance of illiquid private assets because they implicitly assume such illiquidity is trivial. This paper proposes an alternative performance metric for the illiquid private asset, which explicitly captures liquidity risk in a formal analysis. Applying the new performance metric, we are able to explain the decades‐old “real estate risk premium puzzle.”     

Private Equity Performance and Liquidity Risk

Private equity has traditionally been thought to provide diversification benefits. However, these benefits may be lower than anticipated as we find that private equity suffers from significant exposure to the same liquidity risk factor as public equity and other alternative asset classes. The unconditional liquidity risk premium is about 3% annually and, in a four‐factor model, the inclusion of this liquidity risk premium reduces alpha to zero. In addition, we provide evidence that the link between private equity returns and overall market liquidity occurs via a funding liquidity channel.     

ETF Premiums and Liquidity Segmentation

Exchange traded funds (ETFs) provide a means for investors to access assets indirectly that may be accessible at a high cost otherwise. I show that liquidity segmentation can explain the tendency for ETFs to trade at a premium to net asset value (NAV) as well as the life‐cycle pattern in premiums. ETFs with larger NAV tracking error standard deviations (TESDs) tend to trade at higher premiums and the liquidity benefits offered by foreign ETFs and fixed income ETFs are revealed to be the most valuable to investors. Further tests validate that TESD has the desirable properties of a liquidity segmentation measure.     

The liquidity of bank assets and banking stability

This paper shows that an increased liquidity of bank assets, paradoxically, increases banking instability and the externalities associated with banking failures. This is because even though higher asset liquidity directly benefits stability by encouraging banks to reduce the risks on their balance sheets and by facilitating the liquidation of assets in a crisis, it also makes crises less costly for banks. As a result, banks have an incentive to take on an amount of new risk that more than offsets the positive direct impact on stability.     

Short-selling constraints as cause for price distortions: An experimental study

In this paper we explore the influence of the possibility to short stocks and/or borrow money in laboratory markets. A key innovation of our study is that subjects can simultaneously trade two risky assets on two double-auction markets, allowing us to differentiate between assets with relatively high versus low capitalization. Divergence of opinions is created by providing each trader with noisy information on the intrinsic values of both assets. We find that when borrowing money or shorting stocks is restricted prices are systematically distorted. Specifically, stocks with high (low) capitalization are traded at lower (higher) prices than their fundamental value. Lifting the restrictions leads to more efficient prices and more liquidity, thereby also lowering volatility and bid-ask spreads.     

Liquidity risk management and credit supply in the financial crisis

Liquidity dried up during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Banks that relied more heavily on core deposit and equity capital financing, which are stable sources of financing, continued to lend relative to other banks. Banks that held more illiquid assets on their balance sheets, in contrast, increased asset liquidity and reduced lending. Off-balance sheet liquidity risk materialized on the balance sheet and constrained new credit origination as increased takedown demand displaced lending capacity. We conclude that efforts to manage the liquidity crisis by banks led to a decline in credit supply.     

Safe Assets as Commodity Money

This paper presents a model in which safe assets are systemic because they are the medium of exchange in risky assets. It connects the literature from banking and finance on safe assets to the monetary literature on alternative monetary systems involving commodity money, interest bearing money, and private money creation. Because safe assets have intrinsic value, changes in their supply lead to changes in market efficiency. Additionally, because safe assets are costly to produce, there is overproduction of safe assets relative to the social optimum. When the model is calibrated to plausible liquidity premiums the resulting inefficiencies are not large.     

Liquidity provision,interest rates,and unemployment

The effective liquidity supply of the economy—the weighted-sum of all assets that serve as media of exchange—matters for interest rates and unemployment. We formalize this idea by adding an over-the-counter market with collateralized trades to the Mortensen–Pissarides model. An increase in public liquidity through a higher supply of real government bonds raises the real interest rate, crowding out private liquidity and increasing unemployment. If unemployment is inefficiently high, keeping liquidity scarce can be socially optimal. A liquidity crisis affecting the acceptability of private assets as collateral widens the rate-of-return difference between private and public liquidity, also increasing unemployment.     

MUTUAL FUND TRADES: ASYMMETRIC LIQUIDITY PREFERENCES AND FUND PERFORMANCE

We investigate the role of the liquidity of stocks traded by mutual funds on the performance of funds experiencing substantial and sustained redemptions (outflows) or inflows. Accordingly, we identify 770 redeeming fund‐periods and 1,757 inflow fund‐periods and find a statistically significant relation between the liquidity of the stocks they trade and the quantity of the stock traded. Notably, when funds experience redemptions, those with low portfolio liquidity have an elevated preference for selling more‐liquid stocks. In the following period, such funds statistically and economically underperform funds that sell less‐liquid stocks. This is consistent with redemptions detrimentally affecting shareholders that remain in a fund.     

