What is the impact of problem loans on Japanese bank productivity growth?

This paper examines for the first time the impact of problem loans on Japanese productivity growth. We exploit a new data set of Japanese problem loans classified into two categories: bankrupt and restructured loans. We opt for a novel and flexible productivity growth decomposition that allows to measure the direct impact of these problem loans on productivity growth. The results reveal that Japanese bank productivity growth was severely constrained by bankrupt and restructured loans early in 2000s, whilst some persistence of the negative impact of problem loans on productivity growth is observed in the late 2000s. Thereafter, there is only some partial recovery in the productivity growth from 2012 to 2015. Further, we also perform cluster analysis to examine convergence or divergence across regions and over time. We observe limited convergence, though Regional Banks seem to form clusters in some regions.     

Financial Innovation,Basel Accord III,and Bank Value

I examine how financial innovation and Basel III capital requirements in Taiwan respond differently to banking crises and market competition. My panel data set comprises data from thirty-four banks for 2000-2012. I find a significant negative relationship between derivatives and the value of a bank and significant positive relationships among the capital adequacy ratio, bank-specific variables, and the value of a bank. Larger bank size and operational diversification tend to be positively associated with a bank's value, the holding of a relatively high amount of capital requirements, and nonperforming loans that are large. The latter result may simply reflect the scale of economy and improvement of efficiency in terms of financial innovation in the banking sector.     

Credit risk,owner liability,and bank loan maturities during the global financial crisis

We relate credit risk and owners’ personal guarantees to bank loan maturities during the global financial crisis. The findings, which remain robust to reverse causality, show that firms rated as low risk, with a strong relationship with the bank, whose owners provided personal guarantees and with large loan sizes obtained longer maturities. Banks with larger nonperforming loans provided loans with shorter maturities. Firms with low‐ and high‐risk ratings that provided owners’ personal guarantees obtained longer maturities. These findings shed additional light on the relationship between risk and loan maturities and the role of personal guarantees in reducing information asymmetries.     

Institutional development and bank stability: Evidence from transition countries

This paper takes advantage of the dynamic nature of institutional reforms in transition economies and explores the causal effects of those reforms on bank risk. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we show that banks’ financial stability increases substantially after these countries reform their legal institutions, liberalize banking, and restructure corporate governance. We also find that the effects of legal and governance reforms on bank risk may critically depend on the progress of banking reforms. A further examination of alternative risk measures reveals that the increases in financial stability among banks mainly come from the reduction of asset risk. Banks tend to have lower ROA volatility and fewer nonperforming loans after reforming the institutional environment. Finally, we split our sample into foreign and domestic banks and find that the enhancement of financial stability is more pronounced for domestic banks.     

Stronger Risk Controls,Lower Risk: Evidence from U.S. Bank Holding Companies

We construct a risk management index (RMI) to measure the strength and independence of the risk management function at bank holding companies (BHCs). The U.S. BHCs with higher RMI before the onset of the financial crisis have lower tail risk, lower nonperforming loans, and better operating and stock return performance during the financial crisis years. Over the period 1995 to 2010, BHCs with a higher lagged RMI have lower tail risk and higher return on assets, all else equal. Overall, these results suggest that a strong and independent risk management function can curtail tail risk exposures at banks.     

Bank loans during the 2008 quantitative easing

We examine the effect of quantitative easing on the supply of bank loans. During the Fed’s quantitative easing programs, lending banks reduced relatively more loan spreads, offered longer loan maturities, provided larger loans, and loosened more covenants for firms whose long-term bond ratings were below BBB and were lower than those with investment-grade bond ratings. Furthermore, we find that new bank loans in this period were associated with a reduction in a firm’s value and an increase in default risk. These results indicate that banks took greater risk during the 2008 quantitative easing by relaxing lending standards to relatively riskier borrowers.     

Credit Risk in Two Institutional Regimes: Spanish Commercial and Savings Banks

Although credit risk is an important factor that financial institutions must cope with, the determinants of bank problem loans have been little studied. Using panel data, we compare the determinants of problem loans of Spanish commercial and savings banks in the period 1985–1997, taking into account both macroeconomic and individual bank level variables. The GDP growth rate, firms, and family indebtedness, rapid past credit or branch expansion, inefficiency, portfolio composition, size, net interest margin, capital ratio, and market power are variables that explain credit risk. However, there are significant differences between commercial and savings banks, which confirm the relevance of the institutional form in the management of credit risk. Our findings raise important bank supervisory policy issues: the use of bank level variables as early warning indicators, the advantages of bank mergers from different regions, and the role of banking competition and ownership in determining credit risk.     

