Mutual commitment to support exchange: relation‐specific IT system as a substitute for managerial hierarchy

This paper examines the effects of information technology (IT) on the governance of vertically related firms. We propose that a highly relation‐specific IT system in inter‐firm transactions plays a key role in the resulting inter‐firm governance as a mutual sunk‐cost commitment, in terms of leading to both less vertical integration (i.e., a change in governance mode as a first‐order effect) and a smaller number of suppliers (i.e., a change within a governance mode as a second‐order effect). As a result, this highly relation‐specific IT system (bilateral investment) can be an alternative governance mode of electronic integration that acts as a substitute for managerial hierarchy and vertical financial ownership. From a strategic management perspective, this paper provides transaction costs and resource‐based explanations on IT systems' impact on the organizational boundary decision and its impact on the likelihood of the firm achieving sustainable competitive advantage. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An empirical examination of transaction‐ and firm‐level influences on the vertical boundaries of the firm

A large literature has successfully employed transaction cost economic theory to describe how exchange conditions affect the optimal form of organization. However, this approach has historically not accounted for the influence of firm‐specific attributes on the governance decision. This paper develops a model based on insights from transaction cost economics, the resource‐based view, and real options theory to examine how transaction‐level characteristics, firm‐specific capabilities, and product‐market scope influence the governance of production. Empirical evidence derived from analysis of 469 make‐or‐buy decisions involving 117 semiconductor firms indicates that decisions regarding the governance of production activities are strongly influenced by both transaction‐ and firm‐level effects. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do make or buy decisions matter? The influence of organizational governance on technological performance

This paper investigates how firms' decisions to outsource or internalize production affect their technological performance. While several popular arguments and some anecdotal evidence suggest a direct association between outsourcing and technological performance, the effects of firms' governance decisions are likely to be contingent upon several specific attributes underlying a given exchange. This paper first demonstrates how standard performance models can improperly suggest a positive relationship between firms' outsourcing decisions and their technological performance. Models that account for firm‐ and transaction‐specific features are then presented, which indicate that neither outsourcing nor internalization per se result in superior performance; rather, a firm's technological performance is contingent upon the alignment between firms' governance decisions and the degree of contractual hazards. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

交易环境属性、主体特征与纵向一体化

本文以交易成本经济学框架为理论基点,选取我国工业行业和上市企业数据,构建动态面板模型,多层次深入分析决定企业纵向一体化程度的关键因素。研究认为,①不同类型的企业和行业的纵向一体化水平具有不同变化特征,且企业的纵向一体化水平具有动态变动特征。②解释企业纵向一体化水平变动的综合框架应包括三大类因素:交易环境、属性和主体特征。③资产专用性水平对纵向一体化的影响产生滞后效应,且大部分维度对不同特征的企业影响方向有所差异。本文的研究结果对我国不同类型的企业兼并重组等纵向一体化决策具有借鉴意义。     

The co‐evolution of capabilities and transaction costs: explaining the institutional structure of production

This paper proposes that transaction costs and capabilities are fundamentally intertwined in the determination of vertical scope, and identifies the key mechanisms of their co‐evolution. Specifically, we argue that capability differences are a necessary condition for vertical specialization; and that transaction cost reductions only lead to specialization when capabilities along the value chain are heterogeneous. Furthermore, we argue that there are four evolutionary mechanisms that shape vertical scope over time. First, the selection process, itself driven by capability differences, dynamically shapes vertical scope; second, transaction costs are endogenously changed by firms that try to reshape the transactional environment to increase their profit and market share; third, changes in vertical scope affect the nature of the capability development process, i.e., the way in which firms improve their operations over time; and finally, the changes in the capability development process reshape the capability pool in the industry, changing the roster of qualified participants. These dynamics of capability and transaction cost co‐evolution are illustrated through two contrasting examples: the mortgage banking industry in the United States, which shows the shift from integrated to disintegrated production; and the Swiss watch‐manufacturing industry, which went from disintegration to integration. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The choice of organizational form: Vertical financial ownership versus other methods of vertical integration

Vertical integration is a fundamental corporate strategy of interest to the fields of strategic management and organizational economics. This paper synthesizes theoretical arguments and empirical findings from this literature to identify the underlying advantages and disadvantages of choosing vertical financial ownership relative to vertical contracts. It then suggests that in the absence of agency and transaction costs, vertical financial ownership and vertical contracting are equivalent governance structures for achieving corporate objectives. However, given a world of positive agency and transaction costs, the key theoretic question then becomes predicting when market mechanisms are sufficient, when intermediate forms of vertical contracting become necessary, and when vertical financial ownership becomes the preferred governance structure. The concluding section of the paper provides a framework for making this analysis based on a synthesis of agency and transaction costs perspectives.     

Regulation and transaction costs in telecommunications: A research agenda

Antitrust and regulatory policies influence the vertical and horizontal integration of firms and the characteristics of their contractual arrangements. This paper examines the relevance of transaction cost economics for the analysis of regulatory policy in telecommunications. It explores the impact of changes in national telecommunications regulation on the level of transaction costs. After building a new theoretical framework based upon previous transaction cost contributions, the paper sets out a research agenda concerning the importance of transaction costs for antitrust and regulatory policies.     

