Efficient Sorting in a Dynamic Adverse-Selection Model

We discuss a class of markets for durable goods where efficiency (or approximate efficiency) is obtained despite the presence of information asymmetries. In the model, the number of times a good has changed hands (the vintage of the good) is an accurate signal of its quality, each consumer self-selects into obtaining the vintage that the social planner would have assigned to her, and consumers' equilibrium trading behaviour in secondary markets is not subject to adverse selection. We show that producers have the incentive to choose contracts that lead to the efficient allocation, and to supply the efficient output. We also provide a contrast between leasing contracts, resale contracts, and different kinds of rental contracts. Resale contracts do not lead to the efficient allocation. A specific kind of rental contract provides the appropriate incentives to consumers.     

职业经理人声誉评价模型构建及应用研究

通过问卷调查及因子分析建立了包括战略管理能力、个人特征、社交能力、领导能力、财务业绩、任职背景、变革能力、职业精神、道德和个人品质10个一级指标及36个二级指标的评价体系,通过专家问卷、层次分析法和模糊综合评判法计算出两级影响因子权重,构建了职业经理人声誉评价模型,并通过一个实例说明了具体运用的方法。     

Transboundary Pollution in a Dynamic Game Model

We consider a dynamic game model in which N countries produce a single product that is not traded. Production results in emissions that accumulate a stock of pollution in each country. Households in each country derive utility from consuming the product but face costs depending on the level of the country-specific stock of pollution as well as the pollution stocks of the other countries. We distinguish three different cost scenarios. For all three, we show the existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) and derive the collusive outcome. The MPEs are associated with the case where countries fail to coordinate their policies, while the collusive solutions correspond to the coordinated policy.
JEL Classification No.: C73.     

Trade and Indeterminacy in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model

This paper introduces sector-specific externalities in the Heckscher-Ohlin two-country dynamic general equilibrium model to show that indeterminacy of the equilibrium path in the world market can occur. Under certain conditions in terms of factor intensities, there are multiple equilibrium paths from the same initial distribution of capital in the world market, and the distribution of capital in the limit differs among equilibrium paths. One equilibrium path converges to a long-run equilibrium in which the international ranking of factor endowment ratios differs from the initial ranking; another equilibrium path maintains the initial ranking and converges to another long-run equilibrium. Since the path realized is indeterminate, so is the long-run trade pattern. Therefore, the Long-Run Heckscher-Ohlin prediction is vulnerable to the introduction of externality. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E13, E32, F11, F43.     

动态不一致性及政府声誉与通货膨胀防范

本文阐述了货币政策的动态不一致性及其代表性的巴罗-戈登模型,在分析了克雷普斯·威尔逊声誉模型的基础上,指出政府在一定程度上能解决货币政策动态不一致性问题,并认为通货膨胀目标制是一种成功防范动态不一致性的制度安排.     

The credibility game: Reputation and rational cooperation in a changing population

Labor-managed firms often depend on voluntary cooperation to generate efficient levels of labor input. This paper shows how cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma-like situations can be an equilibrium outcome, when rational individuals act so as to preserve reputations for cooperating. The theory developed here implies that (a) voluntary cooperation will be negatively related to population turnover, and (b) the relationship of community size to voluntary cooperation will have an inverted-U shape.     

Calvin's Reformation in Geneva: Self and Social Signalling

As Weber ( 1904 ) recognized, Calvinistic beliefs about predestination may constitute a powerful incentive for good works; an individual wishes to receive assurances about her future prospects of salvation, and good works may provide a positive signal about such prospects. These beliefs can in turn create a social pressure to behave well, as good works can also signal to others that individuals belong to the “elect” and are therefore likely to behave well in social interactions. Moreover, the Consistory, an institution created by Calvin to monitor and publicize individuals' behavior, can allow for such social signalling. We analyze these self and social signalling incentives, and show how religions affect levels of cooperation and coordination.     

中国产品质量监管的声誉模型分析

当前中国商品市场上假冒伪劣现象严重,损害消费者权益的事件层出不穷.在两阶段声誉模型中,消费者运用贝叶斯法则推断企业诚信状况并决定下期的购买行为,此时声誉力量可以约束企业的投机主义倾向,将造假企业驱逐出市场.而对重点行业加强监管、加大处罚力度、鼓励消费者投诉,可以促进市场净化,加快诚信社会的建设步伐.     

The Nonequivalence of Tariffs and Quotas in a Dynamic Trade Model

The paper provides a novel (and old) argument for the nonequivalence of tariffs and quotas, based on the famous paper by Hotelling published in 1931. Unlike tariffs, quantitative restrictions are inherently dynamic. As long as the foreign exporter earns positive marginal profits, he raises their present value by frontloading sales. As a result, unlike a tariff, equilibrium with a quota exhibits quantity and price dispersion over time. The dispersion may be significant even with small discount rates.     

Gender Differences in Education in a Dynamic Household Bargaining Model

We explore the issue of gender differences in education in the context of a two-sex overlapping generations model where men and women of each generation bargain over consumption, number of children, and investment in education of their children. We show that the gender difference implied by our model is smaller than the one that would result from a pure investment model. We use our model to estimate the cost to a woman of having a child. The estimate we obtain is about 5% of the working lifetime of a woman.     

