首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 34 毫秒
1.
Democratization and media freedom have been suggested as useful tools in the fight against political corruption, but so far their interplay in this fight has received scant attention. We present a game theoretic model which allows for varying quality of media freedom and democratic institutions. The model predicts, among others, that democratization and media freedom are complements in the fight against political corruption. We test our theoretical predictions using differences-in-differences estimations and panel data covering 129 countries from 1980 to 2007. We find evidence of causal effects of democratization and media freedom on corruption, and that the two are complements. Our main results hold after controlling for income, country fixed effects, and continent-specific time-varying shocks.  相似文献   

2.
This paper explores the role played by press regulation in selecting the information mass media deliver to voters. The focus is on whether press regulation can reduce political corruption and increase voters' welfare. By endogenizing the response of the voters to information from the media, we clarify under which circumstances regulation reduces or increases corruption. We show that punitive laws can reduce political corruption only if the moral hazard problem dominates adverse selection and the punishment is large enough to deter the publication of some well-founded scandals.  相似文献   

3.
This study uses a cross-country panel to examine the determinants of corruption, paying particular attention to political institutions that increase accountability. Even though the theoretical literature has stressed the importance of political institutions in determining corruption, the empirical literature is relatively scarce. Our results confirm the role of political institutions in determining the prevalence of corruption. Democracies, parliamentary systems, political stability, and freedom of press are all associated with lower corruption. Additionally, common results of the previous empirical literature, related to openness and legal tradition, do not hold once political variables are taken into account.  相似文献   

4.
This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and fixed capital investment in the setting of a corrupt country. Using different measures of corruption – registered cases of bribe taking and incidents of experienced corruption by the population – we find a negative relationship between investment and corruption. We then address the problem of endogeneity of corruption using an instrumental variables approach: when corruption is instrumented with freedom of the press and violations of journalists' rights, we find an even bigger negative effect. Disaggregating investment by ownership-type shows that only private investment is affected by corruption, but not investment made by state-owned companies. The negative effect is larger for companies with full or partial foreign ownership. Additionally, we look at the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI): similar to the investment in fixed capital, we find a negative relationship; however, its statistical significance varies across specifications with different data sources for FDI and different corruption measures.  相似文献   

5.
Studying a relatively under-researched aspect in economics, this paper examines the nexus between corruption and academic freedom. Our main hypothesis is that greater corruption undermines academic freedom and we test this hypothesis using data for 104 nations from 2012 to 2018. Our results support the main hypothesis, and this finding also generally holds across alternative aspects of academic freedom. Another contribution of this work lies in dissecting the direct and indirect (through corruption) effects of various drivers of academic freedom. Finally, additional insights are gained by considering different dimensions of academic freedom and how they are impacted by corruption.  相似文献   

6.
We consider a framework in which freedom of the media can alleviate barriers to trade, while in the absence of trustworthy market information, firms optimally withhold part of their export activity and opt for testing-the-waters strategies. We employ data on export flows among a large group of Western and Latin American countries combined with the Freedom House measure of press freedom to examine the main theoretical implication. In a standard set-up of gravity equations, we find evidence that the effects are partially conditional on the political institutions of the importing country: press freedom is strongly associated with trade with autocracies.  相似文献   

7.
The prediction that economic freedom is beneficial in reducing corruption has not been found to be universally robust in empirical studies. The present work reviews this relationship by using firms' data in a cross-country survey and argues that approaches using aggregated macro data have not been able to explain it appropriately. We model cross-country variations of the microfounded economic freedom–corruption relationship using multilevel models. Additionally, we analyse this relationship by disentangling the determinants for several components of economic freedom because not all areas affect corruption equally. The results show that the extent of the macro-effects on the measures of (micro)economic freedom for corruption, identified by the degree of economic development of a country, can explain why a lack of competition policies and government regulations may yield more corruption. Estimations for Africa and transition economy subsamples confirm our conjectures.  相似文献   

