开放式投资基金优越性的信息经济学分析

投资基金的开放式与封闭式是就变现方式的不同对投资基金的一种重要分类,从信息经济学的角度分析,开放式投资基金与封闭式投资基金相比,是一种帕雷托更优的选择。开放式投资基金的契约安排,更接近均衡契约的委托－代理关系。我国的投资基金发展的方向是开放式基金,目前的关键是渐进性地推出开放式基金产品。     

私募股权投资基金委托代理关系分析

本文研究了私募股权投资基金中委托-代理关系的三个方面,一是私募股权投资基金委托-代理关系的主体及其成因,二是有限合伙制基金解决委托代理问题、降低代理成本的定性分析,三是有限合伙制私募股权基金解决委托代理问题、降低代理成本的博弈分析。研究结果表明:我国私募股权投资基金的发展方向应为有限合伙制,其操作的关键在于加强信息披露和信息沟通,增强基金管理人的信用,注重成熟代理人市场的培育。     

对标要素② 公司治理

现代企业中的公司治理结构是一种协调股东和其他利益相关者的机制，不仅规定了公司的各个参与者的责任和权利分布，而且明确了决策公司事物时应遵循的规则和程序，涉及激励与约束等多方面的内容。简而言之，公司治理结构是处理企业各种契约关系的一种制度，核心是委托-代理关系，目标是降低代理成本。     

代理成本对债权融资政策选择的影响

债权融资契约产生代理成本的方式。债权融资契约形成的委托代理关系是债权人与股东之间的委托代理关系。由于债权人与股东的行为目标不完全一致，当企业以债权融资契约形式融入资金后，代表股东利益的经营者就会实施有利于股东而有损于债权人的决策，从而产生一定的代理成本。由于股东的代理人问题而使债权融资契约产生代理成本的具体方式表现在以下三个方面：     

自愿性环境规制缓解了企业融资约束吗？——基于代理成本和社会责任的调节作用

通过构建自愿性环境规制与企业融资约束理论模型,选取2011—2021年中国沪深A股上市企业为研究样本,探究自愿性环境规制对企业融资约束的影响,同时考察了代理成本和社会责任对自愿性环境规制与融资约束关系的权变影响。研究发现,自愿性环境规制能够显著缓解企业融资约束,进一步考虑企业成熟度和盈利能力,发现其缓解作用仅在成熟企业、高盈利企业显著。分析权变影响发现,代理成本越高的企业,越难以缓解融资约束;而社会责任会通过U形调节作用影响企业融资约束。     

降低债权融资契约代理成本的融资政策选择

从代理理论的视角看，企业是一系列契约关系的连接点，委托代理关系的存在就会产生一定的代理成本。由于股权融资契约和债权融资契约形成的委托代理关系不同，两种融资契约产生的代理成本必然不同。本就债权融资契约产生代理成本的方式及其降低的融资政策选择进行分析，以期为降低我国企业债权融资契约的代理成本提供理论借鉴。     

证券投资基金中委托代理关系的博弈分析

本文从博弈的角度,对证券投资基金运作方式的委托代理关系进行分析,构建了基金委托代理的博弈模型,并通过分析得出相关结论。     

融资契约的代理成本与融资政策建议

代理理论重点研究的问题是代理成本,包括契约签订的缔约成本、代理人的担保成本和“剩余损失”以及委托人的监控成本等。本文着重研究企业融资契约根据股权融资契约和债务融资契约的不同委托代理关系,分析其代理成本产生的根本原因,并且分别提出相应的融资政策选择建议。     

投资者与基金公司、基金经理中的委托代理问题与解决对策

<正>在中国股市进入机构博弈的时代之后,证券投资基金已经成为证券市场的主力军。除直接投资有价证券以外,投资者还通过投资基金而间接参与证券市场。在基金投资行为中,基金持有者与基金公司、基金投资经理之间构成了双重委托代理关系,投资者关心投资收益,基金公司关心公司收益,基金投资经理更关心个人报酬,如何解决其中的委托代理问题成为保护投资者利益的关键。其中,私募基金因其管理体制有别于公募基金,委托代理问题有所减缓但仍旧存在。本文指出投资者、基金公司与基金管理人之间由于委托代理关系可能存在的问题,分析这些问题的背后原因,并将公募基金和私募基金情况进行比较,     

企业财务目标与代理冲突、社会责任 ——以A集团为例

以A集团为背景研究我国企业的财务目标,通过对几种财务目标以及财务目标与代理冲突、社会责任的关系分析表明:我国企业应该采用相关者利益最大化作为企业的财务目标.相关者利益最大化目标能够兼顾企业各方的利益,引导企业承担社会责任,并能够在一定程度上缓解代理冲突.     

共同基金的起源

本文阐述了共同基金的起源，从“生存合约”及“种植园贷款基金”人手，：介绍了早期共同基金的产生、发展过程，而后来的存托凭证、信托投资基金等对现代共同基金产生了重要影响。     

Socially responsible funds and market crises

Compared to matched conventional mutual funds, socially responsible mutual funds outperform during periods of market crises. This dampening of downside risk comes at the cost of underperforming during non-crisis periods. Investors seeking downside protection would value the asymmetry of these returns. This asymmetric return pattern is driven by the mutual funds that focus on environmental, social, or governance (ESG) attributes and is especially pronounced in ESG funds that use positive screening techniques. Furthermore, the observed patterns are attributed to the funds’ socially responsible attributes and not the differences in fund portfolio management or the characteristics of the companies in fund portfolios.     

