Shareholder Activism and Earnings Management Incentives: An Empirical Examination of Shareholder Proposals in the United States

In this article, we investigate the effect of shareholder activism on earnings management. Using a US sample of shareholder pay‐for‐performance proposals sponsored by institutional investors, we find that when compared to control firms, firms targeted by shareholder proposals have a greater magnitude of discretionary accruals (DA) in their reported earnings. In addition, we find that the likelihood of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks through the use of DA is higher for targeted firms whose managers have job security concerns due to the firms’ inferior stock performance in the past or have plans to sell company stock. Our results are consistent with the notion that pay‐for‐performance proposals have unintended consequences by introducing or exacerbating incentives to manage earnings for short‐term gains. The results also indicate that, for financial reporting, the short‐termism effect may dominate the alignment and/or disciplinary effect of shareholder monitoring.     

The Role of the Business Press in Creating and Disseminating Information around Earnings Announcements

This paper investigates the role of the business press in creating and disseminating information around earnings announcements by examining different motivations of trading volume. We find that press coverage is positively associated with trading activity motivated by differential interpretation and by differential belief revision, consistent with the press playing both an information creation and information dissemination role around earnings announcements. When we divide press coverage into full articles with additional editorial content and news flashes merely repeating verbatim of firm-disclosed press releases, we find that trading volume motivated by both differential interpretation and differential belief revision increases as coverage by full articles increases, and trading volume motivated by differential belief revision increases as coverage by news flashes increases. We also report that the differential interpretation effect of full articles is more pronounced when information users’ sophistication is high. Overall, we provide new evidence to the literature by showing that each type of press coverage plays an informational role in different motivations of trading activity.     

Media Coverage and the Stock Market Valuation of TARP Participating Banks‡

We examine the impact of media coverage of the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) under the Troubled Assets Relief Program on the equity market valuation of participating bank holding companies (CPP banks). We document substantial negative coverage of the CPP and its participants over the five quarters following the program's initiation. We find that the extent of negative media coverage about the CPP exerted substantial downward pressure on the stock returns of CPP banks, decreasing their valuation relative to bank holding companies not participating in the program. We show that our findings cannot be explained by differences in the banks’ financial viability at the CPP's initiation, new information about their performance being released to the market after the CPP's initiation or preceding stock returns causing the negative media coverage. Our findings highlight the importance of investor sentiment, as reflected by the tone of media coverage, in banks’ valuation during a period of high uncertainty in financial markets.     

Boards’ Response to Shareholders’ Dissatisfaction: The Case of Shareholders’ Say on Pay in the UK

Abstract

In 2002, the UK adopted a regulation allowing shareholders to cast non-binding (advisory) votes on their firm's Directors' Remuneration Report during annual general meetings (the ‘Say-on-Pay’ rule). This study evaluates a decade of this regulation and examines how it affected the behavior of shareholders and boards in a sample of Financial Times Stock Exchange 350 firms during the period 2002–2012. I find evidence that shareholder dissatisfaction increases with excess Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation. This relationship does not exist for the expected level of compensation, suggesting that shareholders take a sophisticated approach when casting their vote. Boards do not appear to respond to shareholder dissatisfaction systematically; however, they do respond selectively by reducing the excessiveness of CEO compensation when performance is poor. Boards also seem to respond swiftly to shareholder dissatisfaction. There is evidence that the probability of CEO turnover increases with shareholder dissatisfaction. Overall, the evidence suggests that ‘Say-on-Pay’ regulation addressed regulatory concerns about transparency, accountability, and performance linkage.     

How Analysts Process Information: Technical and Financial Disclosures in the Microprocessor Industry

Abstract

Following Bradshaw (‘Analyst information processing, financial regulation, and academic research’ [2009], and Analysts' forecasts: What do we know after decades of work? [2011]), this paper examines how analysts process information, particularly in an information environment characterised by multiple and potentially complementary information sources. The setting is the microprocessor industry, one in which technical information is particularly significant and complex to digest. Based on 3837 analyst earnings-forecast revisions, issued by 134 analysts, we examine quantitatively the speed, magnitude, and information content of the reactions of individual analysts and subgroups of analysts to both periodic and timely technical disclosures, and as a complement to periodic financial disclosure. We find that analysts are much slower to react to timely technical disclosures than they are to periodic financial disclosures. We find also that technical and financial disclosures complement each other. Furthermore, we find that there is a ‘hierarchy’ of analysts in this particular industry, as evidenced through the strength of reaction to timely technical disclosures. Finally, we find that lower speed in reacting to timely technical disclosures and a higher intensity in the use of timely technical disclosure (in conjunction with periodic financial disclosure) result in greater accuracy, and that more experienced analysts tend to be less accurate. We suggest that the findings may have implications for other industries such as Bio-Tech Pharma.     