8.
Using a well‐known index of corruption, this paper examines the determinants of corruption for a large sample of countries. Specifically, the present study brings empirical evidence to bear on the question of whether economic freedom or political freedom serves as a deterrent to corrupt activity. In particular, does greater economic freedom or greater political freedom yield a more ‘clean’ society? Our results show that greater economic freedom seems to matter more in this regard. Examining different components of economic freedom, we find that not all these components are equally effective in reducing corruption. For instance, monetary policy seems to have a stronger influence on the level of corrupt activity in a country than fiscal policy. Robustness of these findings is checked and policy implications are discussed.  相似文献   

9.
This study investigated the effects of corruption and economic freedom on corporate leverage. We also evaluated how economic freedom shapes the effect of corruption on corporate leverage. Using a sample of Vietnamese firms covering a nine-year period from 2010 to 2018, we find evidence that increased control of corruption has a significant positive impact on firm leverage, whereas the opposite is true for economic freedom. This effect is robust to alternative measures of control of corruption as well as advanced estimation methods, such as firm-fixed effects and quantile regressions. Our results also reveal that the positive impact of corruption controls on corporate leverage is more pronounced for firms with high economic freedom. Econometrically, our findings indicate that firms with better control over corruption prefer debt financing, as demonstrated by their higher leverage ratio.  相似文献   

10.
We examine the determinants of corruption using recent cross-sectional data for nearly one hundred countries. While the causes of corruption have drawn economists' interest in recent years, our main contribution is to examine the corruption determinants throughout the conditional distribution of corruption across nations. Are there different causes of corruption in highly corrupt nations compared to the least corrupt countries? For instance, we examine whether greater democracy and more economic freedom consistently reduce corruption among the most and the least corrupt. Our results for the significant determinants support some findings in the literature, but also provide new conclusions. In many cases, quantile regression estimates are quite different from those from OLS regressions. Among the most corrupt nations, larger governments and greater economic freedom do not appear to reduce corruption, but greater democracy seems to alleviate it. Our results suggest that some current corruption control policies may be reconsidered, especially among the most corrupt and least corrupt nations.  相似文献   

11.
We examine the determinants of corruption using recent cross-sectional data for nearly one hundred countries. While the causes of corruption have drawn economists' interest in recent years, our main contribution is to examine the corruption determinants throughout the conditional distribution of corruption across nations. Are there different causes of corruption in highly corrupt nations compared to the least corrupt countries? For instance, we examine whether greater democracy and more economic freedom consistently reduce corruption among the most and the least corrupt. Our results for the significant determinants support some findings in the literature, but also provide new conclusions. In many cases, quantile regression estimates are quite different from those from OLS regressions. Among the most corrupt nations, larger governments and greater economic freedom do not appear to reduce corruption, but greater democracy seems to alleviate it. Our results suggest that some current corruption control policies may be reconsidered, especially among the most corrupt and least corrupt nations.  相似文献   

12.
The eruption of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt was ensued by deterioration in FDI inflows. Whether a new Middle East free of corruption accompanying previous dictatorships will offset the negative ramifications of the uprisings and enhance FDI in the long run remains debatable. Since the evidence on the causal relationship between corruption and FDI is inconclusive, this study attempts to take another step. The paper investigates the link between corruption and FDI flows to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and assesses whether or not corruption has more importance than other FDI determinants. By employing several panel settings with various econometric specifications on 21 MENA countries over the period 2003 to 2009, it is demonstrated that FDI varies positively with corruption. Additionally, FDI in MENA was found to vary positively with per capita income, openness, freedom and security of investments and negatively with the tax and homicide rates. Since corruption was not found to hinder FDI inflows, treating corruption should be based on sound legal procedures that infringe neither on the rights, freedom and security of FDI nor on the degree of openness and freedom of the economy, which are the real stimulants of FDI in MENA.  相似文献   

13.
This paper examines the standard errors of two popular indices of corruption perceptions: the Worldwide Governance Indicators’ Control of Corruption (WGI-CC) and Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (TI-CPI). The standard errors of these indexes stem from the degree of variation across the sources upon which these two aggregate indices are based. In general, standard errors are not associated with country characteristics; this supports the common assumption that differences across surveys are random. There are two exceptions, however. They involve the degree of media freedom in a country and the country's past corruption scores, possibly indicating the use of cognitive heuristics by the assessors who do the ratings. No evidence exists that more diverse countries have greater variation across corruption scores. In comparing the two aggregate measures, we find that the standard errors for TI-CPI are associated with country characteristics in fewer cases than are those for WGI-CC. Finally, our findings raise concerns about the applicability of the WGI-CC's use of the unobserved components model for extracting signals from noise.  相似文献   

