国外银行业的并购重组及其给我们的启示

全球银行业的并购由来已久,本世纪90年代更是高潮迭起.不仅发达国家的银行通过并购扩大资产规模、抢占市场份额,而且发展中国家银行也利用并购规避风险、维持金融体系的稳定.深入了解全球银行业的并购重组活动,分析其成因和特点,对我国金融改革的深化和发展具有一定的借鉴意义.     

网络与虚拟银行

虚拟银行以技术代替了人工,以虚拟空间代替了物理空间,从而具有交易成本低、方便、迅捷等特点,是未来银行、金融业发展的方向。在数字化革命发展过程中,银行金融业一直走在最前列。当今世界,无论是发达国家还是发展中国家,无论是在先进地区还是在落后地区,银行金融业都是计算机和计算机网络的最大、最先进的用户。随着虚拟现实技术的不断进步,银行金融业正     

政府控股对商业银行风险承担的影响--基于国际银行业的证据北大核心CSSCISSCI

本文选取2005-2012年涵盖174个国家3047家商业银行的非平衡面板数据,将发达国家和发展中国家进行对比,并结合金融危机的背景,从全球视角探究政府控股对商业银行风险承担水平的影响。结果发现,发展中国家政府控股会降低商业银行的风险承担水平,提升银行的稳定性,但金融危机爆发后,政府控股银行的收益波动性和股本波动性反而增加,即风险承担水平增加。相比之下,发达国家政府控股虽然会降低银行的收益波动性和股本波动性,即收益波动风险降低,会增加银行的破产风险;另外,在金融危机前后,发达国家政府控股对于商业银行风险承担水平的影响并无明显差异。本文的研究结论说明,发展中国家和发达国家政府控股商业银行对银行风险承担水平的影响大相径庭。据此,我们提出政策建议,发展中国家政府控股商业银行具有必要性,但是在金融危机期间,政府需要兼顾稳定经济大局和银行系统的稳定;发达国家应避免控股商业银行,避免干预银行的市场化行为。     

金融危机下中资银行跨国并购分析——以招商银行并购永隆银行为例

由美国次贷危机引发的国际金融危机导致主要发达国家的金融业受到了较大冲击,而大部分新兴市场国家的金融机构受影响相对较小。加上在上一轮全球经济增长周期中,以发展中国家为主体的新兴市场国家金融业的实力得到了一定提升。因此,本次危机给部分发展中国家的金融机构海外扩张带来了一定的机遇。本文在金融危机背景下,以招商银行并购永隆银行为例,主要对其并购从原因、过程、效应三方面展开分析,最后评价该跨国并购,并得出对中资银行海外并购的启示。     

股票投资母国偏好之谜及对中国的启示

股票投资的母国偏好是指这样一种现象,即投资者的资产组合倾向于集中在国内股票,从而放弃与股票国际化相伴随的分散化收益。通常,衡量股票投资母国偏好的理论依据是国际资本资产定价模型(I—CAMP),具体指标是用一国国内股票投资价值与该国股票投资总价值之比减去一国股票市场市值与世界股票市场市值之比;该值越大,股票投资母国偏好则越强烈。最新研究表明:在过去20年里,发达国家的股票投资母国偏好有所下降,但仍保持在较高水平;而发展中国家的股票投资母国偏好没     

扩大“溢出效应” 抑制“挤出效应”——跨国公司研发本土化热潮的理性思考

<正>2003年至今,跨国公司在华设立的研发机构数量呈高速增长趋势,每年约有200家跨国研发机构成立,母国来源更加广泛,研发涉及的行业增多,一批原创型技术研发基地投向了中国,总体呈现出良好的发展态势。截至2006年末,全球500强企业中已有400多家在华设立超过900家研发中心,中国已成为外资在海外设立研发中心最多的发展中国家。     

国外处置不良资产的经验--利用外资

从不良资产处置的国际经验来看,开放不良资产处置市场、将不良资产的处置置身于统一的国际市场中,几乎是世界各国处置不良资产的共同特点。 发达国家处置不良资产的经验 就不良资产的处置而言,美国是发达国家的典型代表。与发展中国家相比,发达国家银行体系的主体是非国有的商业银行,银行体系相对间接地参与本国的经济和社会发展。由于经济实力雄厚,     

