Unveiling the objectives of central banks: Tales of four Latin American countries

We estimate the stabilization objectives of four Latin American countries that have implemented a flexible inflation targeting regime recently: Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru. In doing so, we develop a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for these economies and estimate their structural parameters through Bayesian methods. To infer the stabilization objectives in each country, we assume that central banks set monetary policy optimally. Our main results highlight that the central banks in these four countries have a high preference for stabilizing inflation, but do not have the systematic objective of stabilizing the exchange rate. This result is robust to assuming either commitment or discretion in the optimal policy. Also, in contrast to the case of commitment, assuming discretion in the optimal monetary policy increases the preference for interest rate smoothing, making it comparable to a preference for inflation stabilization. Finally, except for the case of Peru, the monetary policy under discretion has a better empirical fit in these countries than the one under commitment.     

Optimal monetary policy in a small open economy with inflation and output persistence

We study optimal monetary policy for a small open economy in a model where both inflation and output show persistence. We incorporate habit formation into intertemporal consumption decision and modify the Calvo price setting to include indexation to past inflation. The message conveyed from this study can be viewed as twofold. First, full stabilization of domestic prices or the output gap is not optimal policy. This is because stabilization of the output gap leads to serial correlation in domestic inflation, whereas under full stabilization of domestic prices the output gap displays some serial correlation. It is, however, shown that at the zero inflation steady state, stabilizing domestic prices is equivalent to stabilizing the output gap. Second, in the presence of foreign income shock inflation and the output gap are more stable under flexible CPI inflation targeting than under other alternative policy regimes considered.     

OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY WITH THE STICKY INFORMATION MODEL OF PRICE ADJUSTMENT: INFLATION OR PRICE‐LEVEL TARGETING?

I investigate the optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian macroeconomic framework with the sticky information model of price adjustment. The model is solved for optimal policy, and welfare implications of three alternative monetary policy regimes under this optimal policy are compared when there is a cost‐push shock to the economy. These monetary policy regimes are the unconstrained policy, price‐level targeting and inflation targeting regimes. The results illustrate that optimal policy depends on the degree of price stickiness and the persistence of the shock. Inflation targeting emerges as the optimal policy if prices are flexible enough or the shock is persistent enough. However, the unconstrained policy or price‐level targeting might be preferable to inflation targeting if prices are not very flexible and the shock is not very persistent. The results also show that as prices become more flexible, the welfare loss usually gets bigger.     

The Role of Openness in the Debate on Rules vs. Discretion: A Simple Exposition

In this paper, we examine to what extent the degree of openness matters for the conduct of monetary policy. Our findings suggest that the stabilising properties of nominal income and price level targeting often reported in the literature on monetary policy in closed economies do not carry over to an economy that imports an intermediate input. We also show that the inverse link between openness and average inflation reported by Romer (1993) obtains under discretion. Finally, we compare and contrast discretion to the various rule-based strategies of monetary policy using policy frontiers. In all but one comparison greater openness makes discretion more attractive relative to the rule-based strategies of monetary policy. Nevertheless, in light of empirical estimates for the size of the variances of demand and supply shocks, the case for rule-based monetary policy strategies cannot be dismissed. Rule-based strategies perform better against discretion in the face of supply disturbances rather than demand disturbances.     

Foreign output shock in small open economies: A welfare evaluation of monetary policy regimes

We examine the impact of negative foreign output shocks, which entail negative demand side effects by lowering exports and positive supply side effects by lowering oil prices, on the welfare of non-oil producing, small open economies under five exchange rate and monetary policy regimes. We use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with parameter values calibrated for Hong Kong, Israel, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. We find that welfare levels among the five policy regimes depend on the economy's share of oil imports in world oil consumption. Hong Kong, Singapore and Israel, which have smaller shares, maximize welfare under the Taylor rule, which targets both CPI inflation and real output. South Korea, with higher shares, and Taiwan, with more rigid prices, maximize welfare under real output targeting. CPI inflation targeting, nominal output growth targeting and fixed exchange rate regimes generate lower welfare. However, optimal monetary policy, which generates the highest welfare, gives greater weight on real output than CPI inflation.     

