Expropriation of minority shareholders and payout policy

This paper studies the payout policy of Italian firms controlled by large majority shareholders (controlled firms). The paper reports that a firm's share of dividends in total payout (dividends plus repurchases) is negatively related to the size of the cash flow stake of the firm's controlling shareholder and positively associated with the wedge between the controlling shareholder's control rights and cash flow rights. These findings are consistent with the substitute model of payout. One of the implications of this model is that controlled firms with weak corporate governance set-ups, in which controlling shareholders have strong incentives to expropriate minority shareholders, tend to prefer dividends over repurchases when disgorging cash.     

Catering effects in corporate dividend policy: The international evidence

This study tests for the international presence of dividend catering across a sample of twenty-three countries. We find evidence of catering among firms incorporated in common law countries but not for those in civil law nations. Catering persists even after controlling for the effect of the firm’s lifecycle. We conclude that when the legal regime and its accompanying set of investor protections permit, investors force dividends from managers, but they also attempt to extract such payouts indirectly by placing a high value on dividend paying firms. The relative failure of civil law firms to cater might be explained by idiosyncratic behaviors in the consumption of the private benefits of control or a lack of interest in responding to temporary market misevaluations of their equity.     

The effect of financial reporting quality on corporate dividend policy

This study examines how financial reporting quality affects corporate dividend policy. We find that higher quality reporting is associated with higher dividends. This positive association is more pronounced among firms with more severe free cash flow problems and among firms with higher ownership by monitoring-type institutional investors. Further analysis of the relation between reporting quality and under?/over-payment of dividends suggests that reporting quality largely mitigates underpayment of dividends. Additionally, both a granger causality test and a difference-in-difference analysis of dividend changes around a quasi-exogenous reporting event yield evidence consistent with the direction of causality going from financial reporting to dividends. Overall, these findings are consistent with financial reporting quality acting as a governance mechanism that induces managers to pay dividends by disciplining free cash flow problems. Our findings support the view that dividends are the result of enhanced monitoring (Jensen 1986; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 2000).     

Nonnegotiable shares, controlling shareholders, and dividend payments in China

China has some unique institutional features. For example, the shares of listed firms are segmented into negotiable and nonnegotiable ones. The controlling shareholders, usually connected to the government, hold nonnegotiable shares. We examine how these institutional features affected cash dividend payments in China during the period 1994-2006. We find that dividend payments are positively associated with the proportion of nonnegotiable shares in a firm and the proportion of nonnegotiable shares held by the controlling shareholder; moreover, the 2001 China Securities Regulatory Commission stipulation requiring cash dividend payments does not benefit negotiable shareholders. However, we also find that dividend payments are downside flexible, and controlling shareholders cannot force firms to pay or to pay more dividends when firms' earnings decline significantly. The conventional factors, especially profitability or the capability to pay, still play an important role in determining the dividend policy. The propensity to pay and the payout ratio in China are not high compared to those of other countries.     

Stakeholder conflicts and dividend policy

This paper compares the dividend policy of owner-controlled firms with that of firms where the owners are a minority relative to non-owner employees, customers, and community citizens. We find that regardless of whether owners or non-owners control the firm, the strong stakeholder uses the dividend payout decision to mitigate rather than to intensify the conflict of interest with the weak stakeholder. Hence, the higher the potential agency cost as reflected in the firm’s stakeholder structure, the more the actual agency cost is reduced by the strong stakeholder’s dividend payout decision. These findings are consistent with a dividend policy in which opportunistic power abuse in stakeholder conflicts is discouraged by costly consequences for the abuser at a later stage. Indirect evidence supports this interpretation.     

Overinvestment,corporate governance,and dividend initiations

Firms with low Tobin's Q and high cash flow have significantly more positive dividend initiation announcement returns than do other firms. I interpret this result as consistent with the hypothesis that reductions in the agency costs of overinvestment at firms with poor investment opportunities and ample cash flow are reflected in higher dividend initiation announcement returns. Further tests, such as examining the impact of governance metrics on initiation announcement returns following the dividend tax cut of 2003 and examining the long-run cash-retention policies of dividend-initiating firms, are consistent with this interpretation. There is also some evidence that is consistent with the cash flow signaling hypothesis, as dividend-initiating firms with low Tobin's Q and low pre-initiation cash flow experience substantial revisions in analysts' earnings forecasts and significantly positive initiation announcement returns.     