The Role of Corporate Sustainability in a Low‐Cost Business Model – A Case Study in the Scandinavian Fashion Industry

This multi‐level case study illustrates how corporate sustainability contributes to the low‐cost business model of a Scandinavian fashion company. Contrary to parts of the extant literature, we do not find that corporate sustainability directly adds measurable value (e.g. a better brand image); neither does it exert coercive control over critical supplier relationships. However, corporate sustainability minimizes the downside risk of the business model. It does so by (1) creating implicit contracts that reach beyond traditional ‘shareholder value’, (2) transferring risk to suppliers and (3) improving leadership by motivating management and employees, and by directing their attention to critical issues. For companies, we offer the insight that corporate sustainability is a necessary complement to shareholder value, even if the relationship is not obvious at first sight. We also suggest that concerted actions of companies or a positive connotation of certification create effective control over suppliers. As to public policy, we conclude that regulators could introduce mandatory disclosure of suppliers to facilitate controls through stakeholders, or alternatively an industry‐wide comply‐or‐explain code of conduct. We also address how regulators can take direct actions against countries with unsustainable labor policies. Last, we suggest future research topics, e.g. expanding the notion of a business model by interpreting ‘adding value’ as prevention of losses. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

A voted based random forests algorithm for smart grid distribution network faults prediction

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we focus on fault prediction in the smart distribution network. modified version of voted random forest algorithm (VRF) is proposed for enhancing the predicting accuracy of the faults. We change the decision process by redesigning the voting algorithm by introducing multiple SVM models for voting model training. Based on the trained models, a simple NSGA algorithm is applied to find the best voting model. Results showed that the new algorithm could improve the accuracy and recall rate of the fault prediction, especially for the recall rate of the negative samples.     

Press freedom and corruption in business-state interactions

We show that press freedom has a role in constraining business corruption. Using firm-level data, we find that countries with greater press freedom have significantly fewer incidences of bribery involving public officials. In particular, we find that a free press is associated with a substantial reduction in the percentage of firms that report corruption during interactions with tax officials and when obtaining construction permits. Furthermore, we find that fewer businesses in these countries report that corruption is the biggest problem that they face. These findings highlight the role of an independent media in combating corruption.     

Firms in financial distress: evidence from inter-firm payment networks with volatility driven by ‘animal spirits’

This paper elaborates an agent-based model of a pure market economy to provide theoretical evidence on how volatility-induced changes in inter-firm payment networks affect the financial distress of firms. This volatility is driven by ‘animal spirits’ in that it arises from the feelings of optimism/pessimism independently of rational decision-making, and influences the liquidity available to each firm through the inter-firm payment network; consequently, some firms may enter financial distress. The model first determines the inter-firm payment network. Then, a mean-reverting square-root process introduces volatility into the inter-firm payment network through firms’ propensity to pay suppliers according to the payments that firms expect to receive from customers. The model is calibrated for compatibility with relevant macro- and microeconomic stylized facts. According to computational experiments, financial distress in the business sector is minimized when feelings of optimism/pessimism generate the lowest volatility in firms’ propensity to pay suppliers. In addition, this volatility must materialize around an intermediate value of firms’ propensity to pay suppliers, and firms must keep this intermediate value over time.

     

The Bribery Paradox in Transition Economies and the Enactment of ‘New Normal’ Business Environments

We develop a novel, sense-making perspective on corruption in transition economies. Prior research has focused on understanding why some entrepreneurs are more likely to pay bribes than others. It typically assumes that paying bribes will lead to an intended – albeit unfair – competitive advantage. We challenge this assumption and uncover a bribery paradox: drawing upon sense-making logic, we argue that beyond gaining an immediate benefit from bribing, entrepreneurs who frequently pay bribes may in the longer run be enacting a ‘new normal’ business environment perceived as high in obstacles, especially in transition countries. As sense making is grounded in identity construction and one’s social context, we argue that owners of family firms will be especially vulnerable to the dangers of perceiving greater obstacles over time and enacting an obstacle-ridden ‘new normal’ business environment. We find empirical support for our framework on a sample of 310 privately held small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from 22 transition economies.     

