Does the nationalization of party systems affect the composition of public spending?

Do political institutions shape the structure of public spending? Based on a sample of elections in eighteen Western European countries over the period 1970–1998, this paper shows that governments’ margin of maneuverability to design and implement fiscal policies depends on the level of party linkage or the nationalization of party systems, defined as the extent to which parties are uniformly successful in winning votes across districts. The mechanism behind this argument is that in weakly nationalized countries there are additional transaction costs to change the structure of budgets as a consequence of the survival of local parties and interests. Therefore, the composition of public spending is more rigid here than in highly nationalized countries.     

Cultural values and public policy: The case of international development aid

This paper investigates whether the quantity and character of aggregate expenditures on foreign aid by donor governments are related to the cultural values held by the people of the donor countries. In particular, we study whether any association exists between three measures of donors’ foreign aid expenditures and two dimensions of culture. We find that the shares of national income governments spend on aid, the proportion of total aid provided in the form of grants, and the proportion of aid directed to humanitarian relief are all related in statistically significant and quantitatively important ways to the location of the cultural values of people in the donor countries on two continua, one from “traditional” to “rational” beliefs about social organization and authority, and the other from “survival” to “self-expression” as the focus of individual aspirations. These results contribute to our understanding of the political economy of aid, and to a growing literature on how culture shapes economic policies, institutions, and performance.     

The Consequences of Appointment Methods and Party Control for Telecommunications Pricing

While the economic approach to the politics of regulation emphasizes the importance of organized economic interests in shaping policies, political institutions in which regulatory agencies are embedded may also have significant effects. By including both economic influences and characteristics of political institutions in a model of price setting by state regulators, this paper demonstrates that both shape regulatory behavior in the telecommunications industry. Whether commissioners are elected or appointed, whether they face confirmation by a legislature, and whether a single party controls both executive and legislative branches of state governments influence the level of prices charged for basic services.     

REAL‐TIME DATA AND FISCAL POLICY ANALYSIS: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

This paper surveys the empirical research on fiscal policy analysis based on real‐time data. This literature can be broadly divided into four groups that focus on: (1) the statistical properties of revisions in fiscal data; (2) the political and institutional determinants of projection errors by governments; (3) the reaction of fiscal policies to the business cycle and (4) the use of real‐time fiscal data in structural vector autoregression (VAR) models. It emerges that, first, fiscal revisions are large and initial releases are biased estimates of final values. Secondly, strong fiscal rules and institutions lead to more accurate releases of fiscal data and smaller deviations of fiscal outcomes from government plans. Thirdly, the cyclical stance of fiscal policies is estimated to be more ‘counter‐cyclical’ when real‐time data are used instead of ex post data. Fourthly, real‐time data can be useful for the identification of fiscal shocks. Finally, it is shown that existing real‐time fiscal data sets cover only a limited number of countries and variables. For example, real‐time data for developing countries are generally unavailable. In addition, real‐time data on European countries are often missing, especially with respect to government revenues and expenditures. Therefore, more work is needed in this field.     

Do Good Institutions Promote Countercyclical Macroeconomic Policies?

The literature has argued that developing countries are unable to adopt countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies due to financial imperfections and unfavourable political‐economy conditions. Using a world sample of up to 112 industrial and developing countries for 1984–2008, we find that the level of institutional quality plays a key role in countries’ ability and willingness to implement countercyclical macroeconomic policies. Countries with strong (weak) institutions adopt countercyclical (procyclical) macroeconomic policies, reflected in extended monetary policy and fiscal policy rules. The threshold levels of institutional quality at which policies are acyclical are found to be similar for monetary and fiscal policy.     

