我国金融业上市公司高管薪酬指数研究

上市公司高管薪酬激励不合理问题一直是公司治理领域的焦点之一。现通过借鉴高明华的中国上市公司高管薪酬指数的研究方法,对金融行业高管薪酬水平进行测算。研究发现,银行业和保险业高管薪酬激励不足,证券业激励适中,其他金融业激励过度,金融业上市公司高管薪酬的内部差异明显,但呈现逐渐缩小的趋势。以期为改善金融业高管薪酬现状提供依据。     

广西上市公司高管薪酬与经营业绩研究

通过广西18家上市公司面板数据的实证分析,发现高管薪酬与公司业绩无显著相关,与公司规模显著正相关,国有控股比例对高管薪酬无影响,近年来高管薪酬也没有显著改善。建议提高广西上市公司高管薪酬水平,完善薪酬结构,加大股权激励力度,逐步降低国有持股比例。     

上市公司高管薪酬制度研究

企业是市场经济竞争的主体。但从某种程度上说,企业的竞争又是其管理者之间的竞争。因此,构建一套好的薪酬制度将会有利于对高管们的约束和激励,从而有助于企业的发展和成长乃至整个市场经济体制的建设。本文分析了上市公司高管薪酬的影响因素及存在的问题,并针对已有问题提出建议。     

我国上市公司高管薪酬影响因素的实证分析——基于上市公司面板数据的实证研究

本文采用2006~2009年沪深上市公司面板数据,运用STATA软件,使用固定效应模型和随机效应模型对部分上市公司的高管薪酬的影响因素进行分析。并采用新的变量因素企业自由现金流以及现金再投资率代表企业所依赖的资本市场,实证分析高管薪酬与公司业绩以及其他变量之间的关系,了解高管薪酬业绩敏感性以及企业的现金流量与高管薪酬的相关性,针对实证的结果提出可能的意见。     

上市公司高管薪酬理论综述

近年来,高管薪酬越来越受到社会各界的关注.既关注高管薪酬水平,也关注薪酬制度,同时还关注薪酬理论.文章对当前社会的高管薪酬基本理论进行了综述,以其为高管薪酬研究提供帮助.     

我国上市公司高管薪酬激励的研究

我国上市公司高管薪酬激励一直以来都颇受舆论的关注,从令人惊愕的"高薪神话"到"史上最穷高管",舆论一次次的将上市公司高管的薪酬问题推到了风口浪尖。本文从我国上市公司高管薪酬激励的现状出发,分析了其中所存在的问题,并提出了相应的改进措施,从而使得我国上市公司高管薪酬激励更加有效。     

我国上市公司高管薪酬粘性问题研究

企业管理层作为现代企业组织结构中重要的一个部分,其薪酬问题已经成为学术界研究的焦点.大量公司高管天价薪酬事件的爆出使得越来越多的学者开始关注高层管理人员的薪酬与公司业绩的粘性特征,即薪酬与盈利业绩的敏感度较高,而与亏损业绩的敏感度较低.本文对关于高管薪酬粘性特征的研究加以梳理,并试图找寻未来在这一问题上可能存在的研究方向.     

上市公司高管薪酬激励问题案例研究

上市公司高管激励问题源于现代企业的所有权与经营权的分离,随着我国企业现代企业制度的逐渐建立和完善,公司内外部治理结构也发生了新的变化。上市公司高管薪酬制度正是伴随着企业治理模式的不断演进而逐渐规范。那么,当前我国上市公司高管薪酬激励现状是什么样呢?本文通过查阅资料和数据统计,发现我国上市公司高管薪酬激励存在诸多问题,并提出相关建议。     

我国上市公司高管薪酬激励体制研究

现代企业想要在市场竞争里取得胜利,人才是一项不可或缺的因素,其中高层管理者在所有企业中所占的地位是不言而喻的。本文结合中国的薪酬的激励现状,对上市公司高管薪酬激励中间存在问题进行了深入的分析,并以此为基础为完善企业的高管的薪酬激励机制提出合理建议。     

上市公司高管薪酬影响因素研究

本文选取了2006~2008年沪深两市的上市公司为样本,提出了公司业绩、规模、股权集中度等与高管薪酬存在相关性的假设。研究发现,我国上市公司高管薪酬与公司业绩、规模、地区发展程度显著正相关,与股权集中度显著负相关。     

上市公司高管相对薪酬差距与公司绩效相关性研究

对高管薪酬与公司绩效的已有研究主要集中在高管薪酬总额以及绝对薪酬差距方面。现采用相对薪酬差距指标,以沪深两市435家制造业上市公司的年报数据为基础,对高管薪酬与公司绩效之间的相关性进行了实证研究。研究结果表明,高管相对薪酬差距对公司绩效无正向显著性,并呈现出负向影响的趋势,结果符合行为理论提出的假说。     

