PCAOB Inspections and the Differential Audit Quality Effect for Big 4 and Non–Big 4 US Auditors*

In this study, we investigate whether the increase in regulatory scrutiny epitomized by the initial PCAOB inspection impacted audit quality differentially for Big 4 and non–Big 4 auditors to better understand the consequences of PCAOB inspections for different audit firm types. Because of competing views on the effect of PCAOB inspections, the relation between PCAOB inspections and the audit quality differential between Big 4 and other auditors is an empirical issue. Empirically, we take the endogenous choice of auditor as a given and utilize a difference‐in‐differences specification that takes into account the staggered timing of the initial PCAOB inspection for different‐sized auditors in the United States. Our results suggest that the initial PCAOB inspection improved audit quality more for Big 4 auditors than for other annually inspected or triennially inspected non–Big 4 auditors. We also examine annually and triennially inspected non–Big 4 auditors separately, and find that the pre‐post Big 4/non–Big 4 differential audit quality effect is more pronounced for the triennially inspected non–Big 4 firms. In the larger context of the highly concentrated US audit market, our findings that PCAOB inspections accentuate the Big 4/non–Big 4 audit quality differential are of potential interest to public company audit clients contemplating an auditor change, investors interested in learning about the consequences of PCAOB inspections, regulators concerned about the Big 4 dominance of the US audit market, and academics investigating audit quality differences.     

Client Satisfaction and Big 6 Audit Fees*

This study examines whether client satisfaction can help explain cross-sectional variation in Big 6 audit fees paid by Fortune 1000 clients. After controlling for other factors related to audit fees (including audit quality attributes), client satisfaction with the audit team is positively associated with fees. It appears that a dimension of client satisfaction unrelated to audit quality attributes is the factor associated with an audit fee premium. This dimension of satisfaction may reflect other aspects of service quality not documented in the literature, or it may simply enable an auditor to earn economic rents through enhanced bargaining power. Client satisfaction with the audit firm does not appear to be priced in this segment of the audit market. The results are consistent with the view that a Big 6 audit is a service that is differentiable in the eyes of client management, and the results highlight the importance of the audit team composition in allowing a Big 6 audit firm to differentiate the audit product. Also, if auditors are earning local rents due to enhanced satisfaction levels, then a perfect competition model may not be appropriate for the audit services market.     

The Effect of Deadline Pressure on Pre‐Negotiation Positions: A Comparison of Auditors and Client Management

This study compares auditors' and chief financial officers' pre‐negotiation judgments and considers the potential differential impact the end of the audit (deadline pressure) has on each party. General negotiation literature suggests that individuals change their behaviors as deadline pressure increases (i.e., when there is less time in which to conduct a negotiation) in order to increase the probability of reaching an agreement. In an audit context, the end‐of‐engagement deadline is often based on regulatory filing deadlines (e.g., SEC filings for public companies), which are not determined by either negotiating party. The audit context is also unique in that there are asymmetric consequences for each party (the auditor and client management) for failing to reach an agreement and different negotiation tactics used by the two parties potentially leading to differing levels of concessions. We predict that auditors, who are in a stronger negotiation position, will generally concede less than client management when determining their pre‐negotiation position and will tend to use more contentious strategies. However, such contentious strategies require time. Thus, we expect, based on negotiation theory, that as deadline pressure increases, auditors' concessionary behavior will be more affected than that of client management. Consistent with expectations, results of our experiment suggest that CFOs concede more than auditors in general; however, auditors are more reactive to deadline pressure and increase concessions when faced with high deadline pressure, while CFOs do not. We also measure planned strategy use and find results to be consistent with theory: when deadline pressure is high, auditors are less likely to use contentious tactics, while CFOs' strategy choices are unaffected by deadline pressure. These results suggest that characteristics of the unique auditor–client negotiation environment, such as deadline pressures, have potentially differential effects on both parties due to the differing negotiation strategies employed by these parties.     

Accounting Restatements and External Financing Choices*

There is little research on how accounting information quality affects a firm’s external financing choices. In this paper, we use the occurrence of accounting restatements as a proxy for the reduced credibility of accounting information and investigate how restatements affect a firm’s external financing choices. We find that for firms that obtain external financing after restatements, they rely more on debt financing, especially private debt financing, and less on equity financing. The increase in debt financing is more pronounced for firms with more severe information problems and less pronounced for firms with prompt CEO or CFO turnover and auditor dismissal. Our evidence indicates that accounting information quality affects capital providers’ resource allocation and that debt holders help alleviate information problems after accounting restatements.     

