Analysis of the practice of job evaluation in the metal industry in Turkey

Job evaluation's main aim is to establish a fair wage structure. Its main principle is ‘equal pay for equal work’. ‘Metal Industry Job Grouping System’ (MIDS) has been in the metal industry in Turkey for more than 20 years. The results of the practice of the system were measured by the Gini coefficient. By the findings, the average wages of the job groups are different enough from each other by their job groups in the way the wage of the bigger number job group is higher than the smaller except the job group two in the industry. However, the wages are far from the principle ‘equal wage for equal job’ within the same job itself. In addition, the workers make use of bonuses and social benefits. The effect of social benefits of them on the wage structure is positive within the same job group and negative between different job groups within the same company. Nevertheless, the effect of both bonuses and social benefits on the wage structure is negative between the companies because, between them they are different from each other. Job group and seniority affect the wage structure. Seniority has a socio-psychological self-producing dynamic. The distribution of seniorities within the same job group has negative effects on the wage structure. However, this fact for each worker disappears for the long term since the worker of today who has short-term seniority will be the one of tomorrow who has long-term seniority. Therefore, for each worker, the wage structure gets closer to the principle ‘equal wage for equal job’ within the same job group itself over time.     

Spatial wage disparities: Sorting matters!

Spatial wage disparities can result from spatial differences in the skill composition of the workforce, in non-human endowments, and in local interactions. To distinguish between these explanations, we estimate a model of wage determination across local labour markets using a very large panel of French workers. We control for worker characteristics, worker fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and the characteristics of the local labour market. Our findings suggest that individual skills account for a large fraction of existing spatial wage disparities with strong evidence of spatial sorting by skills. Interaction effects are mostly driven by the local density of employment. Not controlling for worker heterogeneity leads to very biased estimates of interaction effects. Endowments only appear to play a small role.     

The effects of match uncertainty and bargaining on labor market outcomes: evidence from firm and worker specific estimates

In this paper we examine wage dispersion in labor markets across currently employed workers. We argue that differences in the potential productivity of a match (typically assumed to be known in the previous literature) generates a surplus between the minimum wage the worker is willing to accept and the maximum wage the firm is willing to offer for the job. Existence of this surplus leads to wage dispersion due to negotiating over the amounts extracted by each agent. Our objective is to estimate the surplus extracted by each firm-worker pair and the effect of the net extracted surplus on the wage, for each firm-worker pair using the two-tier stochastic frontier model. An empirical application finds that, on average, firms paid workers less than their expected productivity. More specifically, at the mean, the net effect of productivity uncertainty leads to equilibrium wages which are 3.33% below the expected productivity of matches.

Minimum wages and employment in Swedish hotels and restaurants

This paper considers the effects of union-bargained minimum wages on transitions into and out of employment in the hotels and catering industry over the period 1979–99. This industry is characterised by a high fraction of unskilled labour input, high worker turnover and binding minimum wages. The empirical approach identifies workers affected by real minimum wage increases and decreases, respectively. Job separations and accessions for the treatment groups are then contrasted to the outcomes for control groups, with wages marginally above those of the treatment groups. Unlike previous studies, this paper also considers same-period transitions for same-wage workers who are unaffected by minimum wage changes. This procedure should help to control for unobserved differences between high- and low-wage workers and is made possible by the diversified minimum wage structure of the industry. According to the results, job separations tend to increase with rising minimum wages (except for teenagers during 1993–98). The evidence regarding accessions is less conclusive.     

The relationship between wage growth and wage levels

We estimate the covariance between the permanent component of wages and a random coefficient on experience in models both with potential experience and with actual experience. Actual experience is allowed to be arbitrarily correlated with both the permanent component of wages and the random component on experience. We find no evidence that workers of higher ability experience faster wage growth. Our point estimates suggest that a worker with a one standard deviation higher level of permanent ability would have a return to annual potential experience that is 0.61 of a percentage point lower. The analogous point estimate for actual experience is 0.87 of a point lower. Contrary to the popular perception, wage growth among low‐skill workers appears to be at least as high as that for a medium‐skilled worker. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Monopsonistic discrimination, worker turnover, and the gender wage gap

Motivated by models of worker flows, we argue in this paper that monopsonistic discrimination may be a substantial factor behind the overall gender wage gap. Using matched employer–employee data from Norway, we estimate establishment-specific wage premiums separately for men and women, conditioning on fixed individual effects. Regressions of worker turnover on the wage premium identify less wage elastic labour supply facing each establishment of women than that of men. Workforce gender composition is strongly related to employers' wage policies. The results suggest that 70–90% of the gender wage gap for low-educated workers may be attributed to differences in labour market frictions between men and women, while the similar figures for high-educated workers ranges from 20 to 70%.     

