Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock Prices

We analyze the trading activity of the mutual fund industry from 1975 through 1994 to determine whether funds "herd" when they trade stocks and to investigate the impact of herding on stock prices. Although we find little herding by mutual funds in the average stock, we find much higher levels in trades of small stocks and in trading by growth-oriented funds. Stocks that herds buy outperform stocks that they sell by 4 percent during the following six months; this return difference is much more pronounced among small stocks. Our results are consistent with mutual fund herding speeding the price-adjustment process.     

Herd behaviour & investor sentiment: Evidence from UK mutual funds

The aims of this paper are to detect evidence of institutional investor herding behaviour and examine the role that investor sentiment plays in institutional investor herding behaviour. The herding behaviour is investigated by examining the dispersion of time varying beta of UK open-end and closed-end funds. The study finds evidence of fund managers' herding behaviour, which suggests they are likely to herd on market portfolio, size, and value factors. UK market-wide investor sentiment index is used for investigating the effects of investor sentiment on institutional herding behaviour. We find a unidirectional investor sentiment effect on the herding of UK mutual fund managers. We also reveal that the sentiment factors affecting UK open-end and closed-end fund managers herding behaviour are different due to the differences in fund structure.     

Herding in the German Mutual Fund Industry

This paper analyses the trading activity of German mutual funds in the 1998–2002 period to investigate whether German mutual fund managers are engaged in herding behaviour. Another objective of the study is to determine the impact of this herd‐like trading on stock prices. Our results provide evidence of herding and positive feedback trading by German mutual fund managers. We show that a significant portion of herding detected in the German market is associated with spurious herding as a consequence of changes in benchmark index composition. Investigating the impact of mutual fund herding on stock prices, we find that herding seems to neither destabilise nor stabilise stock prices.     

Herd behaviour in buyout investments

In this study, we explored the presence of correlated investment choices (i.e., herd behaviour) among international buyout funds by distinguishing among the contemporaneous and the following herding of smaller funds towards the top market players (i.e., the top quartile in terms of the fund size). In our analyses, we found that the industry herding towards the largest ones is common in private equity (PE) but mostly during market contractions or the deterioration of general market conditions. Moreover, we also found that as capital inflows into the PE industry slow down, herding occurs more often. This finding is consistent with the increasing competition for new capital fundraising in downturns, which can induce PE funds to herd more. We also found that both types of herding generate higher fund returns and lower risk for funds that are capable of herding. Additionally, we documented the persistence in herding.     

Mutual fund herding and audit pricing

This study investigates how investor trading behavior affects audit pricing by examining mutual fund herding in specific. When mutual fund managers herd due to information cascade, mimicking incentive, or agency problem, it causes information friction and weakens their monitoring effectiveness. Heightened governance risk is associated with higher audit risk and thus higher audit pricing. In our empirical tests, we find that herding weakens mutual funds’ information advantage and monitoring effectiveness, ultimately resulting in higher audit fees. To mitigate the endogeneity concern, we employ the natural experiment of the 2004 SEC regulation change on mutual fund disclosure frequency to capture exogenous change in herding intensity. Our findings are robust using propensity score matching method and alternative measures. Consistent with our conjecture, we document that firms facing stronger mutual fund herding are associated with deteriorated corporate disclosure quality.     

Fund ownership and stock price informativeness of Chinese listed firms

We examine the impact of mutual fund ownership on stock price informativeness in China. Existing evidence shows that stock price informativeness is low in China, and attributes this to firms’ lack of disclosure incentives under the weak investor protection institutional environment. Mutual funds are more sophisticated and influential than individual investors to monitor firms, and thus serve as an external governance mechanism to improve corporate transparency. However, the impact of mutual funds in China can also be moderated by state ownership of listed firms, which reduces firms’ dependence on outside investors for capital. Indeed, we find that mutual fund ownership is positively related to share price informativeness, but this effect is less pronounced among state-controlled firms. The main policy implication from our findings is that mutual funds contribute to the corporate information environment of emerging economies but further privatization of listed firms would be needed to realize greater benefit.     

Individual and institutional herding and the impact on stock returns: Evidence from Taiwan stock market

Using high frequency intraday data, this paper investigates the herding behavior of institutional and individual investors in the Taiwan stock market. The study finds evidence of herding by both investors but a stronger herding tendency among institutional than among individual investors. Institutional investors herd more on firms with small capitalizations and lower turnovers and they follow positive feedback strategies. The portfolios that institutional investors herd buy outperform those they sell by an average of 1.009% during the 20 days after intense trading episodes. By contrast, individual investors herd more on firms with small sizes and higher turnovers, and they crowd to buy (sell) stocks with negative (positive) past returns. The portfolios that individual investors herd buy underperform those they sell by an average of − 0.829% during the following 20 days. Moreover, these return differences of both investors are more pronounced under a market with higher pressure and among small stocks. These findings suggest that the herding of institutional investors speeds up the price-adjustment process and is more likely to be driven by correlated private information, while individual herding is most likely to be driven by behavior and emotions.     

