IPO auctions and private information

IPO auctions, which provide an impartial way of determining IPO pricing and share allocations, offer a natural setting for examining whether institutional investors possess private information, and for measuring how valuable their information is. Analyzing detailed bidding data from Taiwan’s discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions, we find that, relative to retail investors, institutional investors tend to bid higher in auctions when IPO shares are more valuable, and that underpricing is larger in auctions with relatively higher institutional bids. These results imply that institutional investors are better informed about IPO value, and that they obtain higher information rents when they bid higher relative to retail investors. We estimate the value of institutional investors’ private information to be worth about 8.68% of return, which is the extra rate of return they command on their informational advantages over retail investors.     

Measuring misleading information in IPO prospectuses

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Newly public firms may provide misleading information about their business plans in their initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses. Using textual...     

Belief updating, debt pricing and financial decisions under asymmetric information

This paper studies debt holders’ belief updating, valuation of corporate debt, and equity owners’ financing decisions during financial distress under asymmetric information. This is done within a continuous-time framework, where the relevant state variable is assumed to follow an Arithmetic Brownian motion (ABM). ABM can take negative values and has very realistic feature compared with Geometric Brownian motion (GBM). Using Chapter 11 of U.S. Bankruptcy Code as a costly screening device, we can characterize which firm will choose private workouts (in the form of strategic debt service) and which will choose to file for the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy procedure (in the form of debt-equity swap) when the firm is in financial distress. Using arguments similar to equilibrium refinements, we give a clear picture of how debt holders’ beliefs about the firm’s types are updated according to the state variable and the firm’s default behavior, and describe optimal strategies of both parties under those beliefs. We also provide an approximate solution to the debt pricing problem under asymmetric information.     

Corporate investment and financing under asymmetric information

We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions in which corporate insiders have superior information about the firm's growth prospects. We show that firms with positive private information can credibly signal their type to outside investors using the timing of corporate actions and their debt-equity mix. Using this result, we show that asymmetric information induces firms with good prospects to speed up investment, leading to a significant erosion of the option value of waiting to invest. Additionally, we demonstrate that informational asymmetries may not translate into a financing hierarchy or pecking order over securities. Finally, we generate a rich set of testable implications relating firms’ investment and financing strategies, abnormal announcement returns, and external financing costs to a number of managerial, firm, and industry characteristics.     

Limit-order submission strategies under asymmetric information

This paper provides evidence that informed traders dominate the response of limit-order submissions to shocks in a pure limit-order market. In the market we study, informed traders are highly sensitive to spreads, volatility, momentum and depth. By contrast, uninformed traders are relatively insensitive to all these market conditions. The dominance of the informed over limit-order submissions is magnified by contrasts between them and the uninformed in the use of aggressively-priced limit orders.     

Financial equilibrium with asymmetric information and random horizon

We study in detail and explicitly solve the version of Kyle’s model introduced in a specific case in Back and Baruch (Econometrica 72:433–465, 2004), where the trading horizon is given by an exponentially distributed random time. The first part of the paper is devoted to the analysis of time-homogeneous equilibria using tools from the theory of one-dimensional diffusions. It turns out that such an equilibrium is only possible if the final payoff is Bernoulli distributed as in Back and Baruch (Econometrica 72:433–465, 2004). We show in the second part that the signal the market makers use in the general case is a time-changed version of the one they would have used had the final payoff had a Bernoulli distribution. In both cases, we characterise explicitly the equilibrium price process and the optimal strategy of the informed trader. In contrast to the original Kyle model, it is found that the reciprocal of the market’s depth, i.e., Kyle’s lambda, is a uniformly integrable supermartingale. While Kyle’s lambda is a potential, i.e., converges to 0, for the Bernoulli-distributed final payoff, its limit in general is different from 0.     

Convertible calls and corporate taxes under asymmetric information

This paper develops a signalling model of call of convertible securities (bonds or preferred stock) in the presence of corporate taxes and asymmetric information about future earnings. In equilibrium, managers with relatively unfavorable information call to force convertible holders to convert to common stock (in spite of the loss of corporate tax benefits if the convertibles are bonds), while those with relatively favorable information do not call. The model predicts that the announcement period common stock returns are more negative at the call of convertible bond than at the call of convertible preferred stock. Furthermore, we predict that when the importance of the tax deductibility of interest differs among firms, so does the stock price reaction to the announcement of convertible debt call. Specifically, the loss of equity value at the announcement decreases with the amount of non-debt tax shield that the calling firm owns, decreases with the book value of convertible debt called, and increases with corporate taxes.     

