The causes of misapplied capacity related manufacturing costs and corresponding reporting implications: A conceptual perspective

To meet external financial reporting requirements, fixed (i.e., capacity related) manufacturing overhead costs are typically applied to inventory via the use of a predetermined overhead application rate. However, textbooks do not consider all appropriate conceptual issues regarding the setting of the overhead application rate nor how these issues influence the causes of misapplied capacity costs (under/over-applied fixed manufacturing overhead) typically reported as the Production Volume Variance. Specifically, discussion is lacking related to those misapplied capacity costs potentially caused variously by the presence of capacity that is not explicitly planned to be used, capacity that is currently unused but in the longer-term is planned to be used (due to anticipated growth), and capacity that is currently unused but in the shorter term is planned to be used due to seasonality. Determining if any of these three causes are contributing to misapplied capacity costs is critical, as there are important managerial accounting and financial accounting reporting implications associated with each. And while the relevant literature to be discussed offers support for these causal constructs, this paper extends this literature by developing a parsimonious and conceptually-based approach to permit a simultaneous partitioning of misapplied capacity costs into these causal categories. Further, this paper will identify the important conceptual differences among these three causes, how these differences warrant unique approaches for the managerial and financial reporting of information related to capacity costs and utilization, and needed changes to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles to facilitate more appropriate financial reporting in this area.     

Optimal Transfer Pricing Method and Fixed Cost Allocation

Prior empirical research on transfer pricing only reported what firms do but seldom explained why. This study moves the research forward by introducing hypothesis testing.
Atkinson (1987) shows that pricing transfers at variable cost when capacity is in excess. as prescribed by economic theory. would induce the buying unit to overstate expected demand at the capacity planning stage and cause a waste of resources. To test whether the strategic issue affects transfer pricing decisions, the study compares pricing methods for long- term transfer situations. which were provided for at the capacity planning stage, and ad hoc transfers.
As well. while the two-step method of charging full cost -charging variable cost for each unit transferred and separately charging a flat fee each period for capacity on reserve -has many good control qualities, it remained just an academic curiosity: there was no evidence of its wide use among firms. This study finds that the two-step method is as widely in use as the one-step method -charging variable cost plus unit fixed costs for each unit transferred.     

Disclosure of provisions for decommissioning costs in annual reports of oil and gas companies: A content analysis and stakeholder views

This study examines the extent of compliance with accounting disclosure requirements relating to provisions for decommissioning costs by oil and gas companies. We also investigate the views of stakeholders on the reporting practices of these companies. Using a content analysis approach, our findings reveal that compliance is substantially high, but companies tend to take a tick-box approach providing only minimum disclosure requirements. In semi-structured interviews, we find that disclosure decisions were driven by concerns about the credibility of information due to complexities in the accounting processes, regulatory requirements, lack of information demand and proprietary costs. These findings have policy implications.     

An investigation of how the informal communication of firm preferences influences managerial honesty

This study investigates the effectiveness of informal firm communication at motivating managerial honesty. Specifically, it focuses on the effectiveness of informal cost targets, which communicate firms’ specific cost preferences to managers without tying managers’ compensation to reporting costs that meet those targets. I develop predictions about how the tightness of an informal cost target influences the effect that a cost target has on managers’ reporting honesty. Using an experimental setting, I examine three levels of target tightness—loose, moderate, and tight—within a uniformly distributed cost range and where participants’ financial incentives are to ignore the cost target and fully misreport their cost information. I find that both moderate and loose cost targets, on average, increase honesty relative to when the firm does not communicate a specific target or it communicates a tight target. Tight targets have no significant effect, positive or negative, on honesty. Whereas prior research focuses only on the potential benefits of firms communicating their general preferences, my study provides important insights regarding the potential incremental effectiveness of communicating specific preferences.     