扩大“溢出效应” 抑制“挤出效应”——跨国公司研发本土化的理性思考

2003年至今，跨国公司在华设立的研发机构数量呈高速增长趋势，每年约有200家跨国研发机构成立，母国来源更加广泛，研发涉及的行业增多．一批原创型技术研发基地投向了中国，总体呈现出良好的发展态势。截至2006年末．全球500强企业中已有400多家在华设立超过900家研发中心，中国已成为外资在海外设立研发中心最多的发展中国家。[第一段]     

跨国银行并表监管与金融隐私权的冲突及制衡

在金融全球化、金融一体化、金融自由化和金融集团化的趋势下,包括发达国家和发展中国家在内的很多实力雄厚的大银行纷纷走出国门,进行全球扩张和跨国并购,成为国际金融市场上的跨国银行.这种跨国银行的产生和经营给普通的银行监管带来挑战,为了避免对跨国银行监管漏洞的存在从而危及整个国际金融体系的稳健,巴塞尔委员会提出了跨国银行并表监管的核心监管原则.但是在母国具体实施跨国银行并表监管过程中,会遇到东道国保护金融隐私权的法律障碍.因此,由于金融信息披露和金融信息交流所引发的并表监管和金融隐私权保护之间的冲突是不可避免的,为了整个国际金融体系的稳定就必须对两者的冲突进行价值和机制制衡.     

外资银行进入对中资银行的影响研究

一、理论综述 最近几十年来，为了促进商品和金融服务的国际化．各国银行通过在国外设立分支机构和收购实现跨国经营。同时，金融自由化进一步促进了银行的国际化。发达国家和发展中国家都逐步允许外资银行增加数量，并给予其国民待遇。中国加入WTO已三年．按照对银行部门自由化所做的承诺，正逐步取消地域、客户和业务方面的限制，     

Effect of Internationalization on the Cost Efficiency of Taiwan’s Banks

Abstract:

We focus on the effect of internationalization on the cost efficiency of banks by studying Taiwan as a sample for developing countries. We find that (1) increasing overseas businesses and foreign exchange deposits increases cost efficiency; (2) expanding offshore banking units increases bank efficiency; and (3) the profitability of a bank’s overseas branch is not a critical factor behind the differences in cost efficiency across both financial holding company (FHC) banks and non-financial holding company (non-FHC) banks. Finally, our metafrontier empirical results illustrate that FHC banks in Taiwan show better technical performance in cost control than non-FHC banks.     

How does foreign entry affect domestic banking markets?

Using 7900 bank observations from 80 countries for the 1988–1995 period, this paper examines the extent and effect of foreign presence in domestic banking markets. We investigate how net interest margins, overhead, taxes paid, and profitability differ between foreign and domestic banks. We find that foreign banks have higher profits than domestic banks in developing countries, but the opposite is the case for developed countries. Estimation results suggest that an increased presence of foreign banks is associated with a reduction in profitability and margins for domestic banks.     

Determinants of the capital adequacy ratio of foreign banks’ subsidiaries: The role of interbank market and regulation

This paper examines the factors influencing the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of foreign banks. We test whether the CAR of subsidiaries and branches in developed and developing countries depends on the same factors. We use data from 310 subsidiaries and 265 branches to test the impact of the parent banks’ fundamentals on subsidiaries’ and branches’ capital ratios. We also study how the economic condition and regulatory environment in a bank's home country determine foreign banks’ CAR. Our results provide strong evidence that the CAR of subsidiaries and branches operating in developing and developed countries do not depend on the same set of explanatory factors. We also find that the regulatory framework of a parent bank's home country affects the capitalization of its foreign subsidiaries in the host countries. Finally, we show that specific variables of the parent bank have a stronger effect for foreign banks highly related to the interbank market.     

