Product Location with Foresight

Traditional location literatureconcludes that firms will optimally differentiate inorder to alleviate a tendency toward competitivepricing. However, it has recently been shown thatfirms will minimally differentiate if they (correctly)anticipate an absence of price competition. Thispaper examines the relationship between productlocation and the sustainability of cooperativepricing, in horizontally and vertically differentiatedmarkets. Further, it describes equilibrium locationswhen firms are able to choose their locations jointlyand when they must choose independently.     

Resource‐seeking agglomeration: a study of market entry in the lodging industry

We analyze whether firms prefer collocating with incumbent firms when choosing among markets to enter, highlighting the role of resource‐seeking as a motivation for collocation. We propose that entrants will locate near others possessing resources that can spill over, but will avoid locations where existing firms will exploit spillovers without contributing. To test these propositions, we analyze the location decisions of 570 new hotels in Texas between 1992 and 2000. We find that hotels are attracted to markets with branded upscale hotels. Further, we find that owners of upscale hotels avoid markets with hotels without similar resources. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

List pricing and discounting in a Bertrand–Edgeworth duopoly

List, or retail, pricing is a widely used trading institution where firms announce a price that may be discounted at a later stage. Competition authorities view list pricing and discounting as a procompetitive practice. We modify the standard Bertrand–Edgeworth duopoly model to include list pricing and a subsequent discounting stage. Both firms first simultaneously choose a maximum list price and then decide whether to discount, or not, in a subsequent stage. We show that list pricing works as a credible commitment device that induces a pure strategy outcome. This is true for a general class of rationing rules. Further unlike the dominant firm interpretation of a price leader, the low capacity firm may have incentives to commit to a low price and in this sense assume the role of a leader.     

A LOCATION MODEL WITH PREFERENCE FOR VARIETY*

We propose a new location model where consumers are allowed to make multiple purchases (i.e., one unit from each firm). This model may fit many markets (e.g. newspapers, credit cards) better than existing models. A common feature of these markets is that some consumers are loyal to one brand, while others consume more than one product. Our model yields predictions consistent with this observation. If firms are allowed to choose their locations on the interval, then spatial differentiation may not be maximal and in some cases it may even be minimal. Thus, under certain conditions, we restore Hotelling's Principle of Minimum Differentiation.     

Agglomeration economies,firm heterogeneity,and foreign direct investment in the United States

An overlooked aspect of agglomeration economies, which are positive externalities that stem from the geographic clustering of industry, is that firms contribute to the externality in addition to benefiting from the externality. This insight suggests that if firms are heterogeneous they will differ in the net benefits they receive from agglomerating. We argue that firms with the best technologies, human capital, training programs, suppliers, or distributors will gain little, yet competitively suffer when their technologies, employees, and access to supporting industries spill over to competitors. Therefore, these firms have little motivation to geographically cluster despite the existence of agglomeration economies. Conversely, firms with the weakest technologies, human capital, training programs, suppliers, or distributors have little to lose and a lot to gain; therefore, these firms are motivated to geographically cluster. As a result, when firms are heterogeneous we expect agglomeration to be characterized by adverse selection. We find supportive evidence of these arguments by examining the location choice and survival of foreign greenfield investments in U.S. manufacturing industries. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Spatial Price Discrimination with Heterogeneous Firms

In this paper we aim to explain intuitively heterogeneous firms’ optimal location decisions in a simple spatial market. To do so, we present and solve a four‐stage game of entry, location, pricing and consumption in a spatial price discrimination framework with arbitrarily many heterogeneous firms. We provide a unique equilibrium outcome without imposing restrictions on the distribution of marginal costs across firms.     

A Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-Tournament R & D Duopoly

The paper analyzes a simple non-tournament model of R & D where firms are engaged in cost-reducing innovation. It is shown that when spillovers of information are treated as endogenous firms never disclose any of their information when choosing their R & D non-cooperatively. Under cooperative R & D, firms will always choose to fully share their information, i.e., a research joint venture will operate with a maximal spillover value.     

Threat of entry,asymmetric information,and pricing

This paper examines the impact of asymmetric information on incumbent firms' propensity to engage in limit pricing when faced with threat of entry. I draw from information economics to argue that incumbents will use price to respond ex ante to entry in situations characterized by asymmetric information. I suggest two situations in which asymmetric information can arise: when potential entrants are from outside the primary industry and when incumbent firms are members of R&D consortia. I then study pricing in the U.S. cable TV industry to show that pricing patterns of incumbent cable TV systems are consistent with limit pricing when the relationship between the incumbent and potential entrant is characterized by asymmetric information. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stochastic market sharing, partial communication and collusion

This paper analyzes the role of communication between firms in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which firms receive private signals of a common value i.i.d. demand shock. It is shown that firms can use stochastic, inter-temporal market sharing as a substitute for communication in low demand states. Partial communication in high demand states is sufficient to achieve the most collusive, full communication outcome and strictly dominates partial communication in low demand states. Communication in high demand states allows firms to coordinate their pricing, choose the most efficient uninformed price and avoid price wars. I demonstrate that under some conditions consumers are better off with communication among colluding firms.     