14.
This paper examines the effects of economic freedom, democracy and its interaction term on controlling corruption. Interactive results indicate that economic freedom and democracy significantly combat corruption. Economic freedom reduces corruption in any political environment. Democracy increases corruption when economic liberalization is low.  相似文献   

15.
In this paper we test directly for the restrictions implied by rational expectations and structural neutrality. The tests are direct in the sense that they employ theLucas output equation father than the approximations to it, which replace the lagged output term by lagged monetary shocks, commonly considered in the literature. The direct approach is considered preferable because it avoids these ad hoc approximations and saves significantly on degrees of freedom. The latter permits us to pursue a fully nested testing procedure, which was not possible in earlier work employing postwar U.K. annual data. The main result is that the rational expectations restrictions are not accepted.  相似文献   

16.
This paper aims to study the effects of exposure to corruption on all the aspects of political participation. Focusing on Italian municipalities in the period 1999–2014, we generate a daily and local measure of exposure to corruption, screening newspaper articles of the main Italian press agency. We concentrate on local elections and, in an event-study analysis, we find three main results. First, corruption exposure affects citizens' participation in election by reducing voter turnout. Second, corruption impacts on politicians’ participation: the number of candidates and electoral lists decreases after a scandal and candidates with political tenure are more likely to run. Finally, these changes affect local political outcomes as tenured politicians are more likely to be elected, while freshmen lose ground. These results suggest that exposure to corruption has general and negative effects on political participation, leading people to lose interest in politics.  相似文献   

17.
We model the relationship between bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) and the level of corruption in multinational firms’ (MCNs’) home and host countries. We construct and test a model of bilateral FDI between countries that differ in their levels of corruption. FDI is affected negatively both by the level of corruption in the host country and by differences in home- and host-country corruption. Our model emphasizes that MNCs develop skills for dealing with home-country corruption, and these skills become a competitive advantage in similarly corrupt host countries. We test the model using data on bilateral FDI stocks among a large number of home and host countries, using a variety of specifications and estimation strategies to provide robustness. Our results show that the effects of host-country corruption and of differences in corruption levels between home and host countries are statistically and economically significant.  相似文献   

18.
This paper studies how media and the quality of institutions affect government action taken before and after a natural disaster. Provided that more media activity is focused on post-disaster action, we show that more media activity and better democratic institutions both contribute positively to the palliative effort after the disaster, although corruption has a negative effect that decreases as media activity increases. On the preventive effort, however, media and democracy both have a negative effect, as does corruption. We provide empirical evidence based on major cholera epidemics and other natural disasters around the world, which largely support these hypotheses.  相似文献   

19.
LEGAL CORRUPTION     
We challenge the conventional definition of corruption through the analysis of legal forms of corruption, and by devoting special attention to influence induced by the private sector. This paper studies the determinants of the world pattern of legal and illegal corruption by proposing a simple theoretical model of endogenous corruption and related legal framework, and its thorough empirical test. Three types of equilibrium outcomes are identified: one based on illegal corruption, where the elite does not face any binding incentives to limit corruption; one centered around legal corruption, where the elite must incur a cost to legally protect corruption; and finally a no‐corruption outcome, where the population is able to effectively react to corruption. Testable implications from the model are derived based on country‐wide parameters. Crucially, we use a rich corporate survey, including 8,279 firms in 104 countries, tailored for this research, and featuring measures of legal corruption that are novel to the literature. The microdimension of the database enables improving on familiar shortcomings associated with the use of endogeneity‐prone, country‐wide indices of perceived corruption. The empirical results, making use of a broad range of proxies and sources, generally validate the model's explanations.  相似文献   

20.
Natural resources, democracy and corruption   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
We study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. Our game-theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor, but not otherwise. We use panel data covering the period 1980-2004 and 124 countries to test this theoretical prediction. Our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. Our main results hold when we control for the effects of income, time varying common shocks, regional fixed effects and various additional covariates. They are also robust across different samples, and to the use of various alternative measures of natural resources, democracy and corruption.  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号