Liquidity Crunch in the Interbank Market: Is it Credit or Liquidity Risk, or Both?

The interplay between liquidity and credit risks in the interbank market is analyzed. Banks are hit by idiosyncratic random liquidity shocks. The market may also be hit by bad news at a future date, implying the insolvency of some participants and creating a lemons problem; this may end up with a gridlock of the interbank market at that date. Anticipating such possible contingency, banks currently long of liquidity ask a liquidity premium for lending beyond a short maturity, as a compensation for the risk of being short of liquidity later and being forced to liquidate some illiquid assets. When such premium gets too high, banks currently short of liquidity prefer to borrow short term. The model is able to explain some stylized facts of the 2007–2009 liquidity crunch affecting the money market at the international level: (i) high spreads between interest rates at different maturities; (ii) “flight to overnight” in traded volumes; (iii) ineffectiveness of open market operations, leading the central banks to introduce some relevant innovations into their operational framework.     

Does Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity?

Algorithmic trading (AT) has increased sharply over the past decade. Does it improve market quality, and should it be encouraged? We provide the first analysis of this question. The New York Stock Exchange automated quote dissemination in 2003, and we use this change in market structure that increases AT as an exogenous instrument to measure the causal effect of AT on liquidity. For large stocks in particular, AT narrows spreads, reduces adverse selection, and reduces trade‐related price discovery. The findings indicate that AT improves liquidity and enhances the informativeness of quotes.     

Money Creation: Tax or Public Liquidity?

I revisit the example of non‐neutral anticipated monetary expansions used in Lucas (1995) Nobel Prize Lecture, within a broader definition of monetary policy tools, such as paying a nominal return on money or using open market operations, to show that money expansions increase output by reallocating consumption across heterogenous individuals and time periods. This result survives with noninterest‐bearing cash when the latter does not generate relevant distortions.     

Does Stock Liquidity Enhance or Impede Firm Innovation?

We aim to tackle the longstanding debate on whether stock liquidity enhances or impedes firm innovation. This topic is of interest because innovation is crucial for firm‐ and national‐level competitiveness and stock liquidity can be altered by financial market regulations. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach that relies on the exogenous variation in liquidity generated by regulatory changes, we find that an increase in liquidity causes a reduction in future innovation. We identify two possible mechanisms through which liquidity impedes innovation: increased exposure to hostile takeovers and higher presence of institutional investors who do not actively gather information or monitor.     

How Effective Were the Federal Reserve Emergency Liquidity Facilities? Evidence from the Asset‐Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility

The events following Lehman's failure in 2008 and the current turmoil emanating from Europe highlight the structural vulnerabilities of short‐term credit markets and the role of central banks as back‐stop liquidity providers. The Federal Reserve's response to financial disruptions in the United States importantly included the creation of liquidity facilities. Using a differences‐in‐differences approach, we evaluate one of the most unusual of these interventions—the Asset‐Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility. We find that this facility helped stabilize asset outflows from money market funds and reduced asset‐backed commercial paper yields significantly.     

What Style Liquidity Timing Skills Do Mutual Fund Managers Possess?

Recent studies claim that mutual fund managers demonstrate strong MARKET liquidity timing skills. We extend their liquidity timing tests to the four‐factor case and investigate liquidity timing skills with respect to the MARKET, SIZE, VALUE and MOMENTUM factors. Contrary to these claims, we find no evidence that fund managers adjust market exposure in anticipation of market liquidity changes. We find rather strong evidence that fund managers successfully overweight small stocks as market liquidity increases. Our study also demonstrates that it is easy to misidentify SIZE liquidity timing as MARKET liquidity timing in models that focus only on MARKET liquidity timing.     

Are Liquidity and Information Risks Priced in the Treasury Bond Market?

We provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of the effects of liquidity and information risks on expected returns of Treasury bonds. We focus on the systematic liquidity risk of Pastor and Stambaugh as opposed to the traditional microstructure-based measures of liquidity. Information risk is measured by the probability of information-based trading (PIN). We document a strong positive relation between expected Treasury returns and liquidity and information risks, controlling for the effects of other systematic risk factors and bond characteristics. This relation is robust to many empirical specifications and a wide variety of traditional liquidity and informed trading proxies.     

Does Global Liquidity Help to Forecast U.S. Inflation?

We construct a measure of global liquidity using the growth rates of broad money for the G7 economies. Global liquidity produces forecasts of U.S. inflation that are significantly more accurate than the forecasts based on U.S. money growth, Phillips curve, and autoregressive and moving average models. The marginal predictive power of global liquidity is strong at 3-year horizons. Results are robust to alternative measures of inflation.     

