企业所得税法对企业组建税务筹划主要方法的探讨

依法纳税是纳税人应尽的义务,而税务筹划亦是其应当享有的正当权利。在现实经济生活中,税务筹划已逐步成为纳税人理财的重要手段之一。在新形势下,企业作为纳税人,怎样熟悉了解我国企业所得税相关法律制度,利用税法所提供的优惠政策及可选择性条款,合法合理进行税务筹划,为企业提高经济效益已经成为当今企业一个必修的课题。     

Voting between tax regimes to fund a public good

We study experimentally how taxpayers choose between an income tax and a commodity tax to fund a public good. We implement conditions such that a rational and self-interested subject would prefer the commodity-tax regime. We find that voters overwhelmingly support the income-tax regime. We discuss and evaluate empirically alternative behavioral accounts to explain voting behavior. We find that inequality aversion and efficiency concerns matter for voting. We find no evidence for opportunism or for cognitive ability to affect voting.     

我国个人所得税微观税收负担实证分析

随着我国个人所得税制度的不断完善,其作用越来越受到社会的关注。对工资薪金所得征税,关系着所有工薪阶层的利益。通过计算和分析对我国纳税人样本的个税负担后发现,我国个人所得税制度总体上能够体现公平原则,不同纳税人个税负担的差异主要是由劳动报酬或收入水平的差异所导致的,但个人所得税制度的调节作用存在逆向调节倾向,且免征额提高所产生的减税效应总体也不显著。在当前我国税收制度框架下,降低工资薪金的个税负担仍然是工薪阶层直接受益的重要方式,因而需要对工资薪金所得适用税率进行改革,消除当前存在的逆向调节效应。     

Federal Income Tax Reform in the United States: How Did It Happen? What Did It Do? Where Do We Go from Here?

Abstract . The 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1913 provided the legal basis for progressive federal income taxes. They now yield revenues of about $450 billion annually. Tax base erosion eventually produced a levy in serious violation of norms of allocation efficiency, distributional equity, and macroeconomic performance. Vested private interests influenced legislators by propaganda and campaign contributions to minimize their tax burdens at the expense of less wealthy taxpayers. The result was an irrational and badly flawed tax structure. In 1981 the maximum marginal tax rate on income from property and wealth was significantly reduced along with other bracket reductions. The income tax reform movement culminated in 1984 to 1986. It expanded the base of the tax while reducing marginal rates as well as brackets, with little change in the distribution of the burden among different income groups but achieving some greater equity in tax liabilities for those with similar incomes.     

Are There Tax Arbitrage Opportunities in Private Rental Housing Markets?

Tax arbitrage opportunities in rental housing markets arise when high bracket taxpayers exploit the tax shelter and conversion features of the tax treatment of rental housing and as a consequence offer low bracket taxpayers rental housing at a cost lower than if they purchased the same quantity of housing for owner occupation. A microdata set has been employed to estimate the size of these tax arbitrage opportunities with respect to 1907 properties owned by Australian landlords. The measure of tax arbitrage opportunities is the breakeven tax rate at which the maximum rental rate a potential occupant is prepared to pay before turning to purchased housing is equal to the landlord's reservation rental rate. Potential occupants with marginal tax rates below the breakeven tax rate find that renting has a relative cost advantage over home purchase. When agency costs (the costs incurred in managing landlord-tenant relationships) are included in the tax arbitrage model, our estimates of the breakeven tax rate indicate that home purchase has a relative cost advantage over renting for most potential occupants. Renting is only financially attractive to low tax bracket individuals. This finding is consistent with Australian tenure patterns. However, there are more puzzling results. A majority of landlords belong to tax brackets below the top bracket, landlords in the lowest tax brackets typically make below normal profits, and reservation rental rates at the bottom of the rental housing market are relatively high. Down payment requirements, lock-in effects, and rent clientele groups are put forward as possible explanations for these findings.     

Why is there so little tax coordination? The role of majority voting and international tax evasion

It is a striking feature of EU tax policy that countries find it difficult to agree on capital tax coordination. This is in conflict with the prevailing theoretical view, according to which tax coordination is beneficial. This paper develops a political economy argument which may help to explain this puzzle. We consider a model of tax competition where fiscal policy decisions are taken via majority voting and tax evasion is possible but costly. It turns out that tax coordination agreements may fail to generate political support because middle income groups may lose from tax coordination, even if their capital income is below average.     

