Pro forma disclosures,audit fees,and auditor resignations

The disclosure of non-GAAP (pro forma) earnings numbers by managers in the post-SOX era continues to attract attention from regulators, media, and researchers. However, there is limited empirical evidence on how auditors view clients that emphasize pro forma earnings over GAAP earnings. We study the extent to which audit fees and auditor resignations are associated with opportunistic non-GAAP disclosures. We find that during the pre-SOX period, optimistic pro forma differences, measured using either IBES actual earnings or hand-collected pro forma earnings, are associated with higher audit fees and a higher likelihood of auditor resignations. Additional results indicate that auditors seem to be more concerned with non-GAAP earnings disclosures in the post-SOX period.     

The "barbarians" in the boardroom

According to conventional wisdom, the corporate raiders and buyout specialists who flourished in the 1980s were the antithesis of good management. Their goals of realizing quick profits from the acquisition of major companies--frequently through rapid cost-cutting and the breakup of conglomerates--made them the bane of old-school corporate leaders. Long-term management, it seemed, was being sacrificed on the altar of short-term profits. With the abatement of takeovers in recent times, top corporate managers have hailed a return to business-as-usual. But the takeover artists have not, in fact, retreated. Instead, these corporate acquirers, many of whom own large stakes in major industrial companies, are assuming board seats and switching their emphasis to overseeing the companies they control--with an eye toward the long term. In this new role, the takeover experts are not plunderers, nor are they creating quick profit at the expense of companies' long-term health; rather, they are defying expectations and, in a number of important respects, successfully implementing the agenda of the gurus of good management. Setting the pace in this new arena is the most powerful takeover group of the 1980s, the leveraged buyout firm of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company. KKR's partners hold board seats at nine different companies with $1 billion a year or more in sales.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)     

Single-family housing transactions: Seller motivations, price, and marketing time

Factors such as relocation and financial distress motivate the seller of a single-family home to facilitate sale by posting a lower list price, communicating the motivations to the marketplace, or offering sales incentives to agents. Impacts of seller motivations on selling prices and marketing times are estimated using data for single-family homes sold in Arlington, Texas, from 1991 to 1993. Results show selling price discounts for houses with sellers who are either eager, motivated, or anxious, houses with sellers who have relocated, foreclosures, and vacant houses. Only foreclosure houses show the reduced marketing time expected for properties with motivated sellers. The results further suggest that the list price is the seller's primary mechanism for selling the property. Reducing the list price fosters faster sales at the sacrifice of the selling price.     

Liability protection,director compensation,and incentives

We examine the effect of liability protection on the compensation of directors and on takeover outcomes. Consistent with the hypothesis that directors require additional compensation if they bear liability, we find that director compensation is higher for firms that provide less liability protection. Examining takeovers, we find evidence that takeovers of firms with protected directors are less likely to succeed. Moreover, firms with protected directors are more likely to accept a lower bid premium, and this finding is consistent with protected directors having reduced incentives to negotiate for the highest possible price during the acquisition. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that director liability provisions have a significant impact both on director compensation and director duty.     

The timeliness and consequences of disseminating public information by regulators

This paper documents different timeliness in disseminating sanction and enforcement information (SEI) by two types of regulatory agencies in China and the different consequences that flow from them. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) does not make timely public disclosures of SEI and, instead, leaves it up to the firms to make a public announcement under their general obligation to disclose price-sensitive information. The firms therefore have considerable discretion in deciding whether and when to disclose SEI. In contrast, the stock exchanges in Shenzhen and Shanghai make SEI public promptly through the media and the exchanges’ official websites. Using Chinese SEI data during the period 1999–2005, we find that the CSRC approach is associated with significantly lagged corporate disclosure (compared with the timely stock exchange approach) and a significantly negative (but delayed) stock price reaction. We also show that the sanctioned firm may take advantage of the less timely CSRC approach to delay its disclosure of SEI for opportunistic reasons such as completing material transactions. We conclude that the CSRC should make immediate public announcements of SEI as these contain price-sensitive information. Furthermore, the immediate dissemination of SEI will bring the CSRC into line with the disclosure practices of China’s stock exchanges and international market regulators.     

