Large Scale Marine Protected Areas for Biodiversity Conservation Along a Linear Gradient: Cooperation, Strategic Behavior or Conservation Autarky?

In this paper we investigate effects of overlap in species between ecosystems along a linear gradient on the location of marine protected areas (MPAs) under full cooperation, strategic behavior and conservation autarky. Compared to the full cooperation outcome, both strategic behavior and conservation autarky lead to under-investment in biodiversity protection. Under strategic behavior, however, we observe the additional problem of ??location leakage?? i.e. countries invest less in species protected by others. Conservation autarky eliminates location leakage; in ecosystems with partly overlapping species compositions at country borders it even induces MPAs that are too large from a global perspective. We also find that, in our setting of a linear gradient without migrating species, countries focus their conservation efforts on species unique to their own country and that these species are relatively well protected compared to common species.     

International Economies of Scale and the Gains from Trade

In this paper, we present a two-country trade model with external economies of scale that emerge on an international level but are partially localized in each country. First, we show that the larger country exports the good produced in an industry with external economies of scale in the trading equilibrium. Second, we investigate the welfare effects of trade for the following two cases: (I) the case where external economies are completely localized in autarky; (II) the case where external economies are internationally effective in autarky. In case (II), it is shown that trade can be welfare-decreasing for both countries.     

Endogenous Timing in Strategic Environmental Policymaking

In this paper, we endogenize the timing of policymaking in a simple two-country model of strategic environmental policy. We consider a timing game in which two policymakers non-cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves before setting emission tax rates. We show that whether the policymakers implement emission tax policies simultaneously or sequentially crucially depends on the magnitude of environmental damages. When the damages are insignificant, the tax rates are strategic substitutes, and the simultaneous-move policymaking emerges in equilibrium. In contrast, when the damages are significant, the tax rates are strategic complements, and sequential-move policymaking emerges. We also extend the model by allowing for differences in the vulnerability to environmental damages between countries. When the differences are large, the unique equilibrium of the game is the situation where the less vulnerable country acts as a leader. In the case where multiple equilibrium emerges, the risk-dominant equilibrium is also that where the less vulnerable country leads.     

A Note on Production Efficiency in Oligopolistic Trade Models

In a two‐country segmented markets model with homogeneous product Cournot oligopoly we show that production efficiency improves in the free‐trade regime compared to autarky, if autarky price in each country is lower than both the post‐trade prices—which holds, for example, when preferences are identical. The result holds irrespective of the demand structure, number, and cost distribution of firms in the two countries. The improvement in production efficiency lowers average cost of production which, for some parameterizations, gives rise to higher aggregate profits for all countries in the free‐trade regime (compared to autarky). Though free trade (zero tariffs) improves production efficiency from autarky (prohibitive tariffs), freer trade is not always associated with greater production efficiency.     

Tax Competition, Capital Mobility, and Public Good Provision Within a Trading Block

The authors examine a two–country general–equilibrium model of a two–country trading block where governments through tax policies attract mobile capital and provide an imported public consumption good. Within this framework the authors examine, among other things, how preferences over the public good and the size (population) of a country affect the Nash or cooperative equilibrium values of income tax rates in the two countries. The analysis identifies sufficient conditions under which (i) the Nash/cooperative equilibrium income tax rates are strategic substitutes or complements, and (ii) the Nash equilibrium income tax rates may be greater than the cooperative rates.     

Common Ground Between Free‐Traders and Environmentalists

We use a North–South model with property right differences and resource dynamics to study the effects of trade on resource use and welfare. Autarky is likely to Pareto‐dominate free trade in the long run when the environment is quite fragile, and the result is reversed when the environment is quite resilient. Trade may cause an environmentally poor country to “drag down” its richer trading partner, when they degrade their stocks which would be preserved under autarky. It may enable the environmentally richer country to “pull up” its partner, when they preserve their stocks which would be degraded under autarky.     

International trade and consumption network externalities

This paper studies the effects of trade liberalization in the presence of consumption network externalities. The framework is applicable to the choice of network products and sheds light on the debate on globalization and culture. In an extended Ricardian model of international trade the paper shows that: (i) trade is not Pareto inferior to autarky if the free trade equilibrium is unique; (ii) trade is not Pareto superior to autarky if both countries are diverse (network competition) under free trade, but can be if each country is homogenous (network monopoly); (iii) and when multiple free trade equilibria exist everybody in a country can lose from free trade if that country is homogenous under autarky. Consumers of imported network goods tend to gain, while consumers of exported network goods tend to lose from trade liberalization.     

