Do banks overstate their Value-at-Risk?

This paper is the first empirical study of banks’ risk management systems based on non-anonymous daily Value-at-Risk (VaR) and profit-and-loss data. Using actual data from the six largest Canadian commercial banks, we uncover evidence that banks exhibit a systematic excess of conservatism in their VaR estimates. The data used in this paper have been extracted from the banks’ annual reports using an innovative Matlab-based data extraction method. Out of the 7354 trading days analyzed in this study, there are only two exceptions, i.e. days when the actual loss exceeds the disclosed VaR, whereas the expected number of exceptions with a 99% VaR is 74. For each sample bank, we extract from historical VaRs a risk-overstatement coefficient, ranging between 19 and 79%. We attribute VaR overstatement to several factors, including extreme cautiousness and underestimation of diversification effects when aggregating VaRs across business lines and/or risk categories. We also discuss the economic and social cost of reporting inflated VaRs.     

Do banks price their informational monopoly?

Theory suggests that banks’ private information lets them hold up borrowers for higher interest rates. Since new information about a firm is revealed at the time of its bond IPO, it follows that banks will be forced to adjust their loan interest rates downwards after firms undertake their bond IPO. We test this hypothesis and find that firms are able to borrow at lower interest rates after their bond IPO. Importantly, firms that get their first credit rating at the time of their bond IPO benefit from larger interest rate savings than those that already had a credit rating. These findings provide support for the hypothesis that banks price their informational monopoly. We also find that it is costly for firms to enter the public bond market.     

Are elite universities losing their competitive edge?

We study the location-specific component of research productivity for economics and finance faculty over the last three decades. We find that there was a positive effect of being affiliated with a top 25 university in the 1970s; this effect weakened in the 1980s and disappeared in the 1990s. The decline in elite university fixed effect is due to the reduced importance of physical access to productive research colleagues, which in turn seems due to innovations in communication technology. One implication is that knowledge-based organizations should find it more difficult to capture rents vis-à-vis workers. We find that faculty salaries increased the most where the estimated spillover dropped the most. Despite the loss in local spillovers, elite universities still enjoy an edge in average productivity because of agglomeration of top researchers in prestigious institutions with high long-term research reputations.     

Do investment banks listen to their own analysts?

To what extent conflicts of interest affect the investment value of sell-side analyst research is an ongoing debate. We approach this issue from a new direction by investigating how asset-management divisions of investment banks use stock recommendations issued by their own analysts. Based on holdings changes around initiations, upgrades, and downgrades from 1993 to 2003, we find that these bank-affiliated investors follow recommendations from sell-side analysts in general, increasing (decreasing) their relative holdings following positive (negative) recommendations. More importantly, these investors respond more strongly to recommendations issued by their own analysts than to those issued by analysts affiliated with other banks, especially for recommendations on small and low-analyst-coverage firms. Thus, we find that investment banks “eat their own cooking,” showing that these presumably sophisticated institutional investors view sell-side recommendations as having investment value, particularly when the recommendations come from their own analysts.     

Do venture capitalists give founders their walking papers?

We investigate the impact of venture capitalists on the turnover of executives within a sample of nearly 46,500 German high-tech start-up companies founded between 1995 and 2004. We confirm that the presence of VCs increases the chances that the company will change the structure of its initial executive team. For the purposes of our analysis, we distinguish between different types of changes (somebody is replaced, the team is enlarged, the team shrinks). Additionally, we take a closer look at the subsample of venture-backed companies. We find that a small distance between the VCs and the companies they finance, as well as a larger total stake in the company owned by the VCs, goes hand-in-hand with an increased probability of changes in the initial executive teams.     

Does board structure in banks really affect their performance?

We study whether board structure (board size, independence and gender diversity) in banks relates to performance. Using a broad panel of large US bank holding companies over the period 1997–2011, we find that both board size and independent directors decrease bank performance. Although gender diversity improves bank performance in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period (1997–2002), the positive effect of gender diminishes in both the post-SOX (2003–2006) and the crisis periods (2007–2011). Finally, we show that board structure is particularly relevant for banks with low market power, if they are immune to the threat of external takeover and/or they are small. Our two-step system generalised method of moments estimation accounts for endogeneity concerns (simultaneity, reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity). The findings are robust to a wide range of other sensitivity checks including alternative proxies for bank performance.     

