What Determined the Great Cap Rate Compression of 2000–2007, and the Dramatic Reversal During the 2008–2009 Financial Crisis?

In this paper we revisit the many studies that have attempted to explain the determinants of commercial real estate capitalization rates. We introduce two new innovations. First we are able to incorporate two macroeconomic factors that greatly impact cap rates besides treasury rates and local market fundamentals – the variables most commonly used in such research. These are the general corporate risk premium operating in the economy, and the growth rate of debt relative to GDP in the general economy (liquidity). The addition of these factors greatly adds to the ability of previous models to explain the secular fall of cap rates in the last decade and their recent rise – in terms of traditional measures of within-sample fit. Our second innovation is methodological; our analysis uses a large and robust quarterly panel data set of over 30 US metropolitan areas from 1980q1 through 2009q3. With this data we compare 3 models: a “base model” and then one that selectively adds each of our macro-economic variables. We test the ability of each of these models to fit the 2002–2009 period using “back test” dynamic forecasts. Our conclusion is that much of the secular decline in cap rates from 2000 through 2007 and their subsequent rise seem attributable to the macro-economic factors and less to movements in market fundamentals.     

The Impact of Foreign Banks on Monetary Policy Transmission During the Global Financial Crisis of 2008–2009: Evidence from Korea

This article examines the impact of foreign banks on the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the Korean economy during the period from 2000 to 2012, with a specific focus on the lending behavior of banks with different types of ownership. Using bank-level panel data of the banking system in Korea, we present consistent evidence on the buffering impact that the foreign banks, especially foreign bank branches including US bank branches, on the effectiveness of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Korea from the bank-lending channel perspective during the global financial crisis of 2008–2009.     

The Role of Ownership Concentration and Debt in Downturns: Evidence from Brazilian Firms During the 2008–9 Financial Crisis

This article aims to reconcile conflicting literature about the role of ownership concentration in the responsiveness of stock prices to macroeconomic shocks. We modified a previous theoretical model, adding leverage as a disciplining device. An important implication of our model is that only in deep crises ownership concentration plays a role in attenuating the effect of macroeconomic shock on firm value. We test this hypothesis using a sample of Brazilian firms during distinct phases of the 2008–9 crisis. Our empirical analyzes shows that only in the most critical part of the crisis, ownership concentration reduced the negative effects of the financial crisis.     

Fair Value Accounting and the Financial Crisis: Messenger or Contributor?*

This commentary discusses how fair value accounting (FVA) affects the nature of financial reporting, especially for financial institutions that were deeply affected by the 2007‐9 financial crisis. Toward that end, I address four questions. First, I review FVA's role in financial reporting, emphasizing its development over time. While the commentary's focus is on the interface between financial instruments and FVA, its reach extends well beyond financial instruments. Thereafter, I discuss the measurement and valuation challenges that arise from the use of FVA in financial reporting. Then, I analyze the evidence, analytical and empirical, on the role that FVA may have played in the financial crisis of 2007‐9. Since, to some extent, the crisis is still unfolding, there is limited yet very insightful empirical evidence on this issue. The evidence does suggest that FVA, in combination with its use by regulators, may have severely undermined the financial condition of some institutions. The effect was amplified for institutions holding assets in markets that saw their liquidity dry up during the crisis. In other words, FVA may have amplified the crisis. Finally, I discuss some implications that we can draw from the crisis about the merits and risks underlying FVA. For instance, I conclude that, in a search for relevance, the use of FVA in financial reporting may accelerate its disconnection from a firm's business reality.     

The Global Financial Crisis and the European Single Market: The end of integration?

Using various versions of the Feldstein-Horioka (FH) coefficient, we measure the time-varying degree of capital mobility and economic integration in the European Union. Prior research shows high correlation between domestic investment and savings implying low capital mobility. This surprising result has led to subsequent research on the ‘Feldstein-Horioka puzzle’. Our empirical findings show that the puzzle is less puzzling with a coefficient of 0.52 in the period 1990–1995 in EU countries approaching its minimum value of 0.02 in the period 2003–2008. This clearly indicates that the FH coefficient is time-varying signalling a deepening of economic integration in the European Union. Yet, with the advent of the Global Financial Crisis the FH coefficient has increased to 0.26 underlining worrying signs of disintegration.     

The EONIA spread before and during the crisis of 2007–2009: The role of liquidity and credit risk

This paper provides an empirical assessment of the factors affecting the spread between the Euro Overnight Index Average (EONIA) and the main policy rate of the European Central Bank (ECB). Up until the period when Lehman Brothers collapsed in mid-September 2008, the spread was small and positive. After this point, the liquidity surplus that developed from the fixed rate full allotment tendering arrangement in refinancing operations drove the widening of EONIA spread (trading below the ECB policy rate), although other factors also played a significant role. This paper explains the drivers of spread across alternative non-crisis/crisis regimes. In addition, the paper examines how the EONIA spread reacts to shocks imposed on a range of liquidity and credit risk factors in alternative crisis/non-crisis regimes. The results have implications for factors that should be monitored closely across both regimes, and also the implications that this may have for steering an unsecured overnight rate in crisis times.     

