The determinants of cross-border equity flows

We explore a new panel data set on bilateral gross cross-border equity flows between 14 countries, 1989-1996. We show that a “gravity” model explains international transactions in financial assets at least as well as goods trade transactions. Gross transaction flows depend on market size in source and destination country as well as trading costs, in which both information and the transaction technology play a role. Distance proxies some information costs, and other variables explicitly represent information transmission, an information asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors, and the efficiency of transactions. The geography of information is the main determinant of the pattern of international transactions, while there is weak support in our data for the diversification motive, once we control for the informational friction. We broaden the scope of our results by presenting some evidence linking the results on equity transactions to equity holdings.     

The Implications of the Home Bias in Equity Portfolios

Although the diversification benefits of international investment are well documented, many large equity portfolios remain heavily concentrated in their domestic stock market. The reason for this is sometimes given as a desire to hedge domestic inflation by holding domestic equities. The evidence is, however, that equities do not hedge inflation in this way for the types of investment horizon relevant to most portfolios. An alternative explanation is that there are costs, such as taxes, which prevent investors taking full advantage of international diversification. The magnitude of these costs necessary to explain the level of "home bias" is above the level of observable costs, such as withholding taxes. The implications of these results are that international capital markets are segmented not only by costs and restrictions, but also by other informational imperfections. They also imply that international corporate investment and financing decisions depend on the location of the investing company.     

Financial integration and the wealth effect of exchange rate fluctuations

Recent years have witnessed a large increase in international financial integration in the form of largely offsetting cross-holdings across countries. We assess how such financial leverage affects the international transmission of monetary shocks, and find that it leads to sizable welfare differentials that far exceed the impact due to nominal rigidities. We document the relevance of the exact nature of holdings, with bond holdings associated with larger effects than equity holdings. The impact of financial leverage on welfare is also sensitive to the extent of exchange rate pass-through and the substitutability between goods produced in different countries.     

Does trade raise income?: Evidence from the twentieth century

Efforts to estimate the effects of international trade on a country’s real income have been hampered by the failure to account for the endogeneity of trade. Frankel and Romer recently use a country’s geographic attributes — notably its distance from potential trading partners — to construct an instrument to identify the effects of trade on income in 1985. Using data from the pre-World War I, the interwar, and the post-war periods, we find that the main result of Frankel and Romer is confirmed throughout the whole century: countries that trade more as a proportion of their GDP have higher incomes even after controlling for the endogeneity of trade. We also find that the OLS estimate of trade’s effect on income is biased downwards in almost every sample year. However, this result is not robust to the inclusion of distance from equator (latitude).     

Is the multinational firm in danger?: The threat of nationalism

A ground swell of nationalism in foreign countries may mean the end of the multinational firm; steps to accommodate to public sentiment in the host country offer only temporary relief, and the proposed. “supranational” corporation would still be considered an outsider. A new form of international business activity must evolve. One possibility is a management contract, whereby the Western firm supplies management skills and technical knowledge without the equity participation and direct control that have been the essence of traditional foreign investment. This device would remove the principal objection of host countries to direct investment from abroad—foreign ownership of local industry—and the foreign firm would benefit from some revenue—better than eviction.     

The demand for safe assets in emerging economies and global imbalances: New empirical evidence

Recent economic theory has singled out mismatches between the supply and the demand of safe financial assets in emerging countries as drivers of international capital flows and, ultimately, global current account imbalances. This paper assesses empirically the contribution of such “search for safe assets” to the size and composition of emerging economies’ international asset portfolios. Excess demand for safe assets in financially less‐developed countries would imply that these countries hold disproportionately high shares of their total portfolios in foreign assets. Moreover, financially less‐developed countries would hold disproportionately high shares of their foreign portfolios in financially developed countries, which are the major producers of ostensibly safe assets. This paper finds little empirical support for these predictions. Financially less‐developed countries allocate a larger proportion of their total holdings to domestic assets. Even when focusing on their foreign portfolios, there is no evidence of a general bias towards the assets of financially developed countries. Overall, asset mismatches do not appear to explain the asset allocation of financially less‐developed countries.     

The composition of international capital flows: risk sharing through foreign direct investment

Evidence on international capital flows suggests that foreign direct investment (FDI) is less volatile than other financial flows. To explain this finding I model international capital flows under the assumptions of imperfect enforcement of financial contracts and inalienability of FDI. Imperfect enforcement of contracts leads to endogenous financing constraints and the pricing of default risk. Inalienability implies that it is not as advantageous to expropriate FDI relative to other flows. These features combine to give a risk sharing advantage to FDI over other capital flows. This risk sharing advantage of FDI translates into a lower default premium and lower sensitivity to changes in a country’s financing constraint.The model offers the new implication that financially constrained countries should borrow relatively more through FDI. This is because FDI is harder to expropriate and not because FDI is more productive or less volatile. Using several creditworthiness and country risk ratings to measure financing constraints, I present new evidence linking FDI and financing constraints. Moreover, numerical simulations of the model generate stronger serial correlation for FDI than for other flows into developing countries. This corroborates the view that non-FDI flows are more short-term and more likely to change direction.     