Earnings management and firm valuation under asymmetric information

This paper seeks to provide an explanation for why corporate officers manage the disclosure of accounting information. We show that earnings management affects firm value when value-maximizing managers and investors are asymmetrically informed. In equilibrium, the strategic management of reported earnings influences investors' assessments of the market values of companies' shares.     

IPO underpricing,signaling, and property returns

This paper investigates whether IPO signals reveal proprietary information about the prospects of an issuing firm’s underlying industry. By analyzing a sample of European property company (EPC) IPOs from 1997 to 2007, we take advantage of a heterogeneous set of industry performance measures, i.e., yields and total returns of direct property investments in various European property markets that can be clearly assigned to each individual IPO. The results reveal that the main signal of interest, underpricing, is in fact positively related to average property yields for a 12-month post-IPO period; a result that supports our assumption. Other signals, as proposed in previous research, do not appear to contain any information about the prospects of the IPO firm’s target property investment market. We also show that total returns seem to be a biased measure for direct property performance. Further tests for the signaling model’s preconditioned presence of information asymmetry among EPCs reveal that underpricing levels are a function of company-specific ex ante uncertainty proxies. In contrast, property-specific ex ante uncertainty proxies do not explain underpricing levels.     

Risk, Reputation, and IPO Price Support

Immediately following an initial public offering, underwriters often repurchase shares of poorly performing offerings in an apparent attempt to stabilize the price. Using proprietary Nasdaq data, I study the price effects and determinants of price support. Some of the key findings are (1) Stabilization is substantial, inducing price rigidity at and below the offer price; (2) I find no evidence that stocks with larger information asymmetries are stabilized more strongly; (3) Larger underwriters stabilize more, perhaps to protect their reputations with investors; and (4) Investment banks with retail brokerage operations stabilize much more than other banks, inconsistent with the view that stabilization benefits primarily institutional investors.     

Optimal design of securities under asymmetric information

A firm must decide what security to sell to raise external capitalto finance a profitable investment opportunity. There is exante asymmetry of information regarding the probability distributionof cashflow generated by the investment. In this setting, wederive necessary and sufficient conditions for a security tobe optimal (uniquely optimal), that is, for pooling at thissecurity to be an (the unique) equilibrium outcome. Using theseconditions we show that the debt contract is (uniquely) optimalif and only if cash flows are ordered by (strict) conditionalstochastic dominance. Finally, we derive an equivalence relationshipbetween optimal security designs and designs that minimize mispricing.     

Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit

Bank credit has evolved from the traditional relationship banking model to an originate-to-distribute model. We show that the borrowers whose loans are sold in the secondary market underperform their peers by about 9% per year (risk-adjusted) over the three-year period following the initial sale of their loans. Therefore, either banks are originating and selling loans of lower quality borrowers based on unobservable private information (adverse selection), and/or loan sales lead to diminished bank monitoring that affects borrowers negatively (moral hazard). We propose regulatory restrictions on loan sales, increased disclosure, and a loan trading exchange/clearinghouse as mechanisms to alleviate these problems.     

Transparency in IPO mechanism: Retail investors’ participation,IPO pricing and returns

Using data from the transparent Indian IPO setting, the paper examines retail investors’ participation, their influence on IPO pricing and the returns they make on IPO investment. The transparency in the mechanism, which allows investors to observe prior investors’ participation, leads to demand which is concentrated at either one or two points of the offer price range. Analysis of investors’ demand during the offer period shows that the participation of retail investors is significantly influenced by the participation of institutional investors. We examine IPO pricing and find that favourable demand by retail investors is positively associated with a high IPO price even after controlling for demand by institutional investors. Further, we find that due to aggressive bidding by overconfident investors, retail investors are, on average, unlikely to make positive allocation weighted initial returns even in a setting where they do not have to compete with institutional investors. Retail investors, however, can earn significant positive allocation weighted initial returns if they limit their participation in IPOs with above average institutional investors’ demand.     