经理人报酬与公司业绩之间的相关性检验

以我国上市公司2000、2001、2002年年报数据为主要分析对象,运用线性回归的方法对经理人报酬与公司资本成本及公司业绩之间的相关性进行实证研究,并得出如下结论:经理人报酬与ROA呈显著的线性相关性,与ROE、△SMVA非线性相关,与SEVA存在较强的线性相关性。通过实证研究,还发现经理人报酬主要激励当前业绩和未来业绩,当期激励效果直接影响下期业绩水平。     

管理层权力、TMT网络与高管薪酬

文章基于管理层权力理论和社会网络理论,以2010〖KG-*4〗-〖KG-*6〗2014年我国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了管理层权力对高管薪酬的影响,并考察TMT网络的调节作用。研究发现：管理层权力显著提高了高管薪酬水平,但显著降低了高管薪酬业绩敏感度;而TMT网络显著增强了它们之间的相关关系。研究为管理层权力与高管薪酬之间关系的研究提供了增量证据,为完善我国高管薪酬激励制度、抑制管理层权力、规范高管之间的兼任行为提供了参考和借鉴。     

职业经理人薪酬实证研究述评

职业经理人薪酬是近年来国内外理论界关注的热点问题.本文对职业经理人薪酬的实证研究进行了全面回顾,并对今后我国职业经理人的薪酬研究作出了展望.     

An Examination of the Structure of Executive Compensation and Corporate Social Responsibility: A Canadian Investigation

We explore the extent to which Boards use executive compensation to incite firms to act in accordance with social and environmental objectives (e.g., Johnson, R. and D. Greening: 1999, Academy of Management Journal 42(5), 564–578 ; Kane, E. J.: 2002, Journal of Banking and Finance 26, 1919–1933.). We examine the association between executive compensation and corporate social responsibility (CSR) for 77 Canadian firms using three key components of executives’ compensation structure: salary, bonus, and stock options. Similar to prior research (McGuire, J., S. Dow and K. Argheyd: 2003, Journal of Business Ethics 45(4), 341–359), we measure three different aspects of CSR, which include Total CSR as well as CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses. CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses capture the positive and negative aspects of CSR, respectively. We find significant positive relationships between: (1) Salary and CSR Weaknesses, (2) Bonus and CSR Strengths, (3) Stock Options and Total CSR; and (4) Stock Options and CSR Strengths. Our findings suggest the importance of the structure of executive compensation in encouraging socially responsible actions, particularly for larger Canadian firms. This in turn suggests that executive compensation can be an effective tool in aligning executives’ welfare with that of the “common good”, which results in more socially responsible firms (Bebchuk, L., J. Fried and D. Walker: 2002, The University of Chicago Law Review 69, 751–846; Zalewski, D.: 2003, Journal of Economic Issues 37(2), 503–509). In addition, our findings suggest the importance of institutional context in influencing the association between executive compensation and CSR. Further implications for practice and research are discussed.Lois. Mahoney is an Assistant Professor at Eastern Michigan University. Her research is focused in the areas of ethics and accounting information systems. She has published in ethics and accounting journals including Journal of Business Ethics, Business Ethics Quarterly, Research on Professional Responsibility and Ethics in Accounting, Information and Organization. Dr. Mahoney has received several research awards, including Best Paper award at the Seventh Symposium on Ethics Research in Accounting. Dr. Mahoney is also actively involved in the American Accounting Association.Linda Thorn is an Associate Professor at York University in Toronto Ontario. Her research focuses on ethical decision making, the ethics of accountants and accounting students and ethical aspects of accounting information. She has published in ethics and accounting journal including among others, Business Ethics Quarterly, Journal of Business Ethics, Contemporary Accounting Research, Behavioral Research in Accounting and Audit: A Journal of Practice in Theory.     

我国上市公司经理报酬水平的制度特征研究

本文在回顾我国上市公司经理报酬制度的基础上,对我国上市公司总经理现金报酬水平及趋势作了分析,并比较了不同股权性质的上市公司经理报酬水平的差异和变化趋势。此外,本文对我国上市公司经理现金报酬的类型及特征作了分析,发现业绩型报酬在上市公司中的使用逐步增加,且该类型的报酬水平比非业绩型的报酬水平要高。最后,我们分析了上市公司确定经理现金报酬水平的参照标准,发现它们主要参照同行业或同地区企业的薪酬水平和业绩。     