Growing up with capital flows

We examine the capital flows-domestic investment relationship for 60 developing countries from 1979 to 1999. In the 1990s, even as liberalization attracted new flows, foreign capital stimulated less domestic investment than in the preceding decade. With greater financial integration, governments accumulated more international reserves and domestic residents diversified by investing abroad. Foreign investors were also motivated by diversification objectives rather than by unmet investment needs. Inflows were channeled increasingly through portfolio flows—or through foreign direct investment (FDI) with the characteristics of portfolio capital—resulting in weak investment stimulus. However, stronger policy environments strengthened the link between inflows and investment.     

Does it Really Hurt to be Responsible?

Prior literature on socially responsible investment has contended that excluding “sin stocks” from a portfolio (negative screening) will reduce performance and increase risk. Further, incorporating stocks of firms with positive social responsibility scores (positive screening) will improve performance and reduce risk. We simulate portfolios designed to mimic typical equity mutual funds’ holdings and investigate these propositions. We remove the potentially confounding influences of differences in manager skill, transaction costs and fees, and conduct a clean experiment on the effect of positive and negative portfolio screening. We find no difference in the return or risk of screened and unscreened portfolios. We conclude that a typical socially responsible fund will neither gain nor lose from screening its portfolio.     

Accounting for quality differences in human capital and foreign direct investment

This paper empirically investigates how cross-country differences in the quality of human capital, as they are captured by the conventional measures of international test score differences, influences the patterns of foreign direct investment. Using panel data covering 32 countries during the period between 1985 and 2004, this paper finds that a host country's quality of educational attainment plays an independent role in attracting foreign direct investment. In particular, the quality of human capital influences horizontal foreign direct investment, even after accounting for the roles of skill and factor endowments, trade costs, investment costs, and country-size and income effects.     

The Role of Geography in Financial and Economic Integration: A Comparative Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment,Trade and Portfolio Investment Flows

The objective of this paper is to examine the role of geography in explaining the patterns of financial and economic integration among both developed and developing countries. Using a gravity model, we compare North‐North, North‐South and South‐North FDI, trade and portfolio investment flows to examine how geographical factors influence these bilateral flows. The results indicate that the impact of geography variables on FDI and portfolio are similar to their effect on trade. Geography variables have a statistically significant effect both on FDI and portfolio investment, but FDI is more sensitive to distance. We interpret the negative effect of distance as the existence of information costs in financial flows. Also bilateral FDI, trade and portfolio investment flows react to macroeconomic fundamentals in the same way, however, with different degrees of sensitivity. There are significant differences between North‐North and North‐South flows. Our results find support for the argument that most FDI among industrial countries are horizontal, whereas most FDI investment in developing countries is vertical. The fact that the significance of geographical variables on financial flows still remained even after controlling for the macroeconomic fundamentals, is in contrast with the standard capital market model. The results can, however, be reconciled if geographical factors can proxy for information costs, which may in turn explain why country portfolios are still home‐biased. The significant effect of distance on financial flows may also explain how idiosyn cratic shocks are spread (i.e. contagion) to other countries in the same region. Ultimately, the geographical location of a country may determine its economic and financial integration into the world economy.     

Export industry policy and reputational comparative advantage

Country-of-origin reputations are endogenized in this paper and it is shown that otherwise identical countries can be correctly perceived as differing in their percentage of high-quality producers. These self-fulfilling reputations determine not only the average quality of a country’s exports but also the type of products in which a country specializes. Hence, the pattern of international trade can be determined by this ‘reputational comparative advantage’. An inferior country-of-origin reputation leads to lower national welfare, therefore, several trade and industrial policies that can improve country-of-origin reputation are examined.     

International portfolios, capital accumulation and foreign assets dynamics

Despite the liberalization of capital flows among OECD countries, equity home bias remains sizable. We depart from the two familiar explanations of equity home bias: transaction costs that impede international diversification, and terms of trade responses to supply shocks that provide risk sharing, so that there is little incentive to hold diversified portfolios. We show that the interaction of the following ingredients generates a realistic equity home bias: capital accumulation and international trade in stocks and bonds. In our model, domestic stocks are used to hedge fluctuations in local wage income. Terms of trade risk is hedged using bonds denominated in local goods and in foreign goods. In contrast to related models, the low level of international diversification does not depend on strongly countercyclical terms of trade. The model also reproduces the cyclical dynamics of foreign asset positions and of international capital flows.     