Court Intervention as a Governance Mechanism over CEO Pay: Evidence from the Citigroup Derivative Lawsuit

Abstract

We use an unanticipated court ruling in a lawsuit against Citigroup claiming corporate waste related to CEO pay to analyse court intervention as an alternative governance mechanism in cases of excess pay. We find a negative relation between announcement returns and excess pay, consistent with shareholders of these firms perceiving court intervention as net costly. However, we find a positive relation between announcement returns and excess pay accompanied by poor performance, suggesting that intervention is welcome when pay is more egregious. Finally, we find that firms with excess pay and whose shareholders welcome intervention reduce future pay relative to other firms, suggesting that the threat of court intervention is a potential mechanism to control excess pay.     

Largest shareholder and dividend policy around the world

This paper examines the interaction between the largest shareholder and dividend policy in a sample of 8,279 listed firms drawn from 37 countries. We find that firms are more likely to pay dividends when profitability is high, debt is low, investment opportunities are limited or when the largest shareholder is not an insider. Further, the magnitude of dividend payout tends to be smaller when the largest shareholder is either an insider or a financial institution. It is also apparent that largest shareholding and dividend payout are related and that, consistent with the extant literature, legal system does matter in dividend policy decisions.     

Unleashing the Power of Networks: Shareholder Activism,Sustainable Development and Corporate Environmental Policy

In recent years, a new trend has emerged in which shareholder activists have formed networks to empower shareholders and magnify shareholder voices. This study explores the structural patterns and effectiveness of shareholder activism networks and shows how those networks affect corporate sustainability policies. We draw upon stakeholder influence theory, stakeholder network management theory and recent studies on activism networks to examine a shareholder activism network formed around environmental issues. The study found that (1) the structure of shareholder activist networks is largely driven by organizational attributes such as organization type, organizations’ human resources, media visibility and history; and (2) activist organizations with high centralities and eigenvector centralities enjoy more efficient results. This study contributes to our understanding of the business responses to shareholder demands on improving environmental performance and paves the way for future research on sustainable development through partnerships with shareholder networks. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Do Investors Pay Sufficient Attention to Banks’ Unrealized Gains and Losses on Available-for-sale Securities?

Abstract

Unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale securities (AFSGL) are included in Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) and directly affect shareholders’ equity but are not included in earnings. We investigate whether unrealized AFSGL help predict future earnings and whether analysts and investors incorporate the information conveyed by unrealized AFSGL in a timely manner. We conduct our investigation on a sample of banks because unrealized AFSGL are material in the banking industry. First, we show that unrealized AFSGL are material and help in predicting next period realized AFSGL and future earnings change. Second, we document that financial analysts are slow to react to unrealized AFSGL and update their forecasts after AFSGL are realized in earnings. Third, we find that investors are also slow to react to unrealized AFSGL and do so only after AFSGL are included (realized) in earnings and after financial analysts update their forecasts. We document an annual difference of 5% in future abnormal returns between banks in the top and bottom quintiles of past unrealized AFSGL. A zero-cost trading strategy that relies on public information about unrealized AFSGL generates a sizeable monthly alpha that ranges between 1.8% and 1.9%.     

Corporate Governance Berichterstattung als Instrument wertorientierter Unternehmensführung: Empirische Erkenntnisse für den deutschen Kapitalmarkt

This paper tests a simultaneous equation system on the relationship between corporate governance disclosure and firm performance for 113 German listed firms underlying the highest standards of transparency & disclosure of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and receiving strongest analyst coverage. Capturing both mechanisms endogeneity and reverse causation, we provide evidence that there is a significantly positive relationship between voluntary corporate governance disclosure and market-to-book value and total shareholder return. Against theoretical assumptions, we couldn’t find evidence for reverse causation between firm performance and corporate governance disclosure. Surprisingly, we could not longer find evidence on a positive impact of declared compliance with the German Code of Corporate Governance on firm performance.     

