Liability Sharing as a Mechanism to Improve Firms' Investment and Liquidation Decisions

This paper investigates the impact of liability sharing on firms' investment and liquidation decisions. We look at a model involving private effort, unverifiable information, and unenforceable liquidation decisions. In this model, there exist simultaneously two typical types of agency problems, i.e., underinvestment (lower effort) and risk seeking (delaying efficient liquidation). We show how firms can mitigate these problems by forming a business group and sharing each other's liabilities. Under certain conditions, such an alliance is an effective commitment by the member firms to provide a higher level of equity investments (higher effort) and to liquidate inefficient assets (lower risk).J. Comp. Econom., December 2000, 28(4), pp. 739–761. University of Amsterdam, 1018 WD Amsterdam, The Netherlands; International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria, and United Nations University, WIDER, Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Henlsinki, Finland.     

Consistency and optimality in a dynamic game of pollution control II: Monopoly

This paper continues a line of research begun in Batabyal (1995a). I model the interaction between a regulator and a monopolistic, polluting firm as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firm creates pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under dynamically consistent policies.     

Regulating a risk-averse firm under incomplete information

We examine the optimal regulatory policy for a risk-averse firm when the firm is imperfectly informed about its efficiency parameter for a project at the time of contracting. The firm’s risk aversion shifts the optimal regulatory policy from a fixed-price contract to a cost-plus contract. The optimal regulatory policy entails undereffort by an inefficient firm as in Laffont and Tirole (J Polit Econ 94(3):614–641, 1986) and the effort distortion increases as the firm becomes more risk-averse. Further, the regulator benefits from sequential contracting with the firm where the firm chooses contract terms gradually as it acquires information, albeit the benefit diminishes as the firm becomes more risk-averse.      

Pitfalls to avoid when measuring institutions: Is Doing Business damaging business?

Over recent years, both governments and international aid organizations have been devoting large amounts of resources to “simplifying” the procedures for setting up and formalizing firms. Many of these actions have focused on reducing the initial costs of setting up the firm, disregarding the more important role of business registers as a source of reliable information for judges, government departments and, above all, other firms. This reliable information is essential for reducing transaction costs in future dealings with all sorts of economic agents, both public and private. The priorities of reform policies should therefore be thoroughly reviewed, stressing the value of the legal institutions rather than trivializing them as is often the case. Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (4) (2007) 729–747.     

Industry specific effects in investment performance and valuation of firms

A necessary criterion for a performance measure in corporate governance is the degree to which it mirrors how well the management succeeds in maximizing firm value. Such a performance measure is marginal q which links changes in firm value to the investments undertaken by the management. Empirical studies of investment and performance based on marginal q have demonstrated the usefulness of this measure. Most research however, has mainly focused on long-term performance. This paper takes a short-term perspective and, based on the marginal q-theory, considers how firms’ market values change in the extreme stock price cycle of a stock market bubble. Using a data set of listed Swedish corporations we find an anomaly in form of a new industry specific effect that, in addition to investment, explains changes in firm value.

Privatization Methods and Productivity Effects in Romanian Industrial Enterprises

Comprehensive panel data on privatization transactions and labor productivity in Romanian industrial corporations are used to describe the postprivatization ownership structure and to estimate the effect of Romania's diverse privatization policies on firm performance. The econometric results show consistently positive, highly significant effects of private ownership on labor productivity growth; the point estimates imply an increased 1.0 to 1.7% growth for a 10% rise in private shareholding. The strongest estimated impacts are associated with sales to outside blockholders; insider transfers and mass privatization are estimated to have significantly smaller, although still positive, effects on firm performance. J. Comp. Econ., December 2002, 30(4), pp. 657–682. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Central European University; and Budapest University of Economic Sciences, Central European University. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G32, G34, L32, L33, P20, P31.     

Information Disclosure Policies: When Do They Bring Environmental Improvements?

There has been a growing interest among policy makers on the use of information disclosure policies for pollution control. This paper theoretically assesses the consequences of information disclosure policies and identifies the conditions under which such policies are likely to bring environmental improvements. Based on a dynamic game framework, the paper shows that both eco-labeling and more general full information disclosure policies may not always result in pollution reduction. Full information disclosure policies are likely to be effective if the product is not heavily polluting and if the minimum quality standard is set quite low. The paper also identifies the conditions under which all consumers are strictly better off with information disclosure policies.

