The Role of Book Income, Web Traffic, and Supply and Demand in the Pricing of U.S. Internet Stocks

In this paper I assess the degree of similarity in the cross-sectionalpricing of Internet and non-Internet stocks during the tumultuousyear of 2000. Despite large differences in their economic fundamentals, I find that the equity market values of Internetfirms with immaterial web traffic, firms that are randomly selected, and firms that went public atthe same time as Internet firms are similarly related to analysts' forecasts of earnings in 2001 andthe long-term rate of growth in earnings. This is not the case for firms with intensive web traffic.I also find that at the peak of Internet prices in March 2000 the market rewarded losses ofweb-traffic-intensive firms but did not reward profits, while after the peak the market reversed itsview, rewarding profits but not losses. Beyond earnings, web traffic is significantly positivelypriced both at and after the Internet peak. However, I find no evidence that two proxies forsupply and demand forces – the degree of public float and short interest – are value-relevantfor Internet firms. Overall, I argue that there are enough similarities in the cross-sectional pricingof Internet and non-Internet firms to make it unlikely that the pricing of Internet stocks during2000 was entirely irrational. Moreover, any irrationality in the prices of Internet stockscannot be linked to public float and short interest.     

The Effect of Demand on Stock Prices: Evidence from Index Fund Rebalancing

I examine the effect of demand on stock prices by analyzing the conversion of the TIPs 35 and TIPs 100 exchange‐traded funds into the i60 Fund. This conversion occurred at the Toronto Stock Exchange on March 6, 2000. Forty stocks of the TIPs 100 Fund that were not members of the new units of the i60 Fund were sold to complete this conversion. I find that a decrease in demand produced a permanent stock price decline, which was accompanied by significant abnormal trading volume. The results provide support for the downward‐sloping demand curve hypothesis.     

SECURITIES PRICE EFFECTS OF UNIONIZATION LEGISLATION

Prior studies document that firms experience negative stock price effects in response to unionization. We study the economic effects of a radical change in unionization legislation in New Zealand and hypothesize that the stock price effect of unionization is a function of prior unionization status of firms. We provide evidence that legislative events that increase the likelihood of introducing more stringent legislation do not affect stock prices of high‐unionized firms, whereas low‐unionized firms are affected negatively and significantly. Legislative events that signal less stringent unionization legislation result in significant stock price increases for all firms.     

Do CRA‐Related Events Affect Shareholder Wealth? The Case of Bank Mergers

This study explores how Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) protests and their resolution affect the market value of merging banks. We find, in contrast to earlier research, that CRA‐related events are not associated with significant negative market reactions for either bidder or target institutions. Rather, the market does not seem to respond strongly to CRA‐related events at all. The results appear to stem from the choice of an estimation period for establishing an institution's baseline stock‐market price dynamics that does not include abnormal security price movements induced by the merger announcement.     

Do Analyst Stock Recommendations Piggyback on Recent Corporate News? An Analysis of Regular‐Hour and After‐Hours Revisions

Analysts often update their recommendations following corporate news. Questions have been raised regarding analysts’ ability to generate new information beyond recent corporate events. Employing a comprehensive database on corporate news, we show that only a small minority, or 27.9%, of all recommendation revisions directionally confirm the information in the preceding corporate events and even these “confirming revisions” facilitate the information discovery of corporate events and thus cannot simply be dismissed as “piggybacking.” Our analysis further shows that analysts not only facilitate price discovery to corporate news through issuing trending revisions but also help reverse prevailing market sentiments following corporate news by issuing contrarian revisions. Our study is the first to investigate short‐window intraday market reactions to revisions issued after hours, which account for 70% of all recommendation revisions in our sample period. Analysts’ incentives to issue revisions after hours appear to reflect demands from large institutional clients, who dominate after‐hours trading. More importantly, we show that the after‐hours revisions are associated with significantly greater price reactions and different price reaction patterns than revisions issued during regular trading hours. Collectively, our evidence indicates that analysts are a significant source of new information beyond recent corporate news and they also help shape the market's assessment of corporate disclosures.     

Is there price discovery in equity options?

We use tick-by-tick quote data for 39 liquid US stocks and options on them, and we focus on events when the two markets disagree about the stock price in the sense that the option-implied stock price obtained from the put-call parity relation is inconsistent with the actual stock price. Option market quotes adjust to eliminate the disagreement, while the stock market quotes behave normally, as if there were no disagreement. The disagreement events are typically precipitated by stock price movements and display signed option volume in the direction that tends to eliminate the disagreements. These results show that option price quotes do not contain economically significant information about future stock prices beyond what is already reflected in current stock prices, i.e., no economically significant price discovery occurs in the option market. We also find no option market price discovery using a much larger sample of disagreement events based on a weaker definition of a disagreement, which verifies that the findings for the primary sample are not due to unusual or unrepresentative market behavior during the put-call parity violations.     

