Cash Holdings and Corporate Diversification

This paper studies the relation between corporate liquidity and diversification. The key finding is that multidivision firms hold significantly less cash than stand‐alone firms because they are diversified in their investment opportunities. Lower cross‐divisional correlations in investment opportunity and higher correlations between investment opportunity and cash flow correspond to lower cash holdings, even after controlling for cash flow volatility. The effects are strongest in financially constrained firms and in well‐governed firms, and correspond to efficient fund transfers from low‐ to high‐productivity divisions. Taken together, these results bring forth an efficient link between diversification and corporate liquidity.     

Corporate Cash Reserves and Acquisitions

Cash-rich firms are more likely than other firms to attempt acquisitions. Stock return evidence shows that acquisitions by cash-rich firms are value decreasing. Cash-rich bidders destroy seven cents in value for every excess dollar of cash reserves held. Cash-rich firms are more likely to make diversifying acquisitions and their targets are less likely to attract other bidders. Consistent with the stock return evidence, mergers in which the bidder is cash-rich are followed by abnormal declines in operating performance. Overall, the evidence supports the agency costs of free cash flow explanation for acquisitions by cash-rich firms.     

公司特征、股权结构与现金持有量

在中国特定的制度和治理背景下探讨企业特征与股权结构对企业现金持有量的影响,并从静态和动态两个角度进行实证研究的结果表明,虽然静态实证结果显示权衡理论、代理理论和融资优序理论都能一定程度上解释中国企业的现金持有行为,但动态实证结果显示中国上市公司的现金持有量具有动态的均值复归趋势。这符合权衡理论和代理理论的预期,但不符合融资优序理论预期。     

Product Market Threats and the Value of Corporate Cash Holdings

We construct a model to show that predatory strategies by a financially strong rival can cause a financially weak firm to underinvest. This threat intensifies when the two firms produce similar products and share similar future investment opportunities. We show that cash holdings become more valuable by providing liquidity to fund investment opportunities as they emerge, thereby mitigating the underinvestment problem. Empirical evidence supports these model predictions. The value of cash is significantly higher for firms facing higher predatory threats. The results are robust to various controls for financial constraints, corporate governance, risk factors, and industry‐level measures of product market competition. An identification strategy that exploits exogenous variation in financial constraints further corroborates the causal effect of predatory threats on the value of cash.     

Labor Union Effect on Corporate Cash Holdings and Their Marginal Value

By using panel data from Korean listed firms, we find that unionized firms strategically hold less cash to enhance their bargaining power against labor unions. We also find that unionized firms are likely to reduce the marginal value of their cash holdings, thereby decreasing shareholder value from the agency theory perspective. This finding complements the agency theory argument that managers tend to waste corporate resources by hoarding cash, particularly when faced with increased information asymmetry and financial constraints. Overall, our results suggest that information-related financial constraints and agency problems are likely to co-exist in unionized firms.     

Earnings Quality Effect on Corporate Excess Cash Holdings and Their Marginal Value

By using panel data from Korea’s listed firms, we find that firms with poor earnings quality are more likely to accumulate excess cash holdings, perhaps in an attempt to buffer themselves from information asymmetry problems. We also find that firms with poor earnings quality are more likely to discount the marginal value of their excess cash holdings because their shareholders appear to question the reason for such cash policy changes from the agency theory perspective. Overall, our results suggest that information asymmetry and agency problems are likely to co-exist in firms with poor earnings quality.     

Refinancing Risk and Cash Holdings

We find that firms mitigate refinancing risk by increasing their cash holdings and saving cash from cash flows. The maturity of firms’ long‐term debt has shortened markedly, and this shortening explains a large fraction of the increase in cash holdings over time. Consistent with the inference that cash reserves are particularly valuable for firms with refinancing risk, we document that the value of these reserves is higher for such firms and that they mitigate underinvestment problems. Our findings imply that refinancing risk is a key determinant of cash holdings and highlight the interdependence of a firm's financial policy decisions.     

The Determinants of REIT Cash Holdings

The factors influencing the cash holdings of REITs are examined with the view that the REIT industry should yield new information regarding the drivers of corporate cash policy due to their unique operating conditions. The availability of REIT line of credit data also allows us to test the association between cash holdings and line of credit access and use. Data constraints in prior investigations have left this an unresolved empirical question in the cash holdings literature. The baseline results show that REIT cash holdings are inversely related to funds from operations, leverage, and internal advisement and are directly related to the cost of external finance and growth opportunities. Cash holdings are also negatively associated with credit line access and use. The results imply that REIT managers elect to hold little cash to reduce the agency problems of cash flow thereby increasing transparency and reducing the future cost of external capital.

Disclosure Regulation and Corporate Acquisitions

This paper examines the effect of disclosure regulation on the takeover market. We study the implementation of a recent European regulation that imposes tighter disclosure requirements regarding the financial and ownership information on public firms. We find a substantial drop in the number of control acquisitions after the implementation of the regulation, a decrease that is concentrated in countries with more dynamic takeover markets. Consistent with the idea that the disclosure requirements increased acquisition costs, we also observe that, under the new disclosure regime, target (acquirer) stock returns around the acquisition announcement are higher (lower), and toeholds are substantially smaller. Overall, our evidence suggests that tighter disclosure requirements can impose significant acquisition costs on bidders and thus slow down takeover activity.     