Foreign direct investment and vertical integration of production by Japanese multinationals in Thailand

We test the vertical model of foreign direct investment (FDI) empirically using firm level information on Japanese multinational activity in Thailand. These data allow us to investigate the effects of both home country (Japan) and host country (Thailand) characteristics on the inter-industry pattern of FDI. For 85 manufacturing industries over the period from 1985 to 1995, we find a positive influence of industry variation in skill intensity and market size in the host country and a negative effect of transport costs on the amount of FDI. These results provide strong direct econometric evidence of vertical integration of production across the countries. Journal of Comparative Economics 32 (4) (2004) 805–821.     

Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in transition economies

Data from the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey is used to examine state capture and influence in transition economies. We find that a capture economy has emerged in many transition countries, where rent-generating advantages are sold by public officials and politicians to private firms. While influence is a legacy of the past inherited by large, incumbent firms with existing ties to the state, state capture is a strategic choice made primarily by large de novo firms competing against influential incumbents. Captor firms, in high-capture economies, enjoy private advantages in terms of more protection of their own property rights and superior firm performance. Despite the private gains to captor firms, state capture is associated at the aggregate level with social costs in the form of weaker economy-wide firm performance. Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4) (2003) 751–773.     

How large is liquidity risk in an automated auction market?

We introduce a new empirical methodology that models liquidity risk over short time periods for impatient traders who submit market orders. Using Value-at-Risk type measures, we quantify the liquidity risk premia for portfolios and individual stocks traded on the automated auction market Xetra. The specificity of our approach relies on the adequate econometric modelling of the potential price impact incurred by the liquidation of a portfolio. We study the sensitivity of liquidity risk towards portfolio size and traders' time horizon, and interpret its diurnal variation in the light of market microstructure theory.

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Predatory Short Sales and Bailouts

This paper extends the literature on predatory short selling and bailouts through a joint analysis of the two. We consider a model with informed short sales, as well as uninformed predatory short sales, which can trigger the inefficient liquidation of a firm. We obtain several novel results: A government commitment to bail out insolvent firms with positive probability can increase welfare because it selectively deters predatory short selling without hampering desirable informed short sales. Contrasting a common view, bailouts can be optimal ex ante but undesirable ex post. Furthermore, bailouts in our model are a better policy tool than short selling restrictions. Welfare gains from the bailout policy are unevenly distributed: shareholders gain while taxpayers lose. Bailout taxes allow ex ante Pareto improvements.     

Rural Industrialization and Increasing Inequality: Emerging Patterns in China′s Reforming Economy

This paper′s goal is to increase the understanding of the inequality trends during the postreform period in China. It uses a rigorous, inference-based procedure to demonstrate that inequality among the counties in an east coast province registered statistically significant increases between 1984 and 1989. Decomposition analysis reveals that the changing patterns of inequality were closely associated with the changes in the structure of the rural economy. In particular, policies that increased the importance of agriculture in the economy led to a reduction in inequality; those that stimulated the expansion of rural industry gave rise to greater inequality. One explanation is that barriers keep outputs, inputs, and information from flowing among regions, leading to higher inequality. J. Comp. Econom., December 1994, 19(3), pp. 362-391. Food Research Institute, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305-6084.     

Severance Payment: Incentive or Lethargy Effect?

The aim of the paper is to determine the impact of severance payment on the motivation of the worker to make an effort, when there is a risk for him to be dismissed once his effort was made. We highlight through a two‐stage model the various factors which influence the dismissal decision by the firm and the worker's effort, such as the initial wage, the litigation costs and the relative bargaining powers of the parties when the relationship ends or goes on. In this context, we show that the impact of the severance payment paid ex post in case of dismissal on the level of effort chosen by the worker ex ante may depend on such characteristics.     

Cournot competition and endogenous firm size

The paper studies the dynamics of firm size in a repeated Cournot game with unknown demand function. We model the firm as a type of artificial neural network. Each period it must learn to map environmental signals to both a demand parameter and its rival’s output choice. However, this learning game is in the background, as we focus on the endogenous adjustment of network size. We investigate the long-run evolution of firm/network size as a function of profits, rival’s size, and the type of adjustment rules used.