The pecking order of cross-border investment

Is there a pecking order of cross-border investment in that countries become financially integrated through some types of investment rather than others? Using a novel database of bilateral capital stocks for all types of investment - FDI, portfolio equity securities, debt securities as well as loans - for a broad set of 77 countries, we show that such a pecking order indeed exists. The paper focuses on two key determinants of this pecking order: information frictions and the quality of host country institutions. Overall, we find that in particular FDI, and to some extent also loans, are substantially more sensitive to information frictions than investment in portfolio equity and debt securities. We also show that the share as well as the size of FDI that a country receive are largely insensitive to institutional factors in host countries, while portfolio investment is by far the most sensitive to the quality of institutions. This provides new evidence in favor of some hypotheses but contradicts others put forward in the literature on trade in financial assets.     

The cross-Atlantic tussle over financial data and privacy rights

Banking is an international business; both information and capital flow relatively unimpeded across international borders. Banking institutions’ information stores have increased dramatically with the spread of computers, and these institutions protect data inside their firewalls from outside eyes, and from disaster, through establishing multiple secure data repositories. However, access to banks’ databases is increasingly sought by governments and governance institutions, and restrictions are tightening on moving data across borders. Probably the most prominent example of both trends involves European Union–domiciled cross-border banking business. A key legal reason for resulting issues hinges on differing views of privacy rights: the European Union enshrines privacy as a human right, while the United States empowers rights of free speech over privacy. These differing approaches to privacy rights have caused a cross-Atlantic conflict for global banks. Caught between competing, conflicting regulations, banks’ capacity to move information and to comply with governments’ demands for it have become restricted. This restriction is happening as governments seek increased access to banks’ information for purposes of financial information statecraft—the notion that countries can influence other governments’ policies and actions through data.     

Why did the equity home bias fall during the financial panic of 2008?

Investors tend to put most of their wealth in local stocks; theories of portfolio choice and uncertainty aversion jointly predict that this home bias should increase during a financial crisis. Yet, using a sample of 45 countries, I document that the equity home bias fell during the financial panic of 2008. Exploiting bilateral stock holdings, I find that investors actively increased their home bias, but large valuation changes subsumed these trades. Across countries, the change in home bias is consistent with partial portfolio rebalancing and increased information asymmetries during the crisis.     

Benefits and Costs of International Financial Integration: Theory and Facts

This paper provides a selective review of the recent analytical and empirical literature on the benefits and costs of international financial integration. It discusses the impact of financial openness and capital flows on consumption, investment and growth, as well as the impact of foreign bank entry on the domestic financial system. It argues that, for small open developing countries, the benefits of financial integration are mostly long term in nature, whereas risks can be significant in the short run. Careful preparation and management are therefore essential to ensure that short‐run costs do not lead to policy reversals. It also stresses that the empirical evidence on the impact of foreign direct investment on domestic capital formation and growth, as well as on the effects of foreign bank entry, should be viewed with caution. In particular, the possibility that foreign bank penetration may lead to adverse changes in the allocation of credit cannot be dismissed on the basis of the existing evidence.     

Rhetorics of saving–investment correlations and the international mobility of capital: A survey

This study surveys the literature on saving–investment (SI) correlations and international mobility of capital (IMC) generated over more than three decades since the 1980s. Several studies have shown the presence of paradoxically high SI correlations for the developed countries with observed high IMC, and low SI correlations for the developing countries with observed low IMC. The studies accounting for structural breaks in model parameters provide dominant support for the decrease in SI correlations and increase in IMC after the switch from fixed to flexible exchange rate regime and the removal of policy restrictions on capital flows. The intertemporal optimisation approach to current account and the open-economy growth and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models mainly provide theoretical predictions and suggest that it is possible to find high SI correlations in the wake of high IMC. The increases in international capital flows have been the natural corollary of the growth of international trade in goods and services and increases in foreign direct investment flows. It is these factors, rather than international trade in capital market securities (bonds and equities) driven by the diversification benefits of financial portfolios per se, that have been the key levers of international financial flows.     

Do trade costs in goods market lead to home bias in equities?

Two of the main puzzles in international economics are the consumption and the portfolio home biases. We solve for international equity portfolios in a two-country/two-good stochastic equilibrium model with trade costs in goods markets. We show that introducing trade costs, as suggested by Obstfeld and Rogoff [Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K., 2000a. The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics: Is There a Common Cause? NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 15], is not sufficient to explain these two puzzles simultaneously. On the contrary, we find that trade costs create a foreign bias in portfolios for reasonable parameter values. This result is robust to the addition of non-tradable goods for standard calibrations of the preferences.     

东道国投资壁垒、汇率波动与中国对外直接投资

在国际竞争激烈的大背景下,各国的投资壁垒日益增加。我们采用2010-2019年41个国家的面板数据,构建了以实际有效汇率指数为中介变量的中介效应模型并进行Sobel检验,探究了东道国投资壁垒对我国对外直接投资的影响作用。研究发现,东道国投资壁垒的上升会减少我国的对外直接投资流量,实际有效汇率指数在其中不存在中介效应,而是存在遮掩效应,即投资限制指数遮掩了实际有效汇率指数对外来直接投资的影响作用。最后,据此提出拓展我国对外直接投资发展空间的相关建议。