Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints

This paper studies combinatorial auctions with budget-constrained bidders from a mechanism design perspective. I search for mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational, symmetric, non-wasteful and non-bossy. First focusing on the greedy domain, in which any increase in a bidder’s valuation always exceeds his budget, I derive the unique mechanism, called the Iterative Second Price Auction. For the general domain, however, no such mechanism exists.     

Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions

This paper tests the behavioral equivalence of a class of strategically-equivalent mechanisms that also do not differ in terms of their procedures. In a private value setting, we introduce a family of mechanisms, so-called Mechanism (α), that generalizes the standard first-price sealed-bid auction. In Mechanism (α), buyers are asked to submit a value which will then be multiplied by α to calculate the bids in the auction. When α =?1, Mechanism (α) is the standard first-price sealed-bid auction. We show that for any α, calculated bids should be identical across mechanisms. We conduct a laboratory experiment to test the behavioral equivalence of this class of mechanisms under different values of α. Even though the procedure and environment do not change across auctions, we do not observe the same bidding behavior across these strategically-equivalent mechanisms. Our research can inform mechanism design literature with respect to the design of optimal mechanisms.     

Learning through Simultaneous Play: Evidence from Penny Auctions

This paper contributes to the emerging empirical literature on penny auctions, a particular type of all‐pay auctions. We focus on the potential learning effects that bidders may experience over time but also (and particularly) across auctions as a result of their auction participation. Using detailed bid‐level information, we find that, similarly to earlier literature, bidders suffer from a sunk cost fallacy, whereby their probability of dropping out of an auction is decreasing in the number of bids they have already placed in that auction. Although we do find that learning through repeated participation alleviates the sunk cost fallacy, participation in simultaneous penny auctions emerges as a much more effective learning mechanism, ultimately contributing toward bidders earning higher individual surpluses.     

Sustainable product innovation and changing consumer behavior: Sustainability affordances as triggers of adoption and usage

This conceptual paper argues that for sustainable product innovation to make a contribution to addressing sustainability issues, we need to understand not only why consumers adopt sustainable products but also what makes them use these in sustainable way. To explain how specific product features can change the ways in which consumers engage with sustainable products in the adoption and usage phase, we draw on affordance theory. Affordances refer to the potential for agentic action of users in relation to a technological object. We develop a conceptual framework that explains how sustainable product innovation can lead to the design of sustainability affordances that stimulate adoption and sustainable usage. The framework shows how three forms of agency—material, firm, and user agency—interact and together influence a product's sustainability affordances that drive adoption and a change in consumer behavior. The framework explains how trade-offs between a product's environmental features and consumer expectations regarding desired functionalities and user experience can be overcome.     

LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS FOR ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING

Abstract In this paper, we assess the scope and the specific contribution of laboratory experiments for economic policy making. We review experiments which have addressed a specific problem, institution, mechanism design or tool relevant in economic policy. We have two research questions. What type of policy questions can be addressed in the laboratory? And what is the specific value added of economic experiments for policy making. The survey contains experiments on competition policy, auctions, regulated markets, and emission permits.     

EQUILIBRIA EXISTENCE AND CHARACTERIZATION IN AUCTIONS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND OPEN QUESTIONS

Abstract Establishing existence and characterizing equilibria are both important achievements in the study of auctions. However, we recognize that equilibria existence results form the basis for well accepted characterizations. In this survey, we review the landmark results and highlight open questions regarding equilibria existence and characterizations in auctions. In addition, we review the standard assumptions underlying these results, and discuss the suitability of the Nash equilibrium solution concept. We focus our review on single‐object auctions, but also review results in multi‐unit, divisible, combinatorial and double auctions.     

校企合作战略联盟反馈控制机制研究

校企合作是经济发展和技术创新的必然要求。本文在对校企合作战略联盟内涵界定的基础上,构建了校企合作战略联盟反馈控制模式,高校和企业之间建立起密切的战略伙伴关系,通过实现资源共享,实现利益均沾"、互惠双赢"的目的。校企合作战略联盟系统是复杂反馈系统,通过反馈机制,不断调整系统,促进合作的顺利实施。校企合作战略联盟反馈控制机制需要强化控制意识、控制机制实施和构建信息系统三方面开展。     

