China's Growing Demand For PVC

ChinawillneedmorepolyVinylchloride(PVC)in1999,ChinaLightindustryNewsreports.PVCisusedintheproductionofplasticsandplasticsheetingforagriculturaluse.IndusalanalystspredictariseinPVCdemandbecauseoftheincreaseduseofthesheeting.TheexpansionofChina'slandco...     

Collusion with Fluctuating Exchange Rates: A Note

A fluctuating exchange rate has an impact on how firms value a given stream of profits, thereby affecting the ability of an international oligopoly to collude implicitly. The conversion effect arises because the foreign firm maximizes its profits earned on the home market measured in foreign currency. The discount factor effect captures the fact that exchange rate fluctuations are connected with fluctuations in the interest rates, thereby changing the present value of future profits. Although each effect refers to only one of the firms, considered together they have an identical impact on the home and the foreign firm. If the foreign country is small, the conversion effect and the discount factor effect exactly offset each other. Otherwise, the effects analysed make collusion more difficult to sustain.     

Collusion in Spatially Separated Markets with Quantity Competition

This paper develops the incentives to collude in a model with spatially separated markets and quantity setting firms. We find that increases in transportation costs stabilize the collusive agreement. We also show that, the higher the demand in both markets the less likely will collusion be sustained. Gross and Holahan (Int Econ Rev 44:299–312, 2003) use a similar model with price setting firms, we compare their results with ours to analyze the impact of the mode of competition on sustainability of collusion. Further we analyze the impact of collusion on social welfare and find that collusion may be welfare enhancing.     

Growing Energy Demand ProvidesImmense Opportunities to Chinese Investors:Minister Naveed Qamar

Fdoeral Minister for Water and wer of Pakistan,Syed Naveed Qamar said that the growing energy demand in Pakistan is a challenge for the government,yet it provides immense opportunities for Chinese investors to contribute towards reducing energy shortage in the country while sharing the benefits on August 2,2011.Leading the Pakistani delegation in the 1st China-Pakistan Joint Energy Working Group (JEWG) meeting in Beijing,the Minister thanked the Chinese government “for extending every possible support to Pakistan at all times,especially in the hours of need.”Qian Zhimin,Deputy Administrator of National Energy Administration (NEA) of the National Development Reform Commission of China led the Chinese side in the largely attended JEWG meeting.     

Collusion among many agents

In this paper we examine under a variety of contractual and informational settings how the addition of an additional agent affects the moral hazard problem between a principal and an agent. We find that there are circumstances when, even though the second agent can provide perfect information about the actions of the first agent, and vice versa, there is still a possibility that a wealth transfer from the principal to agents will occur. We later show that through an appropriate bonus-penalty scheme that a prisoner's dilemma situation can be created that eliminates any possibility of a wealth transfer. This paper differs from other recent works in this area in that it explicitly allows for collusive behavior and does not require that the principal know the explicit form of the agents' utility functions.     

厂商合谋理论研究综述

厂商合谋理论是产业组织理论的重要组成部分,最近几十年,西方国家在这一领域积累了丰硕的研究成果。从厂商数量、生产能力约束、需求波动、信息交流、产品差异、最优价格政策、多市场合约、交叉持股、纵向限制以及厂商内部结构等影响合谋形成和维持的因素着手,对相关理论研究文献进行系统的回顾和梳理,有助于窥见合谋理论发展的全景。     

审计合谋的博弈分析

审计合谋现象的存在直接影响到证券市场的有效运行,同时也使整个注册会计师行业遭到质疑。通过对注册会计师和被审计单位博弈过程分析,可发现审计合谋现象极为隐蔽,有的则极为明显,有恃无恐。这些审计合谋现象的存在,给证券市场、投资大众和政府监管等方面造成巨大损失。为消除合谋造假,从监管机构方面,要加大监管机构监管力度和频率,完善会计师事务所的内部治理,强化注册会计师风险意识,提高审计独立性和审计质量,推动会计师事务所之间的合作与联合。从被审计单位方面,要完善企业治理结构,减少操作空间,提高多次重复博弈过程中诚信贴现收益,从而达到有效防范和治理审计合谋现象。     

Pricing Policy and Partial Collusion

We study the pricing policy equilibria emerging in a partial collusion duopolistic framework where firms in the first stage of the game choose non-cooperatively the pricing strategy (perfect price discrimination or uniform pricing), and from the second stage onward collude on prices. We show that for intermediate discount factors and high firms’ asymmetry, the unique equilibrium is characterized by only the smaller firm choosing price discrimination. In the case of intermediate discount factors and low firms’ asymmetry, there are two possible equilibria: both firms price discriminate or no firm price discriminates. When the discount factor is particularly high or particularly low both firms price discriminate in equilibrium.     