Do Demand Curves for Small Stocks Slope Down?

Stocks added to the S&P 500 generally experience positive abnormal returns following the announcement. Several competing explanations exist for this reaction, but small sample sizes and other issues make it difficult to distinguish among them. We examine this subject using the small‐cap Russell 2000 index, which has several advantages over the S&P 500 in this context. Our primary finding is that stocks added to or deleted from the Russell 2000 experience significant changes in stock price and trading volume, but the effect is transitory. The results support the price pressure hypothesis.     

The Impact of Terrorist Attacks on International Stock Markets

We examine the effects of terrorist attacks on stock markets, using a dataset that covers all significant events and that directly relate to the major economies of the world. Our event study suggests that terrorist attacks produce mildly negative price effects. We compare these price reactions to those from an alternative type of unanticipated disaster, earthquakes, and find that price declines following terror attacks are more pronounced. However, in both cases prices rebound within the first week of the aftermath. We also compare price responses internationally and for separate industries, and find that reactions are strongest for local markets and for industries that are directly affected by the attack. Our results suggest that financial markets react strongly to terror events but then recover swiftly and soon return to business as usual. The September 11th attacks turn out to be the only event that caused long‐term effects on financial markets, especially in terms of industries' systematic risk.     

Systematic liquidity risk and stock price reaction to shocks

This study examines the relationship between systematic liquidity risk and stock price reaction to large 1‐day price changes (or shocks). We base our analysis on a yearly updated constituents list of the FTSE All share index. Our overall results are consistent with the price continuation hypothesis, which suggests that positive (negative) shocks will be followed by positive (negative) abnormal returns. However, further analysis indicates that stocks with low systematic liquidity risk react efficiently to both positive and negative shocks, whereas stocks with high systematic liquidity risk underreact to both positive and negative shocks. Our results are valid irrespective of various robustness tests such as size of the shock, size of the firm, month‐of‐the‐year and day‐of‐the‐week effects. We conclude that trading on price patterns following shocks may not be profitable, as it involves taking substantial liquidity exposure.     

Stock‐Split Post‐Announcement Returns: Underreaction or Market Friction?

We explore the relationship between stock splits and subsequent long‐term returns during the period from 1950 to 2000. We find that, contrary to much previous research, firms do not exhibit positive long‐term post‐split returns. Instead, we find that significant positive returns after the announcement date do not persist after the actual date of the stock split. We also observe that abnormal returns are correlated with the price‐delay or market friction. We conclude that the stock‐split post‐announcement “drift” is only of short duration, and it is attributable to trading frictions rather than behavioral biases.     

Competition For Order Flow, Market Quality, And Price Discovery In The Nasdaq 100 Index Tracking Stock

We investigate competition for order flow, market quality, and price discovery in the Nasdaq 100 Index Tracking Stock (QQQ). The QQQ, an AMEX‐listed, exchange‐traded fund, is the most actively traded security in the U.S. equities market. On July 31, 2001, the NYSE began trading the QQQ, marking the first time it traded securities of companies it does not list. The greatest volume of trading takes place on electronic communication networks (ECNs), following by trading on the AMEX and the NYSE. Most of the block trades are executed on the AMEX, where the bid‐ask spreads are narrower. We find that ECNs contribute the most to the price‐discovery process. The spreads on all trading platforms have decreased and market quality and price discovery have improved since QQQ shares have traded on the NYSE.     

A Comparison of Underwriting Costs of Initial Public Offerings by Investment and Commercial Banks

We examine differences in underwriting costs between commercial‐bank‐Section‐20‐underwritten initial public offerings (IPOs) and investment‐bank‐underwritten IPOs. Our results suggest that total underwriting costs (gross margin plus underpricing) are significantly lower for commercial bank IPOs. The lower cost for commercial bank IPOs is attributable to less severe underpricing for these issues. Gross margin costs generally do not differ between commercial bank and investment bank issues. Furthermore, we find that the long‐run stock price performance for commercial bank issues is superior to that of investment bank issues. That is, lower underpricing for Section 20 issues may not be a short‐run phenomenon. Rather, there appears to be a favorable outcome for investors in the long run for holding IPOs underwritten by Section 20 commercial banks. These results are inconsistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis often associated with merging commercial and investment bank functions in one organization.     