Entrepreneurship policy and systemic conditions: Evidence-based implications and recommendations for emerging countries

Entrepreneurship policies are now widely spread among the general policy agenda in most of the countries. In particular, emerging countries started to focus on startups and young firms as potential engines of economic growth and structural transformation. Therefore, several governments from these countries are devoting significant efforts to develop their entrepreneurial ecosystems and promote the emergence of new dynamic firms. However, data on entrepreneurship in these countries is scarce leaving policymakers without a clear evidence-based platform for designing their policies and programs. This paper tries to contribute to this task in two manners. First, it presents a systemic conceptual approach to guide the design of entrepreneurship policies that explicitly includes the structural factors acting act as barriers in less developed contexts. Secondly, Based on the information from the IDE (Index of Dynamic Entrepreneurship) this study advances into the characterization of six different configurations of systemic conditions – three of which include emerging countries – analyzing their main strengths and weaknesses. Hence, this article provides a new evidence-based platform to identify and discuss the heterogeneity among ecosystems in emerging countries and suggests several policy recommendations for those governments that want to implement new entrepreneurship policies. At the same time, they introduce to the literature new concepts such as ‘systemic balance’ and ‘dual ecosystems’, which serve to characterize most of the observed configurations of systemic conditions for entrepreneurship in less developed regions. All in all, the results of this study would serve to guide policymakers to formulate their policies in a more contextualized framework.     

On the design and efficiency of a participating growth bill

A Participating Growth Bill (PGB) is an innovative hybrid financial vehicle employed by Western institutions and governments in lieu of short-term debt instruments. This study proposes PGB to be considered as an alternative way of raising funds for open market operations by the governments of Muslim countries constrained by religious regulations against fixed-interest debt (ribawi) financing. The security (PGB) is developed using partial equilibrium analysis under the assumption that the assets backing the financial package do not trade in a secondary market—a situation which invalidates the risk-neutral pricing of the well-known Black and Scholes (1973) model. The study finally demonstrates the efficiency of a PGB over a conventional (ribawi) debt vehicle thereby providing results contrary to assertions of the (i) Capital Structure Irrelevance Theorem (see Modigliani and Miller, 1958) and (ii) Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (see Sharpe, 1964).     

Auditor Industry Specialization,Political Economy and Earnings Quality: Some Cross‐Country Evidence

Using cross‐country data, we evaluate the impact of investor protection on the association between earnings quality and audits by industry specialists. Our findings show that the positive association between industry specialist auditors and earnings quality as documented in the literature is affected by the political electoral system, which reflects investor protection rights in a country. We document that audits by industry specialists are associated with higher earnings quality in countries with the proportional electoral system, reflecting weak investor protection. Our results also confirm Kwon et al.'s findings that overall there is a positive association between earnings quality and audits by industry specialists in countries with weak legal enforcement. Our findings, however, indicate that Kwon et al.'s results are valid only for countries with weak investor protection reflected by the proportional electoral system and not for countries with strong investor protection reflected by the majoritarian electoral system. These findings thus suggest that higher earnings quality of firms audited by industry specialists across countries can especially be expected when investor protection is low and legal enforcement is also weak. In addition, our research suggests that future cross‐country studies could explicitly consider the role of the political electoral system of a country in evaluating corporate governance, management and accounting issues.     

AFRICAN TRANSITIONS AND THE RESOURCE CURSE: AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Despite periodic rises in commodity prices, resource-rich African countries have been characterised by state failure and low long-term economic growth. Competing explanations for the resource curse are examined with a particular focus on political institutions. The effective privatisation of states is considered within an alternative theoretical framework of non-democratic governance and non-market economics. Given the nature of many African governments, international initiatives to encourage the development of effective markets and democracy may be inadequate to prevent increased resource rents from consolidating existing elites and their patronage regimes.     

Islam and Human Rights: A Growing Rapprochement?