Environmental Taxes and First-Mover Advantages

This paper studies whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in environmental policies. To analyze this question I assume transboundary pollution and two countries that have to decide whether to set environmental taxes sequentially or simultaneously. When taxes are set sequentially an effect, denoted as the sequential setting effect, arises that raises the equilibrium taxes. I show that whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in taxes depends on the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners. When this overspill is low enough, taxes are strategic complements and both the leader and the follower obtain greater welfare than under a simultaneous tax setting. However, the leader country obtains greater welfare than the follower. In this case, governments set taxes sequentially. When the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners is high enough, taxes are strategic substitutes and governments set taxes simultaneously. In this case, each government wants to avoid becoming the follower in taxes.     

Comparative Advantage With and Without Gains from Trade

In 1980, Deardorff, and Dixit and Norman, generalized the law of comparative advantage to show that the value of net imports at autarky prices (or "DDN index") is nonnegative, so that net imports are correlated with autarky prices. The DDN index can be decomposed into the sum of (i) the equivalent variation of gains from trade, and (ii) the difference in GNP at autarky prices between autarky and trade. Several examples are given of classical and neoclassical economies where (i) or (ii) can be zero. Hence gains from trade are sufficient but not necessary for the existence of comparative advantage.     

Endogenous enclosure in North-South trade

Abstract .  We show that the second-best case against the optimality of free trade remains valid in the face of a well-targeted, but costly, policy response. Trade between a North, where property rights can be enforced at relatively low cost, and an otherwise identical South, yields trade patterns and welfare results nearly identical to those previously shown to arise if North and South differ exogenously in the extent of control over resources. Both nations respond optimally to world prices, and the opening of trade leads to the development of property rights in the South. Nonetheless, for a set of world prices bounded by the South's autarky price, the South is better off under autarky and is made worse off by each increase in its export price.     

Predator–prey dynamics in general equilibrium and the role of trade

We examine the implications of trade in an economy with two interrelated natural resources, focusing on the case of a simple predator–prey relationship. We derive a three-sector general equilibrium model where production functions are linked via the ecological dynamics of the natural system. Under autarky, this economy exhibits a steady-state equilibrium that overexploits the prey stock, reducing the linked predator population and overall welfare in the absence of harvesting controls. When two economies engage in trade, differences in the dynamics of the two resource systems can become the basis for comparative advantage. In this case, the predator–prey relationship leads to a source of comparative advantage in harvesting prey for a country with a lower autarky steady-state proportion of predators to prey. This feature has not been noticed in the literature and leads to a counterintuitive implication: free trade can help conserve predator and prey stocks in the country with the higher autarkic steady-state proportion of predators to prey. To illustrate the relevance of our analytic findings, we present the stylized empirical example of the effect of Chinook salmon imports on killer whale populations.     

Growth, Trade, and Government Policies of a Small Open Economy

Utilizing a linear endogenous growth model, the paper provides an economic rationale for two empirical findings: the positive correlation between export growth and income growth, and the association of rapid structural changes with fast income growth. In the benchmark case, the small open economy converges eventually to a balanced growth path along which exports and total output grow at the same constant rate as consumption. Government policies affect the pattern of specialization and trade since they change the autarky or foreign relative price. Only taxation on the capital goods sector can affect asymptotic growth rates.     

Cross-subsidization and cost misallocation by regulated monopolists

While cross-subsidization is understood theoretically as involving the sustainability of a cost allocation scheme, it is invoked in regulatory policy contexts, such as the divestiture of AT&T, where costs of serving unregulated markets may be borne by ratepayers of regulated monopolies. We analyze two cross-subsidization tactics—cost misallocation and distorted technological choice — under a spectrum of regulatory cost allocation policies. These tactics lead to higher prices in regulated markets and inefficient production in unregulated markets. Welfare effects are discussed; we conclude with observations on strategic behavior and regulatory policy.     

