Mutual Fund Advisory Contracts: An Empirical Investigation

We investigate marginal compensation rates in mutual fund advisory contracts and find the following. Equity and foreign fund advisors receive higher marginal compensation than debt and domestic fund advisors. Advisors of funds with greater turnover receive higher marginal compensation. Also, closed-end fund advisors receive higher marginal compensation than open-end fund advisors. Finally, we find that marginal compensation is lower for advisors of large funds and members of large fund families. We argue that these differences in marginal compensation reflect differences in advisor marginal product, differences in the difficulty of monitoring performance, differences in control environments, and scale economies.     

Portfolio Manager Compensation in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry

We study compensation contracts of individual portfolio managers using hand‐collected data of over 4,500 U.S. mutual funds. Variations in the compensation structures are broadly consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium. The likelihood of explicit performance‐based incentives is positively correlated with the intensity of agency conflicts, as proxied by the advisor's clientele dispersion, its affiliations in the financial industry, and its ownership structure. Investor sophistication and the threat of dismissal in outsourced funds serve as substitutes for explicit performance‐based incentives. Finally, we find little evidence of differences in future performance associated with any particular compensation arrangement.     

The shrouded business of style drift in active mutual funds

This study investigates the motivation and performance consequence of intentional style drift in an exclusively in-house fund management industry in China. With style drift, fund investors are exposed to investment portfolio outside their risk-return preference but are generally unaware that their risk and return expectations are disrupted, and the functioning of the fund market undermined. Our study provides evidence for the first time about the incentive that motivates style drift behavior. We find that style drift increases a fund's subsequent net inflows, thus affirming the maximization of AUM-linked compensation as the motivation for fund manager's style drift behavior. We also find that larger funds have greater incentive to drift. We demonstrate that style drift behavior interferes with the picking of quality stocks to deliver fund performance for fund investors. Style drift as an unobserved risk behavior harms fund investor interest and undermines market integrity.     

The Optimal Size of Hedge Funds: Conflict between Investors and Fund Managers

This study examines whether the standard compensation contract in the hedge fund industry aligns managers’ incentives with investors’ interests. I show empirically that managers’ compensation increases when fund assets grow, even when diseconomies of scale in fund performance exist. Thus, managers’ compensation is maximized at a much larger fund size than is optimal for fund performance. However, to avoid capital outflows, managers are also motivated to restrict fund growth to maintain style‐average performance. Similarly, fund management firms have incentives to collect more capital for all funds under management, including their flagship funds, even at the expense of fund performance.     

Fund Advisor Compensation in Closed-End Funds

This paper examines the relation between the premium on closed-end funds and organizational features of the funds and advisors, including the compensation scheme of the investment advisor. We find that the fund premium is larger when: (a) the advisor's compensation is more sensitive to fund performance; (b) the assets managed by the advisor are concentrated in the fund in question; (c) the advisor manages other funds with low compensation sensitivity to performance and with low concentration of assets managed by the advisor; and (d) the advisor's compensation contract evaluates performance relative to a benchmark.     

Outsourcing accounting information systems: Evidence from closed-end mutual fund families

This study examines the factors associated with the decision of closed-end funds to outsource their accounting information systems. Using data from 2010 and 2011, we find that the outsourcing decision is made by groups of funds with common service providers (called “fund families”), rather than by individual funds. Our results indicate that fund families containing a larger number of funds and older fund families are less likely to outsource their accounting functions. These types of fund families may have greater internal economies of scale, diminishing the potential cost savings from outsourcing. We also find that fund families with more good-faith-valued assets are less likely to outsource accounting information systems than those with more market-valued assets. Valuing these good-faith-valued assets is both an important investment-management process and a key accounting task, reducing the need to outsource accounting to focus managers on their core competency. This study is of potential importance to investors and regulators in evaluating closed-end funds' decisions on outsourcing accounting functions.     

High‐Water Marks: High Risk Appetites? Convex Compensation,Long Horizons,and Portfolio Choice

We study the portfolio choice of hedge fund managers who are compensated by high-water mark contracts. We find that even risk-neutral managers do not place unbounded weights on risky assets, despite option-like contracts. Instead, they place a constant fraction of funds in a mean-variance efficient portfolio and the rest in the riskless asset, acting as would constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) investors. This result is a direct consequence of the in(de)finite horizon of the contract. We show that the risk-seeking incentives of option-like contracts rely on combining finite horizons and convex compensation schemes rather than on convexity alone.     

