Job search monitoring intensity, unemployment exit and job entry: Quasi-experimental evidence from the UK

Because unemployment benefit reforms tend to package together changes to job search requirements, monitoring and assistance, few existing studies have been able to empirically isolate the effects of job search monitoring intensity on the behaviour of unemployment benefit claimants. This paper exploits periods where monitoring has been temporarily withdrawn during a series of Benefit Office refurbishments — with the regime otherwise unchanged — to allow such identification. During these periods of zero monitoring the hazard rates for exits from claimant unemployment and for job entry both fall.     

Compulsory work-focused interviews for inactive benefit claimants: an evaluation of the British ONE pilots

Using administrative panel data on individuals, we evaluate the effect of compulsory work-focused interviews (CWFI) on the probability of leaving social security benefit for the two main recipient groups of out-of-work benefits outside the unemployed: lone parents and the sick or disabled. CWFI for these groups were first introduced for new benefit claimants in Britain under the ONE programme in a limited number of benefit districts, enabling us to identify the policy effect. Using a difference-in-differences procedure, we find little evidence to suggest that CWFI increases labour market participation amongst inactive benefit claimants.     

The effect of unemployment benefits on re-employment rates: Evidence from the Finnish unemployment insurance reform

In January 2003, the unemployment benefits in Finland were increased for workers with long employment histories. The average benefit increase was 15% for the first 150 days of the unemployment spell. At the same time severance pay system was abolished. In this paper we evaluate the effect of the change in the benefit structure on the duration of unemployment by comparing the changes in the re-employment hazard profiles among the unemployed who were affected by the reform to the changes in a comparison group whose benefit structure remained unchanged. We find that the change in the benefit structure reduced the re-employment hazards by on average 17%. The effect is largest at the beginning of the unemployment spell and disappears after the eligibility period for the increased benefits expires.     

The impact of unemployment insurance taxes on wages

This paper examines the incidence of state unemployment insurance taxes on wages paid to workers in various demographic groups. The empirical work matches state level measures of unemployment insurance tax and benefit variables to data aggregated from the Current Population Survey on worker earnings for the period 1992 to 2002. Econometric evidence presented in the paper supports the paper's main hypothesis that UI tax rate structure has its greatest adverse impact on less mobile workers (prime age married women and young workers) and little impact on more mobile workers (prime age men).     

Unemployment insurance and the distribution of unemployment spells

In this paper administrative data from the unemployment-insurance (UI) system are used to examine the distribution of unemployment spells. Hazard plots of the data reveal a strong clustering around the benefit exhaustion point. In addition, estimation of the effects of the exhaustion point and of the UI benefit level on spell lengths obtained with a non-parametric proportional-hazards model - estimated by direct maximization of the general likelihood function - shows significant effects of both. However, the effect of the exhaustion point on the hazard is not proportional, making detection of its effect somewhat difficult.     

Are housing benefit an effective way to redistribute income? Evidence from a natural experiment in France

In this paper, I show that in-kind benefit such as a housing benefit program may have a significant impact on the price of the subsidized good. I use a French housing benefit reform to evaluate the impact of the subsidy on the level of rents. The results indicate that one additional euro of housing benefit leads to an increase of 78 cents in the rent paid by new benefit claimants, leaving only 22 cents available to reduce their net rent and increase their consumption. This large impact of housing benefit on rents appears to be the result of a very low housing supply elasticity. I show that the housing benefit reform induced additional demand, not only from low income households but also from students who used the benefit to become independent. Unfortunately, this increase in demand was unmatched by increasing housing supply in the short and middle term. The only possible effect of the reform is a small increase in housing quality. These results raise questions about the use of such in-kind transfers when the supply of the subsidized good is almost inelastic. It is therefore very important to estimate the incidence of the subsidy when assessing the efficiency of such welfare programs.     

