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1.
Summary. This paper proves the C 1,1 differentiability of the value function for continuous time concave dynamic optimization problems, under the assumption that the instantaneous utility is C 1,1 and the initial segment of optimal solutions is interior. From this result, the Lipschitz dependence of optimal solutions on initial data and the Lipschitz continuity of the policy function are derived, by adding an assumption of strong concavity of the integrand. Received: July 29, 1996; revised version: November 25, 1997 相似文献
2.
Rationalizable variable-population choice functions 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Summary. We analyze the rationalizability of variable-population social-choice functions in a welfarist framework. It is shown that
fixed-population rationalizability and a weakening of congruence together are necessary and sufficient for rational choice,
given a plausible dominance property that prevents the choice of alternatives involving low utility levels. In addition, a
class of critical-level separable choice functions is characterized. This result, which extends an earlier axiomatization
of a related class of bargaining solutions to a variable-population setting, is the first axiomatization of critical-level
principles in a general choice-theoretic model.
Received: November 30, 1999; revised version: September 11, 2000 相似文献
3.
Koji Shimomura 《Economic Theory》1999,14(2):501-503
Summary. Based on some elementary results on duality, the paper proposes a much simpler way of deriving the class of non-homothetic CES production functions which was derived as a solution to a partial differential equation that defines the elasticity of substitution. Received: February 11, 1998; revised version: April 28, 1998 相似文献
4.
Valeri M. Marakulin 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):621-633
Summary. The aim of the paper is to provide a new proof of the Mas-Colell–Richard existence of equilibrium result when preferences
are non-transitive and incomplete. Our proof generalizes the main ideas of the Negishi approach to the case of unordered preferences.
Received: January 10, 1996; revised version: November 23, 1999 相似文献
5.
Summary. We prove that locally, Walras' law and homogeneity characterize the structure of market excess demand functions when financial
markets are incomplete and assets' returns are nominal. The method of proof is substantially different from all existing arguments
as the properties of individual demand are also different. We show that this result has important implications and is part
of a more general result that excess demand is an essentially arbitrary function not just of prices, but also of the exogenous
parameters of the economy as asset returns, preferences, and endowments. Thus locally the equilibrium manifold, relating equilibrium
prices to these parameters has also no structure.
Received: September 17, 1996; revised version: November 7, 1997 相似文献
6.
Summary. In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms. Received: July 10, 1997 / Revised version: November 24, 1997 相似文献
7.
Kala Krishna 《Economic Theory》1999,13(2):377-391
Summary. This paper looks at the determination of ownership of capacity when there are two ex-ante symmetric agents bidding for many
units of capacity which are sold sequentially. It is shown that convexity of payoffs in the final stage of the game is sufficient
to ensure monopolization of capacity, but that increasing returns to scale are not sufficient to ensure monopolization.
Received: March 14, 1997; revised version: December 1, 1997 相似文献
8.
Summary. In this paper we fully characterize an individual's choice behaviour according to three different so–called external references. The first system which we describe axiomatically is standard utility maximization or preference optimization. The second approach characterizes the choice of the second largest element as an optimal choice, the third system is the choice of a medium element, also as a first best choice. For all three approaches, we have established a common axiomatic structure which allows us to point out rather precisely congruences and divergences among the different systems considered. Received: December 12, 1997; revised version: September 15, 1998 相似文献
9.
Tito Pietra 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):649-659
Summary. I consider the set of equilibria of two-period economies with S extrinsic states of nature in the second period and I assets
with linearly independent nominal payoffs. Asset prices are variable. If the number of agents is greater than (S-I), the payoff
matrix is in general position and S 2I, the set of equilibrium allocations generically (in utility function space) contains a smooth manifold of dimension (S-1).
Moreover, the map from states o
f nature to equilibrium allocations (restricted to this manifold) is one-to-one at each equilibrium.
Received: February 23, 1998; revised version: June 1, 2000 相似文献
10.
Wilfredo Leiva Maldonado 《Economic Theory》1999,14(2):473-478
Summary. In this paper I give a method for finding long-run-average policies in the undiscounted economic growth problem using approximations
by finite horizons. Required hypothesis is the strong interiority of T-horizon solutions.
Received: March 25, 1996; revised version: July 29, 1997 相似文献
11.