Timing of Sale,Pricing, and Cost Information: Evidence from the Airline Industry*

This study examines the association between when an airline sells its passenger seats and the pricing method (marginal cost or full cost) it employs. Prior literature suggests that when firms are able to change prices during the selling period, the optimality of full cost pricing or marginal cost pricing depends on when demand information is revealed during the period between capacity commitment decisions and time of sale. Full cost‐based pricing is appropriate in determining capacity commitment and prices simultaneously, while marginal cost provides more relevant information for pricing when capacity has been committed. Using the price and cost data from a sample of four U.S. domestic airlines, we find that full cost explains price variations of first‐day sales robustly. The adjusted R² of the marginal cost pricing model is larger in the sample of sales two days prior to departure than in the sample of first‐day sales. In the analysis of the sample of sales two days prior to departure, we find that, based on the adjusted R² of the full cost pricing and marginal cost pricing models, the explanatory power of marginal cost pricing is relatively weaker than full cost pricing. Our results document the use of different cost information along the dynamic change of price and provide implications in understanding the role of cost information in setting prices.     

经济政策不确定性如何影响企业出口决策？——基于出口频率的视角

出口频率作为出口决策的重要一环,是企业出口扩张的新边际,也是出口变化的“晴雨表”。本文在随机存货模型的基础上,考察了经济政策不确定性对企业出口频率的影响及其传导渠道,并采用2000-2006年工业企业数据库与海关数据库的匹配数据进行实证检验,结果发现:目的国经济政策不确定性增加会显著降低企业出口频率,且这一影响存在部分惯性效应;经济政策不确定性通过贸易成本、存货成本和市场需求波动共同影响企业出口频率的中介效应十分显著,其中贸易成本是最重要的传导渠道,占比达到19%以上;如果进一步考虑目的国、产品和企业异质性,会发现出口目的国经济发展水平较高、出口产品为中间品和消费品的企业,其出口频率受经济政策不确定性的影响较小。因此,政府和企业应高度关注出口频率的变化趋势,合理应对经济政策不确定性对出口决策的外部冲击。     

Bank runs and investment decisions revisited

We examine how the possibility of a bank run affects the investment decisions made by a competitive bank. Cooper and Ross [1998. Bank runs: liquidity costs and investment distortions. Journal of Monetary Economics 41, 27-38] have shown that when the probability of a run is small, the bank will offer a contract that admits a bank-run equilibrium. We show that, in this case, the bank will chose to hold an amount of liquid reserves exactly equal to what withdrawal demand will be if a run does not occur; precautionary or “excess” liquidity will not be held. This result allows us to show that when the cost of liquidating investment early is high, an increase in the probability of a run will lead the bank to invest less. However, when liquidation costs are moderate, the level of investment is increasing in the probability of a run.     

Litigation environment and auditors’ decisions to accept clients’ aggressive reporting

This study contributes to accounting and auditing literature by addressing two empirical questions: (1) whether litigation environment affects auditors’ decisions to accept clients’ aggressive reporting and (2) whether litigation environment, client business risk, and client retention pressure interact and jointly affect auditors’ decisions to go along with clients’ preferred accounting choices. Fifty-nine (59) US and sixty-one (61) Hong Kong auditors employed by the Big-4 accounting firms participated in this study. The result shows that litigation environment has a significant effect on auditors’ decisions. Auditors who practice in more litigious environments tend to be less willing to go along with clients’ aggressive reporting than those who practice in less litigious environments. This study also confirms that there is a significant interactive effect between litigation environment, client business risk, and client retention pressure on auditors’ decisions to accept clients’ aggressive reporting choices. Implications of the empirical findings for policymakers, standard-setting organizations, and international accounting firms, as well as directions for future studies, are discussed.     

DOES FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY REDUCE INVESTMENT DISTORTIONS?

The average U.S. firm has less leverage than one would expect based on the trade‐off between tax shields and bankruptcy costs. We focus on firms’ financial flexibility and examine whether firms preserve debt capacity to reduce investment distortions in the future. We find that firms with high unused debt capacity invest more in future years than do firms with low unused debt capacity. Furthermore, firms that are reluctant to borrow in unconstrained periods are more likely to issue debt in periods in which access to capital markets is more constrained.     

