Earnings Management in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy

We study the impact of earnings management prior to bankruptcy filing on the passage of firms through Chapter 11. Using data on public US firms, we construct three measures of earnings management: a real activities manipulation measure (abnormal operating cash flows) and two accounting manipulation measures (discretionary accruals and abnormal working capital accruals). We find that, controlling for the impact of factors known to influence earnings management and firm survival in bankruptcy, earnings management prior to bankruptcy significantly reduces the likelihood of Chapter 11 plan confirmation and emergence from Chapter 11. The results are driven primarily by extreme values of earnings management, characterized by one or two standard deviations above or below the mean. The findings are consistent with creditors reacting positively to unduly conservative earnings reports and negatively to overly optimistic earnings reports. We also find that the presence of a Big 4 auditor is associated with a higher incidence of confirmation and switching to a Big 4 auditor before filing increases the incidence of emergence.     

The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation versus Chapter 11 Reorganization

Our paper explores a comprehensive sample of small and large corporate bankruptcies in Arizona and New York from 1995 to 2001. Bankruptcy costs are very heterogeneous and sensitive to the measurement method used. We find that Chapter 7 liquidations appear to be no faster or cheaper (in terms of direct expense) than Chapter 11 reorganizations. However, Chapter 11 seems to preserve assets better, thereby allowing creditors to recover relatively more. Our paper also provides a large number of further empirical regularities.     

The Effect of Bankruptcy Protection on Investment: Chapter 11 as a Screening Device

Asymmetric information and conflicts of interest between equity and debt holders can force a distressed but efficient firm to liquidate and may enable a distressed inefficient firm to continue. In the extreme, if it is costless for an inefficient firm to mimic an efficient firm in a debt restructuring, efficient and inefficient firms are equally likely to continue or liquidate. This article shows that Chapter 11 procedures impose costs on inefficient firms that would otherwise mimic efficient firms. This separation induces voluntary filing for bankruptcy by inefficient firms and consequently enables efficient firms to continue when they would otherwise be liquidated.     

The Economic Impact of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy versus Out‐of‐Court Restructuring

Companies in financial distress have usually been able to choose between working out an agreement with their creditors (“private restructuring”) or entering into more expensive and lengthier formal Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. But 2015 rulings in two cases by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York may force distressed firms to enter Chapter 11 rather than seek negotiated out‐of‐court settlements. Using a large sample of U.S. companies that experienced financial difficulty during the period 2006–2014, the authors found that the companies that filed for bankruptcy and went through Chapter 11 proceedings experienced significantly more job losses and reductions of economic output than companies achieving out‐of‐court restructurings, both overall and on a per‐case basis. The authors' estimates of the overall losses in output associated with Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases ranged as high as 2.3% of 2014 GDP, as compared to at most 0.3% of GDP in the case of out‐of‐court negotiations. At the same time, the authors estimate that as many as 2.2 million job losses were attributable to cases involving bankruptcies while the out‐of‐court cases were associated with the loss of at most about 300,000 jobs. But, as the authors concede, these findings are exaggerated by a clear self‐selection bias—one that stems from the well‐documented tendency of more fundamentally profitable, and hence more solvent, companies to choose private restructuring over bankruptcy. Despite this limitation, the study provides a useful point of departure for future studies that aim to quantify the costs to the U.S. economy of limiting or removing the option of companies with valuable operations but the “wrong” capital structures to work out their financial difficulties outside of the bankruptcy court.     

Reporting Discretion and the Choice of Fresh Start Values in Companies Emerging from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy

Using a sample of seventy-two firms that adopted fresh start reporting upon their emergence from Chapter 11 bankruptcy, I test whether management estimates of fresh start equity values are misstated and whether such misstatements are related to characteristics of individual firms' bankruptcy process. I predict that the reported fresh start value reflects a tension between managerial incentives to promote the acceptance of the plan of reorganization, and incentives to enhance future reported performance. I test whether the tendency to overstate the fresh start equity value is increasing in factors affecting the acceptance of the reorganization plan (i.e., bankruptcy claimants' relative bargaining power) and decreasing in factors affecting postbankruptcy reported performance (i.e., the probability of future losses). I find that, relative to the market value of equity immediately after emergence from Chapter 11, the fresh start equity value is, on average, understated by about 4%. The difference between the fresh start equity value and market value also exhibits significant cross-sectional variation (an average absolute error of 11%). Consistent with my first prediction, the misstatement is increasing in the relative bargaining power of junior claimants. In contrast to my second prediction, the misstatement is also increasing in the likelihood of future reported losses. This result suggests that firms that are more likely to experience postbankruptcy financial distress are more concerned with obtaining acceptance for their plan than with the effects of the fresh start equity value on postbankruptcy performance. Finally, I document that the misstatement in the fresh start equity value is negatively related to whether firms have undergone prepackaged bankruptcies, and positively related to replacement of a prebankruptcy CEO.     