Learning and Equilibrium Selection in a Monetary Overlapping Generations Model with Sticky Prices

We study adaptive learning in a monetary overlapping generations model with sticky prices and monopolistic competition for the case where learning agents observe current endogenous variables. Observability of current variables is essential for informational consistency of the learning setup with the model setup but generates multiple temporary equilibria when prices are flexible and prevents a straightforward construction of the learning dynamics. Sticky prices overcome this problem by avoiding simultaneity between prices and price expectations. Adaptive learning then robustly selects the determinate (monetary) steady state independent from the degree of imperfect competition. The indeterminate (non-monetary) steady state and non-stationary equilibria are never stable. Stability in a deterministic version of the model may differ because perfect foresight equilibria can be the limit of restricted perceptions equilibria of the stochastic economy with vanishing noise and thereby inherit different stability properties. This discontinuity at the zero variance of shocks suggests one should analyse learning in stochastic models.     

Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation

Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. However, many of these relationships are long term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two treatments (one-shot and repeated) of a gift-exchange game. In both treatments we observe reciprocity, which is strengthened in the repeated game. A detailed analysis shows that, in the repeated game, some subjects imitate reciprocity. Thus, reciprocity and repeated game incentives reinforce each other. Observed behaviour is robust against experience. We conclude that long-term interaction is a "reciprocity-compatible" contract enforcement device.
JEL classification : J 30; C 91     

Endogenous effort in a Dynamic Model of Union–Firm Interaction

This paper studies the implications of union deviation by reducing effort in the context of a repeated game model. We find that a failure to account for the possibility of union deviation may lead to an overestimation of the possibility of cooperation. In contrast to the existing literature, we find that unions may reach the efficient outcome despite wage hikes because they work harder under cooperation. We also find that when effort is an endogenous variable, the cooperative wage is likely to be higher than otherwise. Finally, our model predicts that if the union alone deviates, effort will fall as the endgame approaches. However, wages could either rise or fall.     

Investment in Tourism Market: A Dynamic Model of Differentiated Oligopoly

We present a theoretical dynamic model in tourism economics, assuming that the market for tourism is an oligopoly with differentiated products. Destinations can invest in order to improve their stock of physical, natural or cultural resources. Tourism flows yield current revenues, but they are usually detrimental for the stock of resources. We find the solution of the dynamic model, and in particular we find the open-loop Nash equilibrium of the game among destinations, under alternative settings, depending on whether the degree of differentiation among destinations is exogenous or endogenous. In particular, under the latter case, an increase of the number of destinations leads to a higher degree of product differentiation in steady state.     

服务贸易的动态发展模型研究——兼对中国数据的实证检验

文章以新的视角研究服务贸易的动态发展,首先借鉴新增长理论中的研究与开发模型——将资源分配到两个生产部门——讨论内生要素动态变化的分析方法,针对资源在对外贸易的货物生产以及服务生产这两个最终产品部门之间的分配建立模型,分析了在不同的现有服务贸易规模影响状态下,服务贸易的动态变化以及其他变量对其运动情况的影响。其次结合模型,对我国的服务贸易发展状况进行了实证研究,得出的主要结论是,准确了解服务贸易的规模报酬状况,是分析市场发展战略的关键;中国的服务贸易正呈现出规模报酬递增的状态,但仍表现为劳动和资本密集型的特征。     

Reputation and the league standing effect: the case of a split season in minor league baseball

Split season league design resets standings at the midpoint of the season, thus allowing for two periods in which a team can potentially achieve success in a single season. This context allows us to test both the reputation of the first half winner and the league standing effect on demand. Examination of game-level data from the 2010 Southern League reveals fans are unaffected by measures of both team quality and league standing in the second half of the season. On the other hand, the first half winners saw an 11% increase in attendance as a percent of stadium capacity, suggesting that in the second half of the season winners matter more than winning.     

医疗领域的政府干预与声誉机制

不确定性和信息不对称常常被认为是医疗市场失灵和政府干预的依据,但政府的过度干预会导致医疗声誉机制的扭曲。改革现行“管办不分”的医疗卫生体制,由市场声誉取代政府行政干预,通过重复博弈建立医生与患者之间的长期稳定关系,解决医疗卫生领域的难题。     

基于时间维度的组织学习理论——组织从过去经历中学习的模型

从经历中学习是组织学习的重要方面。从科学、严谨的研究范式出发,结合东方传统的阴阳哲学思想,基于时间维度提出了包含学习主体、经历样本、成功失败经历集、学习主体特征、知和行等要素的组织从过去经历中学习的模型,并对相关问题进行了探究。具体包括:学习主体从经历中学习的认知特性;不同类型经历对应的不同学习方法,成功经历和失败经历对学习效果的差异性影响,经历集影响知和行的7种自动的和有意的学习方式;知与行相互转化及其触发机制;客观世界从时间和空间两个维度客观展开的观点等。该系统模型为未来研究提供了理论框架和实证检验方向。     

基于时间维度的组织学习理论——组织从当前现状中学习的模型

基于组织学习时空理论的时间维度,提出组织从当前现状中学习的模型。该模型包括4个方面:"知",以组织面临的现状、机会和挑战为出发点,运用行动学习的方法,通过团队形式的讨论、反思和质疑、实践的循环,从当前现状中获得知识;"行",将学习到的知识运用于实践,改进自身方案和采取适当行动;知与行的转化,包含知与行的循环;从知和行两个维度评估学习的有效性。最后,总结了理论和实践贡献,并指出存在的不足和未来的改进方向。