Lenders’ Response to Peer and Customer Restatements

We investigate whether restatements announced by economically related firms influence the contract terms a borrower receives from lenders. A restatement by a major customer firm increases the loan spread of a borrower by 11 basis points, on average. The contagion effects of customer restatements are higher (45 basis points) when a borrower's switching costs are high. Restatements by peer firms in the same industry also increase a borrower's loan spread, and this increase occurs regardless of restatement severity. Moreover, the sensitivity of loan spread to peer restatements is significantly greater when the restating peer firms are also in the bank's lending portfolio, suggesting that a lender's personal experience with restatements in an industry makes it more attuned to the potential implications of these restatements for the borrowing firm. Finally, our results suggest that lenders utilize information from peer restatements to anticipate future restatements by the borrowing firm.     

Common Auditors and Private Bank Loans*

We show that when banks and borrowers share the same audit firm, borrowers receive lower interest rates, after controlling for potentially confounding director connectedness. The common auditor effect is observed only for opaque borrowers, and is greatest when the same audit engagement office audits the bank and borrower. A common auditor connection also matters more for longer‐tenured auditors, for geographically proximate borrowers, and when the syndicate involves fewer lenders. The effect does not hold for auditors recently sanctioned by the PCAOB. Finally, the interest rate discount is not the consequence of homophily or biased decision making, based on a comparison of postloan performance of firms with common auditor loans versus those with noncommon auditor loans.     

Improving Jurors' Evaluations of Auditors in Negligence Cases*

Prior research indicates that individuals acting as jurors experience outcome effects in audit negligence litigation. That is, jurors evaluate auditors more harshly in light of negative outcomes, even when audit quality is constant. I posit that outcome effects in this setting are caused by jurors using their negative affect (i.e., feelings) resulting from learning about negative audit outcomes as information relevant to auditor blameworthiness. I tested this hypothesis in an experiment in which I manipulated audit quality, outcome information, and provision of an attribution instruction. The attribution instruction was designed to discredit negative affect as a cue to auditor blameworthiness. Consistent with expectations, attribution participants' evaluations of auditors exhibited less reliance on outcome information and more reliance on audit quality information than did evaluations made by control participants. In fact, outcome effects were eliminated for attribution participants. Courts may be able to improve the quality of jurors' decisions in such cases by employing an attribution instruction.     

Auditors and deceptive financial statements: Assigning responsibility and blame*

Abstract. Public accountants (auditors) who do not prepare the financial statements of their clients are not directly responsible for them. However, if the statements are deceptive, then the question of their indirect responsibility arises. The various kinds of defenses that auditors might present for being excused from responsibility, and/or blame, are examined and evaluated. Relevant parts of the codes of ethics of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario (ICAO) and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants are compared on this basis. The ICAO Code is a better codification of auditors' obligations regarding deceptive financial statements. One implication of the analysis is that the issue of the independence of auditors is more complex than the codes suggest, and needs further clarification. Résumé. Les experts-comptables (vérificateurs) ne sont pas directement responsables des états financiers de leurs clients qu'ils ne préparent pas. Cependant, si les états financiers sont trompeurs, alors la question de leur responsabilité indirecte se pose. Les différentes sortes de défenses que les vérificateurs pourraient présenter pour ne pas être tenus responsables et/ou blâmés sont examinées et évaluées. Les parties pertinentes des codes de déontologie de l'Institut des comptables agréés de l'Ontario et de l'American Institute of Certified Public Accountants sont comparées sur cette base. Le code de déontologie de l'Institut des comptables agréés de l'Ontario est une meilleure codification des obligations du vérificateur en ce qui a trait aux états financiers trompeurs. Une implication de l'analyse, est que la notion de l'indépendance des vérificateurs est plus complexe que ne le suggèrent les codes et demande d'être clarifiée.     