FDI activity and worker compensation: evidence from US non-manufacturing industries

This study examines worker compensation effects of FDI activity in US non-manufacturing industry sectors. A clustered standard error correction is used when estimating wage and non-wage compensation equations, with special attention given to FDI’s effect by worker educational attainment and union status. Wage findings reveal an FDI-wage premium for highly educated non-union workers and FDI-union rent erosion for all educational-gender groups excluding females with low educational attainment. Non-wage compensation analysis reveals FDI activity is generally associated with significantly higher probabilities of workers receiving employer financed non-wage compensation for union and non-union workers regardless of their level of educational attainment.     

Performance Pay and Offshoring

In this paper, we construct a North–South general equilibrium model of offshoring, highlighting the nexus among endogenous effort‐based labor productivity and the structure of wages. Offshoring is modeled as international transfer of management practices and production techniques that allow Northern firms to design and implement performance compensation contracts. Performance–pay contracts address moral hazard issues stemming from production uncertainty and unobserved worker effort. We find that worker effort augments productivity and compensation of those workers assigned to more offshorable tasks. An increase in worker effort in the South, caused by a decline in offshoring costs, an increase in worker skill, or a decline in production uncertainty in the South, increases the range of offshored tasks and makes workers in the North and South better off. An increase in Southern labor force increases the range of offshored tasks, benefits workers in the North, and hurts workers in the South. International labor migration from low‐wage South to high‐wage North shrinks the range of offshored tasks, makes Northern workers worse off and Southern workers (emigrants and those left behind) better off. Higher worker effort in the North, caused by higher worker skills or lower degree of production uncertainty, decreases the range of offshored tasks and benefits workers in the North and South.     

THE IMPACT OF LABOR MARKET REGULATION ON EMPLOYMENT IN LOW‐INCOME COUNTRIES: A META‐ANALYSIS

Controversy over labor market policy often centers on achieving a balance between preventing worker exploitation, and avoiding loss of productivity or employment through excessive regulation. Although the literature documenting the impact of labor market regulation on employment is extensive, there is a dearth of evidence on the impact of such policies in low‐income countries (LICs). Since it is easier for workers, especially women, to slip into the informal sector in LICs, regulations are likely to have stronger impacts on formal employment in these countries (but lower impacts on unemployment). We systematically reviewed available research from countries that are, or were until recently, LICs. Most studies document that more stringent labor regulations are associated with lower formal sector employment and higher informal sector employment. We also conducted a metaregression analysis of the impact of minimum wages on formal and informal employment. After controlling for publication bias, higher minimum wages are associated with lower formal employment and a higher share of informal workers.     

Do salaries improve worker performance?

We establish the effects of salaries on worker performance by exploiting a natural experiment in which some workers in a particular occupation (football referees) switch from short-term contracts to salaried contracts. Worker performance improves among those who move onto salaried contracts relative to those who do not. The finding is robust to the introduction of worker fixed effects indicating that it is not driven by better workers being awarded salary contracts. Nor is it sensitive to workers sorting into or out of the profession. Improved performance could arise from the additional effort workers exert due to career concerns, the higher income associated with career contracts (an efficiency wage effect) or improvements in worker quality arising from off-the-job training which accompanies the salaried contracts.     

Labour market oligopsonistic competition: The effect of worker immobility on wages

We suggest that firms in a local labour market may be able to exploit worker mobility costs and offer immobile workers wages that are lower than their marginal product. If so, the ability of employers to exploit worker immobility in setting wages would decline in the competitiveness of the local labour market. We test this intuition using a measure of individual mobility costs and measures of local labour market competition. Our findings suggest that worker immobility causes substantial wage variation across workers in small, weakly competitive markets, and in occupations where wages are individually bargained.     

Great expectations: Past wages and unemployment durations

Decomposing wages into worker and firm wage components, we find that firm-fixed components are sizeable parts of workers' wages. If workers can only imperfectly observe the extent of firm-fixed components in their wages, they might be misled about the overall wage distribution. Such misperceptions may lead to unjustified high reservation wages, resulting in overly long unemployment durations. We examine the influence of previous wages on unemployment durations for workers after exogenous lay-offs and, using Austrian administrative data, we find that younger workers are, in fact, unemployed longer if they profited from high firm-fixed components in the past. We interpret our findings as evidence for overconfidence generated by imperfectly observed productivity.     