The effect of financial reporting quality on CEO compensation structure: Evidence from accounting comparability

This study examines the effect of accounting comparability on the design of CEO compensation structure. After controlling for firm-specific attributes, we find that accounting comparability is positively associated with CEO equity-based compensation intensity and pay-performance sensitivity. This suggests that the improved comparability increases the usefulness of equity-based compensation and a firm is willing to offer more equity-based compensation contracts to CEOs and increase their pay-performance sensitivity. Further, we find that the impact of comparability on the CEO’s compensation contract increases with information asymmetry, which is consistent with the notion that accounting comparability is a quality of financial reporting that facilitates the use of equity-based compensation in a poor information environment. Our analysis also reveals that the effect of accounting comparability on CEO compensation structure is greater when a firm’s corporate governance is strong, consistent with the complementary relation between comparability and the exiting corporate governance in determining CEO compensation schemes. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms utilize more equity-based compensation as a proportion of total compensation under greater accounting comparability and enhance the alignment between equity-based compensation and firm performance.     

AGENCY CONFLICTS IN DELEGATED PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM NAMESAKE MUTUAL FUNDS

Namesake funds provide a unique sample for studying the two agency conflicts that exist within a mutual fund. The first is between the fund management company and fund shareholders, and the second is between the fund management company and the fund manager. A typical namesake fund manager sits on his or her fund's board, frequently as the chairman, is the majority owner of the fund management company, and has significant investments in the fund he or she manages. Our results indicate that namesake funds charge higher fees, suggesting that the boards of namesake funds are less effective. We find that namesake funds are more tax efficient, consistent with the idea that managerial ownership helps align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Because of fewer career concerns, namesake fund managers herd less while assuming greater unsystematic risk. We find weak evidence that namesake fund managers outperform their benchmarks and peers. Finally, we observe that namesake funds attract higher levels of investor cash flow.     

Do Female Mutual Fund Managers Manage Differently?

We examine the performance and investment behavior of female fixed‐income mutual fund managers compared with male fixed‐income mutual fund managers. We find that male‐ and female‐managed funds do not differ significantly in terms of performance, risk, and other fund characteristics. Our results suggest that differences in investment behavior often attributed to gender may be related to investment knowledge and wealth constraints. Despite the similarities between male and female managers, we find evidence that gender influences the decision making of mutual fund investors. We find that the net asset flows into funds managed by females are lower than for males, especially for the manager's initial year managing the fund.     

Closing and cloning in open-end mutual funds

Using a unique dataset, we document that only those closed funds for which no new fund is subsequently launched continuously deliver positive abnormal returns. This suggests the existence of an optimal fund scale. In spite of the potential diseconomies of scale, a non-trivial proportion of closed funds have new funds cloned—the scale motive would not be a complete explanation for the closure. When managers of closed funds clone new funds, they receive greater public attention and thus can attract more fund flows and charge higher fees. Furthermore, better-performing closed fund managers attract more fund flows to their new siblings, making the closure an effective mechanism to extract economic rents. Overall, we find that closing and cloning is an attractive strategy for funds seeking to increase their management fees and funds with more managers in place. Aspects of the closed fund family also affect the launch decision of new siblings.     

Mutual fund corporate culture and performance

In this paper we test if a mutual fund's own corporate culture predicts fund performance. To do this we use Morningstar's corporate culture ratings for mutual funds and then examine the ability of these corporate culture ratings to predict risk-adjusted performance of domestic equity funds over the period 2005–2010. Using methods that are robust to survivorship bias, we find there is little significant evidence that corporate culture predicts better fund performance. Indeed, we find that no individual component of the Morningstar stewardship rating including board quality, fees, manager incentives and regulatory issues is able to consistently predict fund performance.     

Management sub-advising in the mutual fund industry

This is a study of how contractual mechanisms can mitigate agency conflicts in sub-advised mutual funds. Sub-advising contracts allow fund families to expand their product offerings to include new investment styles and thereby gain market share. We show that costly contractual arrangements, such as co-branding, multi-advising, and performance-based compensation, can mitigate agency conflicts in outsourcing and protect investors from potential underperformance. Fund families will find it cost-effective to implement such incentive mechanisms only when investors are sophisticated in assessing manager skill. The findings help to explain why a large percentage of fund families outsource their funds to advisory firms.     

Why do managers avoid EPS dilution? Evidence from debt–equity choice

Survey evidence reveals that managers prefer to avoid dilution of earnings per share (EPS), though financial theory suggests it is irrelevant in firm valuation. We explore contracting and behavioral explanations for this apparent paradox using a large sample of debt–equity issuers. We first provide evidence that firms with greater agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are more likely to use EPS as a performance measure in bonus contracts. After controlling for possible endogeneity related to compensation contract design, we find that managers are more likely to avoid earnings dilution when their bonus compensation explicitly depends upon EPS performance. This effect is increasing in the magnitude of bonus compensation for this subset of firms; we document no such associations for the firms that do not use EPS in setting bonus pay. Additional tests of firms’ speed of adjustment to target leverage ratios and firms’ debt conservatism levels indicate that explicitly rewarding executives on EPS performance helps to resolve underleveraging problems. We also find that clientele effects are associated with managers’ aversion to earnings dilution. Our findings provide a deeper understanding of the factors that underlie the use of accounting performance in compensation contracts and new evidence on the implications of the contracting role of accounting in firm decision-making.     