Too big to fail: Some empirical evidence on the causes and consequences of public banking interventions in the UK

During the 2007–09 financial crisis, the banking sector received an extraordinary level of public support. In this empirical paper, we examine the determinants of a number of public sector interventions: government funding or central bank liquidity insurance schemes, public capital injections, and nationalizations. We use bank-level data spanning all British and foreign banks operating within the United Kingdom. We use multinomial logit regression techniques and find that a bank's size, relative to the size of the entire banking system, typically has a large positive and non-linear effect on the probability of public sector intervention for a bank. We also use instrumental variable techniques to show that British interventions helped; there is fragile evidence that the wholesale (non-core) funding of an affected institution increased significantly following capital injection or nationalization.     

Financial fraud,director reputation,and shareholder wealth

We investigate the reputational impact of financial fraud for outside directors based on a sample of firms facing shareholder class action lawsuits. Following a financial fraud lawsuit, outside directors do not face abnormal turnover on the board of the sued firm but experience a significant decline in other board seats held. This decline in other directorships is greater for more severe allegations of fraud and when the outside director bears greater responsibility for monitoring fraud. Interlocked firms that share directors with the sued firm also exhibit valuation declines at the lawsuit filing. Fraud-affiliated directors are more likely to lose directorships at firms with stronger corporate governance and their departure is associated with valuation increases for these firms.     

民生政府重组的智慧

几百年前,牛顿发现,力的作用是相互的。其实他少发现了一点,不仅实际中存在的力,就是现实事物的一点改变,都需要付出其"成本力"。《孙子兵法》中说行军无非天时地利人和,三者具备,则立于不败之地。这就是打仗的"成本力"。而对于乡镇民生服务中心来说,改革成功的成本力,指的是在"人和"先导中的人权、事权、财权三权变更中的巧妙设计。具体如何,请待我慢慢道来。     

External regulation,independent director attendance,and governance effects

In this study we examine how the regulation of director attendance disciplines directors’ behavior, and consider the governance effect of such regulations. This examination exploits the differences between the requirements for director attendance at board meetings enacted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). Using a difference-in-differences model with a sample of A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2017, we document that the rate of meeting attendance by independent directors who serve with firms listed on the SHSE (SHIDs) has increased significantly since the exchange’s enforcement of the regulation on attendance. This positive effect has been more pronounced for independent directors with legal backgrounds. Further investigations find that the regulation of attendance plays a corporate governance role through the mechanism of enhanced monitoring. The attendance regulation increases the SHIDs likelihood of casting dissenting votes, and it leads to both better accounting performance and higher firm value. In addition, SHIDs are more likely to depart from firms listed on the SHSE, and to transfer their directorships to firms listed on the SZSE, which has a less constraining attendance requirement. Our findings provide evidence of how external regulation shapes director attendance and voting behavior in emerging markets.     

2004硕果累累 2005期待辉煌--专访中国人民银行科技司司长陈静

记者:2004年中国银行业和中国人民银行自身的信息化建设取得了哪些令人瞩目的成就?陈静:2004年绝对是不平凡的一年。在过去的一年里,中国金融业、中国银行业和中国人民银行自身的改革都在进一步推进。起支持、保障、服务作用的信息化建设也在新的形势下取得了显著的成果。从中国银行业和中国人民银行自身信息化建设的角度看,2004年是在多年建设的基础上取得丰硕成果的一年。这主要体现在以下几个方面:1.中国现代化支付系统取得突破性进展,现代化支付清算服务体系基本形成。按照中央“建立和完善统一、高效、安全的支付清算系统”的战略部署,…     

Audit committee,board of director characteristics,and earnings management

This study examines whether audit committee and board characteristics are related to earnings management by the firm. A negative relation is found between audit committee independence and abnormal accruals. A negative relation is also found between board independence and abnormal accruals. Reductions in board or audit committee independence are accompanied by large increases in abnormal accruals. The most pronounced effects occur when either the board or the audit committee is comprised of a minority of outside directors. These results suggest that boards structured to be more independent of the CEO are more effective in monitoring the corporate financial accounting process.     

Us knows us in the UK: On director networks and CEO compensation

We analyze the relation between CEO compensation and networks of executive and non-executive directors for all listed UK companies over the period 1996-2007. We examine whether networks are built for reasons of information gathering or for the accumulation of managerial influence. Both indirect networks (enabling directors to collect information) and direct networks (leading to more managerial influence) enable the CEO to obtain higher compensation. Direct networks can harm the efficiency of the remuneration contracting in the sense that the performance sensitivity of compensation is then lower. We find that in companies with strong networks and hence busy boards the directors' monitoring effectiveness is reduced which leads to higher and less performance-sensitive CEO compensation. Our results suggest that it is important to have the ‘right’ type of network: some networks enable a firm to access valuable information whereas others can lead to strong managerial influence that may come at the detriment of the firm and its shareholders. We confirm that there are marked conflicts of interest when a CEO increases his influence by being a member of board committees (such as the remuneration committee) as we observe that his or her compensation is then significantly higher. We also find that hiring remuneration consultants with sizeable client networks also leads to higher CEO compensation especially for larger firms.     

Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors

I study incentives received by outside directors in Fortune 500 firms from compensation, replacement, and the opportunity to obtain other directorships. Previous research has only shown these relations to apply under limited circumstances such as financial distress. Together these incentive mechanisms provide directors with wealth increases of approximately 11 cents per $1,000 rise in firm value. Although smaller than the performance sensitivities of CEOs, outside directors' incentives imply a change in wealth of about $285,000 for a 1 standard deviation (SD) change in typical firm performance. Cross‐sectional patterns of director equity awards conform to agency and financial theories.     

Outside wealth,the demand for money and the crowding out effect

Policy simulations with most large macroeconometric models evidence little, if any, crowding out of private spending from debt financed increases in government expenditures. Examination of the structure of these models reveals that none allows for a wealth effect of debt finance on the demand for money, even though theoretical studies suggest that this wealth effect may cause significant crowding out. This paper provides empirical evidence that increases in government debt held by the public do increase the demand for money; therefore, the fiscal policy simulations of the large macroeconometric models may yield biased conclusions concerning the crowding out effect.     

立足于发展的银行监管——访中国银监会广西银监局局长熊良俊

长期在广东工作.曾任中国人民银行深圳市中心支行副行长、中国银监会深圳银监局副局长的熊良俊,于2006年5月被调入广东的邻居广西担任广西银监局局长。"两地虽然在空间距离很近.但经济差距却不小",熊局长如是说。虽然他早有思想准备,但来到广西后就发现,广西金融业的差距与深圳更大。这就提醒他.到广西担任局长的思路和做法要与深圳相比应有所不同。他是如何想,如何做的呢?带着这些疑问,几经周折,终于找到了这位低调的年轻局长。     

Innovation, public choice and public control in the market for health insurance.

Innovation, public choice and public control in the market for health insurance/benefits in the United States are largely dependent upon the ability of the various stakeholders to successfully argue their positions with legislators, regulators, providers, purchasers and third party beneficiaries. Given the public/private nature of health benefits, these relationships are examined in a Stigler/Posner/Peltzman public choice framework. Conflicts among various stakeholders and their ability to influence innovation in the market for health benefits are discussed.     

信息化水平是衡量保险企业核心竞争力的重要标志--访中国保险监督管理委员会统计信息部副主任吴晓军

作为行业监管机构的中国保险监督管理委员会（简称保监会），在制定行业IT发展战略规划、建立和推行行业信息化发展所必需的基础性业务规范和技术标准以及保障行业信息系统安全运行等方面的作用至关重要。日前，本刊记者就保监会自身信息化建设及其推动行业信息化发展所做的工作采访了中国保险监督管理委员会统计信息部副主任吴晓军。     

Strategic foresight in public policy: Reviewing the experiences of the UK, Singapore, and the Netherlands

In an interdependent and complex world, only few public policy challenges can be confined to one particular policy area anymore. Many governments have realized that a single-issue focus is often insufficient in dealing with emerging threats and opportunities. They have therefore started to experiment with strategic foresight that deliberately cuts across the traditional boundaries of policy areas and government departments. This article reviews the foresight activities of three countries that have been at the forefront of this trend: the United Kingdom, Singapore, and the Netherlands. To this end, the article discusses the concept of strategic foresight and explains the two distinct ways in which it contributes to public policy-making: on the one hand, it informs policy by providing more systematic knowledge about relevant trends and developments in an organization's environments; on the other hand, it acts as a driver of reflexive mutual social learning processes among policy-makers that stimulate the generation of common public policy visions. The article concludes by drawing lessons with regard to the key success factors allowing strategic foresight to make an effective contribution to public policy-making.     

金融发展、对外开放与区域科技创新

金融发展通过解决信息不对称、降低研发成本、提供个性化服务等方式促进科技创新,而对外开放通过示范效应、溢出效应以及拉动有效需求等方式促进科技创新.从全国层面看,金融发展与对外开放均对我国区域创新具有推动作用.在经济发展水平较低的地区,金融发展对科技创新具有显著的促进作用,而对外开放对科技创新的作用并不显著;在经济发展水平...