面向供应链的环境治理组织模式研究——基于交易费用视角的考察

环境治理的组织形式既可以是单个企业的末端治理，也可以是具有纵向关系的企业间合作治理。后一种环境治理组织方式在激励机制、节约信息成本和治理成本等方面具有的优势．已经越来越成为政府环境治理和企业提高竞争力的重要途径。本文试图借助交易费用理论．从供应链的视角考察具有纵向关系的企业间合作环境治理的组织形式与结构，并进一步探讨供应链上环境治理的驱动者与驱动方式的选择问题。分析表明．面向供应链的环境政策是末端治理政策一个很好的补充与替代。但面向供应链的环境政策必须能够降低供应链上企业环境治理的交易成本．并依据纵向关系或供应链的组织特征而有所差异．才能提高企业问协调环境治理效率。     

Testing alternative theories of the firm: transaction cost,knowledge-based,and measurement explanations for make-or-buy decisions in information services

Firms boundary choices have undergone careful examination in recent years, particularly in information services. While transaction cost economics provides a widely tested explanation for boundary choice, more recent theoretical work advances competing knowledge-based and measurement cost explanations. Similar to transaction cost economics, these theories examine the impact of exchange attributes on the performance of markets and hierarchies as institutions of governance. These theories, however, offer alternative attributes to those suggested by transaction cost economics or offer alternative mechanisms through which similar attributes influence make–buy choices. Traditional empirical specifications of make–buy models are unable to comparatively test among these alternative theories. By developing and testing a model of comparative institutional performance rather than institutional choice, we examine the degree of support for these competing explanations of boundary choice. Hypotheses are tested using data on the governance of nine information services at 152 companies. Our results suggest that a theory of the firm and a theory of boundary choice is likely to be complex, requiring integration of transaction cost, knowledge-based, and measurement reasoning. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The moderating influence of firm market power on the transaction cost economics model: An empirical test in a forward channel integration context

Transaction cost economics (TCE) has guided a variety of research on governance in the strategic management literature. An important question arises, however, as to whether the TCE framework is equally appropriate for all types of firms in all business settings. In this paper, we argue that TCE is not and suggest that firms with high market power may be able to lower transaction costs under high asset specificity and uncertainty in nonintegrated distribution channels, avoiding the need to utilize highly integrated channels as a result. We test our hypotheses with data collected from 40 manufacturers of electronic and telecommunications products in 109 product‐markets in the United States. The results support our hypothesis that transaction cost factors are better at explaining forward channel integration for firms with low market power than for firms with high market power. Our results indicate that the basic TCE framework must be supplemented by the market power construct to adequately explain forward channel integration decisions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Transactional hazards,institutional change,and capabilities: Integrating the theories of the firm

Using a detailed dataset from the Chilean construction industry, we explore how the predictions of the transaction cost and capabilities theories interact to explain building contractors' decisions to ‘make or buy’ the specialty trade activities needed to complete a construction project. We show that the contractor's productive capabilities strongly mediate the relationship between transaction hazards that originate from either temporal specificity or an exogenous change in the subcontracting law and the vertical integration decision. The inclusion of differential capabilities and its interaction with transactional hazards infuse contractors' boundary choices with systematic patterns of heterogeneity and contribute to the integration of these theoretical perspectives. Our analysis corrects for the endogeneity of the capabilities variable and provides a detailed assessment of the marginal effects in logit models. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

纵向一体化的选择及其影响因素——基于能源行业的实证分析

文章研究中国能源行业的纵向一体化状况,以能源企业的纵向并购为例运用Logit模型分析了能源企业选择纵向一体化方式时考虑的因素。研究结果表明,策略效应和交易成本对能源企业采用纵向一体化的意愿影响较大,生产成本和不确定性的影响较小。     

Competition,governance, and relationship‐specific investments: Theory and implications for strategy

This paper uses biform games to examine the endogenous decision to invest in relationship‐specific assets. It addresses the questions of how competition affects suppliers' decisions to produce a general‐purpose product or a relationship‐specific product for a buyer and under what circumstances a governance arrangement designed to share investment costs between the transacting parties increases the investment in relationship‐specific assets. We offer a balanced perspective that emphasizes both the superior transaction value of relationship‐specific products and their high transaction costs while considering the competition effects generated by alternative investment plans. The model and its extensions generate new insights into investment decisions regarding relationship‐specific assets. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

R&D Cooperation in a Transaction Cost Perspective

This paper investigates R&Dcooperation between buyers and suppliers, drawing bothon transaction cost theory and resource-based theoryof the firm. Results of logistic regression analyses,using a unique firm-level database containing 689manufacturing firms located in a Dutch region, supportassumptions of transaction cost theory. Frequentknowledge transfer and moderate and high levels ofasset specificity increase probabilities of R&Dcooperation. In particular, Williamson's assumptionsconcerning the moderating influences of uncertainty onbilateral governance are confirmed. Extending theoriginal transaction cost model with indicatorsderived from resource based theory of the firmincreases the performance of the model.     

