Workers or Employers: Who is Shaping Wage Inequality?

An extensive micro data set matching firms, establishments and their employees, is used to study the determinants of earnings inequality in Portugal and its evolution from 1983 to 1992, with the Theil index, its decomposition, and the decomposition of its change as tools of analysis. The relevance of both worker and employer attributes in shaping earnings inequality and its trend is quantified. The impact of the firm on wage inequality in a European country is compared to the situation in the USA, and the results suggest that a more regulated and centralized European bargaining system might reduce the scope for firm action. A profile of an economy undergoing modernization, where rising labour market inequality signalled the lack of an adequate labour force, can be drawn, with the minimum wage having nonetheless a certain narrowing effect on the earnings distribution.     

Holdup in oligopsonistic labour markets - a new role for the minimum wage

We consider a labour market model of oligopsonistic wage competition and show that there is a holdup problem although workers do not have any bargaining power. When a firm invests more, it pays a higher wage in order to attract workers from competitors. Because workers participate in the returns on investment while only firms bear the costs, investment is inefficiently low. A binding minimum wage can achieve the first-best level of investment, both in the short run for a given number of firms and in the long run when the number of firms is endogenous.     

Some deadweight losses from the minimum wage: the cases of full and partial compliance

This paper highlights the social costs from non-price rationing of the labour force due to the minimum wage. By short-circuiting the ability of low reservation-wage workers to underbid high-reservation wage workers, the minimum wage interferes with the market's basic function of grouping the lowest cost workers with the highest productivity firms. The present paper models the deadweight loss that society bears when high reservation-cost workers displace low reservation-cost workers. When firms can evade part or all of the minimum wage, an extra deadweight loss arises. Firms with high evasive ability but low productivity may displace firms with low evasive ability but high productivity.     

Evidence on Caste Based Discrimination

Caste based quotas in hiring have existed in the public sector in India for decades. Recently there has been debate about introducing similar quotas in private sector jobs. This paper uses a correspondence study to determine the extent of caste based discrimination in the Indian private sector. On average low-caste applicants need to send 20% more resumes than high-caste applicants to get the same callback. Differences in callback which favor high-caste applicants are particularly large when hiring is done by male recruiters or by Hindu recruiters. This finding provides evidence that differences in callback between high and low-caste applicants are not entirely due to statistical discrimination. High-caste applicants are also differentially favored by firms with a smaller scale of operations, while low-caste applicants are favored by firms with a larger scale of operations. This finding is consistent with taste-based theories of discrimination and with commitments made by large firms to hire actively from among low-caste groups.     

Minimum wages,wages and employment in various sectors in Honduras

This paper contributes to our understanding of the impact of minimum wages on labor markets of developing countries, where there are often multiple minimum wages and compliance is weak. We examine how changes in more than 22 minimum wages over 1990–2004 affect employment, unemployment and average wages of workers in different sectors, defined by coverage under the legislation. The evidence suggests that minimum wages are effectively enforced only in medium and large-scale firms, where a 1% increase in the minimum wage leads to an increase of 0.29% in the average wage and a relatively large reduction in employment of ? 0.46%. We find that public sector wages emulate minimum wage trends but the higher cost of labor does not reduce employment there. There are no discernable effects of minimum wages on the wages of workers in small-firms or the self-employed; yet, higher minimum wages may create more unemployment. We conclude that (even under our upper bound estimate of the effect on the wages of workers) the total earnings of workers in the large-firm covered sector fall with higher minimum wages in Honduras, which warrants a policy dialogue on the structure and level of minimum wages.     

Control and commitment HR practices,job satisfaction and turnover intentions: a comparison between local and multinational firms in China

There is a growing body of literature and debate around control versus commitment human resource management (HRM) systems and their impacts on employees. However, the impacts of these constructs have not been widely examined in more emerging economies. Taking a specific sample of educated professionals working for multinational and local firms in China, this study investigated employee perceptions of control and commitment HR practices, job satisfaction and turnover intentions. A total of 311 respondents completed a structured survey questionnaire. Results revealed that those working for multinational firms reported more positive perceptions of their employers' control and commitment HR practices. In multinational firms, the use of commitment HR practices predicted lower intentions to leave. However, in domestic firms a lack of control HR practices predicted higher turnover intentions. Theoretically, the study adds to discussions about the nature and roles of these constructs, their impacts on HR outcomes and how institutional mechanisms might shape the degree of HRM homogeneity and hybridity across organizations in China. Practically, the study provides guidance to international and local firms on how to improve their HRM effectiveness to achieve a higher retention of their most talented professionals.     