Effect of internal cost management,information systems integration,and absorptive capacity on inter-organizational cost management in supply chains

Inter-organizational cost management is a strategic cost management approach to managing costs that span organizational boundaries in supply chains. Drawing on the resource-based view of the firm, we develop a model to predict which inter-related resources might enable companies to manage inter-organizational costs. We test this model using a survey of managerial accountants whose organizations are part of a supply chain. Using structural equation modeling, we conclude that the resources of internal electronic integration, external electronic integration, internal cost management, and absorptive capacity play significant direct and indirect roles in the development of an inter-organizational cost management (IOCM) resource. We find that these resources are inter-related and together are useful in enabling companies to ultimately benefit from managing inter-organizational costs. We find in particular the importance of relational resources associated with absorptive capacity in the development of an IOCM resource. Our research contributes to theory and practice by explaining how specific resources can be combined in allowing companies to better manage inter-organizational costs.     

The value of distorting overhead cost allocations in an agency setting

This paper shows a strict demand for suitably chosen inaccurate overhead cost allocations in an agency model in which a profit centre manager is in charge of production cost containment and pricing decisions. Given exogenous restrictions on the compensation scheme, the use of distorted overhead costs by transforming the performance measure into an ‘accounting profit’, helps calibrate incentives for the manager. The paper derives conditions for under- or overallocation of overhead costs to products. Generally, underallocation is preferable if the riskiness of quantity is strongly positively related with price and unit cost of a product, or if the product is relatively more price-sensitive.     

What drives foreign expansion of the top 100 multinational banks? The role of the credit reporting system

This study explores how information costs, proxied by characteristics of credit reporting systems, affect the foreign expansion of the top 100 multinational banks. We find that banks prefer to expand operations in countries where private credit bureaus exist or where the credit reporting system is of better quality. This preference is particularly strong for banks’ branch decisions. Furthermore, banks prefer subsidiary entry only in countries where private credit bureaus exist with better credit information quality. Overall, our results indicate that banks are attracted to countries where the credit reporting system helps reduce banks’ information costs.     

The effect of cognitive style and sponsorship bias on the treatment of opportunity costs in resource allocation decisions

The incorporation of opportunity cost is stressed in normative approaches to resource allocation decisions. Empirical evidence has revealed a variety of behaviours. A consequence of inappropriate treatment of opportunity costs is an incorrect assessment of the economic consequences of resource allocation decisions. Improved understanding of why some managers treat opportunity costs inappropriately permits identifying situations where the incorrect economic evaluations will lead to sub-optimal resource allocation and therefore provides a basis for remedial action. This study identifies two conditional factors which potentially influence the way managers respond to opportunity cost information.These factors are managers' cognitive style and whether or not managers sponsor a project (project sponsorship), and it is argued that they influence managers' decisions on opportunity costs in situations in which opportunity cost implications are implicit. In particular, the paper proposes, first, that in the absence of project sponsorship, managers with an “intuitive” style of “taking in data” will tend to incorporate opportunity costs in their economic decisions whereas those wiht a “sensation” style will not. Second, it is suggested that because sponsorship encourages managers to ignore negative economic signals (sponsorship bias) any effects of cognitive style will be moderated in conditions where sponsorship is evident.A laboratory experiment with managers as subjects was used to examine these propositions. The results indicated that intuitive managers tended to incorporate opportunity costs in their decisions whereas sensation individuals appeared to focus more on the directness of the relationship between expenditure and a project to determine the relevance of the cost. Opportunity cost implications tended not to be identified by the sensation group. Evidence was found that sponsorship moderated the influence of cognitive style on decisions to include opportunity costs.     

Optimal level of fraudulent disclosure when litigation is costly

In this article, we show that the effects of a legal system depend on the cost of litigation. For very low levels of legal costs, an equilibrium exists where the manager always fraudulently reports firm quality (i.e., always reports “good news”) and the investors bring suit any time firm earnings are low. For an intermediate range of legal costs, there exists an equilibrium where the frequency of fraudulent reporting is an increasing function of the costs of litigation. In this equilibrium, investors will follow a mixed strategy of bringing suit. With high legal costs, the manager always issues fraudulent disclosures and the investors never bring suit. When legal costs are not high, the threat of lawsuits removes moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The dead-weight loss from lawsuits creates a demand for auditing and may cause the manager to manipulate the amount of retained ownership.     

