Big Six auditors and audit quality: The Korean evidence

This study investigates the association between discretionary accruals and Big Six and non-Big Six auditors, and the direction of auditor change. We hypothesize that there is no significant difference in discretionary accruals between Big Six and non-Big Six clients when there is low incentive for auditors to provide high-quality audits, as in Korea.Upon examination of the discretionary accruals of firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange from 1994 to 1998, we find there is no significant difference between the discretionary accruals of firms with Big Six and non-Big Six auditors. This holds true for firms that switch from non-Big Six to Big Six auditors and vice versa. These resources imply that there may be no difference in audit quality between Big Six and non-Big Six auditors in Korea. This is consistent with other studies in Korea, while inconsistent with the findings of previous studies on audit quality in other countries.     

Auditor choice and accruals patterns of cross-listed firms

We examine the association between auditor choice and the accruals patterns of Chinese listed firms that cross-list in Hong Kong. Our evidence suggests that the clients of Big 4 auditors report lower unsigned discretionary accruals relative to the clients of non-Big 4 auditors. Further, we find that cross-listed firms with non-Big 4 auditors are more likely to understate their earnings and experience larger reversals of accruals in the future than cross-listed firms with Big 4 auditors. These findings suggest that Big 4 auditors play a meaningful role in improving earnings quality for cross-listed firms, which helps to explain why cross-listed firms have higher earnings quality than their domestic counterparts, as documented in the previous literature.     

Independent and joint effects of audit partner tenure and non-audit fees on audit quality

We examine the individual and joint effects of auditors’ non-audit services (NAS)/abnormal NAS fees and length of audit partner tenure on audit quality. Our results raise questions about the ‘one size fits all’ approach imposed by the current audit partner rotation requirement in Australia as a result of (1) a learning differentiation that we observe between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors and (2) higher discretionary accruals associated with non-Big 4 auditors. We find abnormal NAS fees to have a positive association with both absolute and positive (income-increasing) values of discretionary accruals for firms with short audit partner tenure. NAS/abnormal NAS fees are also negatively associated with the issuance of going concern opinions to financially distressed firms when partner tenure is short. In terms of policy implications, regulators are able to gauge the efficacy of the CLERP 9 reforms which currently impose a five year mandatory audit partner rotation requirement.     

Client importance and audit partner independence

We use data from Taiwan where audit partners are required to sign audit reports to examine whether audit partners compromise their independence for economically important clients. Uniquely, we include both listed and unlisted clients in audit partners’ client portfolios and separately study these clients for Big N and non-Big N auditors. We employ multiple proxies for auditor independence, including various abnormal accruals measures, the propensity of audit partners to issue modified audit opinions, and the probability that clients meet or just beat earnings targets. We fail to find evidence that Big N audit partners compromise their independence for economically important clients; however, we find such evidence for non-Big N auditors. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses. While our inferences are limited to the Taiwanese capital market, our study may be of interest to market participants and regulators in other well developed capital markets.     

Client importance and non-Big 5 auditors’ reporting decisions

In this paper, we examine the effect of the trade-off between economic dependence and reputation protection on the link between client size and the audit reporting decisions of non-Big 5 auditors. We find that non-Big 5 auditors, like Big 5 auditors, do not allow their larger clients greater leeway to manage earnings. In fact, there is some evidence that non-Big 5 auditors treat their larger clients more strictly. In addition, non-Big 5 auditors, like Big 5 auditors, are at least as likely to issue a going-concern report to their potentially financially distressed larger clients as they are to their otherwise smaller clients.     

Audit opinion and earnings management: Evidence from Greece

This study examines the relationship between audit opinions and earnings management, as measured by discretionary accruals, for listed firms on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). We divide the qualified audit opinions into two categories: qualified for the going-concern uncertainty and qualified for other reasons. The results indicate that audit opinions are not related to earnings management. Client financial characteristics, such as profitability and size are determinants of the going-concern audit opinion decision. The decision of auditors to issue qualified opinions for other reasons is explained by the type of audit opinion issued in the previous year.     