Corporate social responsibility and dividend policy

This study outlines and tests two corporate social responsibility (CSR) views of dividends. The first view argues that firms are likely to pay fewer dividends because CSR activities lower the cost of equity, encouraging firms to invest or hoard cash rather than to pay dividends. The second view suggests that CSR activities are positive NPV projects that increases earnings and hence dividend payouts. The first (second) view predicts that firms with a stronger involvement in CSR activities should be associated with a lower (higher) dividend payouts. The finding supports the second view and is robust.     

Optimal dividend policy and growth option

We analyse the interaction between the dividend policy and the decision on investment in a growth opportunity of a liquidity constrained firm. This leads us to study a mixed singular control/optimal stopping problem for a diffusion that we solve quasi-explicitly by establishing a connection with an optimal stopping problem. We characterize situations where it is optimal to postpone the distribution of dividends in order to invest at a subsequent date in the growth opportunity. We show that uncertainty and liquidity shocks have an ambiguous effect on the investment decision.      

Entrenched controlling shareholders and the performance consequences of corporate diversification in Taiwan

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the value/performance effects of corporate diversification in an emerging market. Prior evidence on this issue is still mixed. The present study adds the role of entrenched controlling shareholders into this issue. We argue that when controlling shareholders have larger excess board seats control rights, they have higher ability and incentive to expropriate minority shareholders through corporate diversification. Using a sample of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange in 2003, we find that controlling shareholders’ excess board seats control is negatively associated with the market valuation of corporate diversification. Consistently, we also document that highly diversified firms run by more entrenched controlling shareholders have lower future financial performance than otherwise similar firms. Overall, our findings imply that corporate diversification is not necessarily harmful or beneficial for firms. We conclude that the agency problem arising from the excess board seats control rights owned by controlling shareholders is an influential factor leading to negative performance consequences with regard to firm diversification.     

Corporate liquidity and dividend policy under uncertainty

We examine optimal liquidity (retained earnings) and dividend choice incorporating debt financing with risk of default and bankruptcy costs as well as growth options under revenue uncertainty. We revisit the conditions for dividend policy irrelevancy and the broader role of retained earnings and dividends. Retained earnings have a net positive impact on firm value in the presence of growth options, high external financing costs and low default risk. High levels of retained earnings enhance debt capacity but have a negative effect on equity value due to the likelihood of losing accumulated cash balances in case of default, unless offset by high external financing costs. Opposite directional effects of retained earnings on equity and debt create a U-shaped relation with firm value. The framework is extended to analyze management-shareholder conflicts, demonstrating that managers accumulate higher than optimal cash.     

Accounting conservatism in a setting of Information Asymmetry between majority and minority shareholders

Following LaFond and Watts (2008), we examine the relation between information asymmetry (as measured by PIN, probability of information-based trading) and accounting conservatism but focus on a country – Taiwan – whose institutional background is different from that of the United States. Due to the disparate degree of conservatism across the world, the conclusions of LaFond & Watts (2008) might not be universally applicable. Our findings support, in general, the applicability of their conclusion to a Taiwan data set. We find, however, that the effect of PIN appears weaker when auditor tenure is taken into account, thus supplementing their conclusions.     

Corporate dividend policy in Thailand: Theory and evidence

This paper examines dividend changes in an emerging market: Thailand. We begin by considering the possible effects of the Thai corporate environment on dividend policy. We develop a theoretical model that considers the relationship between the strength of investor power and dividends in an agency cost/free cashflow framework. This allows us to consider the conditions for the outcome (positive relationship) or substitute (negative relationship) models, as discussed by La Porta et al. (2000). Our model also allows us to consider the expropriation hypothesis, in which the presence of large controlling shareholders may actually reduce outside investor power, leading to lower dividends. We then turn to our empirical analysis. Employing a large sample of companies that changed dividends in Thailand during the period 1996–2009, we test for the signaling, free cashflow and life-cycle hypotheses. A further contribution of our analysis is that we consider the impact of investor power and ownership on dividends in Thailand. Overall, we find little support for the signaling hypothesis, but we find considerable support for the free cashflow and life-cycle hypotheses. Our analysis of ownership variables suggests that increasing investor power (for example, high ownership concentration together with the presence of domestic institutional ownership) results in higher dividends, in support of the outcome model, rather than the substitution or expropriation models.     

