Government integrity and corporate investment efficiency

We explore the relation between government integrity and firms’ investment efficiency in the context of China’s deepening reforms and its strengthening the social credit system. We find that government integrity is positively associated with the investment efficiency of listed companies in China. Government integrity is negatively related to corporate underinvestment, but insignificantly related to corporate overinvestment. Higher government integrity reduces underinvestment in non-state-owned firms, but this relation is not significant in state-owned firms. Furthermore, we find that the negative relation between government integrity and underinvestment is only significant for firms in industries that receive supportive government policies. This study enriches research on corporate investment by adopting the perspective of government integrity, and supplements the literature on government integrity and its economic consequences. Our study also provides micro-level empirical evidence that strengthening government integrity will promote the economic transformation of China.     

Financial reporting quality,debt maturity and investment efficiency

This study, conducted with a sample of Spanish listed companies during the period 1998–2008, examines the role of financial reporting quality and debt maturity in investment efficiency. The results show that financial reporting quality mitigates the overinvestment problem. Likewise, lower debt maturity can improve investment efficiency, reducing both overinvestment and underinvestment problems. We further find that financial reporting quality and debt maturity are mechanisms with some degree of substitution in enhancing investment efficiency: firms with lower (higher) use of short-term debt, exhibit higher (lower) financial reporting quality effect on investment efficiency.     

把纪律挺在前面聚焦监督执纪问责全面推进党风廉政建设和反腐败工作

本文总结了新形势下长春中心支行2015年党风廉政建设和反腐败工作取得的成绩和积累的经验：认真履行了党风廉政建设主体责任与监督责任;强化反腐败教育与廉政文化建设;落实中央八项规定推动作风建设;强化岗位（廉政）风险防控发挥风险监督管理系统作用;积极推进“三转”工作,加强纪检监察干部队伍建设。同时,本文又着重展望了2016年党风廉政建设和反腐败工作,全面把握了新一年纪检工作的主要任务和具体措施,即坚持全面从严治党、依规治党,忠诚履行党章赋予的职责,聚焦监督执纪问责,深化标本兼治,强化党内监督,把纪律和规矩挺在前面,持之以恒落实中央八项规定精神,积极实践监督执纪“四种形态”,继续保持惩治腐败高压态势,创新工作机制,建设忠诚干净担当的纪检监察队伍,不断取得党风廉政建设和反腐败工作新进展。     

Media coverage and investment efficiency

We examine the effect of media coverage on firm-level investment efficiency. We find that media coverage reduces under-investment but increases over-investment. The negative effect of media coverage on under-investment is more pronounced in firms affected by greater information asymmetry and poorer corporate governance. The positive effect of media coverage on over-investment is driven by media-induced CEO overconfidence. Additional results show that both investment- and non-investment-related news coverage decrease under-investment, while non-investment-related news coverage is more influential in increasing over-investment. In general, higher news optimism is associated with less under-investment but more over-investment. Moreover, media coverage affects investment efficiency through its information dissemination rather than information creation function. Collectively, our results suggest that firms’ media visibility promotes more over-investment than under-investment.     

Managerial ability,investment efficiency and stock price crash risk

We examine empirically the effect of managerial ability on firm-level investment efficiency and how this affects future stock price crash risk. Using a managerial ability measure developed by Demerjian et al. (2012), the paper documents consistent evidence that the more able managers over-invest compared to their not-so-able counterparts, even after controlling for the effects of financial reporting quality and other firm specific determinants of investment efficiency. This evidence is robust to alternative proxies for investment efficiency. The empirical evidence also suggests that crash risk increases for firms with more able managers, primarily through the investment inefficiency channel. Overall, the study contributes to a better understanding of the influence of managerial ability on investment decisions in the context of diverging opinions regarding manager-specific effects on organizational outcomes.     

Auditor specialization,accounting information quality and investment efficiency

This study is examined how the auditor specialization moderates the effect of accounting information quality on investment efficiency, i.e., whether the effect of accounting information quality on investment efficiency is increasing or decreasing with the presence of the specialist auditor.The reached result reveals that the accounting information quality appears to help decrease the overinvestment problem. Similarly, the auditor specialization has been discovered to help greatly in improving investment efficiency, while reducing the underinvestment problem. We further find that the accounting information quality and the auditor specialization are two mechanisms with some degree of substitution in enhancing investment efficiency. The accounting information quality is positively associated with investment efficiency for firms whose auditor is an industry specialist.In addition, to check the robustness of the main results, this paper investigates the causal relationships between investment efficiency, auditor specialization and accounting information quality from the dynamic simultaneous-equation models.     