The endogenous relationship between audit-report type and business termination: evidence on private firms in a non-litigious environment

This study provides evidence on the relationship between audit-report type and subsequent business termination for private companies in a non-litigious environment. The results show that an endogenous relationship exists between bankruptcy and audit-report type, and between voluntary liquidation and audit-report type. A non-clean opinion is typically issued when firms face financial difficulties, which in turn become more severe after the receipt of a non-clean audit opinion. We find evidence that, even without a litigation deterrent in Belgium, financial performance has a similar impact on audit-report type as in litigious environments. We find that the self-fulfilling prophecy hypothesis holds for bankruptcy but not for voluntary liquidation. Our study also provides some evidence on audit reporting differences between Big 6 and non-Big 6 auditors in the Belgian audit market. When financial difficulties are obvious, as is the case when a company is about to go bankrupt, both Big 6 and non- Big 6 auditors are as competent and/or independent to assess and report going-concern problems. However, when financial difficulties are less apparent, as is the case for firms that voluntarily decide to liquidate, our results indicate that Big 6 auditors are more likely to issue a non-clean audit opinion than non-Big 6 auditors.     

Is there a relation between audit fee cuts during the global financial crisis and banks’ financial reporting quality?

As a result of the global financial crisis (GFC), several audit clients were able to negotiate lower audit fees for the years 2008 and 2009. However, the PCAOB has expressed concern that lower audit fees might lead to lower audit effort and lower audit quality and financial reporting quality. This study examines the relation between audit fee cuts and banks’ financial reporting quality. Specifically, we focus on earnings management via loan loss provisions (LLP), the relation between current period LLP and future loan charge-offs, i.e., LLP validity, and the timely recognition of loan losses. For banks audited by Big 4 auditors, we find that income-increasing abnormal LLP are decreasing in audit fee cuts and LLP validity is increasing in audit fee cuts. For banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors, LLP validity is higher for banks that received a fee cut of more than 25% relative to other banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors. We do not observe an association between timely loan loss recognition and cuts in audit fees except for banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors and exempt from internal control audits where a fee cut of more than 25% is associated with less timely loan loss recognition. Overall, the findings suggest that Big 4 auditors constrained earnings management via LLP in banks that received cuts in audit fees. Our findings have important implications for regulators, investors, and others.     

Client Importance and Audit Quality at the Individual Audit Partner,Office, and Firm Levels

We investigate whether audit partner level data provides a more powerful measure than office or firm level measures of client importance. We find that the likelihood of issuing a going-concern opinion (any and first-time) increases, and the absolute value of discretionary accruals decreases, in relation to the proportion of audit fees to the total audit fees received by audit partners from all their clients. We also find that the likelihood of issuing a going-concern opinion (any and first-time) increases, and the absolute value of discretionary accruals decreases, in relation to the proportion of non-audit services fees from a client to total non-audit service fees, and the proportion of total audit and non-audit service fees from a client to total fees from all their clients at the office and firm levels. Our findings provide evidence to regulators, audit clients, and stakeholders that audit partners do not succumb to pressure from economically more important clients as audit quality has a positive association with client importance.     

An investigation of recent changes in going concern reporting decisions among Big N and non-Big N auditors

Corporate accounting failures and regulatory proceedings that led to the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 increased the scrutiny of auditors. We investigate whether these events resulted in a change in auditor behavior with respect to going concern reporting. Generally speaking, we find that non-Big N auditors became more conservative while Big N auditors became more accurate. Specifically, non-Big N auditors issued more going concern opinions to both failing and non-failing clients post-2001, reducing their Type II misclassifications at the expense of increased Type I misclassifications. However, Big N auditors decreased their Type I misclassifications with no corresponding increase in Type II misclassifications. Thus, our findings suggest that increased auditor scrutiny resulted in performance improvements in the area of going concern reporting primarily for larger auditors. For smaller auditors, improved going concern accuracy for subsequently bankrupt clients came at the cost of more going concern opinions being issued to subsequently non-failing clients.     

Do the Big 4 and the Second-tier firms provide audits of similar quality?