Do firms’ earnings management practices affect their equity liquidity?

This study investigates the relationship between earnings management and equity liquidity, positing that as incentives arise for the manipulation of firm performance through earnings management (due partly to conflicts of interest between firm insiders and outsiders), greater earnings management may signal higher adverse selection costs. If earnings manipulation reveals aggressive accounting practices, liquidity providers tend to widen bid-ask spreads to protect themselves. The empirical results indicate that companies with higher earnings management suffer lower equity liquidity.     

How do UK financial institutions really price their banking products?

This paper has several objectives. The first is to explore the type (or types) of imperfect competition that prevailed in the retail banking sector in the 1990s. A general linearised pricing model is employed to test for the degree to which competition in certain markets deviated from the competitive ideal. The key finding, is that, with the exception of mortgage products, deposit and loan rate setting by UK financial institutions is best described by the Salop–Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, with bargain and rip-offs. Cournot type behaviour is evident in some cases. Indirectly, the presence of perfect contestability is largely ruled out. Another objective is to compare these findings with the results of a similar study conducted nearly a decade ago, when financial reforms introduced to encourage greater competition were relatively recent. Based on the results of this study, the policy lesson is that financial firms exhibit different types of price setting behaviour depending on the banking product. The policy implication is to require firms to produce comparable information for consumers, thereby helping to contain the loss of consumer surplus in imperfectly competitive markets.     

Do hedge funds' exposures to risk factors predict their future returns?

This paper investigates hedge funds' exposures to various financial and macroeconomic risk factors through alternative measures of factor betas and examines their performance in predicting the cross-sectional variation in hedge fund returns. Both parametric and non-parametric tests indicate a significantly positive (negative) link between default premium beta (inflation beta) and future hedge fund returns. The results are robust across different subsample periods and states of the economy, and after controlling for market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors as well as the trend-following factors in stocks, short-term interest rates, currencies, bonds, and commodities. The paper also provides macro-level and micro-level explanations of our findings.     

Students’ perceptions of their first accounting class: implications for instructors

The purpose of this action research study is to learn directly from undergraduate students, through focus groups, about their experiences in their first accounting class, especially about the students’ knowledge and practice of critical thinking and about which classroom experiences engaged their attention and enhanced learning. The findings show that students want to understand how the first accounting course connects to the business world and to their other classes. Participants were unsure about when and how they practiced critical thinking; for improved learning outcomes, instructors need to keep critical thinking front and center. Students also need instruction in how to study accounting and how to utilize effectively the resources provided in their textbooks and as supplemental tools (e.g. integrated accounting software). Accounting professors must adapt their teaching methods to help students to meet professional demands, such as critical thinking skills and ability to handle a complex global business environment.     

How aware are employees of their benefits? Findings from two companies

This study examines benefit awareness of employees in two companies. Contrary to previous research, the results show that employees are generally accurate in their perceptions of the benefits available to them. However, the results also show a lack of awareness of unemployment insurance and disability insurance as benefits. In addition, employees were somewhat uncertain regarding costs of benefits to employers. These findings suggest that employers should monitor employee awareness of benefits and target communications to specific problem areas.     

How firms manage their cash flows: an examination of diversification’s effect

We extend recently documented evidence that diversified firms hold significantly less cash than specialized firms to consider differences in how diversified and specialized firms adjust their cash flows to achieve their target cash balance. We find that diversified firms have higher free cash flows as a result of equal operating cash flows and lower investment in comparison to specialized firms. Diversified firms save less cash by placing less reliance on external financing; by issuing less debt and equity, and distributing higher cash dividends. Our findings support the hypothesis that diversified firms are able to hold less precautionary cash as they are in better position to finance investment opportunities internally from operating cash flows.     

Is newer better? Penn World Table Revisions and their impact on growth estimates

This paper sheds light on two problems in the Penn World Table (PWT) GDP estimates. First, we show that these estimates vary substantially across different versions of the PWT despite being derived from very similar underlying data and using almost identical methodologies; that the methodology deployed to estimate growth rates leads to systematic variability, which is greater: at higher data frequencies, for smaller countries, and the farther the estimate from the benchmark year. Moreover, this variability matters for the cross-country growth literature. While growth studies that use low frequency data remain robust to data revisions, studies that use annual data are less robust. Second, the PWT methodology leads to GDP estimates that are not valued at purchasing power parity (PPP) prices. This is surprising because the raison d’être of the PWT is to adjust national estimates of GDP by valuing output at common international (purchasing power parity [PPP]) prices so that the resulting PPP-adjusted estimates of GDP are comparable across countries. We propose an approach to address these two problems of variability and valuation.     

