Financial incentives to postpone retirement and further effects on employment — Evidence from a natural experiment

This paper examines the effect of the introduction of permanent benefit reductions for early retirees (i) on the duration until benefit claiming and (ii) on the duration until exit from gainful employment. I estimate discrete time duration models using different error term specifications. Administrative data containing the full earnings history of the individuals are used. Since the reform implementing the benefit reductions was a natural experiment, under some assumptions a causal effect can be identified. The permanent reduction of retirement benefit amounts causes a postponement of claiming benefits by about 14 months and a delay of employment exit by about 10 months on average.     

Optimal unemployment policy in a matching equilibrium

This paper considers optimal unemployment policy in a matching equilibrium with risk averse workers and unobserved job search effort. The Planner chooses unemployment benefits, taxes and job creation subsidies to maximise a Utilitarian welfare function. Optimal policy involves a trade-off between higher employment taxes (which finance more generous unemployment benefits) and greater market tightness (which reduces the average unemployment spell). Optimal UI implies the initial UI payment equals the wage, thus ensuring consumption is smooth across the job destruction shock, and UI payments then fall with duration.     

Minimum wages,wages and employment in various sectors in Honduras

This paper contributes to our understanding of the impact of minimum wages on labor markets of developing countries, where there are often multiple minimum wages and compliance is weak. We examine how changes in more than 22 minimum wages over 1990–2004 affect employment, unemployment and average wages of workers in different sectors, defined by coverage under the legislation. The evidence suggests that minimum wages are effectively enforced only in medium and large-scale firms, where a 1% increase in the minimum wage leads to an increase of 0.29% in the average wage and a relatively large reduction in employment of ? 0.46%. We find that public sector wages emulate minimum wage trends but the higher cost of labor does not reduce employment there. There are no discernable effects of minimum wages on the wages of workers in small-firms or the self-employed; yet, higher minimum wages may create more unemployment. We conclude that (even under our upper bound estimate of the effect on the wages of workers) the total earnings of workers in the large-firm covered sector fall with higher minimum wages in Honduras, which warrants a policy dialogue on the structure and level of minimum wages.     

Unemployment insurance and the distribution of unemployment spells

In this paper administrative data from the unemployment-insurance (UI) system are used to examine the distribution of unemployment spells. Hazard plots of the data reveal a strong clustering around the benefit exhaustion point. In addition, estimation of the effects of the exhaustion point and of the UI benefit level on spell lengths obtained with a non-parametric proportional-hazards model - estimated by direct maximization of the general likelihood function - shows significant effects of both. However, the effect of the exhaustion point on the hazard is not proportional, making detection of its effect somewhat difficult.     

On the structure of unemployment benefits in shirking models

An increase in unemployment compensation is commonly argued to raise unemployment in a shirking model of efficiency wages. This prediction is based on the assumption of a uniform benefit level. However, 32+13if differential benefits for shirkers and non-shirkers exist, higher unemployment compensation for non-shirkers will reduce unemployment. In the long-run, this effect is amplified. Therefore, not only the level of benefits influences unemployment in an efficiency wage economy but also eligibility conditions, the effectiveness with which benefits are administered and, more generally, the institutional design of the unemployment insurance system.     

Spell durations with long unemployment insurance periods

This paper uses data from a natural experiment to investigate the potential incentive effect of a fixed unemployment insurance period. We compare two large groups of Norwegian unemployed persons who registered as unemployed in 1990 and 1991. The last group was affected by a rule change that in practice extended the length of unemployment benefits to more than 3 years. Our data are taken from official records, and we construct unemployment durations by combining information from the unemployment registers with employers' records. We use a proportional hazard model with a flexible baseline. The results suggest that the main effect of benefits running out is to make people drop out of the unemployment register. We find neither clear evidence that the hazard into employment increased when the end of benefits approached in the pre-liberalisation group, nor that behaviour in this part of the spells changed after the reform. On the other hand, our results suggest that the reform had an all over negative effect on the employment hazard.     

Demographic and education effects on unemployment in Europe

We analyse the effects of demographic and education changes on unemployment rates in Europe. Using a panel of European countries for the 1975–2002 period - disaggregated by cohort and education - we empirically test the economic effects of the “baby bust” and the “education boom”. We find that structural shifts in the population age structure play an important role and that a significant share of variation in unemployment rates is also attributable to educational changes, the latter being usually neglected in aggregate studies. Results show that demographic and education shocks are qualitatively different for young (adult) workers as well as for more (less) educated people. Changes in the population age structure are positively related to the unemployment rate of young workers, while have no effect on adults. Conversely, changes in the education structure show a negative effect on the unemployment of the more educated. Labour market institutions also influence unemployment rates in different ways. Employment protection for regular workers increases unemployment rates, while temporary employment provisions reduce it. Unemployment benefits are found to have a displacement effect on unemployment, while corporatism of wage bargaining improves employment performance.     