Personalized pricing and advertising: Who are the winners?

This paper investigates who wins and who loses when firms depart from a mass advertising/uniform pricing strategy (benchmark model) to a targeted advertising/price discrimination one. Considering a duopoly market in which firms simultaneously compete in prices and advertising decisions, we examine the competitive and welfare effects of personalized pricing with targeted advertising by comparing equilibrium outcomes under customized advertising/ pricing decisions to the results arising under mass advertising and uniform pricing. We show that, when both firms compete in both market segments, all segment consumers are expected to pay higher average prices under the personalized advertising/pricing strategy. We also show that, in the context of our simultaneous game, targeted advertising with price discrimination might boost firms’ profits in comparison to the case of mass advertising and uniform prices. The overall welfare effects of the personalized strategy are ambiguous. However, even when the personalized strategy boosts overall welfare, consumers might all be worse-off. Thus the paper gives support to concerns that have been raised regarding the firms’ ability to adopt personalized strategies to boost profits at the expense of consumers.     

Small Firms and Formality: The Influence of Judicial Efficiency and Regulation Costs

Small firms face three serious problems, namely, the high costs of regulation, of contract enforcement, and of finance. A simple model is developed to explain why in dealing with these problems small firms choose different strategies. Special emphasis is given to the effects of regulation costs and judicial efficiency on these choices. Several propositions concerning these effects are derived from the model and tested with data on Mexican microenterprises. The results support most hypotheses, and show that firms obtain more credit when they either register with official entities or participate in private associations and especially when they do both.     

Replication using templates: Does the unit learn from itself,the template,or both?

Research Summary : Replication of practices is an important value-creating strategy for multi-unit firms, yet they often struggle to share knowledge internally across locations. Drawing on the replication and learning literatures and using data from a Fortune 100 retail chain that implemented a new restocking practice in 280 stores, I examine whether and how templates influence unit learning when replicating new practices. Stores were divided into districts, each with one randomly chosen template and 6–10 replicating stores. A replicating store's prior performance relative to that of its template influences the extent to which the store learns from the template versus from its own experience. These findings suggest that replication involves simultaneously and dynamically learning from both transferred knowledge and knowledge gained from experience. Managerial Summary : Transferring valuable practices within the firm is an important yet difficult task for many firm types, especially multi-unit firms. One way that firms choose to transfer practices is through the use of templates—working examples of the new practice that act as models. Using data from a Fortune 100 retail chain, I show that the use of templates affects the way in which units learn to implement the practice. Because managers face tradeoffs when devoting attention to implementing the new practice, they must balance learning from the template with incorporating their own local experience with the new practice. Overall, my results suggest that choosing many templates is less important than choosing a few templates with superior performance for firms whose units or contexts are similar.     

The choice among acquisitions,alliances, and divestitures

This paper investigates how firms choose among acquisitions, alliances, and divestitures when they decide to expand or contract their boundaries. The dataset covers 9276 deals announced and completed by 86 members of the Fortune 100 between 1990 and 2000. Our findings support explanations based on resources, transaction costs, internalization, organizational learning, social embeddedness, asymmetric information, and real options, and suggest that these theories are highly related and complementary. We find less consistent support for theories based on agency costs and asset indivisibilities. The strong role of firm attributes explains in part why firms may pre‐specify whether they will pursue acquisitions, alliances, or divestitures as part of their corporate strategies. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

纵向一体化的选择及其影响因素——基于能源行业的实证分析

文章研究中国能源行业的纵向一体化状况,以能源企业的纵向并购为例运用Logit模型分析了能源企业选择纵向一体化方式时考虑的因素。研究结果表明,策略效应和交易成本对能源企业采用纵向一体化的意愿影响较大,生产成本和不确定性的影响较小。     

Consumer referrals

In many industries, firms reward their customers for making referrals. We analyze a monopoly’s optimal policy mix of price, advertising intensity, and referral fee when buyers choose to what extent to refer other consumers to the firm. When the referral fee can be optimally set by the firm, it will charge the standard monopoly price. The firm always advertises less when it uses referrals. We extend the analysis to the case where consumers can target their referrals. In particular, we show that referral targeting could be detrimental for consumers in a low-valuation group.     

Identifying Participants in a Price-fixing Conspiracy: Output & Market Share Tests Reexamined

If there is a cartel agreement among a subset of firms in an industry, it should be predicted that all firms in that industry will increase prices. Nevertheless, industry prices alone should not indicate that a particular firm is guilty of that conspiracy. According to the output test and its market share variant – proposed by Blair and Romano – if the output or the market share of the firm that claims to be innocent in the collusive activity rises in response to the price increase, that firm's claim should be accepted as true. Using a collusive variant of the dominant firm model, this paper shows that these are not robust tests to reveal either innocence or guilt, and characterizes cases where they may pardon a guilty firm (Type I error) or indict an innocent firm (Type II error). This paper also shows that a market share test can not be used to prove a dominant firm's intent for predatory pricing.     

