The efficiency of training and hiring with intrafirm bargaining

This paper demonstrates that firms hire and train workers efficiently in a matching and intrafirm bargaining economy when the Hosios condition holds and returns to scale are constant. This conclusion stands in contrast to the prevailing view that training costs are a source of inefficiency in imperfect labor markets. The efficiency of the competitive economy relies on the ability of large firms to take into account the negative impact of the training rate on the wages negotiated inside the firm through intrafirm bargaining: untrained workers accept a wage reduction in compensation for potential training that is accessible only following employment. This intrafirm bargaining process solves efficiency problems associated with training costs that would otherwise lead to inefficient hiring and training decisions. This conclusion holds true for both specific and general human capital.     

Decentralized trade with bargaining and voluntary matching

Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) study a market with one seller, two buyers, and voluntary matching. Both the competitive outcomep _c and the bilateral bargaining outcomep _b are possible in subgame perfect equilibrium. We consider two variations. First, if there is a cost larger thanp _c −p _c to the seller of changing partner,p _c is the unique outcome, otherwise no restriction expires. In the second variation the seller makes anε-binding preannouncement of whether he will change buyer after disagreement. Ifε is small there are equilibrium prices close top _c . But for anyε, if the discount factor is close to 1, the unique equilibrium price isp _c . The authors thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

Multiple equilibria in a firing game with impartial justice

In this paper, we argue that firms' firing strategies and the judicial strategy of dismissed employees depend to a large extent on labor judges' ability to shed light on the various cases. The model is cast as a sequential game with imperfect information featuring firms, employees and labor judges. The judges' error margin increases with the congestion of the judicial system. The game presents multiple equilibria which differ in the frequency of good workers fired for unfair motives and the frequency of unreliable workers who abusively sue firms for unfair dismissal. The probability that the judge sits with the employee appears to be positively related to the ratio between the severance payment for economic dismissal and the company fine for abusive dismissal.     

A longitudinal analysis of search frictions and matching in the U.S. labor market

This paper takes a partial equilibrium on-the-job search model to a decade (1996–2006) of repeated cross-sections from the U.S. Current Population Survey. Each month, a set of parameters ruling worker mobility between labor market states and along the wage ladder is estimated using wage distributions and individual transitions. In particular, job-to-job mobility is decomposed into a voluntary component (on-the-job search) and an involuntary one (job reallocation). The resulting time series of transition parameters are first used in a longitudinal analysis of labor turnover and search frictions. Job reallocations are shown to be key in the acyclical behavior of the job separation rate, and in the procyclical behavior of the probability of changing job. Moreover, an index of search frictions is computed and shown to follow no cyclical pattern. The paper then turns to an estimation of the matching function with both unemployed and employed job seekers. The transition parameters from the job search model are used as weights in an aggregate indicator of labor supply. The inclusion of employed workers increases the estimates of the elasticities of the matching function with respect to its two inputs (labor supply and job vacancies).     

Labor and investment frictions in a real business cycle model

This paper develops a prototype real business cycle model in which labor and investment frictions may compete directly with technology shocks in accounting for fluctuations in the postwar US economy. Using Ireland's [2004a. A method for taking models to the data. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 28, 1205–1226] methodology, we establish that both types of friction are quantitatively important. Technology shocks still explain a substantial fraction of the fluctuations in aggregate output, as the baseline real business cycle model predicts. Formal hypothesis tests suggest that changes in the recurrence of shocks, frictions, and structural parameters all play a role in accounting for the shift in the time series properties of the data between the periods before and after 1980.     

Introducing financial frictions and unemployment into a small open economy model

Which are the main frictions and the driving forces of business cycle dynamics in an open economy? To answer this question we extend the standard new Keynesian model in three dimensions: we incorporate financing frictions for capital, employment frictions for labor and extend the model into a small open economy setting. We estimate the model on Swedish data. Our main results are that (i) a financial shock is pivotal for explaining fluctuations in investment and GDP. (ii) The marginal efficiency of investment shock has negligible importance. (iii) The labor supply shock is unimportant in explaining GDP and no high frequency wage markup shock is needed.     

Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model

Decisions in Economics and Finance - In this paper, I develop a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model grounded on optimal control in which a firm and a union bargain over the wage in a...     

Auctions with resale and bargaining power

We show that when the weak bidder’s bargaining power in the resale market is weakened, the auctioneer’s revenue from the first-price auction with resale is lower. Using the idea of Coase Theorem, we show that when the resale market is a sequential bargaining model with no commitment, the auctioneer’s revenue is substantially reduced, and the ranking is the opposite of Hafalir and Krishna (2009). We establish a version of the Coase Theorem in the context of the auctions with resale. When Coase Theorem holds, we show that the revenue of the auction with resale is lower than the revenue of the same auction without resale. We also provide the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for our model of auctions with resale.     

Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution

This paper studies a bargaining model where n   players negotiate how to share a pie through (n−1)$(n-1)$ bilateral bargaining sessions. In each session, two players bargain for a partial agreement that specifies who exits and who moves on to the next session (if there is any) via the alternating-proposal framework of Rubinstein [Rubinstein, A., 1982. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50, 97–109]. We consider two bargaining procedures under which the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes converge to the Nash [Nash, J., 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 155–162] bargaining solution for the corresponding bargaining problem as the players’ discount factor goes to one. Hence, the model studied here provides a non-cooperative foundation for the Nash cooperative bargaining solution in the multilateral case.     

Sequential bargaining with common values

We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players who jointly own this object. The players are asymmetrically informed about the object’s value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no depreciation during the bargaining process which involves signalling of private information. We characterise the perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of this game which is unique if offers are required to be strictly increasing. Equilibrium agreement is reached gradually and non-deterministically. The better informed player obtains a rent.     

Introduction to financial frictions and debt constraints

This is an introduction to the special section on financial frictions and debt constraints.     

Stochastic equilibria of an asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs and random dividends

We investigate dynamical properties of a heterogeneous agent model with random dividends and further study the relationship between dynamical properties of the random model and those of the corresponding deterministic skeleton, which is obtained by setting the random dividends as their constant mean value. Based on our recent mathematical results, we prove the existence and stability of random fixed points as the perturbation intensity of random dividends is sufficiently small. Furthermore, we prove that the random fixed points converge almost surely to the corresponding fixed points of the deterministic skeleton as the perturbation intensity tends to zero. Moreover, simulations suggest similar behaviors in the case of more complicated attractors. Therefore, the corresponding deterministic skeleton is a good approximation of the random model with sufficiently small random perturbations of dividends. Given that dividends in real markets are generally very low, it is reasonable and significant to some extent to study the effects of heterogeneous agents’ behaviors on price fluctuations by the corresponding deterministic skeleton of the random model.     

The changing union and bargaining landscape: union concentration and collective bargaining trends

Unions in Western Europe have tended to merge in larger organisations, straddling across traditional bargaining demarcations. Despite the trend towards union concentration, cross‐national differences remain in the degree of fragmentation and the balance across private and public sectors. In the past years, wage moderation was common to nearly all bargaining systems, partly as a result of coordinated incomes policies or pattern‐setting wage settlements. Tripartite concertation has proven more difficult because of increased dissatisfaction with modest pay increases and insufficient employment effects.     

Financial openness, financial frictions and optimal monetary policy

Increasing financial integration challenges the optimality of inward-looking strategies for optimal monetary policy. Those issues are analyzed in an open economy where foreign net lending, and the current account, are determined by a collateral constraint. Durables represent collateral. The current account features persistent imbalances, but can deliver a long run stationary equilibrium. The comparison between floating and managed exchange rate regimes shows that the impossible trinity is reversed: higher financial integration increases the persistence and volatility of the current account and calls for exchange rate stabilization. In this context, the Ramsey plan too prescribes stabilization of the exchange rate, alongside with domestic inflation.     