Firm adaptiveness and performance heterogeneity: the case of sales–advertising dynamics in an evolving product market

We combine evolutionary theory concepts and multivariate persistence methodology to develop and test expectations about the adaptiveness of firm decisions and its implications for performance heterogeneity. We focus on the relatively reversible advertising decisions in an evolving product market, domains typically ignored by evolutionary research. We find that an adaptive decision routine helps an incumbent firm maintain its advantages and overcome the challenge posed by a major competitive entry.

To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets

In this paper we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990, Games Econ. Behavior2, 29–46). In their duopoly game firms can choose their quantities in one of two periods before the market clears. If a firm commits to a quantity in period 1, it does not know whether the other firm also commits early. By waiting until period 2, a firm can observe the other firm's period-1 action. Hamilton and Slutsky predicted the emergence of endogenous Stackelberg leadership. Our data, however, do not confirm the theory. While Stackelberg equilibria are extremely rare, we often observe endogenous Cournot outcomes and sometimes collusive play. This is partly driven by the fact that endogenous Stackelberg followers learn to behave in a reciprocal fashion over time, i.e., they learn to reward cooperation and to punish exploitation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92, D43.     

Does affirmative action reduce gender discrimination and enhance efficiency? New experimental evidence

We investigate experimentally the impact of quota policies on gender discrimination in hiring decisions by testing whether affirmative action increases female employment. We also ask whether firm performance is affected by such policies. Our experiment consists of three treatments. In the baseline (no quota) treatment, groups of two employers and six potential job candidates are formed. Employers have to hire two workers based on information on candidate characteristics including gender and years and subject of study. The second, low penalty, treatment is identical to the baseline except there is a quota such that at least half of the employees hired must be women. If this quota is not respected, the firm has to pay a penalty. The last, high penalty, treatment is the same as the low penalty treatment except that the penalty is significantly higher. We find that women are ranked unfavorably in the absence of a quota, and the introduction of a quota significantly reduces gender discrimination. Firm performance is not affected by the introduction of quotas.     

Progressive taxation and corporate liquidation policies with mean-reverting earnings

This paper develops a real options model of an all-equity financed firm that receives mean-reverting earnings and is subject to progressive taxation. Tax progression arises from an exogenously given tax exemption threshold such that the firm pays no corporate income taxes should its earnings be less than this threshold. The firm possesses a perpetual option to liquidate its operation for a deterministic salvage value at any time. We show that the firm optimally exercises the liquidation option at the first instant when its earnings reach an endogenously determined threshold (the liquidation trigger) from above. Using numerical analysis, we show that the liquidation trigger is higher or lower than the exogenously given tax exemption threshold, depending on whether the tax exemption is below or above a unique critical level, respectively. We further show that the liquidation trigger is strictly decreasing for all tax exemption thresholds less than the critical level, and can be hump-shaped for all tax exemption thresholds greater than the critical level, especially when the salvage value is small. Corporate income taxes as such are not neutral when tax schedules are progressive.     

The Political Foundations of Development: The Case of Botswana

Unlike many of its fellow sub-Saharan countries, Botswana has avoided the African Growth Tragedy. The success lied in the ability of the government of Botswana to successfully adopt growth-enhancing policies. We argue that the success stems from three factors. First, the government enhanced its legitimacy by relying on traditional sources of authority. Second, the traditional leaders pursued policies that legitimized the political system. Third, the government did not expend resources on military expenditures during its first decade. The interaction of these factors explain Botswana’s success.

DO TAX CUTS ENCOURAGE RENT SEEKING BY TOP CORPORATE EXECUTIVES? THEORY AND EVIDENCE

This paper explores the role of tax policy in shaping incentives for executive effort (labor supply) and rent seeking within the firm. We develop a theoretical model that distinguishes between effort and rent‐seeking responses to income taxes, and provides a framework to estimate a lower bound for the rent‐seeking response. Using executive compensation and governance data, we find that rent seeking represents an important component of the response to changes in tax rates, especially among executives in firms with the worst corporate governance. (JEL D31, G30, H21)