IPO Underpricing, Firm Quality, and Analyst Forecasts

We find that IPO underpricing is positively related to post-IPO growth in sales and EBITDA, but is not significantly related to growth in earnings. Our evidence suggests that accrual reversals or earnings management may cause this inconsistency. We interpret the growth rates of sales and EBITDA as measures of firm quality, and conclude that our evidence supports the notion that IPO firms with greater underpricing are of better quality. Our tests on analysts' earnings forecast errors show that analysts are less positively biased in their earnings forecasts for IPO firms that have greater underpricing.     

Chinese IPO activity,pricing, and market cycles

We examine the activity, pricing, and market cycles of 1,380 Chinese A share IPOs over the period 1991–2005 and find initial underpricing of 238%. The government restrictions on IPO offer price and quota allocation cause pricing structural breaks and attribute more than half of initial underpricing. A multifactor model that includes firm’s characteristics, excess demand for IPO shares, and the government restrictions explains cross-sectional initial returns, after controlling for industrial differences and stock market conditions. In addition, monthly IPO volume and average initial return are highly correlated. A VAR model indicates that initial return leads IPO volume by 6 months.     

The partial adjustment of IPO prices to public information and issuing methods in Taiwan

Using 1997 to 2009 exchange-listed data, we examine the treatment of public information by underwriters throughout the entire initial public offering (IPO) price-setting process in Taiwan. We find that regardless of which mechanism (fixed-price, auctions, or book-building) an issuer has chosen, the partial adjustment of the IPO offer prices to public information is evident in our study. Although both fixed-price and book-built issues show a modest but statistically significant relationship between market returns and the level of initial returns, we find economically meaningful effects for both issuing methods. Our findings also demonstrate that auctioned IPOs exhibit strong evidence of partial adjustment to market returns. That is to say, the estimated effect is statistically and economically significant. Therefore, we attempt to provide rational explanations for such phenomena.     

Insiders’ incentives for asymmetric disclosure and firm-specific information flows

Recent research suggests that insiders’ incentives for capturing cash flows affect price formation process in which insiders are inclined to withhold good news and to accelerate the release of bad news (Jin and Myers, 2006). We investigate whether insiders’ incentives for private control benefit, proxied by control-ownership wedge, affect firm-specific return characteristics. We find that control-ownership wedge is negatively related to the likelihood of positive return jumps and positively related to the extent of asymmetric market reaction to good news rather than to bad news. Overall, our results support the notion that corporate insiders increase opaqueness and withhold good news in order to capture unexpected cash flow.     

承销商声誉、媒体关注与IPO首日抑价

本文以2006—2014年上市的1107家A股IPO公司为样本,研究了承销商声誉对公司媒体报道、进而对IPO首日抑价的影响。研究发现:(1)媒体关注与IPO首日抑价正相关;(2)承销商通过媒体报道这一中间传导环节提高新股首日抑价;(3)IPO承销商声誉有助于公司获得更高的媒体关注,特别是来自地方性媒体的关注,2009年6月IPO发行政策改革后,承销商声誉对媒体关注影响增强。本研究有助于进一步揭示并理解金融中介对资产定价影响的内在机理。     

民营企业发审委社会关系、IPO资格与上市后表现

中国IPO监管的"核准制"使得证监会发行与审核委员会拥有企业上市的决定权,在发审委委员名单公开的"准自然实验"契机下,本文立足于民营企业与发审委委员的社会关系来研究中介机构发审委社会关系与上市资格、IPO抑价程度以及上市后表现的关系。实证结果发现:中介机构发审委社会关系显著提高了民营企业的上市成功率,但主要由会计师事务所关系的作用带来,对于公司聘任过去在发审委任职而产生的社会关系检验则发现这种社会关系具有时效性;进一步研究发现,拥有会计师事务所发审委社会关系的民营企业在IPO短期抑价幅度及发行当年的业绩与成长性都要高于没有关系的企业,但是在未来两年拥有会计师事务所发审委社会关系的公司的业绩和成长性反而更低,说明具有发审委背景的中介机构对企业进行了暂时的"包装"帮助企业上市且成功欺骗了投资者,发审委社会关系是寻租行为的体现而非信号显示。结论无论是对于中国制度背景下独特的"关系"研究还是对于当下IPO由核准制过渡到注册制的改革实践都具有重要的启示。