Multilateral bargaining and Walrasian equilibrium

A class of bargaining games in which agents bargain over prices and maximum trading constraints is considered: It is proved that all the Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibria of these games implement Walrasian allocations as the bargaining frictions vanish. The result holds for any number of agents and is robust to different specifications of the bargaining process.     

Stable and efficient bargaining networks

Abstract. We examine a bargaining game among players connected by a network, where successively potential partners negotiate over terms of a project. For any network structure and ordering of selection of bargaining partners, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome which coincides with the standard Rubinstein split. Based on this, we derive expected payoffs for players as a function of the network. We the characterize the pairwise stable and efficient bargaining networks. These two sets do not always coincide and in many situations pairwise stable networks are over-connected. Received: 10 April 2001 / Accepted: 17 January 2002 I am indebted to Matthew Jackson for suggesting this paper. I also thank Bernard Caillaud, Sanjeev Goyal, and the seminar participants at Universidad de Alicante, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, CEMFI (Madrid), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Erasmus University of Rotterdam, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona) and CERAS (Paris) for helpful comments. This paper was written while at Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CERAS. Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through research grant DGESIC PB96-0302, and from the Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, Paris is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are of course mine.     

Worker directors and collective bargaining

Elizabeth Chell and Derek Cox report on some of their findings of a study into worker directors and collective bargaining which was carried out between 1976 and 1979 and funded by the Department of Employment. The research involved seven private sector companies which have some form of worker director system.     

Discrete-space agglomeration model with social interactions: Multiplicity,stability, and continuous limit of equilibria

This study examines the properties of equilibrium, including the stability, of discrete-space agglomeration models with social interactions. The findings reveal that while the corresponding continuous-space model has a unique equilibrium, the equilibrium in discrete space can be non-unique for any finite degree of discretization by characterizing the discrete-space model as a potential game. Furthermore, it indicates that despite the above result, any sequence of discrete-space models’ equilibria converges to the continuous-space model’s unique equilibrium as the discretization of space is refined.     

Competitive moment matching of a New-Keynesian and an Old-Keynesian model

The paper considers two rival models referring to the new macroeconomic consensus: a standard three-equation model of the New-Keynesian variety versus dynamic adjustments of a business and an inflation climate in an ‘Old-Keynesian’ tradition. Over the two subperiods of the Great Inflation and Great Moderation, both of them are estimated by the method of simulated moments. An innovative feature is here that the moments do not only include the autocovariances up to eight lags of quarterly output, inflation and the interest rate, but optionally also a measure of the raggedness of the three variables. In short, the performance of the Old-Keynesian model is very satisfactory and similar to the New-Keynesian model, or even better. In particular, the Old-Keynesian model is better suited to match the new moments without deteriorating the original second moments too much.     

Profit sharing regulation and repeated bargaining with a shut-down option

We analyze the behavior of a firm where workers share profits with shareholders by using a model cast in an Aoki framework. There are two sorts of uncertainties: one relates to the market price, assumed to follow a random path in continuous time, while the other concerns internal organization, i.e. the share of profits to be distributed between workers and shareholders. In the institutional setting we adopt the firm is flexible, since it has the possibility of shutting down, by paying laid off workers a bonus, which represents a sunk cost. The distributive share is determined in the firm's internal labor market through a bargaining that takes place at two occasions: at the beginning of the firm's life and when profits reach a threshold level. The second bargaining is endogenized according to a procedure imposed upon shareholders and workers by a regulator who may use profit distribution as a way to intervene in the firm's internal labor market. Specificities make this market highly imperfect. Different share parameter patterns result, owing to a shut down option, according to whether (a) the regulator calls for renegotiation when profits are increasing or decreasing, (b) the regulator's rule is announced in advance or is discretionally set.