Implicit incentives and reputational herding by hedge fund managers

Several theories of reputation suggest that managers' incentives affect their propensity to engage in herding behavior. This paper investigates these theories by tracking hedge fund managers' herding behavior over their careers. I first examine managerial incentives for herding, and show that more senior managers that deviate from the herd have a significantly higher probability of failure and do not experience higher fund inflows than their less-senior counterparts. These implicit incentives should encourage managers to herd more as their careers progress. I find strong support for this hypothesis: using a number of proxies for herding, I show that more experienced managers herd more than less-experienced managers. Finally, I examine performance differences between more and less-experienced managers, and find that while more experienced managers underperform less-experienced managers, this underperformance does not appear to be caused by differences in herding. Overall, these results are in direct contrast with studies of mutual fund managers, reflecting important difference in implicit incentives between the two industries.     

Herding and the information content of trades in the Australian dollar market

This study shows that the information content of FX transactions depends on the identity of market participants. Using spot FX transactions of a major Australian bank, we find that central banks have the greatest price impact, followed by non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) such as hedge funds and mutual funds. Trades by non-financial corporations have the least impact on dealer pricing. In the interbank market, dealers with greater private information tend to choose direct trading which has lower post-trade transparency. Indirect trading via brokers is partially revealed to the market and has little price impact. The price impact largely comes from institutions in the top quartile of the trading volume. Furthermore, NBFIs have the greatest propensity for herding, followed by interbank dealers. Non-financial corporations do not herd in their trades. Except for central banks, the differential impact of market participants can largely be explained by their propensity for herding.     

Herd mentality in the stock market: On the role of idiosyncratic participants with heterogeneous information

This paper examines herd behaviour using aggregate market data for stocks, with a focus on the role of idiosyncratic participants with heterogeneous information. We look at herding asymmetry between up and down markets, taking into consideration the daily price limits and the impact of the recent financial crisis. We also improve upon existing tests for fundamental and non-fundamental herding, as well as proposing a method for investigating herd behaviour of different groups of investors. Empirical evidence based on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange in Vietnam reveals a greater level of herding on up compared to down market days, and a significant reduction in the magnitude of herding following the crisis. We document robust intentional herding even when unintentional (fundamental) herding is factored out. Our empirical results also uncover potential within-group herding and between-group interactions among arbitrageurs and noise traders in the market.     

Deconstructing Herding: Evidence from Pension Fund Investment Behavior

In this paper, we examine herding across asset classes and industry levels. We also study what incentives managers at various layers of the financial industry face when investing. To do so, we use unique and detailed monthly portfolios between 1996 and 2005 from pension funds in Chile, a pioneer in pension-fund reform. The results show that pension funds herd more in assets that have more risk and for which pension funds have less market information. Furthermore, the results show that herding is more prevalent for funds that narrowly compete with each other, namely, when comparing funds of the same type across pension fund administrators (PFAs). There is much less herding across PFAs as a whole and in individual pension funds within PFAs. These herding patterns are consistent with incentives for managers to be close to industry benchmarks, and might be also driven by market forces and partly by regulation.     

中国基金业业绩持续性问题研究：基于羊群行为的分析

以2005～2010年上半年开放式股票型基金为样本,从羊群行为角度考量开放式股票型基金业绩持续性。结果表明,基金卖出股票羊群行为强于买入股票羊群行为,且没有证据表明我国基金有联手坐庄行为。相对于输者组合,赢者组合在卖出价格下跌股票时行为更加趋同,且受市场行情影响较小,这与其业绩压力和研究能力有关。     

Fund managers' herding and the sensitivity of fund flows to past performance

This study provides a new explanation for the weak sensitivity of investors' flows to poor fund performance based on fund managers' incentives to herd from career concerns. We show that a manager's decision to trade with (against) the herd decreases (increases) significantly investors' willingness to redeem capital from underperforming funds. We argue that this differential investor reaction to poor performance conditional on herding explains the lower termination risk identified among herding managers. We also find that financial intermediaries do not mitigate this sub-optimal investors' response. Our findings support the view that underperforming funds can retain larger payoffs if they herd.     