Commitment, advertising and efficiency of two-sided investment in competitive search equilibrium

Competitive search entails both commitment to and advertising of pay-off relevant aspects of market participants. This paper considers incrementally the implications of each in a labor market where both workers and firms invest prior to market entry. A wide range of institutional arrangements are addressed within the same general framework. When the characteristics of jobs or workers are advertised the efficient outcome pertains. Commitment without advertising typically leads to market unravelling: the Diamond paradox. But, whenever wages and human capital are advertised, firms become residual claimants; the private and social returns to investment coincide. Absent wage commitment, the Hosios condition implies efficiency when investments are advertised.     

Pretty Vacant: Recruitment in Low-Wage Labour Markets

This paper is a study of the process by which employers in five relatively low-wage British firms fill vacancies. It studies the determinants of the number and quality of applicants, the way in which these applicants are selected for interviews and offered jobs. The main conclusions are that thenumber of applicants is relatively small, the monetary and non-monetaryaspects of jobs are important determinants of the number of applicants forjobs, but that firms do eventually fall virtually all vacancies. Non-employedjob applicants have more difficulty in getting a job interview than those whoare currently employed but, once interviewed, do not appear to face any further difficulties in getting employment.     

Explaining cross-racial differences in teenage labor force participation: Results from a two-sided matching model

White teenagers are substantially more likely to search for employment than black teenagers. This differential occurs despite the fact that, conditional on race, individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely to search. While the racial wage gap is small, the unemployment rate for black teenagers is substantially higher than that of white teenagers. We develop a two-sided search model where firms are partially able to search on demographics. Model estimates reveal that firms are more able to target their search on race than on age. Employment and wage outcome differences explain half of the racial gap in labor force participation rates.     

Volatile multinationals? Evidence from the labor demand of German firms

Does more FDI make the world a riskier place for workers? We analyze whether an increase in multinational firms' activities is associated with an increase in firm-level employment volatility. We use a firm-level dataset for Germany which allows us to distinguish between purely domestic firms, exporters, domestic multinationals and foreign multinationals. Employment in multinationals could be more volatile than employment in domestic firms if multinationals were facing more volatile demand or if they react more to aggregate developments. We therefore decompose the labor demand of firms into their reaction and their exposure to aggregate developments. We find no above-average wage and output elasticities for multinational firms.     

The making of the German minimum wage: a case study of institutional change

In the more recent dualistic theories, Germany is cited as an example of a less solidaristic equilibrium, in which ‘producer coalitions’ between core workforces supposedly unaffected by deregulation and their employers prevented the introduction of a minimum wage. The present article shows that such an equilibrium never existed. Core workforces are being threatened by the outsourcing of jobs to the low‐wage sector. This threat created the breeding ground for a joint campaign by manufacturing and service unions for a minimum wage, which made it possible to amalgamate the unions' considerable resources at company level, their strength being derived from the German system of codetermination. Under pressure from the manufacturing unions in particular, the arrangements for the minimum wage follow, as far as possible, the traditions of free collective bargaining. As a result, the social partners in Germany have a considerably stronger influence on the minimum wage than those in the UK.     

Search frictions,real wage rigidities and the optimal design of unemployment insurance

In this paper, we study the optimal unemployment benefits financing scheme when the economy is subject to labor market imperfections characterized by real wage rigidities and search frictions. The US unemployment insurance financing is such that firms are taxed proportionately to their layoffs to finance unemployment benefits. Using DSGE methodology, we investigate how policy instruments should interact with labor market imperfections. It is shown that wage rigidities in a search and matching environment cause welfare costs, especially in the absence of an incentive-based unemployment insurance. This cost is mainly due to the distorting effect of wage rigidities which generate inefficient separations. We show that the optimal unemployment benefits financing scheme – corresponding to the Ramsey policy – offsets labor market imperfections and allows implementation of the Pareto allocation. The second-best allocation brings the economy close to the Ramsey allocation. The implementation of the optimal policies clearly highlights the role of labor market institutions for short-run stabilization.     

Monopsonistic competition for the “best” workers

In this paper we analyse an economy where firms use labour as the only production factor, with constant return to scale. We suppose that jobs differ in their non-wage characteristics so each firm has monopsonistic power. In particular, we suppose that workers are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity. Then, each firm has incentives to offer higher wages in order to recruit the most productive workers. Competition among firms leads to a symmetric equilibrium wage, which is higher than the reservation wage, and to involuntary unemployment for the less productive workers, who are willing to work at the current wage but are not hired because their productivity is lower than the wage level. If firms have no institutional constraint on paying lower wages for the same job, an endogenous labour market segmentation emerges.     