In this paper, we examine audit quality for Big 4 and Second-tier auditors during 2003–2006. We utilize the auditor’s propensity to issue a going concern audit report for distressed clients as a measure of audit quality. In addition, since the purpose of an audit is to improve financial reporting quality, we utilize abnormal accruals as an observable proxy for audit quality. Further, we utilize the client- and year-specific ex ante equity risk premium as a proxy for audit quality as perceived by investors. We control for auditor self-selection bias using the matched-pairs sample approach discussed by Francis and Lennox (2008). We find weak evidence that the Big 4 have a higher propensity to issue going concern audit opinions for distressed companies. However, the level of performance-adjusted abnormal accruals for Big 4 and Second-tier audit firm clients appears to be similar. With respect to investor perceptions, we find the client-specific ex ante equity risk premium to be lower for Big 4 clients than for Second-tier audit firm clients. Overall, our findings suggest little difference in actual audit quality but a more pronounced difference in perceived audit quality. Collectively, the evidence we provide informs the current discourse on audit quality, auditor choice, and the viability of Second-tier auditors as an alternative to the Big 4.     

Was audit quality of Laventhol and Horwath poor?

Laventhol and Horwath (L&H), the then seventh largest accounting firm in the US, declared bankruptcy in November 1990. The firm claimed that its bankruptcy was due to the perception of it being a deep pocket rather than inherent deficiencies in its performance. In this study, we examine whether the audit quality of L&H was lower than other auditors. Results do not show that L&H is associated with lower quality audits either in terms of lower likelihood of issuing modified audit opinion, higher levels of discretionary accruals for its clients, or lower predictability of discretionary accruals for future non-discretionary net income for its clients than for clients of other auditors. Results of additional tests also do not suggest that auditors that take up clients of L&H report differently from L&H. This evidence does not support the proposition that L&H’s audit quality was less than audit quality of other audit firms during the period leading up to the bankruptcy.     

Effects of audit committee chair characteristics on auditor choice,audit fee and audit quality

We investigate whether the characteristics of audit committee (AC) chairs are associated with decisions about auditor choice, audit fees and audit quality. Using hand-collected Australian data, firms with AC chairs who have longer tenure and multiple AC memberships across several boards are found to be more likely to choose Big 4 and/or industry specialist auditors, pay higher audit fees and have lower discretionary accruals. Those AC chairs with higher business qualifications are more likely to hire a Big 4 auditor, pay higher audit fees and have lower discretionary accruals, while AC chairs with professional qualifications are more likely to hire a Big 4 and/or industry specialist auditor. In contrast, firms with AC chairs who are executive directors are less likely to hire a Big 4 auditor and have higher discretionary accruals. Our findings contribute to the literature by documenting that various characteristics of AC chairs are important for enhancement of auditor selection and audit quality.     

Determinants and consequences of voluntary switches to Chinese auditors in Hong Kong

Hong Kong market regulators have permitted 12 large Chinese accounting firms to audit the financial statements of Chinese firms that cross list in Hong Kong (i.e., H-share firms) since 2010. This paper examines the characteristics of H-share firms that voluntarily replaced their Hong Kong (HK) auditors with Chinese auditors, and the market reaction to auditor switches following this policy. We find that 38 out of 147 H-share firms voluntarily switched to Chinese auditors during 2011–2013. Switching firms are larger in size and are less likely to use Big4; they also have less need for external financing, a longer cross listing history, and a lower percentage of foreign revenue. We also find that investors negatively react to the auditor switches from HK non-Big4 to China non-Big4, but do not react to the auditor switches from HK Big4 to China Big4. This suggests that investors perceived lower audit quality for China non-Big4.     

Innate and discretionary accruals quality and corporate governance

This paper extends previous research on the association between corporate governance mechanisms and accruals quality. We derive measures of the discretionary and innate components of accruals quality and regress them against corporate governance characteristics. For discretionary accruals, we find use of a Big 4 audit firm and a larger audit committee as the primary governance mechanisms associated with higher accruals quality. For innate accruals quality, we find that higher quality is associated with an independent board of directors, a larger, more independent and more active audit committee, and use of a Big 4 audit firm. Our findings suggest a stronger relation between sound governance mechanisms and innate accruals quality than discretionary accruals quality.     

