The Effects of Compensation and Board Quality on Non-GAAP Disclosures in Europe

This study reports international evidence on the impact of compensation and board quality on the voluntary disclosure of non-GAAP earnings numbers. We find that compensation contracts of board directors that are linked to firm's market performance are associated with a higher probability of disclosure of non-GAAP figures in the earnings announcements' press release. Furthermore, when this type of compensation is used, firms tend to report non-GAAP figures in the title of the press release, make more adjustments for recurring items, and avoid reporting reconciliations. These reporting practices have been associated with opportunistic disclosure. We also show that an efficient governance structure of the board of directors can help restrain most of these discretionary disclosure decisions regarding non-GAAP reporting.     

Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosures on the Face of the Income Statement by UK Firms: The Effect on Market Liquidity

This study benefits by a special feature of the UK information environment which allows UK firms to disclose non-GAAP earnings on the face of the income statement to examine two interrelated questions. First, we ask whether the decision to disclose non-GAAP earnings on the face of the income statement is related to the firm's financial performance and corporate governance characteristics, and second, we investigate the effect of this disclosure decision on market liquidity. Using a dataset of 1227 hand-collected firm-year observations during the period 2006–2013, we show that better governed firms and firms with weaker financial performance are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings. Our evidence also suggests that this disclosure is associated with increased levels of market liquidity and the results hold after controlling for self-selection bias. We conclude that firms' decision to disclose non-GAAP earnings on the face of the income statement is more consistent with the incentive to provide information than to mislead the market.     

The Response of Commercial Banks to Compensation Reform

This study assesses changes in the executive compensation policy of 94 commercial banks following the SEC's expanded compensation disclosure rules and revisions in the Internal Revenue Code regarding deductibility of compensation expense. During the period from 1989–1997, commercial banks experience a significant decline in the number of insiders serving in executive compensation committees. Following compensation reform, banks seem to substitute non-cash for cash compensation, and exhibit a somewhat stronger pay-for-performance relationship. Further, board structures are statistically indistinguishable among banks that were acquired compared to surviving banks, and between banks and a sample of electric utilities. Taken together, our analysis suggests that compensation reform, rather than deregulation or corporate control, led commercial banks to change their governance structures and provides limited evidence that such changes enhanced the incentive effects of compensation contracts.     

The Impact of Disclosures of Internal Control Weaknesses and Remediations on Investors' Perceptions of Earnings Quality

We hypothesize and find that firms making SOX‐mandated disclosures of material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting (ICOFR) exhibit lower investor‐perceived earnings quality (IPEQ) than nondisclosers. We measure IPEQ using e‐loading, a market‐returns–based representation of earnings quality developed by Ecker, Francis, Kim, Olsson, and Schipper (2006). Firms do not exhibit decreases in IPEQ after initially disclosing material weaknesses. This is consistent with investors having anticipated ICOFR strength based on observable firm characteristics. However, firms exhibit increases in IPEQ after receiving their first clean audit reports that confirm the remediation of previously disclosed weaknesses. This indicates that, although investors do not find initial weakness disclosures to be incrementally informative, SOX motivates firms to remediate weak controls and provides a venue for credible remediation disclosures, thus enhancing investors' perception of financial reporting reliability. These findings are consistent with the existence of regulatory benefits associated with SOX's internal control disclosure and audit requirements.     

The Effects of Outside Directors and Board Shareholdings on the Relation Between Chief Executive Compensation and Firm Performance

Critics of corporate governance have suggested that improvements in board monitoring will arise from more independent boards consisting of outside directors and from increased stock ownership by directors. Presumably these changes should result in more rational, more defensible compensation decisions in which pay is clearly tied to results. In this paper, we test the premise that boards with a relatively higher proportion of outsiders and boards with significant shareholdings maintain a closer link between corporate performance and executive pay than do boards with fewer outsiders and boards holding little stock. The results of the study, based on a sample of 268 large corporations, are mixed. As expected, boards with significant shareholdings maintain a stronger linkage between compensation and firm-level performance. This finding persists even after controls are included for CEO and outsider shareholdings. Contrary to expectations, however, evidence was not found that firms with a higher proportion of outsiders on the board of directors relate compensation more strongly to firm results.     

The Information Content of Segment Disclosures: Australian Evidence

This paper investigates whether the voluntary decomposition of consolidated earnings disclosures into industry segments has information content in the sense that such disclosures better enable investors to predict earnings. The broad rationale underlying the experimental design is that if segment disclosure does enable investors to better predict earnings then residual abnormal returns (after controlling for unexpected earnings) surrounding the earnings announcements of firms providing segment disclosures should on average be significantly lower than a matched' group of firms that do not provide this type of disclosure. Using a short event window design, our results support this view.     

Financial Reporting Quality,Structural Problems and the Informativeness of Mandated Disclosures on Internal Controls

Even before firms report internal control weaknesses under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), they are characterized by structural problems, are prone to internal control weaknesses, and have low financial reporting quality. If the stock market incorporates much of this information during the pre‐disclosure years, investors are less surprised when firms subsequently report internal control weaknesses under SOX. We find that for the pre‐disclosure period, firms reporting internal control weaknesses under SOX, (1) had structural problems, (2) were prone to internal control problems, and (3) had low financial reporting quality. Further, we provide direct evidence that stock prices during pre‐disclosure years incorporate much of the information about structural problems, the likelihood of internal control weaknesses, and low reporting quality. Finally, we find that many of these value‐relevant factors are not related to announcement period returns when firms eventually disclose such problems under SOX and that limited new information about structural problems is generated around this date. Our results provide a compelling explanation for the muted stock price reaction around the mandatory disclosure date.     