Wage-setting institutions as industrial policy

Centralized wage-setting arrangements compress wage differentials along many dimensions, but how do they affect employment structure? To address this issue, we relate the evolution of US–Swedish differences in the industry distribution of employment to relative wages between and within industries. We find that centralized wage setting shifted Swedish employment away from industries with high wage dispersion among workers, a high mean wage and, especially, a low mean wage. The dissolution of Sweden's centralized wage-setting beginning in 1983 led to widening wage differentials and a reversal in the evolution of US–Swedish differences in industry structure.     

Wage determination in urban Russia: Underpayment and the gender differential

A stochastic frontier wage equation is employed to examine labor-market efficiency and estimate workers’ potential wages in Russia after a decade of economic reforms using a nationally representative household survey. Dynamic monopsony underpayment, defined as the differences between the highest wage a worker with given characteristics could earn and the worker's actual wage, is a significant factor lowering real wages. The estimated degree of underpayment differs significantly depending on gender and substantially exceeds the estimates for Western economies. Workers’ potential wages are elastic with respect to the local cost of living. Women's mean potential wage is only 58% of men's.     

The ambiguous effect of minimum wages on hours

In a competitive model we ease the assumption that efficiency units of labour are the product of hours and workers. We show that a minimum wage may either increase or decrease hours per worker and the change will have the opposite sign to the slope of the equilibrium hours hourly wage locus. Similarly, total hours worked may rise or fall. We illustrate the results throughout with a Cobb-Douglas example.     

Wage differentials in the presence of unobserved worker,firm, and match heterogeneity

We consider the problem of estimating and decomposing wage differentials in the presence of unobserved worker, firm, and match heterogeneity. Controlling for these unobservables corrects omitted variable bias in previous studies. It also allows us to measure the contribution of unmeasured characteristics of workers, firms, and worker-firm matches to observed wage differentials. An application to linked employer-employee data shows that decompositions of inter-industry earnings differentials and the male-female differential are misleading when unobserved heterogeneity is ignored.     

Deunionization and job polarization – a macroeconomic model analysis for a small open economy

Declining unionization rates and job polarization are two important labor market developments of recent decades. A large body of literature has analyzed these phenomena separately, but little has been done to see whether there is a link between them. We employ a macroeconomic model for a small open economy with a large input–output core to analyze how deunionization may cause job polarization. Our analysis shows that medium-skilled workers are negatively affected by deunionization, mainly as a result of the heterogeneity of the elasticities of substitution between different types of labor. While the elasticities of substitution between high- and medium-skilled labor are relatively low, the elasticities of substitution between medium- and low-skilled are relatively high. As a result, when deunionization leads to increased wage dispersion, we find that demand for low-skilled increases at the expense of medium-skilled labor, thus yielding a more polarized labor market.     

On the extent of re-entitlement effects in unemployment compensation

We analyze the implications of two-tier unemployment compensation systems with non-automatic eligibility in an equilibrium matching model with Nash bargaining. As eligibility for UI does not automatically follow from employment, the two types of unemployed workers have different threat points, which delivers equilibrium wage dispersion. The parameters of the model are estimated for France, and the model is also calibrated for Denmark and the U.S. Re-entitlement effects are shown to be sizeable for all three countries. For France, re-entitlement effects lower by 15% the rise in the wage and by 25% the rise in unemployment following a 10% increase in the benefit level. Finally, we show that in all three countries the optimal compensation system is characterized by time-decreasing unemployment benefits and non-automatic eligibility for UI, with higher levels of both UI and UA benefits, a smaller decrease in benefits over time, and a longer employment duration required for UI eligibility than in the current system.     

Promotion Signals,Experience, and Education

This paper uses a nation‐wide representative survey of employees to examine whether more informative job promotions carry larger wage increases. In job assignment models with asymmetric information, unexpected promotions send a signal to the external labor market to revise upward their assessment of a worker's ability. The employing firm must then increase wages to prevent the worker from being bid away. Less educated workers are assumed to come from a group with lower average ability. Their promotion is hypothesized to induce a larger positive update of the assessment of their ability than the promotion of more educated workers. Promotions of less experienced workers, with less known about their abilities, should also result in strong signaling effects. We obtain regression results consistent with our hypotheses, although the size and significance of the estimates hinge on the promotion definition. Inexperienced workers gain more from promotions that entail new managerial responsibilities, whereas less educated workers gain more from nonmanagerial promotions. This sensitivity to the definition of promotion suggests that promotions reveal information on different dimensions of ability for different types of workers.