Optimal industrial policy in vertically related markets

This paper examines the optimal industrial policy for an industry with a vertical market structure. A home firm and a foreign firm both import an intermediate good from a third country to produce a final good. How the home country government sets the optimal industrial policy has to take account of both profit shifting between the two final good producers and between the intermediate good producer and the home firm. We explain how the optimal industrial policy depends on the slope of the demand curve, the levels of technology spillover and product differentiation. In particular, there exists a critical level of technology spillover at which investments of the firms are neither strategic substitutes nor complements and the optimal industrial policy is always investment tax.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,CREDIBLE POLICY: The Role of Risk Sharing

This article constructs a model of international joint ventures with risk sharing as the main motivation. A foreign firm decides whether to undertake full ownership foreign direct investment, or to form a public-private joint venture with the host country government in an economy in transition. In our framework uncertain taxation is the source of risk. It is demonstrated that start-up investment cost sharing by the host country government encourages foreign investment. Joint financing of investment can act as insurance for the multinational firm because cost sharing serves as a means to sustain the credibility of government policy.     

Cross-border mergers and market concentration in a vertically related industry: theory and evidence

We present a tractable model of oligopoly to identify the linkages between local competition and cross-border mergers in a vertically related industry. We show that the incentives for cross-border mergers rise with vertical integration in an industry when the premerger concentration in that industry is sufficiently high relative to the concentration in the same industry in a foreign country. We also show that the incentives for a merger between a foreign firm and a vertically integrated home firm will be higher than that for a merger between a foreign firm and a disintegrated home firm, when the premerger concentration at home is low relative to the premerger concentration in the foreign country. We then analyze a firm-level panel of 90,614 M&A observations, between 1990 and 2012, from 86 countries. Logistic regressions confirm that market concentration is an important determinant of cross-border M&A. Our results support the conjectures of our theoretical model and are consistent with recent empirical findings and theoretical predictions.     

Institutional conditions,economic policy uncertainty and foreign institutional investment in China

This paper investigates the influence of host and home country institutional conditions on foreign institutional investment. Utilizing longitudinal and multilevel data on foreign institutional investment in Chinese listed firms between 2004 and 2017, we document that foreign institutional investment decreases with increasing economic policy uncertainty in the host nation. We also find that foreign institutional investors respond more strongly to local economic policy uncertainty when their home nations are closer to China, are culturally and administratively similar to China, operate a smaller domestic stock market, and have weaker minority shareholder protection. The impact of economic policy uncertainty on foreign institutional investment is also stronger when the host nation institution is more developed and open.. Moreover, we reveal the mediating role of stock market volatility on this relationship. Overall, we document that foreign institutional investment is not only shaped by institutional conditions in the host country but also influenced by home country characteristics that define geographical and institutional distance between home and host nations.     

Foreign direct investment and productivity spillovers in Irish manufacturing industry: evidence from plant level panel data

It is often argued that foreign firms may enhance the productivity of indigenous firms in an economy, through forward or backward linkages. Such externality effects typically are called “productivity spillovers”. In terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), Ireland is one of the most globalized economies in the world, having pursued a strategy of promoting investment by foreign companies for over 40 years. This article examines possible productivity spillovers from foreign‐owned firms to indigenous firms in the Irish manufacturing sector, using plant‐level data on all manufacturing firms for the period 1991–1998. Despite Irish policy commitment to building linkages between foreign and domestic firms, we find only weak evidence of spillovers and this evidence is sensitive to the definition and measurement of foreign presence.     

R&D Policy Involving Consumer-Friendly Strategy: Cooperative and Non-Cooperative R&D

In a highly globalized economy, foreign exporting firms have initiatives to be consumer friendly for many reasons. The aim of the present paper is to endogenize consumer-friendly actions by the exporting firms, and explore how government’s industrial policy and firm’s R&D investment are affected by the strategy of foreign exporting firms under cooperative and non-cooperative R&D commitments in an international rivalry market. It finds that consumer-friendly action is a dominant strategy equilibrium, and no matter whether under cooperative or non-cooperative R&D, a consumer-friendly firm tends to invest less than does the purely profit-maximizing firm on R&D under symmetrical decisions. In the case of firms cooperating in R&D and involving consumer-friendliness in action, their governments need not intervene. On the other hand, governments always subsidize non-cooperative R&D activities, or cooperative but unfriendly firms. Furthermore, the consumer-friendly action will result in more (less) R&D subsidies by the exporting government when both firms non-cooperate (cooperate) in R&D. Finally, it is robust to indicate that the government of an importing country prefers friendly foreign firms in any circumstances. Above all, the equilibrium outcomes explain the crucial role of consumer-friendly strategy for industrial policies and R&D activities.     