What Drives Stock Price Behavior Following Extreme One-Day Returns

We identify samples of losers and winners by selecting daily stock price returns in excess of 10% (sign ignored) and determine whether these samples over‐ or underreact. We then identify “informed” events, which correspond to announcements in the Wall Street Journal(WSJ), and “uninformed” events, which are not explained in the WSJ. For winners, there is overreaction in response to uninformed events but no overreaction on average in response to informed events. This finding suggests the degree of overreaction to new information depends on whether the cause of the extreme stock price change is publicly released.     

Price Performance Following Share‐Repurchase Announcements by Closed‐End Funds

We investigate the price performance of closed‐end funds that announce share‐repurchase programs. Closed‐end funds experience positive average stock‐price reactions to the announcements. The long‐run buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns of repurchasing funds over the subsequent three years are significantly higher than a nonrepurchasing control sample matched by size, type, investment style and geographic diversification. Funds with larger discounts, international funds, equity funds, and funds that announce larger repurchases or frequently announce repurchases, experience more positive stock‐price reactions. Except for larger repurchases, the same characteristics are associated with more positive long‐run buy‐and‐hold returns.     

The Agency Effect of Repurchases on Closed‐End Funds

Share prices rise after companies announce repurchases, but there are differing views as to why this happens. Repurchases are announced by closed‐end funds when their discounts are widening (market‐to‐book is falling). The immediate post‐announcement effect is a small jump in a fund's share price, but the main effect occurs over the next four years during which time there is significant outperformance both of the fund's price and of its investment portfolio. Liquidity of the shares does not change. Repurchases, if executed, reduce the size of a fund and therefore the manager's fees. Our findings are consistent with directors using the threat of repurchases to discipline managers whose investment performance has been poor, leading to a closer alignment of pay and performance.     

WHAT DETERMINES SEO OFFER‐DAY RETURNS?

We examine seasoned equity offering (SEO) initial‐day returns after controlling for the dilution effect from the SEO discount and new shares offered. Contrary to the existing literature that ignores the effect of dilution, we find that initial‐day returns are not consistently positive. Modeling adjusted initial‐day returns, we show that dilution‐adjusted initial‐day returns respond to partial price adjustments reflecting both private and public information. Additional determinants of SEO offer‐day returns include lockup length, discount reversal, prior operating performance, and underwriter reputation. Long‐run tests reveal that adjusted initial‐day returns are not predictive of postissuance long‐term performance.     

Who Drove and Burst the Tech Bubble?

From 1997 to March 2000, as technology stocks rose more than five‐fold, institutions bought more new technology supply than individuals. Among institutions, hedge funds were the most aggressive investors, but independent investment advisors and mutual funds (net of flows) actively invested the most capital in the technology sector. The technology stock reversal in March 2000 was accompanied by a broad sell‐off from institutional investors but accelerated buying by individuals, particularly discount brokerage clients. Overall, our evidence supports the bubble model of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), in which rational arbitrageurs fail to trade against bubbles until a coordinated selling effort occurs.     

Conference Calls and Stock Price Volatility in the Post‐Reg FD Era

Past research has documented that the utilisation of conference calls is greater in the high tech sector than in other industries. Do high tech firms benefit from that? This study attempts to answer this question by examining the impact of ‘post‐Reg FD’ conference calls on the price volatility of high tech firms listed in the US market. We find evidence that more open conference calls results in lower idiosyncratic volatility.     

Market Reaction to Changes in the S&P SmallCap 600 Index

Firms added to (deleted from) the S&P 600 index experience a significant price increase (decrease) at announcement. Firms that newly enter (exit) the S&P universe experience a larger price increase (decrease) than firms that move between S&P indexes. Trading volumes are higher after the announcement and institutional ownership increases (decreases) following index additions (deletions). However, the price and volume effects are temporary and are fully reversed within 60 days, in contrast to the permanent effects reported for S&P 500 changes. Our results support the temporary price‐pressure hypothesis and are similar to results reported for Russell 2000 index changes.     

DAY‐END EFFECT ON THE PARIS BOURSE

We study the day‐end effect on the Paris Bourse, a computerized order‐driven market with competing dealers. The day‐end return is approximately double the magnitude found in U.S. data and is nearly four times larger for stocks trading with a registered dealer. However, this is largely explained by the time between trades and the bid‐ask spread. Unlike the U.S. data, the effect does not decline as stock price increases, probably because of a variable tick size in the Paris market. Finally, a change to a closing call auction in May 1996 for a subset of stocks did not reduce the day‐end effect.