Exact nonradial input, output, and productivity measurement 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Robert G. Chambers 《Economic Theory》2002,20(4):751-765
Summary. The use of measures originally suggested by Bennet, Bowley, and Hicks in the context of cost of living, welfare, and consumer
surplus measurement to measure inputs, outputs, and productivity is examined. Suitably normalized versions of the Bennet-Bowley
measures are shown to be exact and superlative measures of input, output, and productivity indicators.
Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: August 8, 2001 相似文献
12.
Summary. This paper attempts to merge two strands of the literature on relative deprivation and generalized Gini indices by designing a new class of generalized Gini indices based on the concept of relative deprivation. In this connection, rank-dependent marginal deprivation functions are introduced. A new class of generalized Gini indices is derived axiomatically. It turns out to be the sum of modified versions of the S-Gini and the I-Gini introduced by Donaldson and Weymark (1980). Received: December 23, 1998; revised version: November 9, 1999 相似文献
13.
Summary. Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is implied by the other three axioms in his characterization. Received: October 17, 1997; revised version: January 19, 1998 相似文献
14.
Summary. Two approaches have been proposed in the literature to refine the rationalizability solution concept: either assuming that
a player believes that with small probability her opponents choose strategies that are irrational, or assuming that their
is a small amount of payoff uncertainty. We show that both approaches lead to the same refinement if strategy perturbations
are made according to the concept of weakly perfect rationalizability, and if there is payoff uncertainty as in Dekel and
Fudenberg [J. of Econ. Theory 52 (1990), 243–267]. For both cases, the strategies that survive are obtained by starting with one round of elimination of
weakly dominated strategies followed by many rounds of elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Received: 10 December 1998; revised version: 26 April 1999 相似文献
15.
Utility and entropy 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Juan C. Candeal Juan R. De Miguel Esteban Induráin Ghanshyam B. Mehta 《Economic Theory》2001,17(1):233-238
Summary. In this paper we study an astonishing similarity between the utility representation problem in economics and the entropy
representation problem in thermodynamics.
Received: May 17, 1999; revised version: October 16, 2000 相似文献
16.
Roman Inderst 《Economic Theory》2003,22(2):419-429
Summary. This paper considers bargaining with one-sided private information and alternating offers where an agreement specifies both
a transfer and an additional (sorting) variable. Moreover, both sides can propose menus. We show that for a subset of parameters
the alternating-offer game has a unique equilibrium where efficient contracts are implemented in the first period. This stands
in sharp contrast to the benchmarks of contract theory, where typically only the uninformed side proposes, and bargaining
theory, where typically the agreement only specifies a transfer.
Received: September 10, 2001; revised version: March 25, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I benefitted from discussions with Benny Moldovanu, Holger Müller, and Roland Strausz, and from comments made by an
anonymous referee. 相似文献
17.
Summary. This note provides an alternative proof for the equivalence of decreasing absolute prudence (DAP) in the expected utility
framework and in a two-parametric approach where utility is a function of the mean and the standard deviation. In addition,
we elucidate that the equivalence of DAP and the concavity of utility as a function of mean and variance, which was shown
to hold for normally distributed stochastics in Lajeri and Nielsen [4], cannot be generalized.
Received: November 27, 2000; revised version: November 26, 2001
Correspondence to: T. Eichner 相似文献
18.
Summary. The paper analyzes the properties of cores with differential information, as economies converge to complete information.
Two core concepts are investigated: the private core, in which agents' net trades are measurable with respect to agents' private
information, and the incentive compatible core, in which coalitions of agents are restricted to incentive compatible allocations.
Received: March 15, 2000; revised version: August 24, 2000 相似文献
19.
Summary. In his Nash equilibrium paper, Glicksberg states that the payoff functions are continuous. Such a function is defined on the product of mixed strategies, which are the Borel probability measures on a compactum, endowed with the product of the weak topologies. The continuity property is used in proving the existence of Nash equilibria. This note proves that the payoff functions are continuous, which is not immediate to establish. Received: June 10, 1999; revised version: June 24, 1999 相似文献
20.
Patrick Bajari 《Economic Theory》2001,18(1):187-205
Summary. Collusion is a serious problem in many procurement auctions. In this research, I study a model of first price sealed bid
procurement auctions with asymmetric bidders. I demonstrate that the equilibrium to the model is unique and describe three
algorithms that can be used to compute the inverse equilibrium bid functions. I then use the computational algorithms to compare
competitive and collusive bidding. The algorithms are useful for structural estimation of auction models and for assessing
the damages from bid-rigging.
Received: January 14, 2000; revised version: February 28, 2001 相似文献