Litigation risk,accounting quality,and investment efficiency

This paper examines the moderating effect of litigation risk on the relationship between accounting quality and investment efficiency. We use directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance as a proxy for litigation risk, accruals quality for accounting quality, and investment cash flow sensitivity for investment efficiency (Biddle & Hilary, 2006; Hovakimian & Hovakimian, 2009). Using Canadian data from 1998 to 2008, we show that firms with higher D&O insurance coverage exhibit lower quality accruals. Moreover, the previously documented negative association between accruals quality and investment cash flow sensitivity is stronger (weaker) when abnormal D&O coverage is low (high), suggesting that the role of accounting quality in facilitating investment efficiency is conditional upon observable litigation risk.     

Mandatory CSR disclosure,monitoring and investment efficiency: evidence from China

This study investigates the effect of mandatory corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure on firms’ investment efficiency in China. Using the CSR regulation that mandates a group of listed firms to disclose stand‐alone CSR reports after 2008 as a natural experiment, we find that firms subject to the mandatory CSR regulation have decreased investment inefficiency subsequent to the mandate, especially in cases of overinvestment. This effect is more pronounced for firms with a control‐ownership wedge, state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), and firms having lower institutional ownership. Further analyses find that the reduction of overinvestment is much more significant in industries with high pollution and that the reduction in investment is not due to the CSR spending siphoning off capital used in other projects. We argue that mandatory corporate social responsibility disclosure improves monitoring over firms in China, especially when firms are characterised as having severe agency problems.     

The association between human resource investment in IT controls over financial reporting and investment efficiency

This study investigates the association between human resource investment in information technology (IT) controls over financial reporting and its investment efficiency. To conduct the analysis, it uses novel hand-collected data on the number of IT control personnel. In particular, it uses the ratio of (1) the number of IT control personnel, (2) the number of IT control personnel who are certified public accountants to the total number of employees in a firm, and (3) the natural logarithm of average working experience of IT control personnel in months as a proxy for human resource investment in IT controls. This study finds that such investment is negatively associated with the firm's abnormal investment, suggesting that investing in IT control personnel enhances a firm's investment efficiency. Furthermore, not only quantitative but also qualitative investment in IT control personnel improves investment efficiency. We also find that the association between human resource investment in IT controls and a firm's investment efficiency is more pronounced for firms with lower financial reporting quality and information environment. The results of this study provide useful implications for management, regulators, and market participants, as they demonstrate the positive role of investment in IT control personnel on the firm's internal decision.     

反腐败、企业绩效及其渠道效应——基于中共十八大的反腐建设的研究

本文借助十八大掀起的一系列反腐行动作为外生冲击,通过观测上市公司商旅招待费在反腐败前后的变化水平,在控制相关因素后能在一定效用范围内识别出企业的腐败水平。为了有效缓解内生性问题,本文采用了市场反应模型和DID模型系统地检验了腐败对于微观经济的影响。研究发现:(1)十八大的召开给腐败严重的企业带来了更积极的市场反应;(2)反腐败能提高企业绩效,并且这种效应在政府干预严重的区域更显著;(3)渠道效应研究表明,反腐败通过加快资产周转率,缩短经营周期,优化投资效率,提高生产效率这些中介渠道,最终作用于企业的绩效表现。本文为反腐败的实施成效提供了微观角度的实证证据,并系统性地验证了腐败对经济造成的负面影响。     

Employment protection legislation and R&D investment

This paper examines how employment protection legislation influences corporate R&D investment. With a sample of 113,228 observations across 23 OECD countries from 2001 to 2018, I document that firms in strong employment protection legislation have lower R&D expenditure and investment efficiency. In addition, I find that the effect of employment protection on R&D expenditure is stronger in financially constrained firms but the effect of employment protection on R&D investment efficiency is stronger in financially unconstrained firms.     