The Impact of Receiving Debtor-in-Possession Financing on the Probability of Successful Emergence and Time Spent Under Chapter 11 Bankruptcy

The ability to obtain financing is a critical element in attempting to successfully reorganise a firm which has declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing has become an increasingly popular method in recent years. This paper examines whether receiving DIP financing is related to successful reorganisations and a shortened duration under Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. This study finds that there is an increase in realised returns to equity at the announcement of DIP loan agreements which is positive and statistically significant. It is also found that DIP-financed firms have a reduced probability of liquidation, and shorter time spent under bankruptcy proceedings.     

Is Chapter 11 costly?

We examine a sample of 459 firms filing for Chapter 11 during the period 1991–1998 and find that our sample firms experience significant improvements in their operating performance during Chapter 11. Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that Chapter 11, if anything, provides net benefits to bankrupt firms. In the cross section, firms with higher debt ratios experience greater improvements in operating performance, and the complexity of the renegotiation process negatively affects the improvement. We find no relationship between Chapter 11 outcome and changes in risk-adjusted firm value in Chapter 11.     

Hedge Funds and Chapter 11

This paper studies the presence of hedge funds in the Chapter 11 process and their effects on bankruptcy outcomes. Hedge funds strategically choose positions in the capital structure where their actions could have a bigger impact on value. Their presence, especially as unsecured creditors, helps balance power between the debtor and secured creditors. Their effect on the debtor manifests in higher probabilities of the latter's loss of exclusive rights to file reorganization plans, CEO turnover, and adoptions of key employee retention plan, while their effect on secured creditors manifests in higher probabilities of emergence and payoffs to junior claims.     

Surviving Chapter 11 Bankruptcies: Duration and Payoff?

Three of the authors previously developed a model to predict the duration of Chapter 11 bankruptcy and the payoff to shareholders ( Partington et al ., 2001 ). This work augments that study using a much larger sample to re-estimate the model and assess its stability. It also provides an opportunity for out-of-sample testing of predictive accuracy. The resulting models are based on Cox's proportional hazards model and the current article points to the need to test two important assumptions underlying the model. First, that the hazards are proportional and, second, that censoring is independent of the event studied. Using the extended data set, all the previously significant accounting variables drop out of the model and only two covariates of the original model remain significant. These are the market wide credit spread and the market capitalization of the firm, both measured immediately prior to the firm's entry to Chapter 11. Receiver operating characteristic curves are then used to assess the predictive accuracy of the original and extended models. The results show that Lachenbruch tests can provide a misleading indication of predictive ability out of sample. Using the Lachenbruch method of in-sample testing, both models show predictive power, but in a true out-of-sample test they fail dismally. The lessons of this work are relevant to better predicting the gains and losses likely to accrue to shareholders of companies in Chapter 11 bankruptcy and in similar administrative arrangements in other jurisdictions.     

The Equity Performance of Firms Emerging from Bankruptcy

This study assesses the stock return performance of 131 firms emerging from Chapter 11. Using differing estimates of expected returns, we consistently find evidence of large, positive excess returns in 200 days of returns following emergence. We also examine the reaction of our sample firms' equity returns to their earnings announcements after emergence from Chapter 11. The positive and significant reactions suggest that our results are driven by the market's expectational errors, not mismeasurement of risk. The results provide an interesting contrast, but not a contradiction, to previous work that has documented poor operating performance for firms emerging from Chapter 11.     

Optimal Debt and Equity Values in the Presence of Chapter 7 and Chapter 11

Explicit presence of reorganization in addition to liquidation leads to conflicts of interest between borrowers and lenders. In the first–best outcome, reorganization adds value to both parties via higher debt capacity, lower credit spreads, and improved overall firm value. If control of the ex ante reorganization timing and the ex post decision to liquidate is given to borrowers, most of the benefits are appropriated by borrowers ex post. Lenders can restore the first–best outcome by seizing this control or by the ex post transfer of control rights. Reorganization is more likely and liquidation is less likely relative to the benchmark case with liquidation only.     