Accountability and Role Effects in Balanced Scorecard Performance Evaluations When Strategy Timeline Is Specified

Abstract

This study experimentally examines if fixation on lagging financial measures (relative to leading non-financial measures) as reported in prior balanced scorecard literature is mitigated when evaluators are provided with a strategy implementation timeline (a non-manipulated variable). The experiment manipulates whether or not evaluators are subject to process accountability as well as the role to which evaluators are assigned (i.e. supervisor or subordinate). We predict and find that, in general, the provision of an implementation timeline results in evaluators placing more weight on strategically linked, leading non-financial measures within a subordinate's time span of control compared to strategically linked, lagged financial measures beyond the subordinate's controllable time horizon. However, we also find that evaluators in the role of a supervisor differentiate less between strategically linked non-financial measures that fall within the subordinate's control and strategically linked financial measures beyond the subordinate's control when held accountable compared to supervisors not held accountable. On the other hand, participants in the role of a subordinate were able to differentiate appropriately between these measures when held accountable. Our results extend prior research by considering how linking a timeline to strategy implementation may assist evaluators when assessing performance in the presence of both leading and lagging strategic measures. Further, reference to an implementation timeline may influence role and accountability effects. Implications for future research in multidimensional strategic performance evaluation are discussed.     

Financial reporting fraud and CEO pay-performance incentives

Because prior studies find mixed results on the relation between CEOs’ pay performance incentives and a firm’s likelihood of financial reporting fraud, we restudy their relationship using innovative research methods. First, we concentrate on incentives from granting options rather than equity-based incentives. Second, we emphasize vested options, disregarding unvested option holdings, and take the logarithm transformation of option incentives. Third, we analyse the impact of option incentives on future financial reporting irregularities. Using this innovative approach as well as a full sample and a matched sample, we find that an increase in executives’ option incentives raises the likelihood of financial reporting violations. Moreover, the effect of option incentives on financial reporting fraud is moderated by auditor effort. In addition, we find that another proxy for the measurement of executives’ option incentives, namely, the number of vested options by executives, is highly correlated with the CEO’s vested stock option sensitivity.     

The effect of corporate governance on credit ratings: Evidence from China's bond market

This paper examines the association between firms’ corporate governance and credit ratings (both bond ratings and issuer ratings) in China. In addition to considering the financial attributes of bond issuers, we ask to what extent do credit rating agencies consider the corporate governance attributes of issuers? In concept, bondholders are concerned with the financial effects of how corporate governance resolves the agency conflicts between bondholders and managers, majority and minority shareholders, and shareholders and bondholders. We find that corporate governance affects bond issuer credit ratings in China. After controlling for firms’ financial attributes, we find that issuer ratings are positively related to dual‐listing, whether the firm is a state‐owned enterprise, the ownership of the second to the tenth largest shareholder; and negatively related to the relative scale of audit fees. We attribute the positive association between dual‐listing and credit rating to higher quality and transparency of information reported by the dual‐listed firm. The value to bondholders of the implicit government guarantee of debt payments more than offsets the negative association between firm value and being an SOE. Bond rating agencies expect that the change in agency costs with a reduction in the ownership of the largest shareholder benefits bondholders. To credit rating agencies, the scale of audit fees (relative to total assets of the accounting firm) signals interest binding between the client firm and the accounting firm that threatens the independence of auditing and the quality of financial reporting. We also find that bond‐specific attributes: collateral and issue size, are positively related to bond credit ratings.     

Creditor protection,shareholder protection and investment efficiency: New evidence

Prior studies show significant effects of creditor rights and shareholder rights on corporate investment efficiency; however, they have not addressed how shareholder (creditor) rights influence the relationship between creditor (shareholder) rights and firm investment efficiency. With a research sample of 235,969 firm-years from 31,152 firms across 42 countries during the period 2002–2016, we find that the negative (positive) effect of creditor (shareholder) rights on corporate investment efficiency is stronger (weaker) in countries of strong shareholder (creditor) protection. In addition, our research findings show that both creditor rights and shareholder rights are less effective in investment efficiency during the global financial crisis. Firms in countries of strong shareholder (creditor) protection experience smaller (larger) decreases in the effectiveness of creditor (shareholder) rights.