The Federal Reserve and the 2007–2009 Financial Crisis: Treating a Virus with Antibiotics? Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market

The two main explanations for the crisis in the commercial paper (CP) market are credit concerns and liquidity issues. The CP market is not homogeneous in terms of credit quality, maturities and types of issues. We find that lower credit‐quality CP suffered more during the crisis. Additionally, we find little evidence that Federal Reserve (Fed) liquidity facilities reduced the impact of the crisis, but that when the Fed became a lender in the CP market, the crisis pressures were dramatically reduced. We conclude that the crisis in the money markets is related more to increases in credit risk. Liquidity is a secondary issue.     

The 2007–2009 financial crisis and bank opaqueness

Doubts about the accuracy with which outside investors can assess a banking firm’s value motivate many government interventions in the banking market. Although the available empirical evidence is somewhat mixed, the recent financial crisis has reinforced a common assessment that banks are unusually opaque. This paper examines bank equity’s trading characteristics during “normal” periods and two “crisis” periods between 1993 and 2009. We find only limited (mixed) evidence that banks are unusually opaque during normal periods. However, consistent with theory, crises raise the adverse selection costs of trading bank shares relative to those of nonbank control firms. A bank’s balance sheet composition significantly affects its equity opacity, but we cannot detect specific balance sheet categories that have robust effects.     

Multinational Banks and the Global Financial Crisis: Weathering the Perfect Storm?

We use data on the 48 largest multinational banking groups to compare the lending of their 199 foreign subsidiaries during the Great Recession with lending by a benchmark of 202 domestic banks. Contrary to earlier and more contained crises, parent banks were not a significant source of strength to their subsidiaries during 2008–09. When controlling for other bank characteristics, multinational bank subsidiaries had to slow down credit growth almost three times as fast as domestic banks. This was in particular the case for subsidiaries of banking groups that relied more on wholesale funding.     

The microstructure of fear,the Fama–French factors and the global financial crisis of 2007 and 2008

We analyze minute by minute equity price data from 1 August 2005 to 31 October 2008 to study the relationship between the three sources of systematic risk in Fama and French's (1993) model and the market's expectation of total risk as represented by the VIX (the “fear factor”). Our findings confirm the predicted relationship between the equity risk-premium and risk (Merton, 1980). We find that the size-premium is driven by investors who are flying-to-quality (Abel, 1988; Barsky, 1989). We also find that investors became increasingly sensitive to changes in the VIX during the global financial crisis.     

Causes of the great recession of 2007–2009: The financial crisis was the symptom not the disease!

Globalization has increasingly made it possible for labor in developing countries to augment labor in the developed world, without having to relocate, in ways not thought possible only a few decades ago. We argue that this large increase in the developed world’s effective labor supply, triggered by geo-political events and technological innovations, coupled with the inability of existing institutions in the US and developing nations themselves to cope with this shock, set the stage for the great recession. The financial crisis in the US was but the first acute symptom.     

IPO or SBO?: The Increasing Importance of Operational Performance for Private Equity Exits Following the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–08

The authors report the findings of their recent study of the role of portfolio company operating performance in determining the choice of exit options by private equity firms between initial public offerings (IPOs) and secondary buyouts (SBOs), and how that role may have changed since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2008. Virtually all studies of PE exits in all countries have found that portfolio companies that exit through IPOs tend to be larger and have higher operating returns than companies that exit through SBOs or sales to other companies. After examining the exits of PE portfolio companies based in Denmark and Sweden during the period 2003–2013, the authors report that, although general market conditions continue to be a major factor, operating performance and size have become even more important requirements for IPO exits since the crisis. And thus PE firms that fail to make operating improvements in their portfolio companies are likely to find their exit options limited.     

The Bigger the Better? Merger and Acquisition Performance of Financial Holding Corporations

This study investigates the performance of the merger and acquisition activities of 14 financial holding corporations (FHCs) in Taiwan before and after their establishment in 2002. We find weak evidence of improved performance of FHCs. The findings have implications for other reforming emerging countries in East Asia with similar economic structures and financial environment.     

Financial Supply Chain： An Innovating Research on the Loan Business Model of Commercial Banks in the Post Financial Crisis Era

本文通过扩展传统Shapley数值建模理论的基本假定,研究了金融供应链群态融资模式的产出绩效和风险结构,论证了合作主体收益分配的改进路径;基于正向边际和信息增益的假定,研究了中小企业边际竞争力提升的环境和条件,并由此得出了金融供应链这一新型融资模式的存续机制和运行原理;建立在供应链系统风险结构分解的基础上,本文首次定义了行业特征的产出离差和金融供应链系统的稳定系数,分别计量经济个体与组合生产的系统性风险;通过引入动态价值评估模式,论证了金融供应链在我国弱势信贷市场实践中的重要意义。