隐性杠杆约束、流动性风险和投资者情绪

本文以2003—2019年间开放式主动管理型的股票型和偏股型基金为样本,以持仓占比为权重估算基金投组中A股的总市场风险暴露,检验结果表明,该序列上升反映了基金面临的隐性杠杆约束收紧,刻画了市场的弱流动性。内在逻辑在于,流动性收紧时,投资者难以通过融资直接增加杠杆,更倾向于重仓持有高市场风险头寸的股票而间接实现杠杆。本文发现隐性杠杆约束所刻画的风险在股票或基金收益截面上的无条件定价基本失效,而条件定价则依赖于低市场情绪与弱流动性。分解基金持股的敞口,进一步发现,因中小盘基金在流动性收紧时具有更强的流动性偏好,其持股的市场风险头寸能够更敏锐地捕捉到弱流动性风险。     

AGENCY CONFLICTS IN DELEGATED PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM NAMESAKE MUTUAL FUNDS

Namesake funds provide a unique sample for studying the two agency conflicts that exist within a mutual fund. The first is between the fund management company and fund shareholders, and the second is between the fund management company and the fund manager. A typical namesake fund manager sits on his or her fund's board, frequently as the chairman, is the majority owner of the fund management company, and has significant investments in the fund he or she manages. Our results indicate that namesake funds charge higher fees, suggesting that the boards of namesake funds are less effective. We find that namesake funds are more tax efficient, consistent with the idea that managerial ownership helps align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Because of fewer career concerns, namesake fund managers herd less while assuming greater unsystematic risk. We find weak evidence that namesake fund managers outperform their benchmarks and peers. Finally, we observe that namesake funds attract higher levels of investor cash flow.     

Mutual fund advertising: Should investors take notice?

This research investigates the relationship between advertising, quality, and price in the mutual fund market, considering both equity and fixed income funds. The research considers these relationships based on the results for a time period following the advertisement. Given the complexity of the mutual fund purchase decision for investors, this research provides an initial investigation into whether investors can infer mutual fund quality and price from the presence of mutual fund advertising. Post-advertising period results show a negative relationship between advertising and fund quality, indicating that previously advertised funds exhibit weaker performance than nonadvertised funds. During the post-advertisement period, both equity and fixed income funds exhibit lower expenses (ie, price) than nonadvertised funds. These research findings and implications for theory are discussed.     

Herding by mutual funds: impact on performance and investors’ response†

In this paper we investigate whether herding by actively managed equity funds affects their performances and flows over the 1980–2013 period. We show that during the herding quarter, on average, funds that trade with the herd benefit from this behavior. Although this does not directly translate into a positive association between the extent to which funds herd and their subsequent performance, we find that the funds that follow the herd earn negative abnormal returns whereas the ones that lead earn no abnormal returns. Our results also indicate that investors react adversely to follower funds while they are neutral towards the leader funds.     

Leading the herd: evidence from mutual funds’ buy and sell decisions

This article investigates whether a mutual fund’s performance is related to its herding behavior. Using the methodology of Sias (Rev Finance Stud 17:165–206, 2004), we develop a measure to capture the magnitude that a fund’s buy (sell) decisions are leading other funds’ buys (sells), and find that a fund’s performance is positively (negatively) related to its “buy leading” (“sell leading”). We interpret these findings as evidence that “buy leaders” (“sell leaders”)’ performance benefits (suffers) from the positive (negative) price effect associated with buy (sell) herds. Additionally, we find a positive relationship between fund performance and valuation-motivated “buy leading”, while we find weak evidence on the relationship between performance and valuation-motivated “sell leading”. We interpret these results as evidence that leading funds’ outperformance is due, in part, to their ability to value stocks.     

业绩排序对基金投资风险水平变化的影响

以Brown等人提出的共同基金竞赛假说为基础,通过Spearman检验考察中国开放式基金是否符合竞赛假说得出,总体来看中国开放式基金的竞赛假说并不明显,不同的年份有不同的表现;新基金比老基金表现出了更为典型的竞赛假说特征;Spearman相关系数检验表明新基金比老基金的投资策略更为稳健。     

Evidence of herding and positive feedback trading for mutual funds in emerging Asian countries

When analysing the behavior of investors, the emphasis is usually on positive feedback and herding behavior, and the existing literature abounds with studies on the domestic strategy of mutual funds or on their impact. Due to the advantages in terms of the data, many studies investigate US data. However, with the increased flows of capital into emerging markets, studying the behavior of international mutual funds in emerging markets has become more and more important. Nevertheless, studies involving emerging markets are relatively rare. This study examines whether the positive feedback effect and herding behavior exist in Asian markets based on mutual fund data covering the period from 1996 to 2004. The long period enables us to test the sensitivities under the following four conditions, namely the capital volatility (volatile vs. stable), the degree of suffering during the Asian crisis (more suffering vs. less suffering), and the timing of the Asian crisis (pre-, during, and post-crisis), using the exchange rate regime. It was found in this study that mutual fund inflows into the Asian market were attracted by positive stock returns and currency appreciation. Furthermore, it was found that the positive feedback effect and herding behavior did exist in the Asian markets. However, the extent of the above behavior is not the same under different conditions.