Auctions with endogenous participation

We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participants. After seeing their values for the object, potential participants decide whether or not to enter the auction. They may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize equilibrium bidding strategies and entry decisions for both first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions when participation is endogenous. We show that there is a pure strategy entry equilibrium where only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point actually bid. In this context, both types of auctions generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrary to the predictions of the fixed number of bidders literature, the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts with results from the existing literature on auctions with entry. As in the fixed-n literature, we show that first-price auctions generate more expected revenue than second-price auctions when buyers are risk-averse. Finally, we characterize the optimal auction – the auction that maximizes the seller's expected revenue – by using a direct revelation mechanism. The optimal auction involves a reserve price larger than the optimal reserve price in the fixed-n literature. The winner's payment is the second highest bid less the participation cost and losers receive a subsidy equal to the participation cost. Received: 17 August 1998 / 21 September 1999     

Information concentration in common value environments

We consider how information concentration affects a seller’s revenue in common value auctions. The common value is a function of $n$ random variables partitioned among $m \le n$ bidders. For each partition, the seller devises an optimal mechanism. We show that whenever the value function allows scalar sufficient statistics for each player’s signals, the mechanism design problem is well-defined. Additionally, whenever a common regularity condition is satisfied, a coarser partition always reduces revenues. In particular, any merger or collusion among bidders reduces revenue.     

移动支付使用意向影响因素的实证研究

本文基于用户的角度,以科技接受模型理论(TAM)为基础,通过对部分用户使用体验的访谈结果以及有效问卷的数据分析,探讨了用户对于移动支付的使用意向及其影响因素,并对如何更好推动移动支付服务发展提出了建议。     

Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms

This paper reports the results of over 130 auctions conducted under controlled conditions to examine the robustness of several auction mechanisms to allocate multiple objects. The simultaneous discrete auction process used by the Federal Communications Commission to allocate Personal Communications licenses was contrasted with a sequential auction and a combinatorial auction over a variety of demand conditions. In test environments created to check only the minimum competency of the procedures, the simultaneous discrete auction process produces highly efficient allocations, approaching levels similar to those found with a continuous form of the auction, and it outperforms a sequential auction. However, in environments created to stress test the procedures, a combinatorial auction outperforms the simultaneous discrete auction.     

Existence of optimal auctions in general environments

We provide a unified approach to the problem of existence of optimal auctions for a wide variety of auction environments. We accomplish this by first establishing a general existence result for a particular Stackelberg revelation game. By systematically specializing our revelation game to cover various types of auctions, we are able to deduce the existence of optimal Bayesian auction mechanisms for single and multiple unit auctions, as well as for contract auctions with moral hazard and adverse selection. In all cases, we allow for risk aversion and multidimensional, stochastically dependent types.     

Effect of purchase volume flexibility and purchase mix flexibility on e-procurement performance: An analysis of two perspectives

Despite the widespread adoption of e-procurement by firms in recent years, academic research examining the mechanisms through which e-procurement applications lead to performance has been scarce. Anecdotal evidence points to numerous situations where companies have failed to harness the potential of e-procurement. In this paper, we argue that online purchase volume and mix flexibilities facilitated by these applications play a significant role in the ability of firms to benefit from e-procurement. We examine this tenet from both an economic as well as a social perspective. We propose that increased online purchase volume flexibility as well as online purchase mix flexibility can be facilitated by two mechanisms – supplier customization as explained by transaction costs perspective, and information sharing between supply chain partners using a social exchange theoretical perspective. The increased purchase volume and mix flexibility in turn leads to better performance along the dimensions of cost, quality, and delivery. We present and test a nuanced perspective where we argue that (i) the effect of supplier customization on both purchase volume and mix flexibilities will be moderated by the frequency of transactions conducted online, and (ii) the effect of information sharing on both purchase volume and mix flexibilities will be moderated by trust in the supplier. We estimate our research model using survey data collected from 130 purchasing and procurement managers. We find strong support for our proposed research model with results indicating that purchase volume and mix flexibilities play a vital mediating role in impacting e-procurement performance. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed.     

Sudden Termination Auctions—An Experimental Study

The design of online markets has become a major issue due to the capability of operators to implement almost any set of market rules overnight. With this study we contribute to the literature of auction market design by presenting a theoretical and experimental analysis of sudden termination auctions. Our main focus is on the candle auction that has a positive termination probability at any time in the course of the auction. Candle auctions prove to be a much faster, but equally efficient alternative to standard hard close auctions.     