Changes in REIT Liquidity 1988?C2007: Evidence from Daily Data

In this study, we present panel-data evidence on REIT liquidity and its determinants over the 1988?C2007 period. We focus upon liquidity measures that do not require micro-structure data (1) to facilitate use of our results as benchmarks for comparisons with results from international markets for which micro-structure data may be unavailable, (2) to provide benchmarks that do not require access to costly (and voluminous) micro-structure data. We find that REIT liquidity improved during the early and mid-1990s, deteriorated during the late 1990s, and then improved dramatically during 2000?C2006, with the notable exception of 2007. Liquidity improved the most for REITs traded on the NYSE, and was an order of magnitude better than liquidity of REITs traded on the AMEX or NASDAQ. We link the deterioration in liquidity observed in 2007 to the investment portfolio of a REIT. We find that the percentage bid-ask spread is highly correlated with the measure of price impact proposed by Amihud (2002). We provide panel-data evidence on the key determinants of the percentage bid-ask spread that largely confirms the results reported by Bhasin et al. (1997) for 1990 and 1994: the percentage spread is a positive function of the volatility of stock returns, and a negative function of dollar volume turnover, share price and market capitalization. Finally, we provide evidence that these results obtained using daily closing bid- and ask-prices are not qualitatively different from those obtained using market micro-structure data. This suggests that we can use liquidity measures based upon readily available daily return data rather than being forced to rely upon market micro-structure data.     

Why Does the Interest Rate Decline Over the Day? Evidence from the Liquidity Crisis

We provide a simple model, able to explain why the overnight (ON) rate follows a downward intraday pattern, implicitly creating a positive intraday interest rate. While this normally reflects only some frictions, a liquidity crisis introduces a new component: the chance of an upward jump of the ON rate, which must be compensated by an intraday decline of the ON rate. By analyzing real time data for the e-MID interbank market, we show that the intraday rate has increased from a negligible level to a significant one after the start of the liquidity crisis in August 2007, and even more so since September 2008. The intraday rate is affected by the likelihood of a dry-up of the ON market, proxied by the 3M Euribor—Eonia swap spread. This evidence supports our model and it shows that a liquidity crisis impairs the ability of central banks to curb the market price of intraday liquidity, even by providing free daylight overdrafts. Such results have implications for the efficiency of the money market and of payment systems, as well as for the operational framework of central banks.     

Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off between Liquidity and Control?

This paper analyzes the incentives of large shareholders to monitor public corporations. We investigate the hypothesis that a liquid stock market reduces large shareholders' incentives to monitor because it allows them to sell their stocks more easily. Even though this is true, a liquid market also makes it less costly to hold larger stakes and easier to purchase additional shares. We show that this fact is important if monitoring is costly: market liquidity mitigates the problem that small shareholders free ride on the effort of the large shareholder. We find that liquid stock markets are beneficial because they make corporate governance more effective.     

Market Liquidity,Investor Participation,and Managerial Autonomy: Why Do Firms Go Private?

We focus on public-market investor participation to analyze the firm's decision to stay public or go private. The liquidity of public ownership is both a blessing and a curse: It lowers the cost of capital, but also introduces volatility in a firm's shareholder base, exposing management to uncertainty regarding shareholder intervention in management decisions, thereby affecting the manager's perceived decision-making autonomy and curtailing managerial inputs. We extract predictions about how investor participation affects stock price level and volatility and the public firm's incentives to go private, providing a link between investor participation and firm participation in public markets.     

Forecasting Long-Term Interest Rates with a General-Equilibrium Model of the Euro Area: What Role for Liquidity Services of Bonds?

This paper studies the forecasting performance of a general equilibrium model of bond yields where government bonds provide liquidity services and are, as such, an integral part of the monetary transmission mechanism. The model is estimated with Bayesian methods on Euro area data. I compare the out-of-sample predictive performance of the model against a variety of competing specifications, including that of De Graeve et al. (J Monet Econ 56(4):545–559, 2009). Forecast accuracy is evaluated through both univariate and multivariate measures. I also control the statistical significance of the forecast differences using the tests of Diebold and Mariano (J Bus Econ Stat 13(3):253–263, 1995), Hansen (J Bus Econ Stat 23:365–380, 2005) and White (Econometrica 68(5):1097–1126, 1980). The results indicate that accounting for the liquidity services of bonds contributes to generate superior out-of-sample forecasts for both real variables, such as output, and inflation, and for bond yields.