Nationalization as Credible Threat Against Collusion

Within a simple model of differentiated oligopoly, we show that tacit collusion may be prevented by the threat of nationalising a private firm coupled with the appropriate choice of the weight given to private profits in the maximand of the nationalised company. This happens because the threat of nationalization eliminates the prisoners’ dilemma usually associated with a Cournot game among profit-seekers. We characterise the properties of such a threat and prove that it may allow the policy maker to credibly deter collusion.     

Collusion in Industrial Economics: A Comment

This note comments on Feuerstein's (2005) summary of the literature on collusion in infinitely repeated games. It specifically addresses firm asymmetries and settings in which punishments can be asymmetric. Changes in competition policy such as exception from punishment for the first but only the first compliant and the recent practice to study the effects of mergers after the fact, will provide interesting material for testing the theoretical predictions.     

Growing up with capital flows

We examine the capital flows-domestic investment relationship for 60 developing countries from 1979 to 1999. In the 1990s, even as liberalization attracted new flows, foreign capital stimulated less domestic investment than in the preceding decade. With greater financial integration, governments accumulated more international reserves and domestic residents diversified by investing abroad. Foreign investors were also motivated by diversification objectives rather than by unmet investment needs. Inflows were channeled increasingly through portfolio flows—or through foreign direct investment (FDI) with the characteristics of portfolio capital—resulting in weak investment stimulus. However, stronger policy environments strengthened the link between inflows and investment.     

Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Survey

The aim of this paper is to summarize the theory of (implicit) collusion in the framework of infinitely repeated games, and in particular, to survey the comprehensive literature exploring which factors make collusion easier or more difficult to sustain. On this basis, the existing empirical studies and the experimental results will be discussed. Policy options as e.g. leniency programs are also analyzed. Although the number of clear cut policy conclusions is limited, understanding thoroughly the mechanisms of collusion is important for (anti-trust) policies.     

Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Rejoinder

This rejoinder responds to some issues raised in the comments to my survey on collusion. The focus is on different assumptions on the punishment phase and on some aspects of competition policy.     

垂直差异化与电信运营商合谋分析

电信产业是典型的寡头垄断产业,有足够的市场事实可以证明电信运营商之间易出现合谋行为。本文引入垂直产品差异化变量,研究垂直差异化下电信运营商间合谋行为的机理。当电信运营商之间产品的垂直差异化水平达到一定程度时,运营商间维持合谋所需的贴现因子水平小于产品同质时的贴现因子水平,并且随着差异化程度的增加,维持合谋所需贴现因子水平逐渐降低,说明垂直产品差异化有利于合谋的实现和维持。但是,对于提供不同质量产品的运营商,维持合谋的激励程度不同,提供高质量产品的运营商更容易背叛合谋。     

Collusion Theory: Where to Go Next?

This note comments on Feuerstein's (Feuerstein, Switgard, “Collusion in industrial economics: A survey,” forthcoming in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2005) survey of collusion theory. I start by presenting evidence from a recent real-world collusion case: the lysine industry. Based on this, I point out a few areas where collusion theory can improve: (a) the problem of equilibrium choice (bargaining over each firm's share), which is especially important in asymmetric oligopolies; (b) the problem of equilibrium implementation, including in particular communication in an asymmetric information context; and (c) the relation between price wars and collusion. I conclude with a few notes on policy issues, namely leniency programs and cartel detection strategies.     

企业价格串谋识别的博弈分析及模拟

原料成本的上升经常促使企业联合起来集体涨价,如何识别成本冲击下企业涨价是否存在价格串谋行为成为《反垄断法》的重要课题。研究并利用推测变差理论,给出一种识别成本冲击下的企业串谋行为的方法,并利用数值模拟方法得出了一种经验判断,旨在为我国反垄断执法提供一种理论上的帮助。     

“讲诚信，共成长”——《经济与法》携手家居建材行业打造品牌盛宴

近年来,随着房地产业及住宅商品化的发展,为家居建材业开创了巨大的市场空间,拉动了门业、地板、涂料、橱柜、照明、家具等众多家居产品的市场销售,各行业平均年增长率已超过了30％。巨大的市场空间和高额利润使众多企业纷纷进入这一领域,家居建材行业企业已增至千余家,并仍呈逐步增长态势。     

武红 11年与博鳌同生共长

4月1日,第十一届博鳌亚洲论坛在海南开幕。依旧是椰树、阳光、海滩,曾经的小渔村历经11年的博鳌论坛,早已在现代文明的洗礼下闻名于世,并呈现出她特有的瑰丽与秀美。而历届论坛无不向世界传播着亚洲的共识、合作与发展方向;今年约三分之一的欧美代表来博鳌参会,充分显示了走过了11年的博鳌亚洲经济论坛,已成长为全球最具重要影响力的经济论坛之一。随着博鳌论坛一年年落幕,人们似乎越来越关注这一盛会的幕后筹办团队——新盟国际公关顾问公司,总裁武红与她的团队渐渐步入人们的视野……