The Impact of Central Bank Independence on Political Monetary Cycles in Advanced and Developing Nations

This paper examines the extent to which monetary policy is manipulated for political purposes during elections. We do not detect political monetary cycles in advanced countries or developing nations with independent central banks. We do find evidence, however, in developing countries that lack central bank independence. Furthermore, we find some evidence that these cycles are not caused by monetization of election-related fiscal expansions. This suggests that pressure by politicians on the central bank to exploit the Phillips curve may be an important factor in generating political monetary cycles.     

Bank privatization in developing and developed countries: Cross-sectional evidence on the impact of economic and political factors

We examine how political, institutional, and economic factors are related to a country’s decision to privatize state-owned banks. Using a panel of 101 countries from 1982 to 2000, we find that political factors significantly affect the likelihood of bank privatization only in developing countries. Specifically, in non-OECD countries, bank privatization is more likely the more accountable the government is to its people. In contrast, none of our political variables affects the bank privatization decision in developed countries. Economic factors (such as the quality of the nation’s banking sector) are significant determinants of bank privatization in both OECD and non-OECD nations.     

Why government banks underperform: A political interference view

This study proposes a political interference hypothesis to explain how political considerations depress the performance of government banks. We define political interference as a situation in which government bank executives are replaced within 12 months after the country’s major elections (presidential or parliamentary elections). We classify political and non-political government banks as those that experience or do not experience political interference, respectively. The hypothesis firstly suggests that once government banks undertake political interference, their financial performance deteriorates. That is, political banks display the worst performance, followed by non-political banks and private banks have the best performance. Next, we posit that the impact of political interference is greater in developing countries than in developed countries. Finally, we hypothesize that the underperformance of government banks will be reduced if we remove political interference. By employing bank data from 65 countries from the period of 2003–2007, our hypothesis effectively explains why government banks in developed countries escape relatively unscathed, while those in developing countries suffer significantly.     

What drives foreign expansion of the top 100 multinational banks? The role of the credit reporting system

This study explores how information costs, proxied by characteristics of credit reporting systems, affect the foreign expansion of the top 100 multinational banks. We find that banks prefer to expand operations in countries where private credit bureaus exist or where the credit reporting system is of better quality. This preference is particularly strong for banks’ branch decisions. Furthermore, banks prefer subsidiary entry only in countries where private credit bureaus exist with better credit information quality. Overall, our results indicate that banks are attracted to countries where the credit reporting system helps reduce banks’ information costs.     

Bank ownership and stock price informativeness. Does politics matter?

This study investigates the effects of ownership on the informativeness of the stock prices of 636 commercial banks from 59 countries for 2002–2014. We find strong and robust evidence that state ownership is associated with stock prices having less information in developing countries. This result is consistent with the conjecture that state ownership is associated with a less transparent environment that discourages investors from trading on private information. Furthermore, we find that politics magnifies the effect of state ownership on the informativeness of stock prices during election years. In particular, we show that stock prices are less informative for state ownership in countries with civil law or parliamentary systems. These findings shows that the political channel plays an important role in determining the expropriation by government shareholders, especially in developing countries.     

中资银行海外拓展及市场准入研究

全面理解各国对外资银行的准入监管法规是中资银行构建海外网络、拓展境外业务的重要前提。本文在分析中资银行开展跨国经营的内在动因和外部条件的基础上,以WTO框架下与各国银行业开放相关的服务贸易谈判为背景,着重对中资银行境外分支机构申请设立和开业登记遇到的准入限制、业务监管限制两大方面进行了分析,并就中资银行如何应对东道国的监管限制提出了建议。     

Foreign Banks in Poor Countries: Theory and Evidence

We study how foreign bank penetration affects financial sector development in poor countries. A theoretical model shows that when domestic banks are better than foreign banks at monitoring soft information customers, foreign bank entry may hurt these customers and worsen welfare. The model also predicts that credit to the private sector should be lower in countries with more foreign bank penetration, and that foreign banks should have a less risky loan portfolio. In the empirical section, we test these predictions for a sample of lower income countries and find support for the theoretical model.