Monetary policy,government control and capital investment: Evidence from China

This study examines how the relationships between local governments and local enterprises moderate the effect of targeted monetary policies through different action-propagating mechanisms. First, we investigate the impact of monetary policies on enterprise investment in areas with different institutional environments. Second, we investigate the impact of monetary policies on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with different property rights structures. Third, we examine how political connections can influence the action-propagating mechanism of monetary policies. We conclude that in China monetary policies have different effects on SOEs and on private enterprises with or without political connections. Specifically, local government interventions can significantly weaken and distort the effects of monetary policies, such that the intended reduction in investment is noticeably alleviated for SOEs and private enterprises with close links to local governments.     

Bank lending incentives and firm investment decisions in China

This study investigates whether and how banks’ lending incentives influence firms’ investment behaviors in China. First, empirical results show that loans granted to politically connected firms are less influenced by those firms’ profitability and tangibility. Second, political connection is a violation factor in debt markets, and our study finds that firms with political ties invest less efficiently than firms without political ties when they can access abnormal debt. Finally, we find that regional development with regard to market development and government quality improvement reduces the negative impact of politically connected lending on firms’ investment efficiency.     

粤港澳直接投资的演进路径及其扩散效应——基于直接投资便利化的视角

由于历史原因和不同的制度安排,港澳与粤之间直接投资沿着不同的路径发展。粤港澳三地间的相互直接投资极大的促进了三地间的经济发展,也为相互间的经济融合作出了重要的贡献。因此,未来粤港澳间的直接投资便利化将会对三地经济联系产生重要影响,将对三地的经济可持续增长起到重要的支撑。     

Resource misallocation,production efficiency and outward foreign direct investment decisions of Chinese enterprises

Resource misallocation, as an essential characteristic of China’s “progressive reform,” has become a significant factor restricting high-quality outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). Using the Database of Chinese Industrial Enterprises (2009–2013), this paper empirically analyzes the impact of resource misallocation on OFDI and its heterogeneous characteristics via the Heckman two-stage selection model. This study finds that total factor productivity has a positive influence on expanding investment quantity. In addition, from the perspective of resource misallocation, factor price distortion inhibits the role of productivity in increasing investment propensity. A mechanism analysis indicates that there is no “productivity paradox” in the decision-making process of OFDI in China as a whole; but there may be an investment productivity paradox in foreign-funded enterprises, enterprises in coastal areas, and large-scale enterprises. After controlling for factor price distortions, the productivity paradox disappears. Thus, total factor productivity (TFP) becomes an important factor in promoting OFDI propensity of overseas-funded enterprises, enterprises in coastal areas and large-scale enterprises.     

Abnormal investment and firm performance

We find a negative relation between abnormal investment and future stock performance. Such a negative relation is mainly driven by under-investment, not over-investment. Our results are robust to various estimation methods and investment models. Both delayed market reaction and agency issues may lead to the apparently anomalous return predictability of under-investment. First, market investors may not react promptly to the fundamental information contained in under-investment about a firm’s future profitability, asset growth, and financial distress probability. Second, the negative relation between under-investment and future stock returns is more pronounced for firms with lower investor monitoring and higher agency costs.     

Conditional conservatism and labor investment efficiency

Prior literature documents that asymmetric timely recognition of losses versus gains (also known as conditional conservatism) can induce management to make more efficient investment decisions by mitigating information asymmetry between management and investors and providing early signals about the profitability of projects that are undertaken. In this paper, we investigate the impact of conservatism on an important investment decision that has been overlooked, namely, investment in labor. We find that conservatism is negatively associated with labor investment inefficiency; more specifically, conservatism reduces inefficient investment practices on the labor market, including over-hiring, under-firing, under-hiring, and over-firing. Our results hold after controlling for managerial ability, corporate governance, and other investments.     

Debt structure,economic stimulus and firm investment efficiency

We demonstrate that, in China, firm investment efficiency gains are associated with the use of short-term debt, especially its trade credit component. During the 2009–2010 economic stimulus plan, such effects were heightened and generally remained persistent in the 2011–2013 poststimulus period. Our findings support the view that the rollover pressure of short-maturity debt and the information advantage of supply chain financing are both effective mechanisms for enhancing firm governance in an environment more susceptible to financial market incompleteness. Consequently, the enormous credit boost during the stimulus plan was more efficiently invested when channelled through firms' supply chains.     

Career concerns,shareholder monitoring and investment efficiency: From the perspective of compensation contract rigidity in Chinese SOEs

This paper presents theoretical analysis of how career concerns and shareholder monitoring affect chief executive officer(CEO) agency costs. We investigate inve...