Investing in Chapter 11 stocks: Trading,value, and performance

We address questions about Chapter 11 stocks regarding their trading environment, fundamental value, and performance. First, there exists active trading for Chapter 11 stocks throughout the bankruptcy process. Second, equity value after filing is positively related to asset value, asset volatility, risk-free rate, and expected duration and is negatively related to liabilities. Furthermore, the return correlation between bankrupt stocks and their matching samples exhibits non-linearity similar to out-of-money call options. Third, investing in Chapter 11 stocks incurs large losses. Consistent with heterogeneous beliefs and limits to arbitrage, stocks with higher levels of information uncertainty and more binding short-sale constraints experience more negative returns.     

Forecasting Corporate Bankruptcy: Optimizing the Performance of the Mixed Logit Model

In recent studies, Jones and Hensher (2004 , 2005) provide an illustration of the usefulness of advanced probability modelling in the prediction of corporate bankruptcies, insolvencies and takeovers. Mixed logit (or random parameter logit) is the most general of these models and appears to have the greatest promise in terms of underlying behavioural realism, desirable econometric properties and overall predictive performance. It suggests a number of empirical considerations relevant to harnessing the maximum potential from this new model (as well as avoiding some of the more obvious pitfalls associated with its use). Using a three-state failure model, the unconditional triangular distribution for random parameters offers the best population-level predictive performance on a hold-out sample. Further, the optimal performance for a mixed logit model arises when a weighted exogenous sample maximum likelihood (WESML) technique is applied in model estimation. Finally, we suggest an approach for testing the stability of mixed logit models by re-estimating a selected model using varying numbers of Halton intelligent draws. Our results have broad application to users seeking to apply more accurate and reliable forecasting methodologies to explain and predict sources of firm financial distress better.     

Financial Restructuring in Fresh‐Start Chapter 11 Reorganizations

We find that firms substantially reduce their debt burden in “fresh‐start” Chapter 11 reorganizations, yet they emerge with higher debt ratios than what is typical in their respective industries. While cross‐sectional regressions reveal that post‐reorganization debt ratios are more in line with the predictions of the static trade‐off theory, they also reveal that pre‐reorganization debt ratios affect post‐reorganization debt ratios. Collectively, these results suggest that impediments in Chapter 11 prevent firms from completely resetting their capital structures. We also find that firms that reported positive operating income leading up to Chapter 11 emerge faster, suggesting that it is quicker to remedy strictly financial distress than economic distress.     

Bad news does not always travel fast: evidence from Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings

This paper examines the stock price performances of 275 non‐financial, non‐utility U.S. industrial firms that continue trading on the main exchanges after filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy between 1 October 1979 and 17 October 2005. This paper identifies a negative and statistically significant post‐bankruptcy drift that lasts for at least 6 months. This finding adds to the literature showing that the market is unable to process bad public news events in a timely manner. Further analysis suggests that the theoretical model proposed by Hong and Stein (1999) can be used to help explain this market‐pricing anomaly.     

Debtor-in-possession financing and the resolution of uncertainty in Chapter 11 reorganizations

This paper investigates the use of debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing by firms reorganizing under Chapter 11. A model is developed in which there is asymmetric information between the creditors of a distressed firm and its management. In this context, it is demonstrated that reliance on DIP financing resolves informational asymmetries regarding the true economic value of distressed firms. The model's conclusions are empirically supported in the paper and by results of extant research. The signaling role of DIP financing is evidenced both by the positive stock price reaction to DIP announcements and the fact that firms employing DIP financing have more successful reorganizations.     

Conflicting norms: Impact of the Model Law on Chapter 11's Global Restructuring Role

The Model Law's emphasis on the debtor's center of main interest (COMI) as the proper jurisdiction for the main insolvency proceeding is at odds with the traditional United States approach of applying Chapter 11 to restructure foreign entities with no significant US connection. This paper explores whether adoption of the Model Law has made Chapter 11 less available for debtors with a foreign COMI. The Model Law has had no direct impact on the US courts approach to foreign‐entity Chapter 11 cases. However, shortly after the Model Law's adoption, several reported US decisions added the pendency of a foreign insolvency proceeding as a factor supporting discretionary abstention or dismissal of foreign Chapter 11 cases. While those decisions do not refer to the Model Law, it is possible that the Model Law's COMI‐centric approach influenced this new trend.