Discontinuities and Earnings Management: Evidence from Restatements Related to Securities Litigation*

A heated debate exists as to whether discontinuities in earnings distributions are indicative of earnings management. While many studies attribute discontinuities in earnings distributions to earnings management, other studies argue that earnings discontinuities are artifacts of sample selection and research design. Overall, there is limited direct evidence of a connection between earnings discontinuities and earnings management. In this study, we provide direct evidence linking earnings management to earnings discontinuities for a sample of firms that settle securities class action lawsuits and restate earnings from the alleged GAAP violation period. We compare the distribution of restated (“unmanaged”) earnings to originally reported (“managed”) earnings. We find that discontinuities are not present in the distribution of analyst forecast errors and earnings changes using unmanaged earnings but are present using managed earnings. The discontinuity in the earnings level distribution is attenuated, but not eliminated, on an unmanaged basis. These shifts among our sample of firms are caused by earnings management and cannot be explained by sample selection or research design issues. Our findings are important because many studies use earnings discontinuities as a proxy for intentional earnings manipulations and we provide the first direct evidence of a link between these two phenomena.     

Auditors,Specialists, and Professional Jurisdiction in Audits of Fair Values

Auditors frequently use valuation specialists to help them evaluate fair values, but researchers and regulators know little about how auditors use these specialists. Based on interviews with 28 auditors and 14 valuation specialists, I develop a theoretical framework informed by expert systems and professional competition theories. The interviews suggest that institutional pressures in the fair value environment unevenly impact auditors and specialists, causing tension between auditors' needs for ontological security and jurisdictional claims. This tension leads to one-sided competition between auditors and specialists and incomplete acceptance of specialists' work. Auditors' competitive behaviors coupled with this incomplete acceptance result in a tendency to make specialists' work conform to auditors' views. Collectively, these findings suggest that auditors use specialists as an institutional mechanism to create comfort, but not insight. This study links expert systems and professional competition theories, and it provides critical insight into some assumptions underlying tenets of each theory. It also informs researchers, regulators, and practitioners interested in understanding and addressing problems related to the use of specialists.     

我国西北上市公司财务重述现状研究

以西北五省(陕西、甘肃、宁夏、青海、新疆)A股上市公司2007—2013七年间发生财务重述行为的上市公司为样本,系统研究了我国西北地区上市公司的财务重述现状。研究发现,我国西北五省上市公司的财务重述现状不容乐观,与发达地区北京上市公司相比,发生财务重述行为的上市公司数量更多,比重更大,频度更强,且行业分布极不均匀,在重述时进行重大前期会计差错更正、涉及重要财务指标的情况明显较多。最后,从外部监管机构、媒体监督、公司治理、投资者、会计师事务所等多个角度提出了提升西北上市公司信息披露质量的建议。     

Audit Hours and Unit Audit Price of Industry Specialist Auditors: Evidence from Korea

Higher audit fees associated with auditor industry specialization could represent higher unit price charged by industry specialist auditors (ISAs) or the provision of a greater quantity of audit services. This study exploits a field setting in Korea, where the disclosure of audit hours is required in company annual reports, and finds that ISAs charge significantly higher total audit fees but also expend significantly greater audit hours than non‐ISAs. When audit fees and hours are considered together, the unit audit price of ISAs is significantly lower than that of non‐ISAs. This indicates that higher total audit fees associated with ISAs are likely to be attributable to greater audit hours associated with ISAs. However, greater audit hours for ISAs may suggest higher audit quality or may simply indicate that the additional audit work performed by ISAs is conducted by relatively cheaper junior auditors. Our work provides an alternative explanation for the higher total audit fees documented in the previous studies.     

The Circumstances and Legal Consequences of Non‐GAAP Reporting: Evidence from Restatements*

Our study examines the circumstances of non‐GAAP financial reporting by 492 U.S. companies that announced restatements from 1995 to 1999. We focus on income statements to analyze the occurrence and resolution of litigation over restatements and explore the role of accounting items in bringing and resolving this litigation. We provide evidence on the pervasiveness of accounting misstatements, describe their nature, and show how, if at all, they affect litigation. We assess the nature of restatements by determining whether regular, recurring earnings from primary operations (core) or other components of earnings (noncore) are misstated, and we assess their pervasiveness by estimating the number of primary accounts misstated. In our sample, companies with core restatements have higher frequencies of intentional misstatements (fraud) and subsequent bankruptcy or delisting. Likewise, these companies have, on average, more material misstatements, more negative security price reactions to restatement announcements, and more negative security price changes over the six months preceding and following restatement announcements. However, controlling for these and other factors, we find a significant association between accounting items and litigation, whether occurrences or resolutions. Specifically, core restatements — driven primarily by misstatements of revenue, a component of core earnings — and more pervasive restatements each play a role, while misstatements of noncore earnings alone do not.