The effects of match uncertainty and bargaining on labor market outcomes: evidence from firm and worker specific estimates

In this paper we examine wage dispersion in labor markets across currently employed workers. We argue that differences in the potential productivity of a match (typically assumed to be known in the previous literature) generates a surplus between the minimum wage the worker is willing to accept and the maximum wage the firm is willing to offer for the job. Existence of this surplus leads to wage dispersion due to negotiating over the amounts extracted by each agent. Our objective is to estimate the surplus extracted by each firm-worker pair and the effect of the net extracted surplus on the wage, for each firm-worker pair using the two-tier stochastic frontier model. An empirical application finds that, on average, firms paid workers less than their expected productivity. More specifically, at the mean, the net effect of productivity uncertainty leads to equilibrium wages which are 3.33% below the expected productivity of matches.

Zero-intelligence agents looking for a job

We study a simple agent-based model of a decentralized matching market game in which agents (workers or job seekers) make proposals to other agents (firms) in order to be matched to a position within the firm. The aggregate result of agents interactions can be summarised in the form of a Beveridge curve, which determines the relationship between unmatched agents, unemployed job seekers and vacancies in firms. We open the black box of matching technology, by modelling how agents behave (make proposals) according to their information perception. We observe more efficient results—in the form of a downward shift of the Beverage curve in the case of simple zero-intelligent agents. Our comparative statics indicate that market conditions, such as the heterogeneity of agents’ preferences, will also shift the Beveridge curve downwards. Moreover, market thickness affects movement along the Beverage curve. Movement right-down along the curve if there is an increasing number of agents compared to positions within firms. Furthermore, we show that frictions in re-matching, such as commitment to a match, could be another factor shifting the Beveridge curve toward the origin.     

How to close the gender pay gap in Europe: towards the gender mainstreaming of pay policy

The European Employment Strategy includes a new commitment to a substantial reduction in the gender pay gap in European Union (EU) member states, but progress requires a radical shift away from the traditional policy emphasis on the supply‐side deficiencies of women compared with men. Mainstream theory argues that gender inequality is reduced once the pay gap is ‘adjusted’ for differences in individual characteristics (education, experience, etc.). But new empirical studies in many EU member states demonstrate that the work environment—the general wage structure, job and workplace characteristics—shapes gender pay inequality. Given the negative gender impact of trend declines in minimum wages, moves towards more decentralisation of wage‐setting and public sector restructuring, the article argues for a holistic, gender mainstreaming approach to pay policy.     

Minimum wage and restaurant hygiene violations: Evidence from Seattle

We study the association between the minimum wage and food establishment hygiene violations between Seattle (the treated city) and Bellevue (the control city), both cities located in King County and sharing the same health inspection department. An increase in the real minimum wage of $0.25 is associated with an increase of at least 8% in total and less severe (blue) hygiene violation scores for food establishments in Seattle. We find mixed support for the increase in more severe (red) violations. A decline in employment with an increase in minimum wage could be driving the increases in hygiene violations.     

The importance of firms in wage determination

Firms are central to many theories of the labor market. However, the actual degree to which firms shape the structure of wages is still not well understood. This paper investigates (i) the importance of firms in explaining wage differences across individuals and industries, and (ii) how the nature of interfirm mobility – job-to-job vs. job-unemployment-job – affects the relative importance of firms and workers in wage determination. Results indicate that (i) firms are much more important in explaining the variance of average wages across industries rather than across individuals, and (ii) using job-to-job transitions to identify the firm's contribution to the wage rate reduces the importance of firm wage policies in explaining wage differences by as much as 50%.     

Factors affecting corporate environmental strategy in Spanish industrial firms

During the last 30 years, environmental issues have become very important for governments, consumers and companies. Firms, aware of their environmental responsibilities, have started to show an important commitment to society and the natural environment, developing environmentally friendly strategies. However, the factors that determine the choice of environmental strategies are still unclear. They range from ethical motivations to social, legislative and competitive factors. This study analyses the main antecedents that influence firms' ecological behaviour, distinguishing between environmental orientation and environmental strategies. The hypotheses proposed in this study are analysed by means of a structural equation model on a sample of 235 industrial firms. The results reveal that competitive motivations and management commitment are the most important factors explaining why firms incorporate environmental issues into their strategic planning process. Moreover, management commitment is a critical factor for firms because managers' perception about customers' ecological concern directly influences firms' environmental behaviour. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.