Monetary policy and corporate default

When a corporation issues debt with a fixed nominal coupon, the real value of future payments decreases with the price level. Forward-looking corporate default decisions therefore depend on monetary policy through its impact on expected inflation. We build a general equilibrium economy with deadweight bankruptcy costs that demonstrates how nominal rigidities in corporate debt create an important role for monetary policy even in the absence of standard nominal frictions such as staggered price setting in the output market. Under a passive nominal interest rate peg, the direct effects of a negative productivity shock combine with deflation to produce strong incentives for corporate default. A debt-deflationary spiral results when there are real costs of financial distress. Inflation targeting eliminates this amplification mechanism but full inflation targeting requires permitting the nominal interest rate to depend explicitly on credit market conditions.     

The impact of technical defaults on dividend policy

This paper examines how loan covenant violations impact firm dividend policy. Using contract-level loan data for nonfinancial firms in the US, this study provides evidence that the occurrence of a covenant violation significantly increases the likelihood of a dividend reduction in the subsequent quarter. Moreover, we show that the degree of creditor–shareholder conflict and firm financial constraints are important determinants of dividend cuts upon technical default. Additionally, this paper finds the tendency of dividend cuts upon technical default weakened after the repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act. These findings suggest that loan covenants serve a critical role in mitigating creditor–shareholder conflicts.     

Dividend taxation and corporate investment: a comparative study between the classical system and imputation system of dividend taxation in the United States and Australia

In recent times a number of countries have initiated some important tax reforms to eliminate the distortions of double taxation. In this context, Australia adopted a dividend imputation system in 1987, while the US employed the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA). The analysis in this paper examines the effects on the level of corporate capital investment, on proxies for corporate tax rates, financial leverage, liquidity, capital intensity and firm size after controlling for the tax reforms. The empirical results provide evidence that: (1) dividend imputation as introduced in Australia is an effective way to reduce the distortions caused by the traditional system of taxation. (2) Compared with the TRA, dividend imputation has been better able to positively stimulate corporate capital investment. (3) TRA effect on corporate investment is more pronounced in the US for firms having a net operating loss. (4) Individual tax rates play a role in corporate investment decisions in both the US and Australia.

Debt valuation, renegotiation, and optimal dividend policy

The valuation of debt and equity, reorganization boundaries,and firm's optimal dividend policies are studied in a frameworkwhere we model strategic interactions between debt holders andequity holders in a game-theoretic setting which can accommodatevarying bargaining powers to the two claimants. Two formulationsof reorganization are presented: debt-equity swaps and strategicdebt service resulting from negotiated debt service reductions.We study the effects of bond covenants on payout policies anddistinguish liquidity-induced defaults from strategic defaults.We derive optimal equity issuance and payout policies. The debtcapacity of the firm and the optimal capital structure are characterized.     

The impact of government ownership on dividend policy in China

We investigate the impact of State ownership on Chinese corporate dividend policy. We find that Chinese firms' dividend payout rates respond fairly quickly to earnings changes, and the average actual payout ratio for Chinese firms falls between the payout ratios for emerging-market and developed firms. These results are consistent with the dividend policies of developing economies in general. We also find that dividend payouts among dividend-paying firms, and the likelihood that a firm will pay a dividend, are increasing in State ownership. Our findings are consistent with the State's need for cash flow as a partial motivation for continued State ownership of a significant portion of the corporate economy, and support the agency and tax clientele explanations for dividend policy.     

US cross-listing and corporate disclosure policy

We investigate whether cross-listing in the US contributes to impound more earnings information into stock prices. Our results indicate that US exchange cross-listings are not associated with more future earnings news reflected in current prices, in accord with the view that such mechanism does not improve the information environment of non-US firms. This main finding is robust to many aspects of our methodology.     

Large shareholders, board independence, and minority shareholder rights: Evidence from Europe

We examine the relation between minority shareholder protection laws, ownership concentration, and board independence. Minority shareholder rights is a country-level governance variable. Ownership structure and board composition represent firm-level governance variables. Prior research hypothesizes and documents a negative relation between countries' minority shareholder rights quality and firms' ownership concentration. We introduce the hypothesis that shareholder protection rights and firms' board independence are positively related. When a country's minority shareholder rights are strong, then minority shareholders should have the legal power to affect board composition. Using a sample of large firms from 14 European countries, we test both hypotheses and find that countries with stronger shareholder protection rights have firms with lower ownership concentrations and with more independent directors, consistent with both hypotheses. We also find evidence that ownership concentration and board independence are negatively related.