Income taxes and the destination of movers to multistate MSAs

We examine how differences in state income tax rates, as well as other state and local taxes and public service expenditures, influence the choice of state of residence for households (federal tax filers) moving into multistate metropolitan areas (MSAs) using data from the IRS on the migration of taxpayers. MSAs that are on borders provide a spatial discontinuity—discrete differences in state tax rates within a single labor market. These MSAs allow residents to live in one state and work in another state. We find that differences in state income tax rates have a significant impact on the relative rate of migration to the states within an MSA. However, contrary to what would be expected, this impact is only significant in MSAs in which the filing state is based on employment (states without reciprocity) and not for those states in which the filing state is the state of residence (states with reciprocity). In MSAs where states do not have reciprocity agreements, a difference of ten percent in tax rates leads to a 4.1 percent difference in the relative rate of incoming taxpayers. Analogously, we find that a ten percent difference in state tax rates in these MSAs results in a 3.3 percent difference in the rate of tax base inflow (AGI). Our results suggest that one reason that differences in state income taxes appear to have more impact in multistate MSAs without reciprocity is that only relatively large differences in state income tax rates have any impact on migration and these differences are much more pronounced in MSAs without reciprocity.     

Decreasing average cost in private schools,existence of majority voting equilibrium,and a policy analysis for Turkey

The existing models of mixed public–private school systems usually capture only the decreasing average cost faced by public schools, whereas empirical studies find evidence of it for private schools as well. Motivated by this, an equilibrium model of a mixed public–private school system is studied in this paper, whereby private schools also face decreasing average cost over enrollment. In the model, households, heterogeneous with respect to exogenously specified income and child’s ability, choose among a public and a private school. Private school charges tuition whereas public school is free. Public school spending is financed by income tax revenue collected from all households and the tax rate is determined via majority voting. Achievement of a child depends on its ability and education spending. Under the assumptions on the parameters of the model, a joint lognormal distribution of income and ability, and a Cobb–Douglas utility, majority voting equilibrium is numerically shown to exist. The model is calibrated to match certain statistics from the 2013 Turkish data. Using the calibrated model, we compare the benchmark for a mixed public–private school system with a pure public school system to understand the impact of shutting down some of the private schools in Turkey following the July 15 coup attempt. We find that mean achievement and variance of achievement after high school is \(0.039\%\) higher and \(0.013\%\) lower respectively in a pure public school system.     

Income tax competition at the State and Local Level in Switzerland

Tax competition is supposed to lead to inefficiencies in the provision of public goods and difficulties for decentralized redistribution. A necessary condition for these effects to occur is that residence and location decisions are determined by fiscal considerations. In this paper, the impact of personal income taxes and transfer payments on residence decisions of taxpayers is analyzed using cross sectional data on the distribution of different groups of taxpayers in different income groups among the 26 Swiss cantons and the 137 largest Swiss cities. We find that tax competition with respect to personal income taxes is relatively strong in Switzerland.     

THE ECONOMICS OF TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE

Abstract. There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that tax evasion is now fairly extensive throughout Western Europe and North America. Academic economists have shown considerable interest in various aspects of tax evasion. In this article we examine the literature on two particular issues. First, why do individuals evade their tax obligations and second, what policies should governments pursue in attempting to reduce or eliminate evasion? We concentrate on income tax evasion which has been the major preoccupation in the literature. We first show that the compliance costs of income tax evasion are quite substantial. We then examine theoretical attempts to model individual taxpayers behaviour. Here we find that it is extremely difficult to make unambiguous predictions concerning the effects of changes in important variables, such as income tax rates. Next, we review the empirical ‘evidence’ obtained from (i) attitudinal surveys, (ii) tax games, and (iii) econometric analysis of individuals’ tax returns. All of these studies are found to be flawed in certain major respects. Finally, we consider a number of policy options available to tax authorities. Given the difficulty of determining a socially optimal level of evasion, governments are likely to pursue suboptimal policies aimed at entirely eliminating tax evasion. However, even here there is considerable disagreement about the design of an efficient policy.     

Weighted representative democracy

We propose a new system of democratic representation. Any voter can choose any legislator as her representative; thus, different legislators can represent different numbers of voters. Decisions in the legislature are made by weighted majority voting, where the weight of each legislator is determined by the number of voters she represents. We show that, if the size of the electorate is very large, then with very high probability, the decisions obtained in the legislature agree with those which would have been reached by a popular referendum decided by simple majority vote.     

基于税收筹划谈企业职工薪酬制度的设计

随着中国市场经济的发展与税收分配制度改革的深入,个人收入来源形式也日益多样化,个人所得税在税收比重中所占的份额越来越重,如何使税后利益最大化已成为关系纳税人切身利益的重要问题,如何合理分配与规划企业职工薪金报酬也受到越来越多纳税人的关注。本文着重讨论这一问题。     

THE EQUAL ABSOLUTE SACRIFICE PRINCIPLE REVISITED

Abstract.  We summarize the literature on equal absolute sacrifice income taxes, and make some extensions. We adapt the utilitarian equal sacrifice criterion to a wide class of rank-dependent social welfare functions, and find that liabilities depend on both income and position in the distribution. We investigate whether such taxes need be progressive, using a combination of analytics and simulation, and in the process uncover tax functions not previously recognized as equating sacrifices. Finally, out of horizontal equity considerations a new concept of 'the equal treatment of equals' by an income tax emerges, with implications for future work whose significance is discussed.     