Coping with a decline in world energy prices: Macroeconomic and income distribution effects in Thailand

This paper analyzes the effects of a short-run decline in world oil prices in Thailand. The outcomes of two policy responses are explored. What happens if — under a liberal policy - domestic prices follow world prices down in the short run and back up in the medium run? And what happens if — under a moderate policy - domestic prices are kept pretty much the same in both the short and medium runs? The SIAM2 Model tracked the effect of these policies on economic growth, on the resource balance, and on employment and the distribution of income. Over a 10-year horizon, growth is about the same under the two policies, though with differences for some periods and sectors. Nor is there much difference between the two policies in their effect on employment and income distribution — though the formal and informal sectors perform differently in different subperiods. The most important difference is in the resource balance. Under the liberal policy, the current account balance changes little, but it improves rapidly under the moderate policy.     

Pollution in strategic multilateral exchange: Taxing emissions or trading on permit markets?

We introduce polluting emissions in a sequential noncooperative oligopoly model of bilateral exchange. In one sector, a leader and a follower use polluting technologies which create negative externalities on the payoffs of strategic traders who belong to the other sector. By modeling emissions as a negative externality, we show that the leader pollutes more (less) than the follower when strategies are substitutes (complements). Then, we consider the implementation of public policies to control the levels of emissions, namely, two taxation mechanisms and a permit market. We study the effects of these public policies. Moreover, we determine the conditions under which these public policies can implement a Pareto-improving allocation.     

Codetermination,Price Competition and the Network Industry

This research develops a tractable two‐stage non‐cooperative game with complete information describing the behaviour of price‐setting firms that must choose to be profit maximisers or bargainers under codetermination in a network industry with horizontal product differentiation. The existing theoretical literature has already shown that codetermination might arise as the endogenous market outcome in a strategic competitive quantity‐setting duopoly. In sharp contrast with this result, the present article shows that codetermination does never emerge as a Nash equilibrium in a price‐setting non‐network duopoly. Then, it aims at highlighting the role of network externalities in determining changes of paradigm of the game and letting codetermination become a sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium when prices are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. This equilibrium may be Pareto efficient. Results allow distinguishing between mandatory codetermination and voluntary codetermination. The article also proposes a model of endogenous codetermination according to which every firm may choose to bargain with its own corresponding union bargaining unit only whether the firm's bargaining strength is exactly the profit‐maximising one. The equilibrium outcomes emerging in this case range from a uniform Nash equilibrium, in which both firms are codetermined, to mixed Nash equilibria, in which only one of them chooses to be codetermined. These results are ‘network depending’ and do not hold in a non‐network duopoly.     

Interannual Climate Variation, Climate Prediction, and Agricultural Trade: the Costs of Surprise versus Variability

Agriculture remains sensitive to variation in rainfall and temperature. Fortunately, our ability to predict the lower frequency variation in the earth's atmosphere is increasing rapidly. While information cannot affect the underlying source of variability, it allows unexpected shocks to be anticipated and acted upon. This paper develops and analyzes an intertemporal Ricardian trade model with Bayesian beliefs. Results in this paper show that improved climate prediction reduces expected prices, but increases price variability. In addition, trade is crucial to realizing the potential benefits of climate prediction. The value of climate prediction is highest with both storage and trade, and falls by over 300% when a country is in autarky.     

Taxes on capital in a specific factor model with international capital mobility

The efficiency and distributional effects of sundry capital taxes are analyzed in a simple two-sector specific factor model where capital is mobile both between the two sectors and between the home country and the rest of the world. Two cases are discussed: the small country case where factor and commodity prices are parametric; and the large country case. The optimal tax on capital export is illustrated when commodity prices are parametric. A simple approach to the case when both factor and commodity prices are variable is demonstrated.     

Direct Investment Liberalization,Commodity Trade and Income Distribution: What Can the WTO do?

This paper analyzes a model of two-way movement of physical capital, and examines the effects of direct investment liberalization on resource allocation, income distribution and commodity trade. If either country or both countries liberalizes investment under exogenously given commodity prices, some factor owners in a country will gain but some others will lose. If capital movement affects commodity prices, all factor owners in a country may be better off after multilateral investment liberalization. In these cases, it will be much easier for the home country to sign an agreement liberalizing investment flows.     

Environmental regulation and love for variety

Using a model of monopolistic competition, we examine the relationship between intra‐industry trade and environmental regulation. The decisions on emission standards set by each country show strong strategic interactions. In closed economies regulations act as strategic substitutes, and in equilibrium there is under‐regulation relative to the cooperative outcome. Trade liberalization may lead to stricter or laxer environmental standards, depending on the consumers’ preference for product variety. In addition, we show that with open trade environmental regulations may act as strategic complements and countries may set environmental standards that are as strict (or stricter) than those in the cooperative outcome.