The implications of the national minimum wage for training in small firms

This article investigates the extent to which small firms' training practices have altered since the introduction of the national minimum wage (NMW). Low pay is particularly widespread among small firms and they are thus likely to have been disproportionately affected by the NMW. Drawing on survey data collected from 258 establishments, the study provides information about training practices and identifies the steps that employers have taken to offset the impact of the NMW. The study also assesses the extent to which firms have made use of lower ‘development’ rates for young workers and new adult recruits, and whether this has been associated with an increase in training activity. The findings suggest that the NMW has provided a positive boost to training in some cases, although this has primarily come about as a result of efforts by firms to offset increases in labour costs, as opposed to take‐up of the development rate.     

An empirical assessment of assortative matching in the labor market

In labor markets with worker and firm heterogeneity, the matching between firms and workers may be assortative, meaning that the most productive workers and firms team up. We investigate this with longitudinal population-wide matched employer–employee data from Portugal. Using panel data methods, we quantify a firm-specific productivity term for each firm, and we relate this to the skill distribution of workers in the firm. We find that there is positive assortative matching, in particular among long-lived firms. Using skill-specific estimates of an index of search frictions, we find that the results can only to a small extent be explained by heterogeneity of search frictions across worker skill groups.     

Templates for financial control? Management and employees under the private equity business model

The term ‘private equity business model’ (PEBM) refers to private equity investors that delist publicly quoted firms, managing them as private equity‐controlled portfolio firms. But how and in what form do these investors diffuse a preferred template for the PEBM in portfolio firms? Is diffusion codified, institutionalised or merely tacit? What is the difference between these forms of diffusion? As a method of financial control, how is diffusion evident for managers and workers? Theoretically, while ‘financialisation’ is a contemporary pressure on the British economy, there is a ‘disconnection’ between competitive pressures for financialisation and the diffusion of practices to manage these pressures in portfolio firms. Forty‐two interviews in eight portfolio firms and five associated private equity firms concludes that potentially transformative and decisive restructuring for managers and workers is more evident than a defined template.     

Misallocation,informality, and human capital: Understanding the role of institutions

The aim of this paper is to quantify the role of formal-sector institutions in shaping the demand for human capital and the level of informality. We propose a firm dynamics model where firms face capital market imperfections and costs of operating in the formal sector. Formal firms have a larger set of production opportunities and the ability to employ skilled workers, but informal firms can avoid the costs of formalization. These firm-level distortions give rise to endogenous formal and informal sectors and, more importantly, affect the demand for skilled workers. The model predicts that countries with a low degree of debt enforcement and high costs of formalization are characterized by relatively lower stocks of skilled workers, larger informal sectors, low allocative efficiency, and measured TFP. Moreover, we find that the interaction between entry costs and financial frictions (as opposed to the sum of their individual effects) is the main driver of these differences. This complementarity effect derives from the introduction of skilled workers, which prevents firms from substituting labor for capital and in turn moves them closer to the financial constraint.     

Acquisition of skills, labor subsidies, and agglomeration of firms

The paper develops an analytically solvable model of new economic geography in which agglomeration of firms is caused by workers' investment in the acquisition of skills. Skilled workers earn high wages and have a large demand for goods. Since firms are attracted towards the demand, they locate at proximity of skilled workers. More workers invest in the acquisition of skills when more firms ask for these skills. Consequently, partial or full agglomeration of firms may be the location equilibrium. We also show that a reduction in transport costs increases the regional governments' incentives to subsidize the acquisition of skills.     

Optimal promotions of competing firms in a frictional labour market with organizational hierarchies

We study optimal promotion decisions of hierarchical firms, with one junior and one senior managerial position, which interact in a search and matching labour market. Workers acquire experience over time while being employed in a junior position and the firm has to determine the experience level at which the worker receives a promotion which allows her to fill a senior position. Promoted workers move to the senior position in their current firm, if it is vacant, otherwise they search for senior positions on the market. The promotion cut-offs of the competing firms exhibit strategic complementarity, but we show that generically a unique stable symmetric general equilibrium exists. We find that stronger competition among firms leads to later (earlier) promotions if the initial number of firms is small (large) giving rise to an inverse U-shape relationship. In the presence of two skill groups, stronger competition among firms reduces the importance of skill differences, so the gap in wages and promotion times decreases with the number of firms. The model is compatible with empirical evidence that high-skill workers are promoted faster than the low-skilled and that internal promotions are more frequent than cross-firm moves to a higher hierarchical position.     