Foreign investment and control of transnational enterprises

Foreign investment by transnational enterprises (TNEs) in less developed countries has been explained by the differential rates of return available to foreign capital at home and in the host country. However, an equally significant aspect of such investment is the issue of control of TNE operations in the host country. This forms the basic difference between foreign direct and foreign indirect investment. This paper addresses this issue showing that foreign direct investment is better for the host than indirect investment. We discuss how host government policy can affect the decisions of TNEs and achieve the best outcome for the host economy.     

Infant industry protection with oligopoly and learning-by-doing

I use a simple two-period learning-by-doing model to examine optimal home country protection policy. In some cases, as in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (Oxford Economic Papers 40 (1988), 246–68), the home government will impose an import ban to protect the home firm from foreign competition. On the other hand, a protective tariff often provides greater welfare than when an import ban is imposed. In these cases, the first-period dynamic tariff is greater than the static Brander and Spencer ‘profit shifting tariff’. Protection in the form either of a tariff or an import ban encourages the home firm to invest in current output which reduces future costs. In addition to dynamic profit shifting, protection can bc valuable because the home firm does not consider the effect of its current learning on future consumer surplus. Tariffs can thus encourage the growth of infant industries while benefiting consumers in the future. Furthermore, the home firm can have an incentive to price below cost if the potential cost savings are sufficiently valuable.     

Dumping as a signal of innovation

In the R&D-intensive industries, where technologies change rapidly, an innovative foreign firm may need to export greater than normal quantities to signal the level of the new technology it possesses. We find that such actions lead to sales below cost if the foreign firm has a relatively poor reputation for innovation, has a sufficiently high discount factor or possesses a new technology that significantly cuts its cost. We also show that antidumping reduces the costs of signaling, benefits the home firm, and may raise the profit to the foreign firm in the pre-duty period.     

Potential FDI causing large distortions in domestic production

When a foreign firm enters a domestic market, either via exports or through foreign direct investment (FDI), one factor determining the most favourable entrance mode is the profitability of the market, which may not be directly observed by the foreign firm. If the domestic trade protection policy is within a certain range that causes the foreign entrant's decision to swing between the two entry modes, the final choice will depend on the foreign firm's belief about the profitability. In such a situation, a domestic incumbent firm wishing to prevent FDI will heavily distort its production downward to convince the foreign competitor that the market is not profitable. When making trade policy, such strategic behaviour on the part of the domestic firm should be taken into account.     

Economic slowdowns,hazard rates and foreign ownership

This paper evaluates the link between foreign ownership and firm exit during crises, using a longitudinal micro dataset over an 18-year period. We address two main questions: first, if foreign affiliates have different failure rates than domestic firms during economic downturns, and second if the foreignness effect differs between two different economic downturns. The results partially confirm the liability of foreignness argument, suggesting that when the crisis was more pronounced at home than abroad, the differences in hazard rates between foreign and domestic firms reduce. The footloose argument is also only partially confirmed. For policy makers, our results on survival dynamics during crises are not against policies stimulating inward investment. There is no need to fear that foreign firms destabilize more than usual the host economy during economic slowdowns by immediately closing down operations.     

Cross-Country Evidence on the Effectiveness of Foreign Investment Policies

This study empirically evaluates the effectiveness of government policies toward foreign enterprises and foreign direct investment activity. Foreign investment policies are difficult to quantify, but we overcome this difficulty by employing an index that reflects a country's general regulatory environment and treatment of foreign businesses. The evidence on the effectiveness of foreign investment policy measures is captured by a panel regression model, which pools together a cross-section of 153 countries over the period 1995–2001. The statistically significant explanatory power of the policy index is robust to the presence of a host of conditioning variables, some of which serve as fundamental foreign investment determinants that lie largely outside the direct control of national policy.     

Relational Resources in Interorganizational Exchange: The Effects of Trade Equity and Brand Equity

This research examines the effects of two key relational resources in relationships between retailers and national brand manufacturers. We introduce the new concept of trade equity, defined here as the value that accrues to a firm from being known in a trading network as a trustworthy trading partner, to explore the relational resources that are inherent in a firm’s ties with trading partners. We consider brand equity to represent relational resources that are located in a firm’s relational ties with end consumers. Based on data collected in a survey of 797 home appliance retailers, results show that a manufacturer’s trade equity and brand equity have differential effects on the retailer’s dependence and commitment to the manufacturer. Findings show that a manufacturer’s brand equity strengthens the effect of its trade equity on the retailer’s dependence and weakens the effect on the retailer’s commitment.     

Do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements?

We examine the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy reputation when both are self-sustaining. We show that domestic policy commitment does not necessarily facilitate international cooperation; rather, efficient policies may be most easily sustained when governments are unable to pre-commit to policy domestically. Moreover, the lack of domestic commitment is more likely to facilitate international cooperation the larger the international spillovers of domestic policies are.     