The measurement of unemployment when unemployment is high

Are jobless persons who want work but are not actively searching, unemployed or out of the labour force? Previous research on this issue has focused on North America and used as the test whether the probability of transition to employment is similar for searching and non-searching jobless persons. This paper develops three new tests as to whether those not searching but wanting work are distinct from the searching unemployed. It asks: are non-searching persons richer, happier, and do they have a lesser impact on local wages, than the searchers? These tests are implemented using data from South Africa, a country in which unemployment is very high and where the treatment of non-searchers really matters for the understanding of poverty and labour market issues. The results favour the ‘discouraged worker’ view of the non-searching unemployed and the use of the broad, inclusive, measure of unemployment.     

Envy-minimizing unemployment benefits

This paper offers an analysis of the optimality of unemployment benefits based on the concept of no-envy. Using a general equilibrium framework with uncertainty, we derive the conditions for a trade-off between the intensity of envy and the expected percentage of envious persons. If the government's sensitivity to the intensity of envy is not too strong (alongside conditions on households' utilities), the optimal benefit is positive and below the full-insurance level. We also show that, for a low enough sensitivity to the intensity of envy, the optimal replacement ratio decreases with unfavorable changes in the distribution of the technological shock.     

Monitoring job search effort: An evaluation based on a regression discontinuity design

Since July 2004, the job search effort of long-term unemployed benefit claimants has been monitored in Belgium. We exploit the discontinuity in the treatment assignment at the age of 30 present in the first year of the reform to evaluate the effect of a notification sent at least eight months before job search is verified. Eight months after this notification and prior to the first monitoring interview, transitions to employment have increased by nearly nine percentage points compared to the counterfactual of no reform. Participation in training is raised, but not significantly, while withdrawals from the labor force are not affected.     

On the structure of unemployment benefits in shirking models

An increase in unemployment compensation is commonly argued to raise unemployment in a shirking model of efficiency wages. This prediction is based on the assumption of a uniform benefit level. However, 32+13if differential benefits for shirkers and non-shirkers exist, higher unemployment compensation for non-shirkers will reduce unemployment. In the long-run, this effect is amplified. Therefore, not only the level of benefits influences unemployment in an efficiency wage economy but also eligibility conditions, the effectiveness with which benefits are administered and, more generally, the institutional design of the unemployment insurance system.     

The effect of international firm mobility on wages and unemployment

Although the increase in international firm mobility is well documented, its effects on macroeconomic aggregates and the labour market remain controversial. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) benefit from an international outside option during wage bargaining, leading to a decrease in average wages. However, a strategic incentive to hire extra workers in a foreign (home) plant in order to reduce wages in the home (foreign) plant has an indirect positive effect on wages due to spillovers resulting from an increased demand for labour. In a framework of frictional unemployment, permitting MNEs leads to a decrease in unemployment. Abstracting from transport and plant fixed costs, MNEs lead to higher wages. Including transport and plant costs generally leads to lower wages, though the effects are small. The strategic hiring effect is important in mitigating the fall in wages.     

The relationship between product market competition and unemployment with profit sharing

We investigate the implications of product market imperfections on negotiated wages and equilibrium unemployment under profit sharing. We show that intensified product market competition reduces equilibrium unemployment in a strictly monotonic way when the trade union's bargaining power exceeds the profit share. If the profit share exceeds the trade union's bargaining power, the effect of product market competition is ambiguous: there is a threshold for the benefit–replacement ratio above (below) which intensified product market competition increases (decreases) equilibrium unemployment. The profit share and the union's bargaining power affect the wage mark-up, and thereby equilibrium unemployment, in different directions.     

The cyclical pattern of regional unemployment flows in Poland

Using male unemployment benefit data across Polish regions during 1994–1996, we find that unemployment flows are pro-cyclical and increase with job reallocation, controlling for other factors. At the national level we observe that job reallocation and output are associated with stagnant unemployment flows, low inflows and long duration. This has heretofore been attributed to workers by-passing the unemployment benefit system as they move job to job. We show this to be a fallacy of aggregation. The cyclical behaviour of regional unemployment flows and their response to job reallocation suggests that workers use unemployment benefit system to facilitate transition.     