Liquidity Coinsurance and Bank Capital

Banks can deal with their liquidity risk by holding liquid assets (self‐insurance), by participating in interbank markets (coinsurance), or by using flexible financing instruments, such as bank capital (risk sharing). We use a simple model to show that undiversifiable liquidity risk, that is, the liquidity risk that banks are unable to coinsure on interbank markets, represents an important risk factor affecting their capital structures. Banks facing higher undiversifiable liquidity risk hold more capital. We posit that, empirically, banks that are more exposed to undiversifiable liquidity risk are less active on interbank markets. Therefore, we test for the existence of a negative relationship between bank capital and interbank market activity and find support in a large sample of U.S. commercial banks.     

Asymmetric information and liquidity constraints: A new test

Using a novel measure of the degree of information asymmetry across firms, this study shows that information-related financial market imperfections do matter for a firm’s access to external finance. Prior studies of the importance of liquidity constraints faced by nonfinancial firms have suffered from a glaring weakness. They have been based on a sample of publicly traded firms, omitting precisely those firms most likely to be liquidity constrained. Furthermore, they have tended to rely on indirect measures of the degree of information asymmetry, such as firm size. We overcome these limitations by focusing on the banking sector. Unlike the nonfinancial sector, the banking sector has balance sheet and income data available for all firms, whether or not they are publicly traded. This allows the use of a superior measure of the degree of information asymmetry across firms by distinguishing between publicly traded and non-publicly traded banks.     

Implications of a TAF program stigma for lenders: the case of publicly traded banks versus privately held banks

Term auction facility (TAF) was created during the financial crisis as a substitute for the Federal Reserve’s discount window, the lender of last resort. We hypothesize if TAF borrowing is viewed as a bailout then publicly traded banks would borrow relatively fewer TAF funds to avoid a bailout stigma. We find publicly traded banks did borrow less (as a percent of total assets) in the TAF program than privately held banks. Further, too-big-to-fail banks and investment banks borrowed relatively less than other publicly traded banks indicating greater levels of public scrutiny reduces borrowing under emergency government liquidity programs. We also find that publicly traded banks pledged lower quality and less liquid collateral than private banks when borrowing under the program. Our results suggest TAF provided more benefit to traditional privately held banks with strong balance sheets that were able to borrow relatively greater amounts in anticipation of either future liquidity needs as suggested by Ivashina and Scharfstein (J Financ Econ 97:319–338, 2010) or increased lending as found by Berger et al. (The Federal Reserve’s discount window and TAF programs: “pushing on a string?” Working paper, University of South Carolina, 2014).     

Optimal Hedging and Valuation of Nontraded Assets

This paper examines a number of valuation problems faced by an expected-utility-maximizing investor who, over a given time horizon, is constrained to hold an asset which cannot be replicated by dynamic trading and which therefore does not have a unique no-arbitrage price. We first derive the private valuation which the investor assigns to the nontradedasset in order to determine his optimal investment in the traded assets. We thereby show that, as part of this portfolio, the investor hedges the private valuation process of the nontraded asset, rather than its market price process. We also study the price at which the investor would be willing to sell the nontraded asset if he were subsequently prohibited from trading in it, as well as the amount the investor would be willing to pay to removethe trading restriction. All three values are shown to depend in an intuitive manner on the investor's risk aversion, the residual risk of the nontraded asset unhedged by the traded assets, the difference between the constrained holding and optimal unconstrained holding of the asset and the length of the time horizon over which the asset cannot be traded.     

Asset liquidity,corporate investment,and endogenous financing costs

We analyze how the liquidity of real and financial assets affects corporate investment. The trade-off between liquidation costs and underinvestment costs implies that low-liquidity firms exhibit negative investment sensitivities to liquid funds, whereas high-liquidity firms have positive sensitivities. If real assets are not divisible in liquidation, firms with high financial liquidity optimally avoid external financing and instead cut new investment. If real assets are divisible, firms use external financing, which implies a lower sensitivity. In addition, asset redeployability decreases the investment sensitivity. Our findings demonstrate that asset liquidity is an important determinant of corporate investment.     

Liquidity Crunch in the Interbank Market: Is it Credit or Liquidity Risk, or Both?