Policy choice: Theory and evidence from commitment via international trade agreements

Why do governments employ inefficient policies when more efficient ones are available for the same purpose? We address this puzzle in the context of redistribution toward special interest groups (SIGs) by focusing on a set of important policies: tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). In our policy choice model a government can gain by committing to constrain tariffs through international agreements even if this leads to the use of less efficient NTBs; commitment has political value because it improves the bargaining position of a government that is weak relative to domestic SIGs. Using detailed data we find support for several of the model's predictions including: (i) tariff commitments in trade agreements increase the likelihood and restrictiveness of NTBs but not enough to offset the original tariff reductions; (ii) tariff commitments are more likely to be adopted and more stringent when the government is weaker relative to a SIG. Thus, the results can explain the use of inefficient policies for redistribution and suggest that the bargaining motive is an important source of the political value of commitment in international agreements.     

A theory of the currency denomination of international trade

The currency denomination of international trade has significant macroeconomic and policy implications. In this paper we solve for the optimal invoicing choice by integrating this microeconomic decision at the level of the firm into a general equilibrium open economy model. Strategic interactions between firms play a critical role. We find that the less competition firms face in foreign markets, as reflected in market share and product differentiation, the more likely they will price in their own currency. We also show that when a set of countries forms a monetary union, the new currency is likely to be used more extensively in trade than the sum of the currencies it replaces.     

Information costs and home bias: an analysis of US holdings of foreign equities

We test extant hypotheses of the home bias in equity holdings using high quality cross-border holdings data and quantitative measures of barriers to international investment. The effects of direct barriers to international investment, when statistically significant, are not economically meaningful. More important are information asymmetries that owe to the poor quality and low credibility of financial information in many countries. While a direct measure of information costs is not available, some foreign firms have reduced these costs by publicly listing their securities in the United States, where investor protection regulations elicit standardized, credible financial information. A proxy for the reduction in information asymmetries—the portion of a country’s market that has a public US listing—is a major determinant of a country’s weight in US investors’ portfolios. Foreign countries whose firms do not alleviate information costs by opting into the US regulatory environment are more severely underweighted in US equity portfolios.     

What drives outward FDI of Chinese firms? Testing the explanatory power of three theoretical frameworks

This study examines the forces driving outward FDI of emerging-market firms. Its contribution lies in integrating and testing insights from institutional theory, industrial organization economics and the resource-based view of the firm. This approach enables us to consider three different levels of analysis – firm, industry and country – and, thus, to distinguish between different sources of variation. Using a large firm-level Chinese dataset, we offer new evidence indicating that government support and the industrial structure of the home country of the investing firm play a crucial role in explaining outward FDI. By contrast, technological and advertising resources tend to be less important. The findings have important implications for theorizing. Although some firm-specific idiosyncrasies still play a role in explaining variations across firms in the same industry, the theoretical analysis and empirical results consistently indicate that foreign investment of Chinese firms is largely driven by their distinctive institutional and industrial environment.     

Cooperative ventures in emerging economies

Foreign market entry strategy involves choices about which markets to enter and how to do it. Most of the literature on foreign direct investment reflects an interest in ownership structure decisions and the risks foreign investing firm may face. As recognized in many studies, one set of risks arises from public expropriation hazards, a function of the ability of the host country's institutional environment to credibly commit to a given policy or regulatory regime. Empirical research has shown this hazard to have an impact on ownership levels. This study is a theoretical model that describes how multinational firms face moral hazard risk from their local partners and political risk from the host country when they decide to go abroad in a joint-venture alliance. I found that the greater the level of hazard expropriation, the lower the participation of the multinational firm in the final cash flow, except for when the multinational firm has the negotiation power and there is a high level of local investment protectionism. In that case, the multinational firm increases its participation in the final cash flow.     

Optimal trade,industrial, and privatization policies in a mixed duopoly with strategic managerial incentives

Abstract

This paper examines optimal trade, industrial, and privatization policies in a home-market model of mixed international duopoly with strategic managerial incentives. Under linear demand and constant marginal costs, the optimal degree of privatization is shown to depend crucially on cost and demand parameters and on the availability of strategic trade and industrial policies. If both firms are equally efficient, optimal trade and industrial policies drive out the foreign firm and the privatization policy loses its effect on national welfare; however, if the home firm is less efficient, then full privatization combined with an import tariff and a production subsidy is optimal for the home country, while an export subsidy is optimal for the foreign country. If trade and industrial policies are unavailable and if both firms are equally efficient, full state-ownership, which drives out the foreign firm, becomes optimal; however, if the home firm is less efficient, only partial privatization is optimal, The state-ownership share is increased if either the market size grows, the home firm's efficiency increases, or the foreign firm's efficiency decreases. Further, the paper demonstrates the potential conflict between privatization and trade liberalization policies.