Discussion of “How Banks' Value-at-Risk Disclosures Predict their Total and Priced Risk: Effects of Bank Technical Sophistication and Learning over Time”

Liu et al. (2004, this issue) show that technical sophistication and learning over time help improve the ability of bank trading portfolios' value-at-risk (VaR) disclosures to predict future trading income risk, and that trading VaRs predict bank-wide total risk and systematic risk. While the results suggest that VaRs are a reliable measure of risk for the sample firms, the study's incremental contribution is limited because of the nature of the sample firms and problems in variable measurement.     

财务报告质量评价观及信息披露监管

本文结合我国资本市场的现状和发展趋势 ,就我国如何看待和借鉴西方财务报告质量评价的用户需求观与投资者保护观进行探讨 ,认为准则制订机构和市场监管机构树立投资者保护观 ,对规范我国市场运作具有重要的现实意义 ,并就信息披露监管如何体现投资者保护观提出了政策建议。     

The Impact of Improvements in Institutional Oversight on IFRS Accrual Quality in Europe

This study examines the impact of improvements in institutional oversight specifically for compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards on accrual quality in Europe. The sample comprises 9339 firm‐year observations from a treatment sample of three European countries that had either non‐existent or relatively weak institutional oversight systems at the start of the sample period 2006–2010 but improved oversight systems thereafter, and a benchmark sample of six other European countries that had institutional oversight systems from the start of this sample period. After controlling for legal system, rule of law and other variables, we find incremental improvement in accrual quality in the treatment sample relative to the benchmark sample from the pre‐enforcement period 2006–2007 to the enforcement period 2008–2010. The results suggest that institutional oversight has an incrementally positive impact on accrual quality over and above that attributable to legal system, rule of law and other variables. The results are robust to different measures of accrual quality, alternative enforcement proxy and alternative samples.     

The Influence of Integrated Reporting on Business Model and Strategy Disclosures

Business model (BM) and strategy disclosures could provide investors with relevant information. This study offers a platform for future research on BM and strategy disclosure and is the first to analyse the change in BM and strategy disclosures after the introduction of an integrated reporting (IR) requirement, to propose a framework for disclosure quality analyses, and to analyse how companies disclose the relationship between their BM and strategy. The findings show that BMs and strategy were not disclosed before the requirement to publish an integrated report in South Africa, but were disclosed thereafter. By 2014, companies used diagrams, flow charts, and informative narratives of business plans and value chains. Companies now disclose their strategic goals more transparently, but still do not link these goals to BMs, key performance indicators, risks or opportunities. The findings provide insight into disclosures that improved since the IR requirement and matters that are still not fully disclosed, which would be of interest to regulators tasked with investor protection.     

Incentive Compensation and the Stock Price Response to Dividend Increase Announcements

Linking executive compensation to stock price performance is predicted to decrease the usual positive price response to dividend increases for two reasons. One, increasing pay‐performance sensitivity (PPS) exacerbates managers' optimistic bias regarding future firm performance, reducing the credibility of dividend signals. Two, increasing pay‐performance sensitivity reduces the need for dividends as a means of reducing agency costs. Consistent with behavioral and agency theories of corporate finance, we find that price response does decrease as pay‐performance sensitivity increases and that this effect is concentrated in firms with low market‐to‐book ratios. Additional findings are most consistent with the agency cost explanation.     

价值补偿评估方法探讨

编者按:由建设项目引起的对经济受损单位的价值补偿事项,涉及到有关各方的利益,也关系到建设项目是否能够顺利开展,其重要性不言而喻.本文作者根据实际案例,就价值补偿评估的基本思路及方法进行了探讨.     

The Effects of IFRS 7 Adoption on Bank Disclosure in Europe

With the endorsement of IFRS 7, which became effective in 2007, the European regulation of bank disclosures has substantially changed. Using a sample of 171 banks from 28 European countries, I analyze the effect of the standard's first-time adoption on disclosure quality. I find that disclosure quality has generally increased both in financial statements and in risk reports but that the focus of disclosures has shifted from market risk exposures to credit risk exposures. The effect of the first-time adoption strongly varies across countries. These variations can be explained by differences in the enforcement and interpretation of IFRS 7 by national banking supervision. Using supervisory practices in Denmark, Italy and the UK as representative examples, I distinguish between an interventionist and a non-interventionist approach. The findings suggest that it is not only the content of IFRS 7 but also the enforcement of the standard that accounts for the increase in disclosure quality. With respect to the enforcement of bank disclosures, the results therefore support recent proposals by the De Laroisière High Level Expert Group to harmonize financial supervision within the EU.     

Compensation and Board Structure: Evidence From the Insurance Industry

Monitoring by outside board members and incentive compensation provisions in executive pay packages are alternative mechanisms for controlling incentive problems between owners and managers. The control hypothesis suggests that if incentive conflicts vary materially, those firms with more outside directors also should implement a higher degree of pay‐for‐performance sensitivity. Our evidence is consistent with this control hypothesis. We document a relation between board structure and the extent to which executive compensation is tied to performance in mutuals: compensation changes are significantly more sensitive to changes in return on assets when the fraction of outsiders on the board is high.     

The Usefulness of Direct and Indirect Cash Flow Disclosures

We investigate the ability of disclosed operating cash flow and indirect accruals components to explain annual returns for a sample of Australian firms. Consistent with claims made by accounting standard setters, we find evidence of significant explanatory power for disclosed operating cash flow components beyond aggregate operating cash flows when they also have significant incremental predictive power for future (one year ahead) operating cash flows. Accrual components also have incremental explanatory power for returns. In addition, we find evidence of significant explanatory power for operating cash flow components beyond estimates of the components (based on other financial statement disclosures) for firms with large differences between disclosed and estimated components.