The Ethics of Managerial Compensation: The Case of Executive Stock Options

This paper examines the ethics of contemporary managerial compensation in the context of executive stock options. Economic considerations would dictate that executive stock options should be adjusted to eliminate the effect of overall stock market movements which are beyond the control of the executive. However, in practice, most executive stock options are not adjusted to control for these outside factors. Agency considerations are the most likely culprit. Adjusting for the influence of outside factors, such as a generally rising stock market, from executive stock options sets a higher bar for managers to reach. Furthermore, traditional accounting standards permitted firms that did not adjust options to avoid reporting options as expenses. This presents CEOs and boards of directors with a major ethical dilemma. On the one hand, their duty to their shareholders and stakeholders dictates that executive stock options should be adjusted to eliminate outside noise from unrelated movements in the overall stock market. However, financial statements are presented in the language of accounting. If the overwhelming majority of the users of a language define a particular item in one way, then to deviate from the norm implies that the recipient of such a deviant statement may not properly interpret the statement. Likewise, if the standard practice is for firms to use unadjusted options and thus under-report expenses, to deviate from this industry norm risks that users of financial statements would not properly interpret the financial statements, with perhaps negative consequences for the shareholders. In short, if “everyone else does it,” then it could be wrong for an individual firm to deviate from the norm as that would harm the shareholders. James J. Angel is an Associate Professor of Finance at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University. He is a financial expert whose research focuses on the operation of financial markets in the United States and other countries. He currently serves on the OTCBB Advisory Board, and he has served as Chair of the Nasdaq Economic Advisory Council. He earned his undergraduate degree from the California Institute of Technology, his MBA from the Harvard Business School, and he earned his Ph.D. in Finance from the University of California at Berkeley. Douglas M. McCabe is a Professor of Management at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University. He serves on the Editorial Boards of 20 scholarly journals, including Research on Ethical Issues in Organizations, JAI Press as well as the Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal. Considered by the media to be an expert in his field, he has appeared more than 200 times on international (CNN), national (ABC, NBC, and CBS), and local television and radio. He holds a Ph.D. from Cornell University and is a member of Phi Beta Kappa.     

The Effect of Ethical Fund Portfolio Inclusion on Executive Compensation

This paper divides firms in the Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) into two groups based on inclusion in or exclusion from the Domini Social Index (DSI). Inclusion in the DSI is interpreted as a positive indicator of ethical status. Using data for the 1992–2003 period, I provide evidence that chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, other executive compensation, and director compensation tend to be lower in DSI firms than in other firms in the S&P 500. This applies to the unconditional group averages (and medians) and is particularly striking given that DSI firms as a group had better financial performance than the other firms. This finding is also true in a regression framework that controls for other influences on compensation, including firm size and financial performance. In a regression context, the estimated discount for CEOs of DSI firms is approximately 12% for both current compensation (salary and bonuses) and total compensation (including the value of options). These results are consistent with the expectation that some senior executives require a “compensating differential” to accept positions in firms with less attractive ethical status. It is also consistent with the expectation that some firms with positive ethical status might use more restraint in setting executive compensation.James Brander is the Asia-Pacific Professor of International Business in the Sauder School of Business at the University of British Columbia. An economist, his research areas include international trade, industrial organization and finance. He is a former editor of the Canadian Journal of Economics and has published widely, including the textbook “Government Policy Toward Business”.     

上市公司财务效绩评价研究

从国外企业效绩评价来看,财务效益状况始终是企业效绩评价的核心内容;定量与定性分析相结合是各国评价方法的主要形式;对企业业绩的事后评价是政府间接管理企业的有效手段;并从制度甚至法规上对公营企业的业绩评价作出统一规定;评价结果与对企业经营者的选择和奖惩紧密结合。当前,我国学者主张用总分评定法和功效系数法进行企业业绩的综合评价。在实际应用中,总分评定法要为各项评定指标规定标准值,而且行业不同评价指标体系与标准值也不同,应用难度比较大;应用功效系数法进行综合评价时,各项指标的满意值与不满意值的确定比较复杂,且权数一般凭经验来确定,主观性太强,综合评价的结果与实际状况出入较大。多元统计的评价方法能够比较客观地反映企业的实际状况,同时可以避免人为因素带来的偏差。     

The Effects of Fraud and Lawsuit Revelation on U.S. Executive Turnover and Compensation

This study investigates the impact of fraud/lawsuit revelation on U.S. top executive turnover and compensation. It also examines potential explanatory variables affecting the executive turnover and compensation among U.S. fraud/lawsuit firms. Four important findings are documented. First, there was significantly higher executive turnover among U.S. firms with fraud/lawsuit revelation in the Wall Street Journal than matched firms without such revelation. Second, although on average, U.S. top executives received an increase in cash compensation after fraud/lawsuit revelation, this increase is smaller than that of matched non-fraud/lawsuit firms. Third, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to change top executive when chief executive officer (CEO) was not the board chairman and CEO had been on the board for a short time. Fourth, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation when profitability was low, firms were involved in fraud, the compensation committee size was small, and the board met more often. These findings indicate that although, in general, U.S. fraud/lawsuits firms did not reduce their executive cash compensation, those involved in fraud were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation than to change their top executives. The finding, that ethical standards is not a significant factor for U.S. executive turnover nor compensation reduction, suggests that ethics appears to play no part in the board’s decisions, and that U.S. firms may have ethical standards in writing but they do not implement nor enforce the standards.