Monopsonistic competition for the “best” workers

In this paper we analyse an economy where firms use labour as the only production factor, with constant return to scale. We suppose that jobs differ in their non-wage characteristics so each firm has monopsonistic power. In particular, we suppose that workers are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity. Then, each firm has incentives to offer higher wages in order to recruit the most productive workers. Competition among firms leads to a symmetric equilibrium wage, which is higher than the reservation wage, and to involuntary unemployment for the less productive workers, who are willing to work at the current wage but are not hired because their productivity is lower than the wage level. If firms have no institutional constraint on paying lower wages for the same job, an endogenous labour market segmentation emerges.     

The status of workers and platforms in the sharing economy

We consider whether workers who provide their services through online platforms, such as Handy and Uber, should be classified as independent contractors or employees. Using a formal economic model, we show how being too strict or too liberal in classifying workers as independent contractors (relative to the actual degree of control workers have) can be detrimental, not just to firms and welfare, but sometimes to the workers themselves. We also use the model to explore the extent to which an intermediate classification of workers between employees and independent contractors may lead to better outcomes. The intermediate classification is meant to apply to firms that retain control of some actions while their workers control others, as is the case for many online platforms.     

Gender,careers and flexibility in consultancies in the UK and the USA: a multi-level relational analysis

Management consultants are a core group of knowledge workers, and interest in their work and the organisational environment in which they operate has intensified. However, the role of policies at a national and organisational level in influencing gender regimes in this field of work remains unclear. This paper examines the organisation of careers and flexibility from the perspective of management consultants from the UK and US offices of two case study firms. The findings cast light on the role of macro- and meso-level policies together with the characteristics of the occupation and its client-focus in gendering careers and flexibility. These outcomes point to the need for the structures and policies supporting women and flexible working in these types of firms to be modified accordingly, particularly given that these firms make recommendations to clients nationally and internationally.     

Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms

We study a labor market described by a many-to-one matching market with externalities among firms in which each firm’s preferences depend not only on workers whom it hires, but also on workers whom its rival firms hire. We define a new stability concept called weak stability and investigate its existence problem. We show that when the preferences of firms satisfy an extension of substitutability and two new conditions called increasing choice and no external effect by an unchosen worker, then a weakly stable matching exists. We also show that a weakly stable matching may fail to exist without these restrictions.     

Agreement toward stability in matching markets

For firms with responsive preferences, we prove that the set of stable matchings unanimously preferred by workers to any firm quasi-stable matching has a lattice structure. This follows from a generalization of the Decomposition Lemma. The result does not hold when firms have q-substitutable preferences. Nevertheless, we show that the set of stable matchings unanimously preferred by workers to a firm quasi-stable matching contains an element which is unanimously least preferred by workers, and most preferred by firms. When a firm quasi-stable matching is fed into our extension of the Deferred Acceptance algorithm (where firms propose), the existence of this matching guarantees the success of the algorithm.     

Compensation Schemes and Labor Market Competition: Piece Rate versus Wage Rate

We investigate the choice of compensation scheme by firms. Our basic model shows that the unique equilibrium choice for profit maximizing duopsonists in a labor market is for one firm to offer a wage rate and for the other to offer a piece rate. This result arises because the firms recognize that, by offering different compensation schemes, they induce self-selection among workers, which thereby decreases the intensity of competition in the labor market. We find this asymmetry to be robust to allowing for firing, free entry, and a class of more general compensation schemes. When we broaden our model to permit firms to be differentiated in the eyes of workers (either geographically or by "other working conditions," e.g.), we find that our results are preserved when differentiation is low, but that both firms choose to offer a piece rate when differentiation is high.     

Some deadweight losses from the minimum wage: the cases of full and partial compliance

This paper highlights the social costs from non-price rationing of the labour force due to the minimum wage. By short-circuiting the ability of low reservation-wage workers to underbid high-reservation wage workers, the minimum wage interferes with the market's basic function of grouping the lowest cost workers with the highest productivity firms. The present paper models the deadweight loss that society bears when high reservation-cost workers displace low reservation-cost workers. When firms can evade part or all of the minimum wage, an extra deadweight loss arises. Firms with high evasive ability but low productivity may displace firms with low evasive ability but high productivity.     

