THE RISK BEHAVIOR OF EQUITY OF FIRMS APPROACHING BANKRUPTCY

The risk behavior of financially distressed companies is studied using the shifting regimes regression model originally suggested by Brown, Durbin, and Evans. In addition, the presence of nonsynchronous trading is detected and the regression model is adjusted accordingly using Dimson's technique. The results reveal that the behavior of systematic risk as firms approach bankruptcy depends to some degree on appropriate identification of periods over which beta is constant and adjusting for nonsynchronous trading. The results also lend support to the importance of skewness and to some extent beta but not unsystematic risk in explaining the security returns of firms approaching bankruptcy. Finally, the behavior of equity risk is examined according to the outcome of the bankruptcy filing.     

不良资产处置过程中的风险点及其风险控制体系探讨

在不良资产处置过程中,如何识别存在的风险并及时加以预防,以实现不良资产回收价值最大化的经营目标是各资产管理公司面临的最大问题.资产管理公司作为政策性公司,在资产收购时就埋下许多处置隐患,作为新生事物,在具体处置过程中,由于政府、企业、银行、资产管理公司等多方利益的关联,政治、经济、政策、法律环境的限制,人才、技术、信息、管理因素的制约,使其在实际运作中风险丛生.本文着重对处置起始环节、内部流程环节和组织实施环节的风险点进行了详尽考察,指出资产管理公司在实际运作中只有明确资产处置各项业务的关键环节和风险点,建立完备的风险控制体系,才能顺利完成不良资产的管理和处置任务.     

ALL-EQUITY FIRMS AND THE BALANCING THEORY OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE

Despite the benefits of leverage, many firms exist that at some point in their corporate history had no debt. This study provides evidence that the balancing theory of capital structure can predict the behavior of such firms. All-equity firms allow a more precise measurement of firm market value and risk, and provide a less ambiguous relationship between independent variables and dependent variables than the firms used in previous studies. Using a logit function to avoid spurious correlation between the dependent and independent variables, we find that for most years during 1964–88 all-equity firms listed in the Compustat industrial file exhibited a consistently significant negative relationship between the Myers growth option variable and the probability of borrowing. Positively significant but less consistent relationships exist between the risk measures and the nondebt tax shields, and the probability of borrowing. These results do not qualitatively change when the data are aggregated over twenty years or over five-year subperiods. The tests are also conducted by industry according to the one-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. Significant relationships are found in the 2000 and 3000 SIC code manufacturing industries.     

THE CAPITAL BUDGETING BEHAVIOUR AND CORPORATE CHARACTERISTICS OF CAPITAL-CONSTRAINED FIRMS

This paper addresses (1) the nature and pervasiveness of organisational constraints, frnancial and otherwise, on investment, and (2) the corporate characteristics and capital budgeting behaviour of capital-constrained firms for a sample of 126 UK companies. The results indicate that corporate size, risk and profitability are important corporate characteristics in this regard, and that financially-constrained firms tend to adopt naive capital budgeting methods in resolving the capital rationing problem.     

RISK AND HEDGING BEHAVIOR: THE ROLE AND DETERMINANTS OF LATENT HETEROGENEITY

The notion of heterogeneous behavior is well grounded in economic theory. Recently it has been shown in a hedging context that the influence of risk attitudes and risk perceptions varies for different segments using a generalized mixture regression model. Here, using recently developed individual risk attitude measurement techniques and experimental and accounting data from investors with differing decision environments, we examine the determinants of heterogeneity in hedging behavior in a concomitant mixture regression framework. Allowing for latent heterogeneity, we find that risk attitudes and risk perceptions do not influence behavior uniformly and that the heterogeneity is influenced by manager's focus on shareholder value and the firm's capital structure.     

THE WEALTH EFFECTS OF VOLUNTARY SELLOFFS: IMPLICATIONS FOR DIVESTING AND ACQUIRING FIRMS

Previous research examining the wealth effects of voluntary selloffs has shown positive stock price movements around the announcement date for divesting firms. Shareholders realize positive economic gains from selloffs. One recent study indicates that shareholders of acquiring firms also realize economic gains. This study examines the division of economic gains between divesting and acquiring firms and the impact of the firm's financial condition and relative selloff size on the level of economic gains. Significant positive price movements are observed for divesting firms immediately prior to and on the announcement date. Some evidence of positive, although not significant, price movements is found for acquiring firms. These results suggest shareholders of divesting firms realize economic gains from selloffs while shareholders of acquiring firms neither gain nor lose. Also, as divesting firms sell off larger portions of their total assets, their shareholders realize greater economic gains; the division of economic gains becomes more one-sided (in favor of divesting firms) as the relative size of the selloff increases.