Employee ownership, board representation, and corporate financial policies

French law mandates that employees of publicly listed companies can elect two types of directors to represent employees. Privatized companies must reserve board seats for directors elected by employees by right of employment, while employee-shareholders can elect a director whenever they hold at least 3% of outstanding shares. Using a comprehensive sample of firms in the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) 120 Index from 1998 to 2008, we examine the impact of employee-directors on corporate valuation, payout policy, and internal board organization and performance. We find that directors elected by employee shareholders increase firm valuation and profitability, but do not significantly impact corporate payout policy. Directors elected by employees by right significantly reduce payout ratios, but do not impact firm value or profitability. Employee representation on corporate boards thus appears to be at least value-neutral, and perhaps value-enhancing in the case of directors elected by employee shareholders.     

Corporate board and board committee independence,firm performance,and family ownership concentration: An analysis based on Hong Kong firms

This study examines whether the relationship between corporate board and board committee independence and firm performance is moderated by the concentration of family ownership. Based on a sample of Hong Kong firms, we find no significant association between the independence of corporate boards or board committees and firm performance in family firms, whereas board independence is positively associated with firm performance in non-family firms. Additionally, our findings show that the proportion of independent directors on the corporate boards of family firms is lower than that of non-family firms, but we find no significant difference in the representation of independent directors on the key committees of corporate boards between family and non-family firms. Overall, these results suggest that the “one size fits all” approach required by the regulatory authorities for appointing independent directors on corporate boards may not necessarily enhance firm performance, especially for family firms. Thus, the requirement to appoint independent directors to the corporate boards of family firms needs to be reconsidered.     

What’s the value of politically connected directors?

This study examines the stock price response to Document 18, a regulation released in China in 2013 requiring independent directors with political connections to resign from the boards of directors for publicly listed firms. We document a significant positive price response in the window surrounding the directive’s promulgation date. This response is also of important economic magnitude. Our findings suggest that on average, the market views the costs of hiring politically connected directors as outweighing the associated benefits. Consistent with this view, we document that politically connected directors often shirk their board duties, as evidenced by their poor rates of attendance at board meetings. Further investigations show that the value decreasing effect of politically connected directors is apparent mainly for firms in regulated industries and varies with earnings management practices. However, the market views politically connected directors favorably if firms have significant business transactions with the government.     

Mechanisms of Board Turnover: Evidence From Backdating

Regulators and governance scholars often regard the high rates of reelection among those nominated for boards of directors (and the small percentage of nominated directors who lose elections) as persuasive evidence of limited shareholder power. To correct this perceived imbalance against shareholders, some corporate governance advocates have undertaken a number of efforts to reform the director election system, most recently by proposing “proxy access” regulation to facilitate contested board elections. The authors take a close look at the board turnover within companies implicated in stock‐option backdating to assess the effectiveness of board elections. What they find is that, despite high reelection rates among nominated directors, board turnover is in fact substantial—but it takes place almost entirely before the board elections. Because of the apparently high costs associated with losing such an election, board nominees generally are not renominated for election (or reelection) unless success is quite likely. And whereas independent directors generally leave boards by not being renominated, management directors generally resign. For this reason, reelection rates tell us very little about the effectiveness of shareholder voting. But what the authors' findings do show is that directors involved in stock‐option backdating experience reductions in both the number and prestige of their future directorships. Thus, the authors' findings suggest that the board of director election process functions more effectively than shareholder advocates typically claim, that criticism of the responsiveness of the board‐election process to shareholder interests is overstated, and that reform efforts are therefore likely to be misplaced.     

Bank holding company performance,risk, and “busy” board of directors

We examine the association between “busyness” of the board of directors (serving on multiple boards) and bank holding company (BHC) performance and risk. We estimate several simultaneous-equations models employing the 3SLS technique and instrumental variables to account for endogeneity. We obtain four main results. First, BHC performance measures (return on equity, Tobin’s Q and EBIT over total assets) are positively associated with busyness of directors. Second, BHC risk measures (total, market, idiosyncratic, credit and default risks) are inversely related to busyness of directors. Third, performance (risk) benefits of having busy directors strengthened (weakened) during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Fourth, busy directors are not more likely to become problem directors (fail the 75% attendance standard), and if sitting on boards of both BHC and non-financial firms, they attend more of the BHC board meetings, than those of the non-financials. Our findings partially alleviate concerns that over-boarded directors shirk their responsibilities.     

Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments

We examine the number of external appointments held by corporate directors. Directors who serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to attract directorships. Consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), we find that firm performance has a positive effect on the number of appointments held by a director. We find no evidence that multiple directors shirk their responsibilities to serve on board committees. We do not find that multiple directors are associated with a greater likelihood of securities fraud litigation. We conclude that the evidence does not support calls for limits on directorships held by an individual.     

Does independent directors’’ monitoring affect reputation? Evidence from the stock and labor markets

Using novel data on independent directors’ opinions in China, we investigate the stock and labor market effects prompted by independent directors publicly saying “no” to major board decisions. We find that the market reacts negatively to modified director opinions, but positively to firms interlocked with the directors who said “no.” We further find substantial turnover and decline in board seats after independent directors issue modified opinions. Overall, we identify a dilemma in China whereby the labor market does not reward vigilant directors for standing up to firm insiders, although investors add a premium to effective board monitoring.     

The Case for Activist Directors: A Conversation with Ira M. Millstein

In this conversation held at the 2016 Millstein Governance Forum at Columbia Law School, Ira Millstein, a leading authority on corporate governance and founding chair of the Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership, discusses his new book, The Activist Director, with Geoff Colvin of Fortune Magazine. In explaining why he wrote the book, Millstein said that it is important for boards of directors to understand the key role they must play to secure the future of our corporations, and for shareholders to recognize, encourage, and support this role. The role of directors has changed significantly over the years. Yet corporate performance, broadly speaking, has not lived up to expectations, and Millstein attributes this in part to the failure of directors to adapt and evolve quickly and decisively enough—which in turn has helped to fuel the rise of activist investors. Much of the problem stems from the tendency of boards to view themselves as oversight organizations that review and “challenge” management at arm's length, as opposed to truly engaging with management to make better decisions. To address this problem, Millstein makes the case for “activist” directors who will partner with management, think deliberately and critically about the company's strategy, and work for the longterm interest of the corporation. And to provide financial incentives for directors to reinforce their commitment to the corporations they serve, Millstein favors an increase in compensation for directors that is tied to long‐term performance. As an early example of what became an activist board, Millstein describes his own experience with the board of General Motors in the late 1980s and early 1990s when it confronted managerial failure and ended up replacing the CEO. In the current environment of activist investors, activist boards must give serious consideration to shareholder proposals for change, without succumbing to pressure for shortsighted cutbacks in value‐adding investment and while ensuring that management is focused on long‐term growth and innovation. Directors must have the courage and commitment to carry out the course of action they deem to be in the best longterm interests of the corporation.     

Female tainted directors,financial reporting quality and audit fees

This paper examines the association between the presence of female tainted directors on corporate boards and audit committees and (1) financial reporting quality and (2) audit fees. Female tainted directors are defined as female directors who have been directors of the firms that have previously been involved in financial failures and integrity indiscretions. Using real earnings management and audit fees as proxies for effective governance and board reputation, we find that firms with female tainted directors have higher real earnings management and higher audit fees. However, since prior literature has demonstrated that audit fees are higher for firms with female directors because female directors demand better auditing, we corroborate a supply-side effect of auditors charging higher audit fees when female tainted directors exist. We demonstrate this by showing that while there is an association between audit fee and real earnings management, this association is higher for firms with female tainted directors. Arguably, the governance and reputational benefits of female directors on boards are negated if such directors have tarnished professional reputations.     

