Loan Commitment Contracts,Terms of Lending,and Credit Allocation

This paper analyzes the structure of loan commitment contracts and the interrelationships among their component parameters. Lenders offer borrowers a set of loan “packages,” from which the latter may choose that “package” found to be most appealing. Borrowers may “trade off” changes in any loan parameter in exchange for other adjustments. The borrower, at this time, may “purchase” a larger credit ration for a price. Supporting empirical evidence is presented.     

Information, Credit Risk, Lender Specialization and Loan Pricing: Evidence from the DIP Financing Market

We provide an empirical support for theories of lender specialization using the recently developed market for Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) financing. The legal environment in which DIP financing operates represents a natural laboratory for testing determinants of lending specialization (e.g. lender choice). We find that the choice of lender is not driven by credit risk, but by information considerations and that this lending specialization has loan pricing effects. In short, banks (non-bank lenders) lend to more (less) transparent firms and at lower (higher) loan spreads. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that banks provide important and useful services.

金融创新、私有企业应计质量与非银行信贷融资

随着金融创新活动的不断推进,我国金融体系的非银行信贷增长迅速。本文选取2007年至2012年我国私有上市企业数据,研究金融管制和创新环境下私有企业非银行信贷融资与应计质量之间的关系。我们研究发现,应计质量影响到企业非银行信贷融资的获取,表现为应计质量越高的企业,越容易获取非银行信贷融资。但是,金融创新活动减弱了应计质量对非银行信贷融资的这一正向作用,即在金融创新激烈的年度区间,由于非银行金融机构间的竞争加剧,迫使他们在信贷发放中对应计质量的依赖作用减弱,这无疑增加了金融系统的信贷风险。本文的研究不仅拓展了应计质量能够缓解企业融资约束的理论成果,而且对创新环境下的金融监管具有重要的政策启示。     

The Design of Private Reinsurance Contracts

This article examines the effect of asymmetric information on the trading of underwriting risk between insurers and reinsurers and how it is mitigated in a context of long-term relationships. It begins by explaining how information problems affect the efficiency of the allocation of risk between insurers and reinsurers and how long-term implicit contracts allow the inclusion of new information in the pricing of reinsurance coverage. A key feature of these relationships is the reliance on loss-contingent rebates and commissions in the pricing of reinsurance coverage. We argue that when information is revealed only over time, long-term implicit contracts between insurers and reinsurers allow the inclusion of new information into reinsurance pricing. Because of this feature, the allocation of risk between insurers and reinsurers is more efficient. Specifically, such arrangements lead to more reinsurance coverage, higher insurer profits, and lower expected distress in the industry. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G22, G13, L15, D81.     

风险态度、合作行为与联保贷款契约:一个实验研究

本文应用实验室实验方法,研究了在不同贷款契约情况下,借款人风险态度等因素对合作水平(努力程度)的影响。研究发现:(1)联保贷款契约下参与者的努力水平之间存在正相关关系,且其努力水平显著高于个人责任契约下参与者的努力水平。说明联保贷款契约参与者存在较高的有条件合作行为;(2)在联保贷款契约下,风险喜好参与者的努力水平显著高于风险规避参与者。说明联保贷款契约对风险喜好参与者具有显著激励作用;(3)风险规避参与者的努力水平随实验期数增加而下降的速度比风险喜好参与者更快,风险规避参与者对联保贷款契约合作水平有较大危害。我们提出:小额贷款机构应当为风险喜好借款人提供联保贷款契约,并且避免风险规避的借款人与风险喜好的借款人组成联保贷款小组。对风险喜好借款人组成的联保贷款小组,联保贷款契约的期限可以较长。     

企业风险异质性、贷款利率与信贷违约风险——基于银行信贷微观数据

通过某股份制商业银行2010-2015年贷款数据,讨论不同风险贷款企业、贷款利率与信贷违约之间的关系.结果表明:贷款利率与贷款违约之间呈现U型关系;高风险等级企业与贷款违约之间正相关且显著;无论是高风险等级企业还是低风险等级企业与银行贷款利率之间均呈现负相关且显著,说明贷款利率的抑制现象依然存在.从参数估计值来看,低风险等级企业贷款利率要低于高风险等级企业;高风险企业与贷款利率交叉项与违约之间呈现负相关且显著,说明高风险企业通过贷款利率渠道确实可以降低信贷违约概率.     

集团性客户的信贷风险问题

集团性客户相对于单个客户，在给银行带来较大经济利益的同时也蕴藏着巨大的风险，这类风险主要源自三个方面，一是客户，二是银行，三是社会。     

浅议商业银行的信贷风险管理机制

经济效益不佳，信贷资产质量不高，信贷风险管理机制不健全，是我国目前商业银行经营中面临的一个非常突出的问题，也是制约我国金融改革的主要障碍，为了保证银行信贷资金的安全，现代商业银行特别重视信贷风险管理机制对防范、化解信贷风险所起的积极作用，而完整的商业银行风险管理机制应包括信贷风险识别机制、信贷风险量化分析机制、信贷风险预防机制和信贷风险处理机制等四个方面。     

非对称信息理论与农村信贷市场——兼谈泰国BAAC的经验

从非对称信息理论出发，联系泰国农业合作银行（BAAC）的经营实际，笔者认为非对称信息引起的逆向选择和道德风险，是阻碍正规金融机构在农村开展金融业务的重要原因。解除金融抑制，实现农村利率自由化并不能完全解决农村正规金融弱化的问题，政府介入农村金融市场应该重点采取制度创新方式，帮助解决农村信息不对称问题，激励正规金融部门为农村提供金融服务。     

信贷风险控制中的借款用途审查原则——以一起“以贷还贷”借款担保纠纷诉讼案为例

在对经办行贷款用途真实性调查中发现,企业客户编造虚假贷款用途的现象屡见不鲜,比如,商业企业签订并不真实的购货合同申请贷款,房地产公司侵犯他人名称权订立并不实际履行的住房按揭购房合同套取银行资金,还有的企业甚至以流动资金周转的名义办理实际用途为固定资产投资的项目贷款等.     