Can Islamic thought provide a basis for a fully developed theory of human rights? This article begins with an examination of the tensions between religion in general and the secular framing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). From a historical perspective, it then delves into the history of the relationship between Muslim political and religious leaders and the UDHR. With that background in mind, the author analyzes the positions of three influential Muslim scholars on human rights: Khaled Abou El Fadl's emphasis on ethics and law; Abdulaziz Sachedina's recent book Islam and the Challenge of Human Rights (2009), in which he urges the traditionalists to develop a “public theology”; and finally, Abdullahi An‐Na'im's focus on shari'a and the secular state. He concludes that the majority of Muslims worldwide remain more conservative than these authors, and yet they overwhelmingly support the notion of human rights. This bodes well for the growing influence of such reformist thinking and, as a result, for the retooling of traditional Islamic jurisprudence in addressing human rights.     

Political institutions behind good governance

The present paper investigates the role of political institutions — namely, political regimes and electoral rules — in shaping the capacity of the government to implement policies that address citizens’ preferences, i.e., “good governance”. The empirical analysis, conducted on a panel of 80 democratic countries over the period 1996–2011, shows that the performance of the government depends on the interaction between electoral rules and political regimes. In particular, the performance of a government under a presidential regime improves when associated with a majoritarian electoral rule, while it worsens with a proportional electoral rule.     

Political market failure? The effect of government unity on energy technology policy in industrialized democracies

When do governments implement technology policies that allow society to solve social problems at a lower cost? Focusing on the case of energy, we argue that in industrialized democracies, severe social problems provoke an effective technology policy response when the government is unified. A unified government can easily strike the bargains required to secure political support for new technology programs. We test this theory against data on public energy research and development (R&D) in 22 OECD countries, 1980–2006. We find that as government fractionalization increases in a country, the sensitivity of public energy R&D to wasteful energy use, which presents economic and environmental difficulties to the society, declines. The analysis reveals a new reason for ineffective technology policies and contributes to the broad literature on political market failure.     

Benchmarking institutional variety in the eurozone: An empirical investigation

The European debt crisis has shown that the future of the European Union (EU) depends on the willingness of each member country to implement responsible policies, avoid moral hazard and uncooperative attitudes, and ensure stability and soundness. However, the European institutional variety means that each member country reacts differently to shocks and policies, follows a different path of recovery, and adapts to common institutions, including the common currency, in different ways. Helping countries to converge toward a situation that guarantees well-being, stability, and development at the national and community level is the goal of the European benchmark. This benchmark is a framework inspired by European treaties that, through the distance-to-frontier score methodology, aims to measure member countries’ performance and identify inefficiencies and negative externalities within the economic, social, and political institutions of each member country. The paper presents an empirical investigation of the European benchmark. Based on the results obtained, all countries can improve their performance, and none of them can be considered a model for the others. However, the Mediterranean and post-communist countries have more challenges to face and therefore need to make greater efforts.     

Economic Religion and the Worship of Progress

In contemporary thought, the terms “secular” and “religious” are polar opposites. They are held to occupy separate domains. But that view is mistaken. Religious belief organizes society around fundamental ideas about ethics and existence. This article examines the way economic belief systems function as religions. Economic thought in various forms (Marxist, Keynesian, neoclassical) is brimming with implicit religious meaning. Instead of belief in an afterlife and heaven, modern economics promises heaven on earth in the form of continuous material progress. Adherents of competing economic ideologies often promote them with the energy of religious zealots. Thus, modern societies are still organized around religious principles, but they are now hidden from sight. This article shows how the religious dimension of the modern worship of economic progress is rooted in Christian theology: Calvinism in the United States and Lutheranism in the Nordic countries, which are famous for their own brand of social democracy. In recent decades, secular faith in the religion of economic progress has begun to falter. The failures of mainstream economics to warn of impending crisis has reduced its credibility, even among economists. More importantly, the rise of environmentalism as a religion has vastly increased the number of citizens who question the goal of material progress. The attack on economic religion may have also undermined the credibility of mainstream political parties, partially explaining Brexit in England and the election of Donald Trump in the United States.     