Subprime governance: Agency costs in vertically integrated banks and the 2008 mortgage crisis

Research summary: This study uses the 2008 mortgage crisis to demonstrate how the relationship between vertical integration and performance crucially depends on corporate governance. Prior research has argued that the vertical integration of mortgage origination and securitization aligned divisional incentives and improved lending quality. We show that vertical integration improved loan performance only in those firms with strong corporate governance and that this performance‐integration relationship strongly decreases and actually reverses as governance quality decreases. We interpret these findings as suggesting that the additional control afforded by vertical integration can, in the hands of poorly monitored managers, offset gains from aligned divisional incentives. These findings support the view that corporate governance influences the strategic outcomes of a firm, in our case, by influencing the effectiveness of boundary decisions. Managerial summary: One of the unanswered questions of the 2008 mortgage crisis is why some firms produced toxic mortgages and others did not. Many have argued that vertically integrated banks—banks that both originated and securitized mortgages—had incentives to monitor themselves and thereby avoid overaggressive lending and outright fraud. Yet many of the worst lenders, such as Washington Mutual and New Century Financial, were in fact integrated. This study shows that the behavior of these firms critically depended on their corporate governance. We find that poorly monitored executives used their additional control over the integrated businesses to issue low quality loans that supported short‐term growth. Our results suggest that governance is a crucial prerequisite for financial services, particularly for firms whose managers control multiple, interrelated businesses. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

COST,VALUE AND FOREIGN MARKET ENTRY MODE: THE TRANSACTION AND THE FIRM

This paper compares and contrasts the mode of foreign market entry decision from the transaction cost/internalization and organizational capability perspectives. Each of these perspectives operates at a different level of analysis, respectively the transaction and the firm, and consequently differs in the primary arena of attention, namely transaction characteristics and the capabilities of firms. In making the comparison, a key distinction is made between the cost and the value aspects in the management of know-how, based on which issues pertaining to the transfer of knowledge within and across firm boundaries and the exploitation and enhancement of competitive advantage are closely examined. The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the implications of a shift in frame from cost to value in the analysis of decisions related to firm boundaries. Entry into foreign markets is used primarily as a vehicle for the accomplishment of this purpose. The paper shows how the value-based framework of the organizational capability perspective radically and fundamentally shifts the approach towards the governance of firm boundaries and argues that, even though TC/internalization theory raises some valid concerns, the organizational capability framework may be more in tune with today’s business context. Some of the assumptions of the TC/internalization perspective, both direct—–opportunism, exploitation of existing advantage—and indirect—preservation of the value of know-how across locational contexts, asymmetry between bounded rationality for transaction and production purposes—are critically examined and questioned. Implications of a shift from a cost to a value-based framework are discussed and the need for a shift in research focus is emphasized. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Choosing the right multiple channel system to minimize transaction costs

This paper proposes that firms can use a transaction cost approach to make multiple channel system design related decisions. The author differentiates between two types of multiple channel systems and hypothesizes that transaction asset specificity, behavioral uncertainty and environmental uncertainty lead manufacturers to adopt either a dual channel system or a multiple independent channel system. Furthermore, the author proposes that when all three transaction cost variables match with the type of multiple channel system used, firms can minimize their transaction costs and eventually increase their channel system performance in terms of contribution to firm profitability. The author tests the hypotheses with survey data collected from 229 firms. The results support that the fit between the type of multiple channel mix and the three transaction-cost theory variables results in lower transaction costs and higher contribution to profit. The author presents theoretical and managerial implications.     

The consequences of voluntary traceability system for supply chain relationships. An application of transaction cost economics

This paper analyses the effects of voluntary traceability on vertical relationships within food supply chains using a transaction cost perspective. The analysis makes reference to the Italian situation where the national standard organization has introduced a private standard for traceability that provides a higher degree of information associated with the individual product than the European mandatory traceability system. A survey was conducted by questionnaire to assess changes in transaction characteristics, costs and governance after the introduction of voluntary traceability. The sample represents all Italian firms applying this standard. Factorial and cluster analyses were applied to find the different reorganizations of transactions. The results highlight an increase in asset specificity and a decrease in the uncertainty level throughout the supply chains. The introduction of voluntary traceability shows increased vertical coordination for firms that previously used oral agreements and variation in transactions conditions for firms using contracts. Instead vertically integrated firms do not reveal any variation in the governance of transactions as they are already internally safeguarded.     

Transaction cost economics in global sourcing: Assessing regional differences and implications for performance

This paper addresses two gaps in current research on transaction cost economics (TCE): first, the fundamental claim suggesting that firms that align their governance structure to transactions according to TCE perform better than those that do not, and second, the application of TCE to global sourcing transactions. A research model is presented and evaluated using a set of 150 relationships between Swiss buyers and foreign suppliers. The findings suggest that there are significant differences in how transactions and governance structures are aligned with varying performance and with suppliers from Western Europe as compared to suppliers from other regions.