Meeting new peers: The effects of Morningstar category reassignment on fund flows and star ratings

We investigate how the reassignment of a fund's Morningstar category affects fund flow and Morningstar star rating. We find that funds assigned to a different category gain positive abnormal flows and this effect is significant mainly for high-rated funds. Category reassignment does not improve a fund's star rating on average, and flows are less responsive to a star-rating change if the rating change is likely to be driven by category reassignment. The positive abnormal flows captured by high-rated funds after category reassignment are consistent with a visibility story: some investors filter funds by Morningstar category and star rating, and category reassignment makes a fund more visible to a new group of investors if the fund is highly rated. In contrast, a low-rated fund is likely to be selected only by investors who do not refer to the fund's Morningstar information and, hence, gains little visibility from category reassignment. We also find evidence that more sophisticated investors are more likely to consider not only fund rating but also fund category when evaluating fund performance.     

Independent Directors and Favoritism: When Multiple Board Affiliations Prevail in Mutual Fund Families

I examine whether independent directors with multiple board affiliations (IDMAs) trade off the interests of one fund relative to another (fund favoritism) or whether they benefit fund shareholders by increasing the level of the board's expertise. Using a sample of mutual funds affiliated with the top 55 fund sponsors from 2002 to 2008, I find that the presence of IDMAs is negatively related to performance/resource shifting across funds within fund families. IDMAs appear to decrease fund fees, increase the return gap associated with the unobserved actions of fund managers, and facilitate the transfer of information across funds in a fund family.     

The Cross‐Section of Managerial Ability,Incentives, and Risk Preferences

I estimate a dynamic investment model for mutual managers to study the cross‐sectional distribution of ability, incentives, and risk preferences. The manager's compensation depends on the size of the fund, which fluctuates due to fund returns and due to fund flows that respond to the fund's relative performance. The model provides an economic interpretation of time‐varying coefficients in performance regressions in terms of the structural parameters. I document that the estimates of fund alphas are precise and virtually unbiased. I find substantial heterogeneity in ability, risk preferences, and pay‐for‐performance sensitivities that relates to observable fund characteristics.     

Security Concentration and Active Fund Management: Do Focused Funds Offer Superior Performance?

We examine gross fund returns based on the number of securities held and find no evidence that focused funds outperform diversified funds. After deducting expenses, focused funds significantly underperform. Controlling for various fund characteristics, fund performance is positively related to the fund's number of holdings both before and after expenses. We find evidence linking focused fund underperformance to agency and liquidity problems. Finally, the attrition rate of focused funds is higher than that of diversified funds. These results do not support the view that managers holding focused portfolios have superior stock‐picking skills or that focused funds provide value to investors.     

Not only skill but also scale: Evidence from the hedge funds industry

This paper empirically tests a two-levels model of decreasing returns to scale using a sample of hedge funds. The two-levels model assumes that a fund's gross alpha is a decreasing function of both the fund scale and the style scale measured by the aggregate size of peers in the hedge fund style. We find that a fund-level model underestimates the impact of diseconomies of scale on the gross alpha by 55 basis points. The results indicate that managers should consider the constraints imposed by the style scale when optimizing their portfolio sizes. We also provide evidence that hedge funds did not invest at their optimal amount and confirm that skill and the ability to resist decreasing returns to scale are two important components of selecting hedge fund performers.     

社会责任投资基金的实施契约与代理成本的关系研究

通过对社会责任投资基金契约条款适应社会责任目标而进行的规范和调整进行评估,并采用异质性随机前沿分析和LSDV法阐释基于契约的社会责任约束程度与基金代理成本之间的关系,研究发现,非市场利率追逐型社会责任投资基金的契约对社会责任主题的约束程度普遍高于市场利率追逐型社会责任投资基金,这种差异主要体现在投资目标和投资范围的契约条款设计方面。社会责任投资基金的契约得分与基金的代理成本呈正相关关系,尤其是非市场利率追逐型社会责任投资基金表现得更加明显。因此,“规则前置”的契约条款对社会责任主题的限制和约束增加了代理成本,契约作为一种硬约束手段在解决委托代理问题上作用有限。