Voting with their feet or activism? Institutional investors’ impact on CEO turnover

We examine the relation between institutional investors and management discipline over the last several decades to better understand how CEO turnover has increased. Using a sample of forced and voluntary turnovers, we investigate the changing roles of activism and exit among institutional investors between 1982-1994 and 1995-2006. We find evidence of activist investors throughout the sample period and their impact is consistently significant in multivariate analysis. In contrast, voting with their feet has declined to the point where it no longer affects turnover outcomes. Nonetheless, activism is fairly uncommon and does not explain the higher turnover observed over time. Block holdings of known activists have increased and are linked to improving target firms. However, other blocks merely reflect the increasing size of institutional money managers. Going forward, the increasing size of institutional investors seems likely to inhibit voting with their feet while activism remains an important vehicle for change.     

Do tax benefits conferred to Sub-S banks affect their deposit or loan rates?

Positive economics predicts that Sub-S banks, with no taxes paid at the corporate level, will price their products lower than otherwise identical C corporation banks in a competitive environment. Alternatively, if banks price bundle their products, Sub-S tax benefits might have little (no) effect on product rates. The empirical analysis finds that Sub-S deposit (loan) rates are equal to or lower (higher) than similar C corporation bank rates. Thus, there is little evidence of any tax benefits accruing to Sub-S bank customers. In contrast, tax-exempt credit unions do offer higher deposit rates and lower loan rates than C corporation banks.     

Citizens’ adaptive or avoiding behavioral response to an emergency message on their mobile phone

Abstract

Since November 2012, Dutch civil defense organizations employ NL-Alert, a cellular broadcast-based warning system to inform the public. Individuals receive a message on their mobile phone about the actual threat, as well as some advice how to deal with the situation at hand. This study reports on the behavioral effects of NL-Alert (n = 643). The current risk communication literature suggested underlying mechanisms as perceived threat, efficacy beliefs, social norms, information sufficiency, and perceived message quality. Results indicate that adaptive behavior and behavioral avoidance can be predicted by subsets of these determinants. Affective and social predictors appear to be more important in this context that socio-cognitive predictors. Implications for the use of cellular broadcast systems like NL-Alert as a warning tool in emergency situations are discussed.     

Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors spend their limited time and energy?

We study reputation incentives in the director labor market and find that directors with multiple directorships distribute their effort unequally based on the directorship's relative prestige. When directors experience an exogenous increase in a directorship's relative ranking, their board attendance rate increases and subsequent firm performance improves. Also, directors are less willing to relinquish their relatively more prestigious directorships, even when firm performance declines. Finally, forced Chief Executive Officer departure sensitivity to poor performance rises when a larger fraction of independent directors view the board as relatively more prestigious. We conclude that director reputation is a powerful incentive for independent directors.     

Pay at the executive suite: How do US banks compensate their top management teams?

This study examines how a large sample of US banks compensates their top management teams (i.e., the top four to five highest ranking executives in each bank). We observe two tiers of compensation in the executive suite: the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the rest of the top management team. CEOs receive not only greater pay in absolute dollar, but are also rewarded more in relation to performance, as manifested in having a larger portion of their pay in performance contingent compensation. Below the CEO, top executives have similar compensation structure and pay to performance elasticities. The results are robust to a significant size effect, and alternate measures of performance.     

Do small businesses adjust their capital structure? Evidence from the global financial crisis in Japan

We investigate the extent to which small businesses adjust their capital structures to target levels when their leverage increases substantially during a financial crisis. We examine Japan's Emergency Credit Guarantee (ECG) program during the 2008 global financial crisis. The increased leverage from the use of the ECG program during the crisis increased the probability of default. Additionally, small businesses adjusted their leverage ratios to the target range before the crisis. However, such adjustments were weak during and after the crisis, particularly for target firms in the ECG program.