日本量化宽松政策的影响及对中国的启示

自2012年9月份以来,美联储、欧洲央行以及日本银行（中央银行）纷纷推出量化宽松政策,其间日本银行在9月19日、10月30日和12月20日,四个月内连续三次推出量化宽松政策,这在日本历史上实属罕见。日本银行是在2001年初最早使用这一非传统金融政策的中央银行,中国与日本经贸往来密切,日本银行的量化宽松政策必将对我国经济和金融政策带来一定的影响,如何直面和应对,是摆在我们面前刻不容缓的课题。     

Supply of bank loans and business debts: A view from historical bankruptcy cases

As bank loans fell in the 2008 crisis, business bankruptcy increased. To study how bank loans affect business balance sheets and bankruptcy, we use new data on bankrupt businesses in Missouri between 1898 and 1942. We confirm that when banks curtail loans, courts see more bankruptcies among businesses with high exposure to bank debt. To reduce real volatility, policy‐makers can set tough bank liquidity requirements in the upswing of business cycle but allow weaker requirements in the downswing. We also find that between 1914 and 1933, businesses in St. Louis were more sensitive to changes in bank loans than businesses in Kansas City, probably due to the tight monetary policy conducted by the conservative St. Louis Fed. The Glass‐Steagall Act weakened the relationship between bank loans and business debt structure. The takeaway is that lender‐of‐last‐resort practices stabilize both the financial sector and the real economy.     

Economic capital for nonperforming loans

A portfolio of nonperforming loans requires economic capital. We present two models for forecasting the portfolio loss and its probability distribution. In the first model, the loss for each nonperforming loan entails a change in provision over the risk horizon. The risk determinants are the single-name concentration, measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschmann index, as well as a systematic factor and the idiosyncratic risk. Our second model allows for interportfolio diversification with a portfolio of performing loans because banks typically own both performing and nonperforming loans. In this model, the nonperforming loan is identified with its systematic risk. Both models allow for closed-form expressions of economic capital and for the capital charge of the single loan. We calibrate the macroeconomic model parameters statistically with a loss panel; the microeconomic parameters depend on the portfolio. The portfolio risk for nonperforming loans mainly depends on the volatility of the systematic economic factor. The dependence becomes more pronounced when interportfolio diversification is taken into account. The magnitude of interportfolio diversification is also marked. Finally, we calculate regulatory capital charges according to Basel II for past-due loans. The regulatory charges are on average smaller than our economic charges and, additionally, take the volatility of economic activity into account only implicitly.     

Ability of accounting and audit quality variables to predict bank failure during the financial crisis

We examine the ability of selected accounting and audit quality variables measured in a period prior to the financial crisis (i.e., the four quarters of 2006), to predict banks that subsequently failed during the financial crisis. We employ two sets of samples from the US: a troubled banks sample that includes banks that failed in or after 2007 as well as banks classified as being troubled based on profitability, loan quality, and balance sheet position in 2007, and a full sample that includes all banks with available required data. Using the troubled banks sample, we identify six reliable predictors of bank failure: auditor type, auditor industry specialization, Tier 1 capital ratio, proportion of securitized loans, growth in loans, and loan mix. For the larger full sample of banks, we identify the following ten predictors of bank failure: auditor type, Tier 1 capital ratio, proportion of securitized loans, nonperforming loans, loan loss provisions, growth in commercial loans, growth in real estate loans, growth in overall loans, loan mix, and whether the bank is a public bank.     

Banking Market Size Structure and Financial Stability: Evidence from Eight Asian Countries

Using commercial bank data from eight major Asian countries, we examine the relationship between the banking market size structure and the stability of financial institutions. We also analyze the effect of bank upsizing on the financial stability. Our results show that a rise in large banks’ market power, accompanying an increase in their market shares, lowers the capital adequacy of small banks. Small banks’ nonperforming loans and the possibility of their bankruptcy also increase as large banks’ market shares rise. We further show that larger banks tend to have lower capital adequacy ratios, liquidity ratios, and distance-to-default ratios. Our study suggests that large banks’ greater market shares are associated with small banks’ financial instability. Overall, these findings are consistent with the notion of the recent banking literature that has important antitrust policy implications.     

Deflation,bank credit growth,and non-performing loans: Evidence from Japan

In this paper, I examine the link between bank credit growth and non-performing loans in an economy with deflationary pressures. Using panel OLS regressions and two-step GMM regressions, I find evidence for the time-varying relationship between bank credit growth and non-performing loans in a sample of 82 publicly listed commercial banks in Japan during the period 1993–2013. I show that bank credit growth positively correlates with non-performing loans prior to the onset of the global financial crisis of 2007 but negatively correlates with non-performing loans afterwards. I find evidence to support the notion that large banks drive the observed effects of credit growth on non-performing loans. In addition, credit growth and non-performing loans have no effect on profitability. Overall, the findings suggest that while the increase in the supply of bank loans increases the level of non-performing loans, it does not lead to higher profitability.     