Boon or bane? Others' unemployment,well-being and job insecurity

The social norm of unemployment suggests that aggregate unemployment reduces the well-being of the employed, but has a far smaller effect on the unemployed. We use German panel data to reproduce this standard result, but then suggest that the appropriate distinction may not be between employment and unemployment, but rather between higher and lower levels of labour-market security, at least for men. Men with good job prospects, both employed and unemployed, are strongly negatively affected by regional unemployment. However, insecure employed men and poor-prospect unemployed men are less negatively, or even positively, affected. There is however no clear relationship for women. We analyse labour-market inequality and unemployment hysteresis in the light of our results.     

Potential Unemployment Benefit Duration and Spell Length: Lessons from a Quasi-Experiment in Austria

The paper studies the effect of potential unemployment benefit duration on the length of unemployment spells in Austria. It takes advantage of a quasi-experimental situation, where potential benefit duration was extended in 1988 for elderly workers living in specific regions of the country. The empirical analysis shows that men react significantly to benefit duration whereas women generally do not. The quantitative impact is smaller than in comparable studies for the US and Germany. Furthermore, the impact of extended benefit duration is differentiated for short and long spells. Whereas for long spells higher impacts for men as well as for women are found, no unemployment-prolonging effects for short spells could be detected.     

Regional migration in Spain: the effect of personal characteristics and of unemployment,wage and house price differentials using pooled cross-sections

We present an empirical model of individual migration using time-series of cross-sections from the Spanish Labour Force Surveys 1987–1991. Personal characteristics not only have an important direct effect on migration decisions but also alter the effect of regional variables. We find that the estimated probability of migration for the unemployed not registered, who are known for certain not to receive benefit, is higher than that of the employed which in turn is higher than that of the unemployed registered, which includes all the benefits recipients. An important finding is that the effect of regional unemployment on migration is positive for the unemployed not registered but is important and negative for those registered.     

Justice obtained? How disabled claimants fare at Employment Tribunals

This article explores disability discrimination cases at British Employment Tribunals. Analysing over 750 judgments, it examines the characteristics of claimants and the factors associated with the failure of cases: restrictive judicial decisions, complex legal tests, inequality of arms between claimant and employer and the stigma attached to claimants with mental impairments, providing some evidence for a hierarchy of impairments.     

Spell durations with long unemployment insurance periods

This paper uses data from a natural experiment to investigate the potential incentive effect of a fixed unemployment insurance period. We compare two large groups of Norwegian unemployed persons who registered as unemployed in 1990 and 1991. The last group was affected by a rule change that in practice extended the length of unemployment benefits to more than 3 years. Our data are taken from official records, and we construct unemployment durations by combining information from the unemployment registers with employers' records. We use a proportional hazard model with a flexible baseline. The results suggest that the main effect of benefits running out is to make people drop out of the unemployment register. We find neither clear evidence that the hazard into employment increased when the end of benefits approached in the pre-liberalisation group, nor that behaviour in this part of the spells changed after the reform. On the other hand, our results suggest that the reform had an all over negative effect on the employment hazard.     

Earnings-related unemployment benefits and unemployment

We show that a stronger earnings relationship of unemployment compensation reduces wages and increases employment in an economy in which wages are determined by a trade union that maximises the rent from unionisation. The opposite result applies for a utilitarian union. Using manufacturing and non-manufacturing data for 16 OECD countries, estimates suggest that a 10% increase in the earnings relationship is associated with a 1.9% fall in manufacturing wages, a 0.6% reduction in non-manufacturing wages and a 7.3% reduction in unemployment.     

A pareto optimal collaboration period: The role of financial,industrial and macroeconomic conditions in liquidation decision and timing

In this paper, the author highlights the nexus of interactions among financial, industrial and macroeconomic factors determining the Pareto optimal date on which the firm’s claimants stop collaborating and force the firm into liquidation. The condition for optimal liquidation time summarizes the effects of volatility of the aggregate consumer income and the overall price level, demand elasticity, the industry’s concentration level and depreciation on the firm’s going-concern value. It also takes into account the effects of the firm’s level of indebtedness, foregone interest on alternative usages of the financial resources extended to the firm and the costs of risk bearing perceived by the firm’s claimants from continued collaboration.