The Effects of UI Benefits on Unemployment and Subsequent Outcomes: Evidence from a Kinked Benefit Rule

This paper analyses the effects of unemployment insurance benefits on unemployment exits and subsequent labour market outcomes. We exploit a piecewise linear relationship between the previous wage and benefits in Finland to identify the causal effects of the benefit level by using a regression kink design. Although we only find weak evidence of an effect on the time to the next job, higher benefits decrease the time spent in part-time unemployment and thus result in more full-time unemployment. The re-employment probability and post-unemployment wage are also negatively affected. The results for the duration of the first post-unemployment job are not conclusive, but in total both employment and earnings in the two years following the beginning of the unemployment spell decrease with higher benefits.     

Does public transit reduce car travel externalities? Quasi-natural experiments' evidence from transit strikes

One of the unanswered questions in the field of urban economics is to which extent subsidies to public transit are justified. We examine one of the main benefits of public transit, a reduction in car congestion externalities, the so-called congestion relief benefit, using quasi-natural experimental data on citywide public transit strikes for Rotterdam, a city with mild congestion levels. On weekdays, a strike induces travel times to increase only marginally on the highway ring road (0.017 min/km) but substantially on inner city roads (0.224 min/km). During rush hour, the strike effect is much more pronounced. The congestion relief benefit of public transit is substantial, equivalent to about 80% of the public transit subsidy. We demonstrate that during weekends, travel time does not change noticeably due to strikes. Furthermore, we show that public transit strikes induce similar increases in number of cyclists as number of car travelers suggesting that bicycling-promoting policies to reduce car congestion externalities might be attractive in combination with first-best congestion pricing.     

Unemployment insurance and subsequent job duration: job matching versus unobserved heterogeneity

The relationship between Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefit duration, unemployment duration and subsequent job duration is investigated using a multi‐state duration model with state specific unobserved heterogeneity. I examine two potential explanations for the negative correlation between unemployment and job spell durations; UI benefits increase job matching quality (the ‘Matching’ effect) versus unobserved heterogeneity (‘Adverse Selection’). The Matching effect is found to be weak. Although new jobs accepted within 5 weeks of benefit termination seem to have a higher dissolution rate, the negative correlation between unemployment and job duration is mostly explained by unobserved heterogeneity. Various simulations indicate that increasing the maximum benefit duration by one week will raise expected unemployment duration by 1.0 to 1.5 days but will raise expected job duration by 0.5 to 0.8 day only. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Job separation in a non‐stationary search model: a structural estimation to evaluate alternative unemployment insurance systems

This paper considers a job search model in which the environment is not constant throughout the unemployment spell and where jobs do not last for ever. In this situation, reservation wages can be lower than they would be in a model without consideration of such separations, but they can initially be higher precisely because of the non‐constant environment. The model is estimated structurally by using Spanish data for the period 1985–1996. The main finding is that, after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the unemployment hazard rate is almost flat during the first six months. However, after this duration, the highly decreasing job offer arrival rate comes to be the only significant factor, given that acceptance probabilities become equal to one. The estimated parameters are used to evaluate different unemployment insurance designs. We conclude that a non‐monotonic pattern in unemployment benefits, joint with a tax paid by workers and based on unemployment duration, makes this duration 13.2% lower than it currently is in Spain. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Long-term Unemployment in the Canadian Labor Market

A bstract . Examination of the distribution of long-term unemployment in the Canadian labor market employing longitudinal administrative unemployment insurance data for the 1975–79 period indicates that over relatively long time periods, unemployment tends to be concentrated among those who have multiple unemployment episodes over time. By implication, high unemployment spell frequencies indicate a high propensity for re-employment. A great deal of long-term unemployment is found in lower skilled occupations and in seasonal occupations and industries. Youth and adult women comprise a proportion of long-term unemployed roughly commensurate with their share of the labor force.     