Migration and the Tiebout-Tullock Hypothesis Revisited

This study investigates, using state-level data for the period 2000–2005, the Tiebout hypothesis (as extended by Tullock) of "voting with one's feet." This analysis differs from previous related studies not only in its adoption of more current migration and other data but also in other ways. First, unlike most earlier related studies, it includes a separate measure of the overall cost of living; second, it examines per pupil (rather than per capita) outlays on public primary and secondary education; and third, in addition to property taxes, it also focuses on per capita state income tax burdens. Inclusion of the last of these variables in the analysis is based on studies that have found the existence of a state income tax to have influenced migration patterns and other studies that have found higher state income tax levels to have resulted in reduced per capita income growth over time. Moreover, including both property tax burdens and income tax burdens broadens the scope of the hypothesis. Strong empirical support for the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis (as interpreted here) is obtained for the study period.     

Spatial majority voting equilibria and the provision of public goods

This paper develops general equilibrium conditions for urban areas where a pure public good is provided at a level decided upon by majority voting. Models with a property tax and a head tax and external land ownership are analyzed, and equilibrium solutions are compared using a specific form for the utility function. Optimal cities are characterized and compared to those emerging from the majority voting equilibria. Models where aggregate land rent is divided equally among the urban residents are also developed.     

Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint

Pairwise majority voting over alternative nonlinear income tax schedules is considered when there is a continuum of individuals who differ in their labor productivities, which is private information, but share the same quasilinear-in-consumption preferences for labor and consumption. Voting is restricted to those schedules that are selfishly optimal for some individual. The analysis extends that of Brett and Weymark (2016) by adding a minimum-utility constraint to their incentive-compatibility and government budget constraints. It also extends the analysis of Röell (2012) and Bohn and Stuart (2013) by providing a complete characterization of the selfishly optimal tax schedules. It is shown that individuals have single-peaked preferences over the set of selfishly optimal tax schedules, and so the schedule proposed by the median skill type is a Condorcet winner.     

Flat tax reform: A quantitative exploration

This paper explores quantitatively the general equilibrium implications of a revenue neutral tax reform in which the current income and capital income tax structure in the U.S. is replaced by a flat tax, as proposed by Hall and Rabushka (1995), (The Flat Tax, 2nd ed. Hoover). The central aspects of such reform, the impact of tax reform on capital accumulation and labor supply, as well as its distributional consequences, are analyzed in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Main results are that, (i) the elimination of the actual taxation of capital income has an important and positive effect on capital accumulation; (ii) mean labor hours are relatively constant across tax systems, but aggregate labor in efficiency units increases; (iii) in all circumstances analyzed, the distributions of earnings, income and especially wealth become more concentrated.     

VOTING, INEQUALITY AND REDISTRIBUTION

Abstract.  This paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reasonable assumptions, the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner. If the median is poorer than average, redistribution is from rich to poor, and increasing inequality increases redistribution. However, under different assumptions about the economic environment, redistribution may not be simply rich to poor, and inequality need not increase redistribution. Several lines of argument are presented, in particular, political participation, public provision of private goods, public pensions, and tax avoidance or evasion.     

Distributional implications of informal economy in the EU countries: Accounting for the spread of tax evasion benefits and cultural characteristics

This study provides evidence about the impact of informal economy on income inequality by using annual cross-country panel data from 28 European Union countries observed during the period 2005–2017. Particular attention is dedicated to the cultural setting which is expected to impact taxpayers’ behaviour and thereby income distribution. The study reveals a relationship between the size of the underground economy and income inequality, which is negative when approaching domestic informality and positive when international tax evasion by individuals is related to the top-bottom income disparity. Moreover, a delay of one-year is needed for these effects to occur, sustaining the hypothesis of secondary consequences of the informality. The study also shows that a set of cultural peculiarities are relevant for the nexus of international tax evasion by individuals and income polarisation. The inequality enhancing effect of the offshore activities is larger in countries with high degree of uncertainty avoidance and power distance, and low level of indulgence and long-term orientation respectively.     

Choosing union representation: the role of attitudes and emotions

In the United States, most unions are recognised by a majority vote of employees through union representation elections administered by the government. Most empirical studies of individual voting behaviour during union representation elections use a rational choice model. Recently, however, some have posited that voting is often influenced by emotions. We evaluate competing hypotheses about the determinants of union voting behaviour by using data collected from a 2010 representation election at Delta Air Lines, a US‐based company. In addition to the older rational choice framework, multiple regression results provide support for an emotional choice model. Positive feelings toward the employer are statistically significantly related to voting ‘no’ in a representation election, while positive feelings toward the union are related to a ‘yes’ vote. Effect sizes for the emotion variables were generally larger than those for the rational choice variables, suggesting that emotions may play a key role in representation election outcomes.