Corporate Pyramids,Conservatism and Cost of Debt: Evidence From Taiwan

This study investigates the extent to which the span of corporate pyramids (as measured by the number of ownership layers) is associated with higher agency costs of debt, and whether conservatism can moderate the agency cost. Consistent with corporate pyramids generating higher agency costs and information asymmetries between corporate insiders and outside creditors, we find a positive association between the number of investment layers and cost of debt. However, we also find that multi-layered firms mitigate organizational opaqueness through increased financial reporting conservatism, which results in lower cost of debt capital. These findings provide new insights into the relationship between organizational structure and financial reporting quality.     

The role of generally accepted reporting methods in the public sector: An empirical test

This study explores the role of standard or generally accepted accounting and reporting methods in the public sector. It differs from prior studies that address public sector accounting issues in that it considers more directly how the political process influences decisions to report financial information. The primary contention is that adopting standard reporting methods reduces costs to public officials that arise from factors that characterize political markets. Empirical evidence based on data from the state governments is consistent with this contention, but theoretical and methodological problems restrict our ability to ascertain which specific factors are relevant.     

Activity-Based Pricing in a Monopoly

In this article, I study the interaction between cost accounting systems and pricing decisions in a setting where a monopolist sells a base product and related support services to customers whose preference for support services is known only to them. I consider two pricing mechanisms—activity‐based pricing (ABP) and traditional pricing—and two cost‐accounting systems—activity‐based costing (ABC) and traditional costing, for support services. Under traditional pricing, only the base product is priced, whereas support services are provided free because detailed cost‐driver volume information on the consumption of support services by each customer is unavailable. Under ABP, customers pay based on the quantities consumed of both the base product and the support services because detailed cost‐driver volume information is available for each customer. Likewise, under traditional costing for support services the firm makes pricing decisions on cost signals that are noisier than they are under ABC. I compare the equilibrium quantities of the base product and support services sold, the information rent paid to the customers, and the expected profits of the monopolist under all four combinations of cost‐driver volume and cost‐driver rate information. I show that ABP helps reduce control problems, such as moral hazard and adverse selection problems, for the supplier and increases the supplier's ability to engage in price discrimination. I show that firms are more likely to adopt ABP when their customer base is more diverse, their customer support costs are more uncertain, their costing system has lower measurement error, and the variable costs of providing customer support are higher. Firms adopt ABC when their cost‐driver rates for support services under traditional costing are noisier measures of actual costs relative to their cost‐driver rates under ABC and when the actual costs of support services are inherently uncertain. I also show that cost‐driver rate information and cost‐driver volume information for support services are complements. Although the prior literature views ABC and activity‐based management (ABM) as facilitating better decision making, I show that ABC and ABP (a form of ABM) are useful tools for addressing control problems in supply chains.     

Reporting of overhead variances: a cost management perspective

In this paper we argue that if cost management is the primary purpose of a costing system, as opposed to external reporting, then it is often appropriate to report overhead variances as a period cost, rather than prorating these variances to various accounts. Further, we argue that reporting variances as a period cost may be appropriate in some situations even if external reporting considerations underlie the design of the cost system. However, a review of the accounting treatment of overhead variances in major cost/managerial accounting textbooks indicates a clear preference for proration of overhead variances between product costs and period expenses, compared to reporting the entire variance as a period cost (expensing). Textbooks typically argue that proration is theoretically more correct and expensing is only acceptable where the variance is immaterial.     

A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance

A model is presented in which demand deposits backed by fractional currency reserves and public insurance can be beneficial. The model uses Samuelson's pure consumption-loans model. The case for demand deposits, reserves, and deposit insurance rests on costs of illiquidity and incomplete information. The effect of deposit insurance depends upon how, and at what cost, the government meets its insurer's obligation — something which is not specified in practice. It remains possible that demand deposits and deposit insurance are a distortion, and reserve requirements serve only to limit the size of this distortion.