董事高管责任保险、审计意见与银行信贷决策

董事高管责任保险的引入能否提升公司治理效果,目前存在机会主义假说和外部监督假说两种截然相反的观点。文章以银行信贷决策为切入点,首先考察不同的审计意见如何影响银行信贷决策,在此基础上重点考察董事高管责任保险对审计意见与银行信贷规模关系的调节作用,以检验董事高管责任保险的治理效应。研究显示,与获得标准审计意见的公司相比,那些获得非标审计意见的公司,其次年新增的银行信贷规模显著下降;更为重要的是,董事高管责任保险的购买强化了非标审计意见降低次年新增银行信贷规模的关系。上述结果表明,董事高管责任保险的引入向银行传递了机会主义的信号,导致银行做出了减少信贷规模的决策。     

有关审计意见识别盈余管理能力的研究--来自沪市制造业的经验证据

选取沪市制造行业2000年和2001年两年期间所有被出具非标准无保留审计意见的公司作为样本，以及随机抽取相同数目、相同行业、相同期间被出具标准无保留审计意见的公司作为配对样本，对审计意见识别盈余管理水平的能力进行了实证研究。研究结果表明，审计意见具有一定的信息含量，能在一定程度上揭示出上市公司的盈余管理现象，并找到了2001年独立审计质量得到了提高的证据。     

审计意见影响因素分析与研究

为了研究上市公司财务状况对注册会计师出具审计意见类型的影响,文章从公司偿债能力、盈利能力和营运能力三个方面的财务指标出发,研究分析了财务状况与审计意见类型之间的相关性.研究结果表明:偿债能力与非标准无保留审计意见的相关性不显著;盈利能力越好的公司被出具非标准意见的可能性就越小;应收账款周转率与应收账款周转天数与非标准审计意见显著负相关;固定资产周转率与非标准审计意见没有显著的相关性.     

上市公司非标准审计意见的变化趋势分析

非标准审计意见是指除了标准审计意见之外的其他各种类型的审计意见,按外在形式可分为带强调事项段的无保留意见、保留意见、无法表示意见和否定意见.按照是否涉及持续经营不确定性问题,非标准审计意见又可以分为持续经营审计意见和非持续经营审计意见.本文通过对上市公司2006年到2010年被出具的非标准审计意见进行统计,分析了不同种类非标准审计意见近5年来的变化趋势     

上市公司财务敏感区间与项目的审计意见

本文基于我国A股上市公司数据检验了财务敏感区间、项目与审计意见的关系,发现微利区间、重亏区间同非标准审计意见显著正相关,而配股达线区间、应计项目、线下项目同非标准审计意见的关系不显著。此外发现应收账款占总资产比重、资产负债率、以前年度审计意见和事务所变更等因素对非标准审计意见具有重大影响,主营业务收入比重和上市公司规模则对非标准审计意见没有显著影响,现金比率、上市年限、事务所排名等变量影响不具有时间上的一致性和连续性。     

债务重组、退市压力与审计意见

本文以新准则实施后2007年和2008年中国A股上市公司为样本,研究发现新准则下进行机会主义债务重组的公司主要是已经连续两年亏损面临停牌风险的公司,而一年亏损的公司则对这一极端盈余管理手段的使用比较谨慎,并不倾向于进行债务重组来避免被特别处理。同时,发挥外部公司治理功能的审计师能够在一定程度察觉这些公司的机会主义行为,但是由于我国退市制度中没有对审计意见的严格规定,使得审计意见对公司进行机会主义债务重组行为的制约作用较弱。     

2003年沪市非标审计意见分析

一、2003沪市审计意见概况 非标准无保留审计意见是指注册会计师出具的除标准无保留审计意见外的其他类型审计意见,包括带说明段的无保留意见、保留意见(含带说明段的保留意见)、无法表示意见和否定意见.截止2003年4月30日,沪市除红河光明和*ST丰华2家公司外,共有806家上市公司如期披露了2003年年度报告,59家公司被出具非标准审计报告,非标准审计意见的比例为7.3%:与2002年的9.55%相比,呈现下降的趋势.     

审计收费、审计师变更与意见购买

实证研究表明,虽然变更审计师增加了上市公司年报被出具非标准审计意见和审计意见恶化的可能性,但是审计师变更更为显著地提高了审计意见改善的可能性;审计收费异常增加与被出具非标准审计意见和审计意见恶化的可能性负相关.公司管理层在一定程度上可以成功实现审计意见购买的动机.此外,异常审计收费、审计收费异常增加和异常降低与审计师变更之间不存在显著的交互效应.     