Sinking Funds and the Agency Costs of Corporate Debt

This paper examines whether a firm's sinking fund decision is affected by agency costs. The paper argues that sinking funds can be an effective device to resolve the problems of information asymmetry, risk incentives, and suboptimal investments. Empirical tests are provided. Results show that firms with certain characteristics related to agency problems tend to adopt a sinking fund provision in the bond indenture.     

Agency costs,governance, and organizational forms: Evidence from the mutual fund industry

Using a comprehensive sample of mutual funds and fund families for the period 1992–2004, this study examines the impact of fund management companies’ organizational forms on the level of agency costs within mutual funds. We find that, all else being equal: (1) funds managed by public fund families charge higher fees than those managed by private fund families; (2) public fund families acquire more funds than private fund families; and (3) funds of public fund families significantly underperform funds of private fund families. Collectively, these findings suggest that agency costs are higher in mutual funds managed by public fund families. Our results are consistent with the idea that the agency conflict between the fund management company and fund shareholders is more acute for public management companies because of their shorter-term focus.     

Asset value management in the Portuguese real estate sector

This paper analyzes whether real estate investment fund managers use asset valuation discretion strategically to achieve financial reporting objectives. Portuguese real estate investment funds represent a unique opportunity to investigate executive behavior regarding accounting choice, as fund managers may choose to use historical cost, fair value or a mixed system (historical cost with internal revaluations) to value fund properties. We also investigate the factors that influence this strategic behavior. Empirical results confirm that fund managers manage asset valuations in order to avoid net asset value declines, particularly in a period of financial distress. We also observe that funds with a higher level of past unconditional conservatism are more likely to manage asset values. With respect to corporate governance issues, we conclude that audit quality reduces managerial discretion and that the conflicts that may arise between fund management company shareholders and fund participants due to management fees do not seem to have impact on fund managers’ opportunistic behavior.     

基于DEA分析的养老保险基金投资绩效评价

随着中国人口老龄化趋势及人口结构发生的重大变化,养老保险基金如何保值增值成为现阶段一个重要的问题。本文基于数据包络分析(DEA),提出了一种对养老保险投资基金进行绩效评价的方法。该方法不需要建立评价指标体系,也不需要基金投资公司的生产函数,通过输入层与输出层的数据即可以得到养老保险基金投资公司的相对效率值,该方法为养老保险基金投资与选择提供了决策依据和手段。     

Camouflage play: Making moral claims in managed investments

The paper claims theoretical, empirical and normative contributions to the fledgling research on social accountabilities in financial services. Managers of managed (mutual) funds with public social mandates are obligated to pursue clients’ economic interests and exercise claimed moral considerations. Theoreticians working in post-modern accounting are invited to examine alignment difficulties. Guidance is offered in the form of Foucault's resigned response to Nietzsche's moral cynicism. Theoretical antagonisms are empirically illustrated in interviews with managers of social investment portfolios, comparisons of the portfolios of selected Australian social funds with conventional counterparts, and comparisons of selected investment decisions with claimed investment criteria in a sample of Australian social funds. Research has suggested that a recognisably distinct management bias in Australian socially screened investment products may have diffused into the investment styles adopted by managers of conventional unscreened products. The paper suggests that performance convergence might also be attributable to similar stock holdings. The requirement to sustain competitive economic performance renders the use of moral considerations in managed funds as camouflage play. A number of investment policy innovations are suggested that might serve to increase net fund inflows and so bring closer the objective of social investment to transform capital.     

保险资金的证券投资绩效分析

本文回顾了保险资金在证券投资领域的政策变化历程,分析了保险资金运用效率与基金业绩评价的诸多不同,指出了基于资产组合优化理论的保险资金评价方法的不足,提出用影子组合法,作为一种正向制度激励,对保险资金运用效率进行评价,并基于该方法对三家上市保险公司的资金运用效率进行了比较。     

Security Concentration and Active Fund Management: Do Focused Funds Offer Superior Performance?

We examine gross fund returns based on the number of securities held and find no evidence that focused funds outperform diversified funds. After deducting expenses, focused funds significantly underperform. Controlling for various fund characteristics, fund performance is positively related to the fund's number of holdings both before and after expenses. We find evidence linking focused fund underperformance to agency and liquidity problems. Finally, the attrition rate of focused funds is higher than that of diversified funds. These results do not support the view that managers holding focused portfolios have superior stock‐picking skills or that focused funds provide value to investors.     

Is There a Favoritism Strategy in Taiwan Mutual-Fund Companies?

This paper investigates whether Taiwan mutual-fund companies actively pursue a corporate-level strategy of enhancing the performance of "high-value" funds (i.e., high fee-ratio funds or high past performers) at the expense of other "low-value" funds belonging to the same companies. The results show a significant difference between high- and low-value funds within the same fund families and that this difference favors the high past-perorming funds. The future incremental cash inflows from these high-value funds indicate that fund companies indeed benefit from the subsidized strategy. Our findings highlight the potential for agency problems and the importance of corporate and fund governance in the Taiwan asset-management industry.