(No) Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)

This comment revisits Chung and Ely (Rev Econ Stud 74:447–476, 2007) in which robustly optimal auctions where investigated. Chung and Ely used a maxmin approach to define robust optimality. Chung and Ely provided conditions under which dominant strategy auctions are robustly optimal in their sense. This comment proposes a refinement of Chung and Ely’s criterion and shows that, with this refined criterion, dominant strategy auctions are not optimal if there are at least three bidders. According to the refinement the auctioneer should not choose dominated auctions, that is, auctions for which there exist other mechanisms that never generate lower expected revenue, and sometimes higher expected revenue. We construct such a dominating mechanism for dominant strategy auctions. The construction exploits the possibility of side bets when beliefs are not derived from common priors. Chung and Ely (Rev Econ Stud 74:447–476, 2007) admitted such beliefs.     

基于文化基因算法的组合拍卖竞胜标决定问题研究

针对组合拍卖竞胜标决定问题(WDP)这一NP难题,提出利用文化基因算法(Memetic Algorithm)对其进行求解。结果表明其在求解该问题上相比遗传算法、模拟退火算法具有稳定性好,求解质量高,收敛速度快,运算效率高的特点,能够提高组合拍卖的效率。     

Re-examining the role of attitude in information system acceptance: a model from the satisfaction–dissatisfaction perspective

This study attempts to re-examine the role of attitude in voluntary information system (IS) acceptance and usage, which has often been discounted in the previous technology acceptance research. We extend the unidimensional view of attitude into a bidimensional one, because of the simultaneous existence of both positive and negative evaluation towards IS in technology acceptance behaviour. In doing so, attitude construct is divided into two components: satisfaction as the positive attitudinal component and dissatisfaction as the negative attitudinal component. We argue that satisfaction and dissatisfaction will interactively affect technology usage intention. Besides, we explore the predictors of satisfaction and dissatisfaction based on the disconfirmation theory. Empirical results from a longitudinal study on bulletin board system (BBS) usage confirm the interaction effect of satisfaction and dissatisfaction on usage intention. Moreover, perceived task-related value has a significant effect on satisfaction, while perceived personal value has a significant effect on dissatisfaction. We also discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of our findings.     

Maximizing bidder surplus in simultaneous online art auctions via dynamic forecasting

This paper presents a novel intelligent bidding system, called SOABER (Simultaneous Online Auction BiddER), which monitors simultaneous online auctions of high-value fine art items. It supports decision-making by maximizing bidders’ surpluses and their chances of winning an auction. One key element of the system is a dynamic forecasting model, which incorporates information about the speed of an auction’s price movement, as well as the level of competition both within and across auctions. Other elements include a wallet estimator, which gauges the bidders’ willingness to pay, and a bid strategizer, which embeds the forecasting model into a fully automated decision system. We illustrate the performance of our intelligent bidding system on an authentic dataset of online art auctions for Indian contemporary art. We compare our system with several simpler ad-hoc approaches, and find it to be more effective in terms of both the extracted surplus and the resulting winning percentage.     

Common value auctions with independent types

In this paper I consider a common value model, with independent types, where the ex-post value of the good is influenced by the bidders' information at the auction stage. The seller cannot fully extract the surplus. In a symmetric model the optimal mechanism can be implemented through first price, second price, or English auctions; but not through a Dutch auction. Other properties of the optimal auctions are that the seller's reservation price is endogenous, and that in sealed bid auctions the price may exceed the value of the object (winner's curse).     

“I like it,but I don't use it”: Impact of carsharing business models on usage intentions in the sharing economy

Carsharing is often promoted as a potentially environmental‐friendly alternative to individual car ownership. However, various carsharing programs have displayed limited success in the past. An initial field study of a new carsharing service is such a story of failure: The introduction of this new service at a medium‐sized German university generated unexpectedly low adoption rates so that the service was eventually scaled down and then suspended. Quantitative field study results as well as additional qualitative focus groups reveal that missing compatibility is a key barrier to adoption. Drawing on extant conceptual frameworks of user participation in sharing business models, a factorial survey identifies the importance of different dimensions of carsharing business models for their acceptance. The results reveal that a set of convenience and lifestyle dimensions influences usage intentions, including mode of drive, pickup and drop‐off mode, service level, price model, availability, and type of market mediation. In contrast, vehicle fleet does not appear to influence carsharing models' acceptance. These findings contribute to research on business model configuration as well as the attitude–behavior gap in the sharing economy by determining relevant dimensions of a carsharing business model that can bridge the gap between basically positive attitudes and usage resistance. Thereby, they also serve for concrete managerial recommendations.