非标准审计意见的信息含量研究

本文以我国证券市场2005和2006年获得非标准审计意见的上市公司为样本,运用事件研究法和多元回归分析模型,同时从正向和反向角度分年度考察了非标准审计意见的信息含量。研究发现:2005年我国上市公司非标准审计意见有负的信息含量,但上年非标准审计意见本年标准审计意见无明显的信息含量;2006年和2005年非标准审计意见的信息含量存在显著差异;2006年和2005年上年非标准审计意见本年标准审计意见的信息含量存在显著差异。     

财务报告审计意见与内部控制审计意见不一致影响商业信用吗？

本文以2010-2021年我国沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了上市公司财务报告审计意见与内部控制审计意见的不一致对商业信用融资的影响。研究发现,上市公司财务报告审计意见与内部控制审计意见不一致将显著降低其商业信用融资水平,但公司的市场地位能削弱审计意见不一致与商业信用融资之间的负相关关系,社会信任则加剧了审计意见不一致对商业信用融资的负面效果;相较于标准财务报告审计意见与非标准内部控制审计意见的不一致,非标准财务报告审计意见与标准内部控制审计意见的这种不一致对商业信用融资的负面影响更为显著。本文拓展了审计意见信息含量的研究,为企业信用政策制定以及审计改革的深化提供了参考。     

Ownership,two-tier board structure,and the informativeness of earnings – Evidence from China

This study extends previous research by empirically examining how ownership, two-tier board structure, and auditor affect the informativeness of earnings for companies listed in China. We measure the informativeness of earnings by the earnings–returns relation, discretionary accruals, and audit opinion. The results show that ownership concentration, the presence of foreign shareholders, the percentage of tradable shares, the type of dominant shareholder, the supervisory board, and independent directors affect the earnings response coefficients and discretionary accruals. We also find that the type of dominant shareholder, the size of the supervisory board, and the percentage of independent directors have an impact on the frequency of modified audit opinions. Our research has implications for China’s regulators who are striving to improve accounting information, transparency, and corporate governance.     

Tracing back to the source: Understanding the corporate governance of boards of directors in Chinese SOEs

Based on the relevant theories of corporate governance and the special institutional background of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this paper systematically reviews the literature on the independence and governance effect of SOE boards. We find that the governance effect of SOE boards is driven by the dual characteristics of SOEs: state involvement in ownership and market incentives. With the state involved in ownership, SOEs adhere to the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which results in an enhanced governance effect. Under market incentives, SOEs tend to have an optimal board structure that helps mitigate both the shareholder–management agency problem (Type I agency problem) and the controlling shareholder–minority shareholder agency problem (Type II agency problem). In terms of the governance effect of boards, directors appointed by non-controlling shareholders are effective in alleviating Type I and Type II agency problems, and this highlights the importance of mixed-ownership reforms in SOEs. Independent directors, especially those with a professional background, also play a role in improving corporate governance. However, independent directors in SOEs have relatively weak incentives to monitor, which limits their governance effect. This paper shows positive implications for promoting mixed-ownership reforms and improving board governance in SOEs.     

Does independent directors’’ monitoring affect reputation? Evidence from the stock and labor markets

Using novel data on independent directors’ opinions in China, we investigate the stock and labor market effects prompted by independent directors publicly saying “no” to major board decisions. We find that the market reacts negatively to modified director opinions, but positively to firms interlocked with the directors who said “no.” We further find substantial turnover and decline in board seats after independent directors issue modified opinions. Overall, we identify a dilemma in China whereby the labor market does not reward vigilant directors for standing up to firm insiders, although investors add a premium to effective board monitoring.     

The effect of stock-based incentives and governance mechanisms on voluntary disclosure of intangibles

The purpose of this study is to investigate the role of stock-based incentives in encouraging more voluntary disclosures about firm-specific intangibles. I also examine whether corporate governance, previously found to be related to voluntary disclosures, is a complement to or substitute for stock-based incentives. Using content analysis of annual reports of a sample of high-tech firms, I find that stock-based incentives are positively associated with firms' voluntary disclosures about intangibles. With regard to the effect of governance mechanisms, I find that corporate governance does not have a relationship with disclosures when stock-based incentives are low. On the other hand, better governance will strengthen the positive effect of stock-based incentives on disclosures, suggesting that governance and incentives mechanisms are complements instead of substitutes. The results also show that this complementary effect primarily results from the internal monitoring provided by the board of directors.     