Optimal fiscal and monetary policies in the face of rare disasters

This paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policies in an economy exposed to large adverse shocks (rare disasters). We contrast optimal policies under commitment and discretion and identify several striking differences between these institutional environments. A government that can commit to its policy plans relies heavily on debt to smooth the adverse effects of large shocks over time. Lack of commitment seriously limits the government's ability to use debt as a shock absorber. Under discretion, an increase in debt leads to an increase in inflation expectations and therefore higher nominal interest rate distortions. Hence, the discretionary government keeps debt in close vicinity of its steady-state level, and the response of taxes, inflation, and interest rates to shocks is much more pronounced under discretion than under commitment. This is particularly relevant for large shocks and when the initial stock of government debt is already high at the time the shock occurs. We also argue that the adverse welfare effects of disasters are larger under discretion than under commitment, but these welfare differentials can be significantly reduced by making the discretionary government inflation averse.     

On the welfare implications of nominal GDP targeting

This paper examines the welfare implications of a nominal GDP growth targeting rule, a nominal GDP level targeting rule, and inflation targeting regime in a New Keynesian model featuring positive trend inflation, two measures of welfare, and both high and low growth environments. The paper finds that (i) in general, nominal GDP growth targeting dominates other rules with changes in all dimensions; (ii) nominal GDP growth targeting framework is superior to the level targeting regime for most scenarios; (iii) inflation targeting is preferred to nominal GDP level targeting regime, but to minimize short-run fluctuations, the latter is advantageous; (iv) nominal GDP level targeting may be desirable only in a low growth environment with both low inflation indexation and consumption equivalence criteria. The simulation results provide solid evidence to policy makers on the desirability of nominal GDP growth targeting.     

MONETARY–FISCAL INTERACTIONS WITH A CONSERVATIVE CENTRAL BANK

We study macroeconomic stabilization when monetary and fiscal policies interact via their effects on output and inflation and the monetary authority is more conservative than the fiscal. We find that monetary–fiscal interactions result in poor macroeconomic stabilization. With both policies discretionary, the Nash equilibrium is suboptimal with higher output and lower inflation than optimal; the Nash equilibrium may be extreme with output higher and inflation lower than either authority want. Leadership equilibria are not second best. Monetary commitment is completely negated by fiscal discretion and yields the same outcome as discretionary monetary leadership for all realizations of shocks. But fiscal commitment is not similarly negated by monetary discretion. Optimal macroeconomic stabilization requires either commitment of both monetary and fiscal policies, or identical targets for both authorities – output socially optimal and inflation appropriately conservative – or complete separation of tasks.     

Bond risk premiums and optimal monetary policy

The bond yield dynamics implied by a welfare-maximizing monetary policy and its credibility are explored in general equilibrium. Credibility is captured by a regime change from discretion to commitment. The policy determines the optimal output and inflation responses to a source of inflation risk. Bond yields contain compensations for this risk that depend on the policy. Credibility improvements reduce the exposure to inflation risk and bond risk premiums decline. A model calibration implies lower yield spreads, less volatile yields, and reduced deviations from the expectations hypothesis under commitment. The model suggests an explanation for changes in yield dynamics in the U.S. across different policy regimes.     