Board 3.0: What the Private‐Equity Governance Model Can Offer Public Companies∗

The authors view board structures as an adaptive institution that responds to the key challenges faced by public companies: helping management solve the problems of production and organization of large‐scale enterprise; limiting managerial agency costs; serving as a delegated monitor of the firm's compliance obligations; and responding to the governance environment of changing shareholder ownership patterns. U.S. company board structures are shown to have evolved over time, often through discontinuous lurches, as particular functions have waxed and waned in importance. This article is part of a larger project that traces two iterations of the public company board, what the authors call Board 1.0 (the “advisory board”) and Board 2.0 (the “monitoring board”). The authors argue in particular that Board 2.0, as embedded in both current practice and regulation, now fails the functional fit test for many companies. First, it does not scale to match the dramatic increase in the size and complexity of many modern public corporations. Second, at a time of reconcentrated ownership achieved through institutional investors and increased activism, it does not have the expertise and commitment needed to resolve the tension between managerial or market myopia, or “short‐termism,” and managerial “hyperopia.” This article holds out an optional alternative, Board 3.0, which would bring to the public company board some strategies used by private equity firms for their portfolio company boards. Such “Portco” boards consist of directors who are “thickly informed,” “heavily resourced,” and “intensely interested.” Bringing such “empowered directors” to public company boards could facilitate evolution of the public company board model in response to dramatic changes in the corporate business environment. The authors also suggest possible routes for implementing Board 3.0, including the enlisting of PE firms as “relational investors” that would have both capacity and incentives to engineer changes in board structure.     

The differential effects of classified boards on firm value

Classified boards actually benefit firms that have low monitoring costs and greater needs for advisory services. Previous literature has emphasized the entrenchment effect of classified boards. However, we find that this adverse impact of classified boards can be offset or even superseded by the potential benefits of board classification for firms who hope to benefit from the advisory services of their independent directors. We show that firms with greater advising needs appoint more outside directors with diverse attributes and expertise, qualifications that enhance the ability to provide useful advice to managers. Furthermore, in such firms, board classification is associated with higher performance sensitivity of forced CEO turnover and better acquisition performance. Conversely, in firms with high monitoring costs, board classification hurts managerial equity-based incentives and risk-taking incentives. These findings suggest how and through which channels classified boards engender the differential effects on firm value.     

Depoliticization and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from the mandated resignation of directors in China

The 2013 depoliticization regulation (Rule 18) in China mandates government officials to resign from board positions in public firms, terminating firms' political connections established through these directors. Exploiting this regulation as a quasi-experiment, we document that politically connected firms increase their cash holdings 12.7% more than non-connected firms because of these resignations. This pattern is more pronounced among firms that rely more heavily on the government for external resources. Among state-owned firms, the pattern is more evident in firms that are more deeply privatized. In addition, firms that lose political ties experience a significant decline in obtaining bank loans and government subsidies, and they are also slower to adjust their cash holdings toward the optimal level. These findings underscore the role of corporate political linkages in facilitating firms' access to resources that “soften” firms' budget constraints.     

Director Quality and Firm Performance

Many financial economists argue that the board of directors' efficacy in the monitoring of managerial behavior depends upon the quality of the directors. Assuming that there is a link between the stock performance of target firms and the quality of their directors, we empirically categorize directors receiving additional directorships following a takeover as “above average” and “below average.” We then follow the stock performance of firms hiring new directors for three years after their hiring. We match the two categories of directors with the performance of hiring firms after a director's appointment. Accounting for other contemporaneous effects, we regress the hiring firms' post‐performance on director quality and other attributes. The results indicate that directors of “above average” quality are related to hiring firms with “above average” post‐performance.     

Social Concentration on Boards,Corporate Information Environment and Cost of Capital

Prior evidence on the relationship between demographic diversity in corporate boards and firm performance is mixed. Some studies have found that the relationship between board attributes and firm performance is driven by a firm's information environment. This study examines whether corporate transparency also impacts the relationship between gender and ethnic diversity of directors and firm performance. To test this hypothesis, I use a Herfindahl Index based on directors’ gender and ethnicity to measure board diversity, and an opacity index based on analyst following, analyst forecast error, bid‐ask spread, and share turnover to measure corporate transparency. I find that the cost of capital is positively associated with social concentration on corporate boards and that this premium is larger for highly opaque firms. In further analysis, I find that the interaction of corporate information environment and social concentration on boards is more important for operationally complex firms. Compared with simple firms, operationally complex firms pay a greater premium on their capital if they have a socially concentrated board and an opaque information environment.     