Management Going‐concern Disclosures: Impact of Corporate Governance and Auditor Reputation

The UK regulatory requirements relating to going‐concern disclosures require directors to report on the going‐concern status of their firms. Such directors have incentives not to report fairly in the case of financially‐distressed firms. We expect effective corporate governance mechanisms will encourage directors to report more truthfully in such situations. This paper tests this proposition explicitly using a large sample of going‐concern cases over the period 1994–2000. We find that whereas auditors' going‐concern opinions predict the subsequent resolution of going‐concern uncertainties directors' going‐concern statements convey arbitrary and unhelpful messages to users. However, robust corporate governance structures and high auditor reputation constrain directors to be more truthful in their going‐concern disclosures, bringing these more into line with the more credible auditor opinions.     

Covering or monitoring? Independent director connectedness and corporate fraud in China

This paper examines how independent directors’ social capital, as measured by their social network, affects corporate fraud. We find that firms with well-connected independent directors are less likely to commit fraud, supporting our monitoring effect hypothesis. This result is robust to a battery of tests. Further analyses show that the effect is stronger for firms with a relatively poor legal environment, for firms whose independent directors face strong reputation incentives and when independent directors are audit committee members. Moreover, we explore a potential economic mechanism of the effect and observe that well-connected independent directors are associated with less absenteeism and more dissension. Overall, our findings suggest that independent directors’ social capital plays an important role in corporate governance.     

The association between voluntary disclosure and corporate governance in the presence of severe agency conflicts

Agency conflicts between different types of investors are particularly severe in the presence of high family and block-holder ownership. By focusing on a setting characterised by high ownership concentration, we study the role of independent directors in promoting transparency through increased disclosure. In our tests, we use a sample of Spanish firms and, consistent with prior work, show that the presence of these directors is strongly associated with increased voluntary disclosure. Additionally, we find that when an executive director takes on Chair responsibilities the level of voluntary information is reduced, creating potential conflicts with the role of independent directors. Our results suggest that a strong legal framework holds firm-level clashes of interest in check. We conclude that this regulatory environment can create sufficient incentives to bring together the interests of minority and majority shareholders and guarantee an efficient monitoring role of independent directors. However, results suggest that other mechanisms should be reinforced in order to improve the role of governance control on agency relationships, particularly in the case of the concentration of Chair and executive responsibilities.     

Does the reputation mechanism apply to independent directors in emerging markets? Evidence from China

We examine whether reputable independent directors improve firm performance and governance quality in emerging markets, using data from China. Firms with such directors, measured as the number of directorships in other listed firms, have higher profitability, operating efficiency and productivity. They suffer from fewer agency problems, pay more cash dividends and have lower likelihoods of receiving modified audit opinions and participating in financial disclosure-related irregularities than their counterparts. In China’s unique institutional context, the reputation mechanism for independent directors applies to firms in regions with weak marketization environments, non-state-owned enterprises and firms without political connections; it also applies when external governance is weak. Overall, reputable independent directors appear to occupy valuable advising and monitoring roles and compensate for weak institutions and governance in China.     

Does the independence of independent directors matter?

This paper analyzes the characteristics of firms that declare board directors as independents, although the directors are not strictly independent, and examines the consequences in terms of performance and corporate governance outcomes. Based on publicly available information, eight criteria of “independence” used to examine a panel of Spanish listed firms classify 14.2% of the directors as strictly independent, whereas the firms classify 32.5% of the board as independent directors. Firms with dispersed ownership structures misclassify directors more frequently than do firms with large controlling owners. In terms of consequences, we find weak evidence of a negative relation between misclassification and a firm's future operating performance. However, no relation is found between independents' misclassification and several relevant outcomes of the primary delegated committees with monitoring roles: the audit committee and the nomination and remuneration committee. There is no significance with regard to the non-strictly independent measures explaining executive directors' compensation, CEO turnover, audit qualifications or earning management behavior.     

Executive compensation and corporate governance in China

We investigate executive compensation and corporate governance in China's publicly traded firms. We also compare executive pay in China to the USA. Consistent with agency theory, we find that executive compensation is positively correlated to firm performance. The study shows that executive pay and CEO incentives are lower in State controlled firms and firms with concentrated ownership structures. Boardroom governance is important. We find that firms with more independent directors on the board have a higher pay-for-performance link. Non-State (private) controlled firms and firms with more independent directors on the board are more likely to replace the CEO for poor performance. Finally, we document that US executive pay (salary and bonus) is about seventeen times higher than in China. Significant differences in US-China pay persist even after controlling for economic and governance factors.