Human resource practices and migrant workers' turnover intentions: The roles of post‐migration place identity and justice perceptions

This study adopts an identity perspective to explore the relationship between human resource (HR) practices and turnover intentions among migrant workers. Informed by HR attribution theory, we propose that the effects of HR practices will be more effective in reducing turnover among migrant workers when these workers have stronger post‐migration place identities and when they experience a sense of justice regarding their work and nonwork environments. Using a three‐way interaction model, we tested these ideas on a sample composed of 1,985 migrant workers in 141 firms in China. The results support the theoretical model.     

An exploration of older worker flexible working arrangements in smaller firms

This article explores flexible working arrangements (FWAs) for older workers in smaller UK firms. We address three questions: how far older workers need and value FWAs, the type of FWAs they need, and whether smaller firms can offer these FWAs. We draw on 46 semi‐structured interviews from six smaller case study firms to present a qualitative exploration of both owner‐manager and (under‐researched) worker perspectives. We evidence the offer and importance of temporal and work‐role FWAs, together with the use of i‐deals and ad hoc FWAs in meeting the needs of this diverse group. We make three contributions: first, theoretically, in arguing for an extended definition of FWAs and understanding formality of offer; second, to practice, in highlighting FWA mechanisms appropriate to older workers; third, to policy, in questioning the effectiveness of both the business case approach to older worker FWAs in smaller firms and policy's positioning of older workers as a homogeneous group.     

On the effectiveness of firing costs

This paper evaluates the determinants of the effectiveness of firing costs in reducing layoffs. We define effectiveness as either the level of productivity at which firms start firing workers for a given level of firing costs, or the change in this level caused by a given change in the level of firing costs. We find that both are very sensitive to the rate of interest, the persistence of productivity shocks, and the level of uncertainty. An increase in the persistence of shocks makes firing costs less effective, independent of which definition is used. A rise in the real interest rates initially makes firms start firing earlier, but then later if interest rates rise above a certain threshold. A rise in firing costs affects the firing threshold most at high interest rates. Finally, a rise in the degree of uncertainty makes firms wait longer before firing workers, but the effectiveness of changes in firing costs is not much affected by the degree of uncertainty.     

The effectiveness of more advanced human resource systems in small firms

In this paper, we analyze whether Human Resource (HR) systems in small firms can be associated with higher performance as well as higher wages. Our study, which focuses on Dutch pharmacies, shows that more advanced HR systems do not have any effect on firms' productivity. In these micro firms, it is only employees who significantly benefit from the introduction of both a basic and a more advanced HR system. Our findings that small firms do not significantly benefit from introducing less traditional HR practices offer an explanation for the thresholds in the diffusion of these HR practices in small firms, and suggest that in these firms formal HR practices are less important than personal relations between the employer and his or her employees.     

Enhancing knowledge exchange and combination through HR practices: reflexivity as a translation process

Knowledge‐intensive firms need to encourage their employees to engage in knowledge exchange and combination (KEC) so as to create the new knowledge that is core to their success. HRM has the potential to play a key role in encouraging KEC, but relatively little is known about the micro‐processes through which HRM and KEC are linked. Based on a sample of 498 knowledge workers in 14 knowledge‐intensive firms in the pharmaceutical and information and communications technology sectors in Ireland and the UK, this study focuses on the knowledge workers themselves and their perceptions of how HR practices influence KEC. In so doing, we drill down into the micro‐foundations of the proposed linkages between HRM and knowledge creation, proffering reflexivity as a translation process in understanding these linkages.     

Last in,first out?: Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden

In this paper we investigate whether a relaxation in seniority rules (the “last-in-first-out” principle) had any effect on firms' employment behaviour. Seniority rules exist in several countries, but consequences of seniority rules on firms' employment behaviour have not been examined previously. The “last-in-first-out” principle in Sweden was reformed in January 2001 such that employers with ten or fewer employees were allowed to exempt two workers from the seniority rule. Using an employer–employee unbalanced panel data for the period 1996–2005, we find that both hires and separations increased in small firms relative to large firms by 5%. This also implies that there were no effects on firms' net employment. Our results show that firms reacted to changes in the seniority rules, but we argue that the effects are not overwhelmingly large.