Auditor changes following big eight mergers with non-big eight audit firms

This paper examines the reaction of clients of “non-Big Eight” audit firms to mergers of their auditors with “Big Eight” firms. We postulate that a non-Big Eight audit firm's clients will retain a Big Eight acquirer following a merger if they benefit from the Big Eight firm's specialized services and/or reputation. Clients that do not have these economic incentives to retain the Big Eight firm are more likely to change to another non-Big Eight audit firm following the merger. Empirical tests of the characteristics of clients that remain with a Big Eight acquirer or change to another smaller auditor following an audit merger generally support our hypotheses.     

Subjectivity in fair-value estimates,audit quality,and informativeness of other comprehensive income

This study empirically examines whether difference in audit quality is reflected in the pricing of other comprehensive income (OCI). Specifically, we first investigate whether OCI measures of Big 4 clients are more value-relevant than those of non-Big 4 clients. Considering different degrees of subjective management judgment involved in the OCI reporting process, we then explore whether the differential valuation effect of OCI between Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients is more pronounced for more subjective OCI components (e.g., minimum pension liability and foreign currency-translation adjustment) than a less subjective component (e.g., marketable securities adjustment). We predict that the aggregate OCI of a Big 4 client is more value-relevant than that of a non-Big 4 client. We also hypothesize that the differential valuation effect between Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients can be attributed to the amount of subjective assumption and judgment required in estimating OCI. Consistent with our predictions, we find that aggregate OCI audited by a Big 4 auditor has incremental information content over earnings, compared to OCI audited by a non-Big 4 auditor. More interestingly, our results also show that the differential valuation effect between Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients is stronger for OCI components of a more subjective nature. Our results are robust even after controlling for self-selection bias, the potential effect of the financial crisis, and other related effects.     

Strategic pricing by Big 4 audit firms in private client segments

We examine how Big 4 auditors compete for new private clients. We find evidence suggesting that Big 4 auditors offer fee discounts to attract non‐Big 4 private clients to experience attributes of their brand name audit services. We also find that to attract clients from competing Big 4 suppliers, Big 4 auditors target fee discounts at clients in industries where they are the market leader. Our results further indicate that the Big 4 industry leaders target fee discounts to fast‐growing clients and are able to charge these clients significant price fee increases in the second mandate period (after 3 years).     

Does audit quality matter more for firms with high investment opportunities?

This paper examines the association of firms with high investment opportunities with high quality audits (proxied by Big 5 auditors) and whether that association results in a lower likelihood of earnings management. Firms with high investment opportunities may demand high quality audits for curbing earnings management. This is because they have more flexibility in the provision of discretionary accruals that arises from the attendant operating uncertainty which creates particular monitoring problems. Big 5 auditors will provide high quality audits that will constrain earnings management for firms with high investment opportunities because the risk of losing (and hence the likelihood of maintaining) auditor independence is higher. Results show the following. First, firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to hire Big 5 auditors than firms with low investment opportunities. Second, firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to have more discretionary accruals but this relationship is weaker when they have Big 5 auditors. These results are robust to various sensitivity tests.     

Barriers to entry to the big firm audit market: Evidence from market reaction to switches to second Tier audit firms in the post-sox period

The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) studied concentration in the audit market and found that the Big 4 firms continue to dominate the market for clients with revenue of more than $500 million while non-Big 4 firms have gained market share among clients with revenue of $500 million or less (GAO, 2008). The US Treasury Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession has expressed concern about barriers to entry that might prevent a non-Big 4 firm from increasing its market share among large publicly-traded clients (Advisory Committee, 2008). One of these barriers may be the potential cost to shareholders if the stock market reacts negatively to the appointment of a non-Big 4 auditor (GAO, 2003). We examine whether the stock market reacts negatively when clients switch from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4, because a negative reaction might make such switching less likely to occur. We find that the market does not react more negatively when clients move from a Big 4 to a Second Tier auditing firm than when clients move from a Big 4 to another Big 4 firm. Our results suggest that a negative market reaction may not represent a significant barrier to entry among Second Tier auditing firms.