The Foundations of Rapid Economic Growth

A bstract The fast pace of economic growth of the East Asian nations known as the " Four Tigers "– South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore –has become a legend It is usually claimed that the export-oriented industrialization (EOI) strategy was the basic cause of that rapid growth However, it is contended that the growth strategy of these countries was the result of certain unique historical and geo-political factors The colonial government had created the necessary infrastructure and international linkages which set the stage for initiating the EOI strategy Furthermore, because of the political support accorded to them from foreign governments, these countries, with the exception of Hong Kong, excluded major oppositional groups from sharing political power, and thus they were able to pursue effectively growth and export-oriented policies South Korea and Taiwan also received a large amount of foreign aid from the U S This aid, and the fact the U S laid open its huge market for cheaper Asian exports without insisting on reciprocity , prepared the conditions for export-led growth in those countries     

Determinants of property rights institutions: survey of literature and new evidence

Why do some countries have better institutions than others? More specifically, what accounts for variation in the quality of property rights institutions in different countries? In this paper, I empirically assess four different theories relating to the determinants of property rights institutions: (1) the economic approach, which maintains that property rights institutions are created when the benefits of their creation exceed their costs; (2) the cultural approach, which stipulates that institutional variation reflects the differences in the beliefs of political leaders about what institutions create benefits for society; (3) the historical approach, which contends that cross-country differences in property rights institutions are the by-product of historical accidents; and (4) the political approach, which defends the premise that institutions are voluntarily chosen by the individuals who control political power, and these individuals choose institutions with the objective to maximize their personal payoffs rather than the benefits of the society as a whole. In order to test the veracity of these theories, I undertake a cross-sectional analysis of 142 countries (including 116 developing and 26 developed countries) over the period 1970–2005. The results of this analysis provide several interesting insights. Firstly, they indicate that the political approach appears to be the most relevant explanation for cross-country variation in property rights institutions: not only is this approach the most statistically robust, it also provides the best fit with the property rights index. The results of non-nested hypothesis test à la Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) confirm this analysis. Secondly, regardless of econometric specification and country sample, democracy is positively and significantly linked to property rights institutions. Thirdly, the data also reveal that while legal origin does significantly affect property rights institutions in developing countries, it appears to have no effect in developed countries. Fourthly, my analysis demonstrates that, in contrast to the full sample case, an increase in GDP per capita does not significantly contribute to the improvement in the quality of property rights institutions in Africa.     

Selecting the portfolio investment strategy under political structure change in United States

This paper investigated whether stock market returns and volatilities were induced by change of long-term political structure. The empirical study finds that the political change is a crucial variable to DJIA and S&P 500 stock returns, but is insignificant to volatilities. But after the 1987 Crash, the political change has a positive effect on DJIA stock returns, and reduced the risk of DJIA and S&P 500. When political structure change, significant economic policies must submit to political realities and those proposed by previous governments often do not get implemented, resulting in market confusion. But following the increasing the consummation of market structure during post-1987 crash, hence, the political change effect increased DJIA stock returns, and reduced the risk of DJIA and S&P 500, and therefore the investors might be able to make a profit when they took active portfolio positions of DJIA.     

Corruption in dictatorships

In this paper, we consider a simple model capable of explaining why some dictatorships choose to extract rents via seemingly inefficient institutions. In particular, this paper focuses on institutions associated with high levels of corruption and examines the conditions under which such institutions could serve the interests of a dictatorship. Developing such a model requires that we pose alternative institutions that dictators can choose to extract rents. Using this framework, this paper builds a model providing a theoretical basis for some stylized facts about the observed crosscountry variation in corruption levels. Specifically, the model motivates a rationale for the finding that higher levels of corruption are observed in countries characterized as having more heterogeneous populations, longer expected dictator tenure, and more severe punishment norms. The model is then estimated using international country level data.     

Convergence on the Market?

The economics of public choice indicates that in political systems with two main parties their policies tend to converge. Professor Josef Molsberger, of the University of Tübingen, reviews the convergence between the German Christian and Social Democrats and reflects on the prospects for convergence in the UK.