Cash and Corporate Control

The takeover market is often suggested as appropriate for containing the agency problems of excessive corporate cash holdings. However, recent studies report contradictory evidence. I focus on the takeover‐deterrence effects of corporate liquidity and suggest the proxy contest as an effective alternative control mechanism. I find that proxy fight targets hold 23% more cash than comparable firms, and that the probability of a contest is significantly increasing in excess cash holdings. Proxy fight announcement return also is positively related to excess cash. Following a contest, executive turnover and special cash distributions to shareholders increase, while cash holdings significantly decline.     

内部控制、现金持有及经济后果

以我国A股上市公司为研究样本,本文系统研究了内部控制质量对于企业现金持有的影响及作用机制。实证结果表明,内部控制质量改善能够显著提高企业的现金持有价值,即投资者对内部控制质量高的企业的现金持有给予了显著更高的定价;其作用机制在于,内部控制质量的完善有助于抑制企业内部对自由现金流的过度投资,从而有助于企业更高效地持有相对较多现金以预防未来经营中的不确定性。本文的研究丰富和拓展了内部控制及现金持有等相关领域的研究文献,同时印证了近些年我国监管机构致力于内控体系规范建设的重要现实意义。     

Corporate Innovations and Mergers and Acquisitions

Using a large and unique patent‐merger data set over the period 1984 to 2006, we show that companies with large patent portfolios and low R&D expenses are acquirers, while companies with high R&D expenses and slow growth in patent output are targets. Further, technological overlap between firm pairs has a positive effect on transaction incidence, and this effect is reduced for firm pairs that overlap in product markets. We also show that acquirers with prior technological linkage to their target firms produce more patents afterwards. We conclude that synergies obtained from combining innovation capabilities are important drivers of acquisitions.     

现金持有水平、投资者保护与关联交易

以沪深两市的非金融类上市公司为样本,考察现金持有水平、投资者与关联交易之间的关系,结果发现上市公司的现金持有水平与关联交易显著正相关,这意味着上市公司的现金持有水平越高,基于大股东掏空的关联交易侵占越多;在投资者保护较差的公司,现金持有水平与关联交易之间的正相关关系更强,这说明有效的投资者保护体系能够起到约束大股东通过关联交易从上市公司转移现金的作用。因此进一步引导和规范上市公司的现金分红,以及加强投资者保护的执法力度,是治理关联交易的有效选择。     

Bank Power and Cash Holdings: Evidence from Japan

Using industrial firms from the United States, German, and Japan,we examine the effect of bank power on cash holdings. We showthat Japanese firms hold more cash than U.S. or German firms.We also document that Japanese cash balances are affected bythe monopoly power of banks. During periods with powerful banks,firms' high cash holdings are consistent with banks extractingrents. When banks weakened, Japanese cash levels became morelike U.S. firms. We conclude that strong Japanese banks persuadefirms to hold large cash balances. This is contrary to widelyheld beliefs about the Japanese governance system.     

Customer Concentration and Corporate Real Estate Holdings

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - We present new empirical evidence that higher customer concentration leads to lower corporate real estate holdings at the supplier firm level....     

决定现金持有量：技术还是制度

本文以2003—2008年上海证劵交易所501家上市公司的数据为样本,从技术（企业成长性）和制度（公司治理机制）两个角度出发,实证研究其对企业现金持有量的影响。实证结果表明：企业成长性与现金持有量正相关;股权集中度与现金持有量负相关;股权制衡度与现金持有量正相关。     

The Effects of Liquidity Shocks on Corporate Investments and Cash Holdings: Evidence from Actuarial Pension Gains/Losses

This paper investigates how anticipated liquidity shocks affect corporate investment and cash holdings by examining the impacts of actuarial pension gains/losses that do not reduce current internal resources but will reduce those available in the future. Using a sample from Japanese manufacturing firms in which pension deficits had a huge impact on the internal resources of sponsoring firms, I show that pension losses significantly decrease the capital expenditures of sponsoring firms. Pension losses also increase corporate cash holdings, suggesting precautionary demands for cash prepared for future pension contributions. Overall, the results indicate that managers consider anticipated liquidity shocks in determining current investment and cash‐saving policies.     

International Evidence on Cash Holdings and Expected Managerial Agency Problems

This article uses managerial control rights data for over 5000firms from 31 countries to examine the net costs and benefitsof cash holdings. We find that when external country-level shareholderprotection is weak, firm values are lower when controlling managershold more cash. Further, when external shareholder protectionis weak we find that firm values are higher when controllingmanagers pay dividends. Only when external shareholder protectionis strong do we find that cash held by controlling managersis unrelated to firm value, consistent with generally prevailingU.S. and international evidence.