Board interlocks and the propensity to be targeted in private equity transactions

We examine how board networks affect change-of-control transactions by investigating whether directors’ deal exposure acquired through board service at different companies affect their current firms’ likelihood of being targeted in a private equity-backed, take-private transaction. In our sample of all US publicly traded firms in 2000–2007, we find that companies which have directors with private equity deal exposure gained from interlocking directorships are approximately 42% more likely to receive private equity offers. The magnitude of this effect varies with the influence of directors on their current boards and the quality of these directors’ previous take-private experience, and it is robust to the most likely classes of alternative explanations—endogenous matching between directors and firms and proactive stacking of board composition by management. The analysis shows that board members and their social networks influence which companies become targets in change-of-control transactions.     

Does the independence of independent directors matter?

This paper analyzes the characteristics of firms that declare board directors as independents, although the directors are not strictly independent, and examines the consequences in terms of performance and corporate governance outcomes. Based on publicly available information, eight criteria of “independence” used to examine a panel of Spanish listed firms classify 14.2% of the directors as strictly independent, whereas the firms classify 32.5% of the board as independent directors. Firms with dispersed ownership structures misclassify directors more frequently than do firms with large controlling owners. In terms of consequences, we find weak evidence of a negative relation between misclassification and a firm's future operating performance. However, no relation is found between independents' misclassification and several relevant outcomes of the primary delegated committees with monitoring roles: the audit committee and the nomination and remuneration committee. There is no significance with regard to the non-strictly independent measures explaining executive directors' compensation, CEO turnover, audit qualifications or earning management behavior.     

Board composition,grey directors and corporate failure in the UK

This study examines the effect of board composition on the likelihood of corporate failure in the UK. We consider both independent and non-independent (grey) non-executive directors (NEDs) to enhance our understanding of the impact of NEDs' personal or economic ties with the firm and its management on firm performance. We find that firms with a larger proportion of grey directors on their boards are less likely to fail. Furthermore, the probability of corporate failure is lower both when firms have a higher proportion of grey directors relative to executive directors and when they have a higher proportion of grey directors relative to independent directors. Conversely, there is a positive relationship between the likelihood of corporate failure and the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. The findings discussed in this study support the collaborative board model and the view that corporate governance reform efforts may have over emphasised the monitoring function of independent directors and underestimated the benefits of NEDs' affiliations with the firm and its management.     

Takeover bids and target directors’ incentives: the impact of a bid on directors’ wealth and board seats

I investigate the nature of the incentives that lead outside directors to serve stockholders’ interests. Specifically, I document the effect of a takeover bid on target directors, both in terms of its immediate financial impact and its effect on the number of future board seats held by those target directors. Directors are rarely retained following a completed offer. All target directors hold fewer directorships in the future than a control group, suggesting that the target board seat is difficult to replace. For outside directors, the direct financial impact of a completed merger is predominately negative. This documents a cost to outside directors should they fail as monitors, forcing the external control market to act for them. Future seats are related to pre-bid performance. Among outside directors of poorly performing firms, those who rebuff an offer face partial settling-up in the directorial labor market, while those who complete the merger do not.     

When are outside directors effective?

This paper uses recent regulations that have required some companies to increase the number of outside directors on their boards to generate estimates of the effect of board independence on performance that are largely free from endogeneity problems. Our main finding is that the effectiveness of outside directors depends on the cost of acquiring information about the firm: when the cost of acquiring information is low, performance increases when outsiders are added to the board, and when the cost of information is high, performance worsens when outsiders are added to the board. The estimates provide some of the cleanest estimates to date that board independence matters, and the finding that board effectiveness depends on information cost supports a nascent theoretical literature emphasizing information asymmetry. We also find that firms compose their boards as if they understand that outsider effectiveness varies with information costs.     

The evolution of boards and CEOs following performance declines

This paper examines the evolution of corporate boards following a large performance decline. Over 40% of the original directors depart the board during the three years following underperformance. Measures of initial CEO influence over the board such as CEO ownership are associated with smaller increases in board independence and less board turnover. The underperforming firms undergo a strong recovery subsequently, with the largest performance improvement occurring among firms that experience no turnover on their boards and among firms that do not change their board independence. We conclude that the large board turnover experienced by underperforming firms presents significant challenges for subsequent recovery.