Pricing process as a capability: a resource‐based perspective

Strategists following the resource‐based view argue that firms can generate rents through value creation. To create value, firms develop and use resources and capabilities that other firms cannot imitate, trade for, or substitute other assets for. Even a firm that has created value, however, may not capture the potential rents associated with that value. To capture rents, a firm must set the right prices for what it sells. Most views of pricing assume that a firm can readily set appropriate prices. In contrast, we argue that pricing is a capability. To develop the ability to set the right prices, a firm must invest in resources and routines. We base our argument on a study of the pricing process of a large Midwestern manufacturing firm. We show that pricing resources, routines, and skills may help or inhibit a firm in setting the right price—and hence in appropriating value created. Our view of pricing as a capability contributes to the resource‐based view because it suggests that strategists should consider the portfolio of value creation and value appropriation capabilities a firm uses to create competitive advantage. Our view also contributes to economics because it suggests that strategic decisions about pricing capabilities have important implications for a fundamental economic action, determining prices. Managers in firms without effective pricing processes may be unable to set prices that reflect the wishes of its customers, so the customers may misuse their resources. As a result, resources may be used ineffectively. Our view of pricing as a capability therefore takes the resource‐based‐view straight to the heart of what is perhaps the central economic question: the best use of resources. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Market microstructure in a global B2B network

On‐line marketplaces raise several interesting issues, among them the relevance of location when content is digitized, and the assessment of a supplier's capabilities when buyers worldwide only have electronic contact with sellers. In global B2B on‐line marketplaces, market microstructures, i.e. which firms compete for the same customers, are thus likely to be influenced by how customers value location and firm capabilities in their decisions to do business with different suppliers on‐line. We suggest that both these sets of attributes will continue to matter on‐line—firms possessing similar capabilities, as well as firms that are similar in location by country, time zones or clusters, will compete for business from the same customers. We model the similarity in competitive positions between pairs of firms based on the overlap in their customer networks, using data on actual interactions between supplier and customer banks on an electronic trading system. Using QAP network regression techniques on the 100 largest banks in this industry, we find that similarity in capabilities influences who competes with whom, and that location still matters in a global B2B exchange. Interestingly, location influences who a firm's competitors are, but not where its customers are from. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of Value‐Informed Pricing in Market‐Oriented Product Innovation Management*

Although the positive effect of a market orientation on new product success is widely accepted and the market orientation literature has increased its understanding of how a market orientation leads to performance, the extant literature has overlooked the role of value‐informed pricing in the relationship. Value‐informed pricing is a pricing practice in which the decision makers base the price of the new product on the customers' perceptions of the benefits that the product offers and how these benefits are traded by customers against the price (that has yet to be determined). Considering that pricing mistakes may hit hard on the profitability of product innovations, it is important to firms to have a good understanding of its role. This study develops a framework in which value‐informed pricing is integrated in the relationship between market orientation and new product performance. A distinction is made between customer and competitor orientations, and relative product advantage is also included in the conceptual model. The model is tested on data obtained from managers based on a cross sectional sample of 144 firms. The respondents were involved in a decision‐making process of the pricing of a new product. The model is tested using structural equations modeling. The results show that value‐informed pricing has a strong effect on new product performance. It also reveals that each component of a market orientation fulfills a specific role in a market‐oriented organization. Value‐informed pricing is found to have important mediating effects in the market orientation–new product performance relationship. Results show that firms with a strong customer orientation engage in value‐informed pricing and develop superior benefits to customers in an advantageous product. In turn, both value‐informed pricing and relative product advantage positively affect new product market performance. However, no significant effect of competitor orientation on value‐informed pricing is found. Combined with the finding that competitor orientation negatively affects relative product advantage, this suggests that competitor orientation may hurt new product performance when this orientation is not balanced with a strong customer orientation. The results also portray that value‐informed pricing leads to higher product advantage. Interestingly, this relation is contingent on the degree of interfunctional coordination within the firm. This suggests that the relationship between market orientation and new product performance is strongest if firms integrate value‐informed pricing in the new product development process. In this sense, a market‐oriented firm mirrors the customer value perception that makes a trade‐off between benefits and price.     

Retail Mergers and Food Prices: Evidence from France

This paper analyzes the impact of a merger in the French supermarket industry on food prices. Using consumer panel data, we compare the changes in prices for merging and rival firms in affected and comparison markets. We use a novel definition of affected markets when some firms have a local pricing strategy and others a more centralized pricing strategy. We find that prices increase significantly following the merger, and that the merging firms lose market shares. For the rivals, the price increases are larger in local markets, in which concentration increased and differentiation changed after the merger.