Do capital buffers matter? Evidence from the stocks and flows of nonperforming loans

This paper investigates the determinants of the stocks and flows (both in- and outflows) of nonperforming loans (NPLs) by considering a bank-specific factor that is not adequately analysed in the literature, namely, bank capital buffers. Using unbalanced panel data with 6,087 bank-year observations for the 2006–2018 period and a two-step system generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation, we find that banks with higher levels of capital buffers (both in terms of Tier 1 and total capital) have fewer NPL stocks and generate fewer NPL inflows. When we control for the characteristics of the loan portfolio, real guarantees collected by the bank increase the stocks and flows of new, impaired loans, while personal guarantees favour the outflow of bad loans.     

The Risk‐Taking Channel of Monetary Policy in the U.S.: Evidence from Corporate Loan Data

To study the presence of a risk‐taking channel in the U.S., we build a comprehensive data set from the syndicated corporate loan market and measure monetary policy using different measures, most notably Taylor (1993) and Romer and Romer (2004) residuals. We identify a negative relation between monetary policy rates and bank risk‐taking, especially in the run up to the 2007 financial crisis. However, this effect is purely supply‐side driven only when using Taylor residuals and an ex ante measure of bank risk‐taking. Our results highlight the sensitivity of the potency of the risk‐taking channel to the measures of monetary policy innovations.     

Loan growth and bank risk: new evidence

This study provides new evidence on the relationship between abnormal loan growth and banks’ risk-taking behavior using data from a rich panel of Colombian financial institutions. We show that abnormal credit growth during a prolonged period leads to an increase in banks’ riskiness, accompanied by a reduction in solvency and an increase in the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans. We also show that abnormal credit growth played a fundamental role in the bank-failure process during the late 1990s financial crisis in Colombia. Our results have important implications for financial regulation and macro-prudential policy.     

Macroeconomic Drivers of Loan Quality in Turkey

We analyze the drivers of nonperforming loans in the Turkish banking system after the 2000–01 Turkish banking crisis. By constructing a vector autoregression model, we perform dynamic out-of-sample forecasts, which yield quite accurate results compared to the actual data. Since forecasting is a very crucial tool for both policy makers and market players, these results are some of the main strengths and contributions of this study. This article shows various patterns between the economic and financial indicators and the nonperforming loans. One important message obtained from the results is that policy makers should be concerned about the status of the economy and the market expectations to maintain stability in the banking system.     

我国民营企业贷款的距离影响因素分析

选取我国2011年沪深两市 A股的628家民营上市企业的贷款数据为样本进行实证分析发现：银行贷款量与银行到企业之间距离具有显著的负相关关系,说明银企距离是制约我国民营企业贷款的一个重要影响因素;地区金融发展与企业的银行贷款量之间具有显著的负相关的关系,说明了竞争关系对企业外地银行贷款的抑制作用不是表现在区域的银行网点的竞争,而是地区的金融发展。因此,应重视银企距离,加大地区金融发展。     

Herding behaviour in the Australian loan market and its impact on bank loan quality

We examine the effect of herding behaviour on the credit quality of bank loans in Australia. We find that bank herding varies with different types of loans. It tends to be more prevalent in owner‐occupied housing loans and credit cards than other types of loans. During the global financial crisis period, herding in owner‐occupied housing loans was most pronounced due to the flight‐to‐quality phenomenon in the housing sector. Furthermore, we find that the big four banks tend to herd more than smaller and regional banks. Bank herding behaviour is countercyclical, as it is negatively related to real GDP growth and the cost of funding but is positively related to market risk. Regulatory capital requirements may also encourage herding as banks are required to hold less risk‐weighted capital for residential loans. Most importantly, bank herding is related to higher impaired assets and therefore lower loan quality. Our findings may have implications for policymakers and bank regulators.     

Panacea,Pandora's box,or placebo: Feedback in bank mortgage-backed security holdings and fair value accounting

We examine the relation between bank holdings of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and MBS prices. Theory suggests feedback between MBS holdings and underlying asset markets can be aggravated by mark-to-market accounting. We measure feedback by the relation between asset returns and the changes in bank MBS holdings. Consistent with the existence of feedback effects related to mark-to-market, we find that for banks with high MBS, more nonperforming loans, and lower total capital ratio, changes in bank MBS positions are positively associated with changes in MBS prices and that this relation is reduced after the April 2009 mark-to-market rule clarification. To assess the effect of feedback on shareholder value, we test whether the stock-price response of banks to the announcement of the mark-to-market accounting rule clarification is associated with the intensity of feedback behavior. We find that the stock market reaction to the rule change is more positive for banks with more MBS, higher nonperforming loans and higher pre-rule-change feedback. We also find positive bond-price reactions to the rule change. Overall, our results suggest feedback related to mark-to-market accounting had a measurable effect on shareholder value.