Monetary policy and fiscal limits with no-default

This paper discusses monetary and fiscal policy interactions that stabilize government debt. Two distortions prevail in the model economy: income taxes and liquidity constraints. Possible obstructions to fiscal policy include a ceiling on the equilibrium debt-to-GDP ratio, zero or negative elasticity of tax revenues, and a political intolerance of raising tax rates. At the fiscal limit two mechanisms restore solvency: fiscal inflation, which reduces the real value of nominal debt, and open market operations, which diminish the size of government debt held by the private sector. Three regimes achieve this goal. In all regimes monetary policy is passive. In all regimes a muted tax response to government debt is consistent with equilibrium. The propensity of a fiscal authority to smooth output is found to determine what is an acceptable response (in the form of tax rate changes) to the level of government debt, while monetary policy determines the timing and magnitude of fiscal inflation. Impulse responses show that the inflation and tax hikes needed to offset a permanent shock to transfers are lowest under nominal interest rate pegs. In this regime, most of the reduction in the real value of government debt comes from open market purchases.     

How large are the gains to commitment policy and optimal delegation for New Zealand?

This paper measures the benefits of commitment-based monetary policy over discretion for a small open economy inflation targeting country—New Zealand. Significant gains accrue from commitment policy. If commitment-based policy is unavailable, the government can recoup much of the gains to commitment through optimal delegation, asking the Reserve Bank of New Zealand to care more about inflation stabilisation. The 1999 PTA, the core of the policy contract between the New Zealand government and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, placed an increased emphasis on stabilisation of output, interest rates and the exchange rate. This is inconsistent with a shift to optimal delegation behaviour and must stem from a changed perception of the welfare costs of macroeconomic stabilization on the part of the Government. This is shown to be true when the definition of inflation is extended to a medium term measure.     

On discretion versus commitment and the role of the direct exchange rate channel in a forward-looking open economy model

Abstract

This paper compares optimal monetary policy under discretion and commitment in an economy where the direct exchange rate channel is operative. The stabilization bias under discretion is shown to be weaker in an open economy relative to a closed economy. In an open economy, a ‘less conservative central banker’, one that attaches a smaller weight to the variance of inflation in the loss function, can be appointed to replicate the behaviour of real output that eventuates under commitment. Evaluating the social loss function under discretion and commitment, we find that the existence of a direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve mitigates the pronounced differences between the two strategies in case of high persistence in the stochastic shocks.     

Comparing Different Central Bank Targets

In this paper we analyze different target regimes for a central bank. First, we determine the main macroeconomic variables under inflationtargeting and nominal income targeting in the context of a Mundell–Flemmingtwo country model. We then investigate under which conditions onetarget regime is superior to another if supply or demand shocks occur.The main result of this paper is that there exists a unique boundary for theweight on employment in the objective function of the centralbank. If the actual weight is smaller than this bound, inflation targetingis superior to nominal income targeting. For a weight larger than thisbound, nominal income targeting causes a smaller loss. For the two extremecases of the weight, namely zero or infinity one target regime coincideswith the loss-minimizing solution: inflation targeting for a weight of zeroand nominal income targeting for a weight of infinity.     

Inflation Targeting: Some Extensions

Previous analyses of the implementation of inflation targeting are extended to monetary policy responses to different shocks, consequences of model uncertainty, and effects of interest rate smoothing and stabilization. Model uncertainty, output stabilization, and interest rate stabilization or smoothing all call for a more gradual adjustment of the conditional inflation forecast toward the inflation target. The conditional inflation forecast is the natural intermediate target during inflation targeting. The optimal way of reacting to shocks is hence to check how they affect the inflation forecast and then take the appropriate action.
JEL classification : E 42; E 52; E 58     

Time‐Varying Dynamics of the Norwegian Economy

We use time‐varying parameter vector autoregressive models to investigate possible changes in the time‐series properties of key Norwegian macroeconomic variables since the 1980s. Notably, we find that inflation persistence falls during the inflation targeting period, while the volatility of inflation and nominal exchange rates increases. The observed time‐variation in the correlations between the interest rates and the macro variables largely reflects the prevailing monetary policy regimes. An increase in the correlations between oil prices and other macro variables over time is also documented. Using a counterfactual analysis, we discuss the observed time‐varying dynamics of the Norwegian economy in the light of monetary policy and oil price shocks.     