Treatment effect of job-training programmes on unemployment duration in Slovakia

There is a large literature evaluating job-training programmes. In this paper, we evaluate three such job-training programmes that are used in Slovakia. Individuals participating in a job-training programme during their unemployment spell are usually not a random subsample of the population. To determine the treatment effect of a job-training programme on unemployment duration, one has to correct for this selection effect. Therefore, we use a multivariate mixed proportional hazard-type model to describe the hazard of getting a job simultaneously with the hazard of entering a programme. We allow for a heterogeneous treatment effect and for the treatment effect to vary over time. Furthermore, we add the monthly unemployment rate as a time-varying explanatory variable. The estimation results show that two of the three programmes shorten the unemployment duration quite substantially.     

On the extent of re-entitlement effects in unemployment compensation

We analyze the implications of two-tier unemployment compensation systems with non-automatic eligibility in an equilibrium matching model with Nash bargaining. As eligibility for UI does not automatically follow from employment, the two types of unemployed workers have different threat points, which delivers equilibrium wage dispersion. The parameters of the model are estimated for France, and the model is also calibrated for Denmark and the U.S. Re-entitlement effects are shown to be sizeable for all three countries. For France, re-entitlement effects lower by 15% the rise in the wage and by 25% the rise in unemployment following a 10% increase in the benefit level. Finally, we show that in all three countries the optimal compensation system is characterized by time-decreasing unemployment benefits and non-automatic eligibility for UI, with higher levels of both UI and UA benefits, a smaller decrease in benefits over time, and a longer employment duration required for UI eligibility than in the current system.     

Aging and house prices

The paper investigates how aging will affect house prices. It uses for the first time a house price dataset covering 22 advanced economies. The analysis finds that demography did and will affect real house prices significantly. The results suggest that a major shift is taking place. In the past 40 years, on average demography increased advanced economy real house prices by around 30 basis points per annum, while in the next 40 years aging will decrease them on average by around 80 basis points per annum compared to neutral demographics. The shift from demographic tailwinds to headwinds might also be relevant when thinking about financial asset prices.     

Envy-minimizing unemployment benefits

This paper offers an analysis of the optimality of unemployment benefits based on the concept of no-envy. Using a general equilibrium framework with uncertainty, we derive the conditions for a trade-off between the intensity of envy and the expected percentage of envious persons. If the government's sensitivity to the intensity of envy is not too strong (alongside conditions on households' utilities), the optimal benefit is positive and below the full-insurance level. We also show that, for a low enough sensitivity to the intensity of envy, the optimal replacement ratio decreases with unfavorable changes in the distribution of the technological shock.     

A bigger piece of the pie: The relative importance of affiliative and change-oriented citizenship and task performance in predicting overall job performance

We examine the extent to which both in-role (task performance) and extra-role dimensions of performance (organizational citizenship behaviors) account for variance in ratings of overall job performance by utilizing currently available meta-analytic estimates. Relative weight analysis results show that overall performance is determined more by three OCB forms in combination (RW = 0.34; %RW = 72.9%) than by task performance (RW = 0.12; %RW = 27.1%). Among the OCB forms, the relative weight of OCB-O (RW = 0.17; %RW = 36.9%) is greater than those of OCB-I (RW = 0.11; %RW = 0.22.9%) and OCB-CH (RW = 0.06; %RW = 13.1%). Consistent with the results from a relative weight analysis, results from a series of multiple regression analyses also show that the incremental contribution (ΔR²) of each performance dimension above and beyond the other performance dimensions is the highest for OCB-O (0.056), followed by those of task performance (0.041), OCB-CH (0.007), and OCB-I (0.003). We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings along with study limitations and future research directions.     

State dependency in youth unemployment: A lost generation?

Utilizing a job search framework and survey data on both completed and uncompleted spells of unemployment we present in this paper maximum likelihood estimates of the determinants of re-employment probabilities of young workers in Britain. The model used allows us to examine the importance of state dependency in youth unemployment as well as ethnicity, educational qualifications, and unemployment income. Results suggest that there is strong evidence of negative duration dependence in the transition from unemployment to employment for young workers in Britain.     

Productivity insurance: The role of unemployment benefits in a multi-sector model

We construct a multi-sector search and matching model where the unemployed receives idiosyncratic productivity shocks that make working in certain sectors more productive than in the others. Agents must decide which sector to search in and face moving costs when leaving their current sector for another. In this environment, unemployment is associated with an additional risk: low future wages if mobility costs preclude search in the appropriate sector. This introduces a new role for unemployment benefits – productivity insurance while unemployed. For plausible parameterizations unemployment benefits increase per-worker productivity. In addition, the welfare-maximizing benefit level decreases as moving costs increase.