农业产业链下的信息、信用与信贷链接:东营案例

本文通过研究产业链整合相关理论,从东营海参产业案例出发,分析探了立足于农业产业链所开展的信息、信用与信贷的有效链接模式,为"三农问题"的解决提供了很好的借鉴。     

Price Discovery and Dissemination of Private Information by Loan Syndicate Participants

We delineate key channels through which flows of confidential information to loan syndicate participants impact the dynamics of information arrival in prices. We isolate the timing of private information flows by estimating the speed of price discovery over quarterly earnings cycles in both secondary syndicated loan and equity markets. We identify borrowers disseminating private information to lenders relatively early in the cycle with firms exhibiting relatively early price discovery in the secondary loan market, documenting that price discovery is faster for loans subject to financial covenants, particularly earnings‐based covenants; for borrowers who experience covenant violations; for borrowers with high credit risk; and for loans syndicated by relationship‐based lenders or highly reputable lead arrangers. We then ask whether early access to private information in the loan market accelerates the speed of information arrival in stock prices. We document that the stock returns of firms identified with earlier private information dissemination to lenders indeed exhibit faster price discovery in the stock market, but only when institutional investors are involved in the firm's syndicated loans. Further, the positive relation between institutional lending and the speed of stock price discovery is more pronounced in relatively weak public disclosure environments. These results are consistent with institutional lenders systematically exploiting confidential syndicate information via trading in the equity market.     

Evidence of Forward-Looking Loan Loss Provisioning with Credit Market Information

Our paper makes a fundamental contribution by studying loan loss provisioning over the credit cycle as three distinct phases. Looking at the three distinct phases of the financial crisis – the pre-crisis period, crisis period, and post-crisis period – is important as loan loss provisioning is driven by different factors in each, in part due to extensive shifts in (or in the application of) regulatory rule. Controlling for credit market information using data from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Surveys (SLOOS) we extend the work of previous studies of forward-looking loan loss provisions using the delayed expected loss recognition approach. We contribute to the growing literature on forward-looking loan loss provisioning and early in the cycle loss recognition by incorporating a broader range of available credit information and explicitly controlling for structural breaks in the sample corresponding to the financial crisis.     

借款描述对互联网金融信用风险的影响研究

基于互联网金融提供的客户借款描述,通过潜在语义分析挖掘借款描述文本内容的主题,运用二元分位数回归分析借款描述对互联网金融信用风险的影响。实证结果表明,借款描述中有关情感表达、个人信用和借款目的的描述与违约情况呈负相关,有关财务情况的描述与违约情况呈正相关。     

关联交易对金融企业信贷风险的影响

近年来,部分企业为了达到粉饰业绩、降低税负等目的,常常通过集团客户内部和关联企业之间的关联交易、资产重组等手段在内部关联方之间转移资产或利润。这类问题对于作为债权人的商业银行的稳健经营乃至整个银行系统的安全构成了很大的风险,对于企业持续经营及社会稳定带来负面影响。     

中小企业融资担保信用风险的微观生成机理研究——基于信息经济学视角的探讨

从信息经济学视角分析中小企业融资担保风险生成的微观机理,结果表明,中小企业信用担保机构尽管在一定程度上缓解了其与中小企业之间的信息不对称,但由于增加了中小企业的融资成本,反而会在一定程度上加剧逆向选择和道德风险,导致中小企业信用担保机构成为中小企业融资风险的最终承担者。坚持市场化运作是担保机构生存和可持续发展的根本保证,也是完善我国中小企业信用担保体系应坚持的一条重要原则。     

Credit Reporting, Relationship Banking, and Loan Repayment

How does information sharing between lenders affect borrowers repayment behavior? We show—in a laboratory credit market—that information sharing increases repayment rates, as borrowers anticipate that a good credit record improves their access to credit. This incentive effect of information sharing is substantial when repayment is not third‐party enforceable and lending is dominated by one‐shot transactions. If, however, repeat interaction between borrowers and lenders is feasible, the incentive effect of credit reporting is negligible, as bilateral banking relationships discipline borrowers. Information sharing nevertheless affects market outcome by weakening lenders' ability to extract rents from relationships.     

上市银行信贷资产及信用风险信息披露分析

商业银行信贷资产及信用风险的充分披露是有效监管的基础.论文通过对我国风险披露制度演进和四家上市银行2000-2003年的信贷资产及信用风险披露情况的具体分析,揭示了信用风险披露制度存在的缺陷和四家上市银行在披露中存在的问题,最后提出简要的政策建议.     

备用信用证担保人民币贷款的性质、条件及风险控制

备用信用证贷款是由开证行承担独立、第一性付款责任的外汇、信用保证贷款,其担保的有效性决定了融资业务的低风险特征。认识备用证及其担保作用,明确业务性质,是确立信贷条件和有效控制风险的必要前提,也是规范业务发展的基本要求。