The Simple Post-Keynesian Monetary Policy Model: An Open Economy Approach

Monetary policy with an inflation targeting rule is analyzed through a simple small-scale Post-Keynesian model that incorporates open economy issues. In contrast with previous Post-Keynesian attempts, the model embodies policy authorities that are committed not only to hitting inflation and/or output targets, but also to the achievement of the external balance. To take account of the external balance objective, we model the real exchange rate as an endogenous and moving target, with the nominal exchange rate being the instrument of that target. The model shows that in response to an adverse external shock the central bank has to consider first the required real exchange rate adjustment that will preserve the external balance, and secondly the level at which the interest rate must be set in order to maintain inflation stabilization. Keeping inflation to target requires higher interest rates and strong reliance on the unemployment channel which, under certain circumstances, also has adverse side effects on income distribution. We show that to deal with an exogenous external shock a policy mix of real exchange rate targeting and income distribution targeting outperforms inflation targeting.     

Monetary–fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union

We consider monetary–fiscal policy interactions in a monetary union. If monetary and fiscal authorities have different ideal output and inflation targets, the Nash equilibrium output or inflation or both are beyond the ideal points of all authorities. Leadership of either authority is better. Fiscal discretion entirely negates the advantage of monetary commitment: The optimal monetary rule is equivalent to discretionary leadership of monetary over fiscal policy. Agreement about ideal output and inflation creates a monetary–fiscal symbiosis, yielding the ideal point despite disagreement about the relative weights of the two objectives, for any order of moves, without fiscal co-ordination, and without monetary commitment.     

Evaluating inflation targeting as a monetary policy objective for India

This study formulates a small open economy model for India with exchange rate as a prominent channel of monetary policy. The model is estimated using the Instrumental Variable-Generalized Methods of Moments (IV-GMM) estimator and evaluated through simulations. This study compares different cases of domestic and CPI inflation targeting, strict and flexible inflation targeting, and simple Taylor type rules. The analysis highlights the unsuitability of simple Taylor-type monetary rules in stabilizing the Indian economy and suggests that discretionary optimization works better in stabilizing this economy. There seems to be a trade-off between output gap stabilization and exchange rate stabilization in flexible domestic inflation targeting and CPI inflation targeting respectively. However, flexible domestic inflation targeting seems a better alternative from an overall macro stabilization perspective in India where financial markets are still not sufficiently integrated to ensure quick transmission of interest rate impulses and existence of rigidities in the economy.     

The optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a small open economy

Abstract.  This paper studies how the nature of shocks affects the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a small open economy. Three classic rules, fixed exchange rates, monetary targeting, and inflation targeting are studied and ranked by comparing with the optimal monetary policy under commitment. We find that the ranking of the simple rules can be mapped to the terms-of-trade variability that the rule allows relative to what a particular shock optimally calls for. It turns out that inflation targeting dominates the other two rules under productivity or velocity shocks, whereas monetary targeting is the best performer under fiscal shocks.     

Inflation targeting and the need for a new central banking framework

This article critically analyzes inflation targeting (IT) both theoretically and empirically. IT came into prominence in the 1990s and 1 central bank after another adopted this regime in the 1990s and 2000s. Proponents of IT mainly argued that IT regime was successful on the grounds that it resulted in lower inflation rates and hence better economic performances. However, inflation rates in the world were in a downward trend from the 1980s well into the 2000s, and both IT and non-IT regimes managed to decrease their inflation rates. In addition, focusing too much on price stability through IT paved the way for permanently higher than necessary interest rates and disinflationary “tight” monetary policy periods when inflation rate was above an arbitrarily targeted level. Tight monetary policy can and do affect the real economy negatively and overemphasizing price stability may hurt the economy in terms of lower potential output, decreasing investment and more unequal income distribution. Post Keynesians offer valuable alternatives within the framework of parking-it approach to the existing monetary policy paradigm. Our main conclusion is that central banks should set the policy interest rate as low as possible and keep it there, in line with Keynesian “cheap money” policy.