The interplay between liquidity and credit risks in the interbank market is analyzed. Banks are hit by idiosyncratic random liquidity shocks. The market may also be hit by bad news at a future date, implying the insolvency of some participants and creating a lemons problem; this may end up with a gridlock of the interbank market at that date. Anticipating such possible contingency, banks currently long of liquidity ask a liquidity premium for lending beyond a short maturity, as a compensation for the risk of being short of liquidity later and being forced to liquidate some illiquid assets. When such premium gets too high, banks currently short of liquidity prefer to borrow short term. The model is able to explain some stylized facts of the 2007–2009 liquidity crunch affecting the money market at the international level: (i) high spreads between interest rates at different maturities; (ii) “flight to overnight” in traded volumes; (iii) ineffectiveness of open market operations, leading the central banks to introduce some relevant innovations into their operational framework.     

The price of corporate liquidity: Acquisition discounts for unlisted targets

This paper documents average acquisition discounts for stand-alone private firms and subsidiaries of other firms (unlisted targets) of 15% to 30% relative to acquisition multiples for comparable publicly traded targets. My results are strongly consistent with the notion that sale prices for unlisted targets are affected by both the need for, and availability of, the liquidity provided by the buyer. Corporate parents are significantly liquidity-constrained prior to the sale of a subsidiary, particularly when the subsidiary is being sold for cash. Furthermore, acquisition discounts are significantly greater when debt capital is relatively more expensive to obtain, and when the parent firm has below-market stock returns in the 12 months prior to the sale.     

Price dispersion in OTC markets: A new measure of liquidity

In this paper, we model price dispersion effects in over-the-counter (OTC) markets to show that, in the presence of inventory risk for dealers and search costs for investors, traded prices may deviate from the expected market valuation of an asset. We interpret this deviation as a liquidity effect and develop a new liquidity measure quantifying the price dispersion in the context of the US corporate bond market. This market offers a unique opportunity to study liquidity effects since, from October 2004 onwards, all OTC transactions in this market have to be reported to a common database known as the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE). Furthermore, market-wide average price quotes are available from Markit Group Limited, a financial information provider. Thus, it is possible, for the first time, to directly observe deviations between transaction prices and the expected market valuation of securities. We quantify and analyze our new liquidity measure for this market and find significant price dispersion effects that cannot be simply captured by bid-ask spreads. We show that our new measure is indeed related to liquidity by regressing it on commonly-used liquidity proxies and find a strong relation between our proposed liquidity measure and bond characteristics, as well as trading activity variables. Furthermore, we evaluate the reliability of end-of-day marks that traders use to value their positions. Our evidence suggests that the price deviations from expected market valuations are significantly larger and more volatile than previously assumed. Overall, the results presented here improve our understanding of the drivers of liquidity and are important for many applications in OTC markets, in general.     

Determinants of idiosyncratic volatility: Evidence from the Indian stock market

This paper investigates whether firm-specific characteristics explain idiosyncratic volatility in the stocks of non-financial firms traded in the Indian stock market. It employs the linear time series five-factor model, augmented with a liquidity factor and the conditional EGARCH model, to extract yearly idiosyncratic volatility. We estimate a panel data regression to quantify the relationship between firm-specific characteristics and the volatility of individual securities. The results show that idiosyncratic volatility is significant in emerging markets such as India, and that cross-sectional return variations of firms are associated with firm-specific characteristics such as firm size, book-to-market ratio, momentum, liquidity, cash flow-to-price ratio, and returns on assets. We find that the idiosyncratic risk documented in this study is associated with smaller size of company, higher liquidity, low momentum, high book-to-market ratio, and low cash flow-to-price ratio. The findings suggest need to develop alternative tools to make investment decisions in emerging markets.     

Commitment, banks and markets

We examine how banks and financial markets interact with one another to provide liquidity to investors. The critical assumption is that financial markets are characterized by limited enforcement of contracts, and in the event of default only a fraction of borrowers’ assets can be seized. Limited enforcement reduces the fraction of assets that can be used as collateral and thus individuals subject to liquidity shocks face borrowing constraints. We show how banks endogenously overcome these borrowing constraints by pooling resources across several depositors, and increase the liquidity provided by financial markets.     

Bank liquidity,the maturity ladder,and regulation

We investigate the liquidity management of 62 Dutch banks between January 2004 and March 2010, when these banks were subject to a liquidity regulation that is very similar to Basel III’s Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). We find that most banks hold more liquid assets against their stock of liquid liabilities, such as demand deposits, than strictly required under the regulation. More solvent banks hold fewer liquid assets against their stock of liquid liabilities, suggesting an interaction between capital and liquidity buffers. However, this interaction turns out to be weaker during a crisis. Although not required, some banks consider cash flows scheduled beyond 1 month ahead when setting liquidity asset holdings, but they seldom look further ahead than 1 year.